DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 239 348	EA 016 292

AUTHOR	Peterson, Paul E.; And Others
TITLE	Organizing Schools in Pluralist America, 1870-1940. Final Report.
INSTITUTION	National Opinion Research Center, Chicago, Ill.
SPONS AGENCY	National Inst. of Education (ED), Washington, DC.
PUB DATE	[83]
GRANT	NIE-G-78-0100
NOTE	402p.
PUB TYPE	Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC17 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Administrator Attitudes; Curriculum Development; *Educational Change; *Educational Development; Educational Discrimination; Educational Equity (Finance); *Educational Finance; *Educational History; Educational Trends; Elementary Secondary Education; Equal Education; Governance; Immigrants; *Politics of Education; Racial Discrimination; Resource Allocation; School Administration; Superintendents; Tables (Data); Teacher Recruitment; *Urban Education
IDENTIFIERS	Georgia (Atlanta); Illinois (Chicago)

ABSTRACT

This three-part study of the history of urban education considers the contemporary relationship between school and society, the politics of education, and urban educational reform in Atlanta, Georgia, and Chicago, Illinois. Part I suggests that the contemporary educational system contributes more to social mobility and social change than revisionist writings allow. Part II examines the politics of 19th and 20th century school finance in the United States; suggests that curricular reforms resulted from the response of middle class reformers to challenges from rival institutions; considers equity in the allocation of school resources and in teacher recruitment; and examines the extent to which race politics and race relations in urban education were resolved very differently for Asian and African immigrants than for European immigrants. Part III considers the many educational reforms in Atlanta; the Chicago Otis Law; the contrasting policies of three Chicago superintendents who were all considered reformers; the Chicago financial crisis of the 1930's; and the relationship between the early years of America's urban educational system and the great growth and reform after World War II. Relevant tables and illustrations accompany the document. (PB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED239348

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)

☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official NIE position or policy.

ORGANIZING SCHOOLS IN PLURALIST AMERICA, 1870 - 1940

Paul E. Peterson
Director and Principal Investigator
NORC, The University of Chicago

EA 016 292

national
opinion
research
center
NORC

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ORGANIZING SCHOOLS IN PLURALIST AMERICA,
1870 - 1940

Paul E. Peterson
Director and Principal Investigator
NORC, The University of Chicago

with

James Christiansen, John Echeverri-Gent, Kathleen Gille,
Richard Ginsberg, Marcia Turner-Jones, Susan Sherman Karpluss, Carol
Peterson, David Plank, and Margaret Weir

Final report of research undertaken by NORC, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, pursuant to U. S. Department of Education, National Institute of Education Grant No. G-78-0100. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Institute of Education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...vii

PART I. The Shape of Public Schools

Chapter

INTRODUCTION: THE PLURALIST POLITICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS.........1

I. THE EFFECTS OF FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS ON SOCIAL MOBILITY.....33

PART II. Forming Public Schools

II. POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FREE SCHOOL......................52

III. THE POLITICS OF CURRICULAR CHANGE..........................97

IV. THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION........................132

V. THE POLITICS OF RACE AND EQUITY............................170

PART III. Reforming Public Schools

VI. URBAN REFORM WITHOUT CLASS CONFLICT........................214

VII. CLASS CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE REFORM......................251

VIII. REFORM AND THE PROFESSIONAL SUPERINTENDENT................281

IX. MACHINE POLITICS AND FISCAL CRISIS........................317

X. POLITICS AND THE EXPANSION OF THE URBAN SCHOOL............351

....

REFERENCES...369

LIST OF TABLES

I-1. The Effect on Income of Family Background, Education and Childhood Cognitive Ability for White Males, Ages 25-64, of Non-Farm Backgrounds, 1962 (Bowles-Gintis Study) (a).........38

I-2. Intercorrelations Among Income, Education, Verbal Ability and Family Background for White Males, Age 25-64, NORC (1976).................43

I-3. Simple Relationship Between Family Background Characteristics and Income of All Males, in 1962, 1973, 1974, and 1977-78.......................49

II-1. Expansion of the Atlanta Public School System, 1878-1895..57

II-2. Expansion of the Chicago Public School System, 1870-1896..58

II-3. Expansion of the San Francisco Public School System, 1872-1911....................................59

III-1. Employment of Boys' High School Students, San Francisco, 1878-1890..............................112

IV-1. Average Classroom Size for the Largest Ethnic Groups, Chicago, 1897-1898..........................139

IV-2. Average Classroom Size for Ethnic Groups, Chicago, 1897-1898....................................141

IV-3. Average Classroom Size for 27 Ethnic Groups, by Precinct, Chicago, 1897-98..........................142

IV-4. Percentage of Educators Residing in the Same Ward in Which They Worked, Chicago, 1867-1915............146

IV-5. Percentage of Educators Residing in the Same Ward in Which They Worked, San Francisco, 1874-85........148

IV-6. Ethnicity of the City Population and of Public School Educators, San Francisco, 1870-1910..........152

IV-7. Ethnicity of the City Population and of Public School Educators, Chicago, 1867-1915................153

IV-8. Salary Range for Teachers, by Ethnicity, Chicago, 1882-1894..155

5

IV-9. Salary Range for Principals and Assistant Principals by Ethnicity, Chicago, 1867-18944 156

IV-10. Salary Range for Teachers and Principals by Ethnicity, San Francisco, 1874-1911 157

IV-11. Average Classroom Size by Ethnicity of Teacher, San Francisco, 1874-1911 159

IV-12. Classroom Size by Ethnicity of Teacher, San Francisco, 1874-1911 160

IV-13. Atlanta's Primary School Enrollment by Race, 1878-1895 164

VI-1. The Population of Atlanta 219

VI-2. Economic Growth of Atlanta, 1880-1910 220

VI-3. Atlanta Public School Enrollments, 1878-1910 221

VI-4. Atlanta School Expenditures, 1878-1910 225

VI-5. Social Composition of Atlanta School Board, 1872-1918 237

VII-1. Selected Comparison of Education Bills before Illinois Legislature, 1917 264

VIII-1. Salaries of Principals, by Sex, Chicago, 1867-1893 285

VIII-2. Average Daily Attendance and Per Pupil Expenditures, Chicago Public Schools, 1890-1925 296

VIII-3. Average Daily Attendance as a Percentage of School Age Population, Chicago, 1890-1930 304

IX-1. Employed Persons by Industrial Sectors: Atlanta, Chicago, San Francisco, 1930 319

IX-2. School Expenditures per Pupil in Atlanta, Chicago and San Francisco, 1930-1940 323

IX-3. Expenditures on Engineer-Custodian Wages as a Percentage of Expenditures on Teachers Salaries, Chicago, 1925-1947 339

IX-4. Catholic School Enrollment as a Percentage of Total School Enrollment in Chicago, 1930-1950 344

X-1. Percent Member Years on the Chicago School Board, by Ethnic Group, 1870-1928 360

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

I-1. Path Analysis of the Determinant of Income for White Males (25-64), 1976 44

I-2. Path Analysis of the Determinants of Income for White Males in 1976, by age cohort..............................45

I-3. Path Analysis of the Determinants of Income for Black Males (25-64), 1976. 47

II-1. Per Pupil Expenditures and Pupils per Teacher, by Political Era, San Francisco, 1870-1911..................82

II-2. General Fund Expenditures by Political Era 88

7

Acknowledgements

This project spanned four years and a continent. Contributions were made by many more than can be recognized in this brief acknowledgement. While some of the contributions can be found elsewhere in footnotes and in the Appendix to Chapter IV, there is little doubt that we have overlooked many whose help has been invaluable, if not crucial.

The report itself reflects the interests and preoccupations of its principal author. From the vast amount of material collected by this project, only a portion could be selected for inclusion in this final report, and he bears the greatest responsibility for determining which material was to be included and for heavily editing and rewriting extensively the included information and analyses and interpretation. He is an author of each chapter. But even though the other authors cannot be held responsible for the overall thrust and tone of the report, their contributions to specific chapters have been extremely important. In some cases the contribution is such that the individual is appropriately listed as the principal author of the chapter. The distribution of responsibilities among the various chapters is as follows:

Chapter I: Susan Sherman Karpluss
Chapter II: Carol Peterson, Kathleen Gille and Margaret Weir
Chapter III: Kathleen Gille and Carol Peterson
Chapter IV: James Christiansen, principal author, and Carol Peterson
Chapter V: Margaret Weir, principal author, and Marcia Turner-Jones
Chapter VI: David Plank, principal author
Chapter VII: Richard Ginsberg, principal author and Carol Peterson
Chapter VIII: Carol Peterson, principal author
Chapter IX: John Echeverri-Gent and Carol Peterson

The final report owes a substantial debt to Ira Katznelson, who was co-principal investigator of this study. We have received helpful commentary on various portions of the manuscript from Charles Bidwell, William Boyd, Elizabeth Hansot, Douglas Mitchell, Diane Ravitch, and David Tyack. Research assistance was provided by John Bowman, Bernard Knoth, Sandra Prolman, Marcia Turner-Jones and Kenneth Wong. Word processing and other staff assistance was provided by Annette Barrett, Eve Dimon, Carol Forster, and Adele Pardee. A more helpful and co-operative group of assistants would be hard to find.

Portions of the final report have been published elsewhere. Chapter I appeared as "Schooling in Democratic America: The Effects of Class Background, Education and Ability on Income," in John P. Crecine, ed., *Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management* 2 (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc., 1981): 195-210. Data from this chapter has also been published in Paul Peterson, "Effects of Credentials, Connections, and Competence on Income," in William H. Kruskal, ed., *The Social Sciences: Their Nature and Uses* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 21-33. Chapter VI will be published as "Does Urban Reform Imply Class Conflict? The Case of Atlanta's Schools," in *History of Education Quarterly* 23 (Summer, 1983).

Part I

The Shape of Public Schools

Introduction

THE PLURALIST POLITICS OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Immediately after the Civil War, urban school systems were still fragmentary structures whose parts were scattered in ramshackle buildings under the loose direction of part-time school boards. Atlanta's system was not founded until the 1870s, Chicago's was nearly destroyed by its fire, and even as late as 1906 the San Francisco earthquake dealt the city's schools a severe blow from which it took several years to recover. But the physical threats to survival were the least of the problems schools faced. Public schooling still had to assert its dominance over a variety of possible competitors--private academies servicing the middle classes, denominational schools teaching immigrants, and vocational schools training workers for the new industrial empire.

By 1940 schools had formed a partially autonomous system of political power. They now provided education to the vast majority of children living in the community, teaching the children of both the middle and working classes, training both the native-born and the immigrant, and socializing both the pre-schooler and the young adult. The range of their responsibilities extended to secondary education, vocational education, community schools, kindergartens, continuing classes and adult evening schools. The rivals to public schools were retreating from the educational scene, and it would be decades before they would enjoy a small revival.

The management of schools reflected the prestige that the system had secured. By the 1920s, full-time professional administrators with impressive credentials exercised great influence over school policy. Part-time lay boards, which had once hired teachers and supervised daily activities, played an almost advisory role. School budgets were no longer quite so dependent on decisions taken at City Hall, and even the siting and building of new schools became strictly a prerogative of the school system itself.

This partial separation of schools from the rest of city politics was achieved only because schools, as public institutions, were accepted as a fundamental part of the social order. Viewed from an organizational perspective, schools managed to transform themselves from mere organizations into institutions whose legitimacy was beyond doubt. What had once been problematic became certain. What had once changed and fluctuated rapidly became stable and permanent. Indeed, public schools became as sacrosanct to society as children had long been to their parents.

Recent scholarship has interpreted these developments as the work of dominant economic classes or of a small social elite with great political power.[1] We are told that schools expanded and consolidated their position in American society because Protestant elites needed institutions for imposing their cultural ideas upon recalcitrant, dirty, immigrant masses, or because the imperatives of capitalism required a reserve army of unemployed skilled labor. Consider, for example, the claim by Michael Katz that American schools by the late nineteenth century had taken a permanent form that has not since significantly changed: "it is, and was, universal, tax-supported, free, compulsory, bureaucratic, racist, and class-biased."[2] Colin Greer's claim is almost as bold: "The common school's mission was to maintain and transmit the values considered necessary to prevent political, social or economic upheaval."[3] Or take the popular study of Schooling in Capitalist America, where the authors claim that school "reforms had the intent (and most likely the effect as well) of forestalling the development of class consciousness among the working people . . . and preserving the legal and economic foundations of the society . . ."[4] Consider portions of even David Tyack's sensitive analysis in The One Best System, in which he asserts that "the administrative progressives were notably successful--indeed, their success so framed the structure of urban education that the subsequent history of these schools has been in large part an unfolding of the organizational consequences of

12

centralization."[5]

An earlier generation of historians, working under the influence of Ellwood Cubberly, had characterized the history of schooling as a valiant effort of schoolmen to overcome the forces of darkness.[6] In our more pessimistic age, historians no longer treat the school leader as hero but they are scarcely less inclined to see schools as the product of some single force at work in society or some limited group of individuals exercising inordinate influence. Reformers are no longer treated as the Lord's messengers to mankind, but their capacities for influencing institutions and societies is perceived to be hardly less superhuman. The pronouncements of businessmen are given far-reaching significance. The momentary triumphs of reformers are said to have long-range consequences. Few recall the observation of Tammany Hall's philosopher-politician, George Washington Plunkitt, who knew that reformers were only "mornin' glories--looked lovely in the mornin' and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on flourishin' forever, like fine old oaks."[7]

Reformers, businessmen, and social elites all had a role to play in the development of urban education, but to exaggerate the role of any one of these so that it becomes the single factor explaining everything drastically oversimplifies the processes of social change. School policies were developed in the course of conflict and competition among groups, elites, and organizations. Diverse participants focused on those specific objectives in which they had the greatest stake. Although some may have occasionally related their specific demands to larger views of the good society, their demands were met by counter claims with alternative visions.

The evidence for this argument is necessarily circumscribed. First, observations are limited to Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco. Although these cities are located in three different regions of the United States and are significantly different in their socio-economic development, generalizations to the United States as a whole can be done only at some risk. This risk, it must be said, is somewhat less than that taken by a good deal of recent historiography, which has assumed that the experiences in a small town in Massachusetts, or even those in the city of New York, are prototypical. Second, our analysis is limited by the fact that we are concentrating on the interaction between schools and the working class, as viewed from the perspective of working class groups and organizations. While we do not ignore the activities of business groups, reform leaders, teacher organizations, and other influential participants in school politics, we view their involvement primarily in light of their relationships to working class groups and organizations.

Status, Class, Politics and the Nineteenth Century School

The terms of political competition in nineteenth century America were set by a three-fold system of stratification--class, status, and political power. First, individuals varied according to their differential access to the marketplace. Variations in earning power and accumulated wealth produced a class structure that yielded distinctions among gentlemen, merchants, artisans, unskilled laborers, domestic servants, and contract laborers. As the processes of production became more industrialized, as machine-power replaced labor power, and as units of production increased in size, the class structure underwent significant changes, some of which have implications for urban schooling. But even in the more primitive economy of the post-Civil War period, class differences affected educational opportunities.

Secondly, Americans varied in their social status, the honor accorded to them somewhat independent of their market standing. Because Americans had only a pale imitation of a European aristocracy, variations in status did not have the exactitude such distinctions had in Europe. Yet the differences in cultural heritage associated with and revealed through varying religions, languages, nationalities, and races were the primary criteria for estimating the social worth of others. In the case of blacks, Orientals, and native Americans, cultural distinctions were taken so seriously that status became caste-like. Although cultural distinctions among those of European descent were less rigorously drawn, Protestants distrusted Catholics, Yankees were suspicious of those who could not speak the English language, and northern Europeans shunned their more swarthy neighbors from the southern and eastern parts of the continent. Nativist movements arrived and passed; members of Catholic religious organizations, it was alleged, were sworn to commit the most diabolical and dastardly acts; and recent immigrants were said to carry vicious diseases.

Class and status distinctions overlapped, of course. Since recent European immigrants and racial minorities shared the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder, their impecuniosity reinforced racial and ethnic prejudices. Yet class and status position were not one and the same. Even economically successful immigrants did not find ready acceptance outside their cultural group, and expressions of prejudices focused on the language, religion, and cultural style of the foreigners and minorities, not on their poverty *per se*.

In a society where ascriptively defined criteria determined a person's place, sex differences also had great social significance. Most women were expected to maintain their households, to derive their social worthiness from the status of their husbands, and to avoid active engagement in political life. Although suffragettes were beginning to challenge this definition of the women's place, few accepted their claim that sex was an unreasonable basis for differentiation. Along with race, religion, language, and nationality, sex was a primary basis for evaluating the social place of others.

Political power formed a third dimension of stratification in nineteenth century America. Those who had special access to the power of the state were able to use its coercive authority for their own ends. In many times and places, political power reinforced and sustained class and status differences. But as a consequence of the democratizing wave that had swept eastward across the Appalachians during the Jacksonian period, political relations were as egalitarian in the United States as anywhere else in the world. Most white males in the 1840s voted, and of those eligible to vote, rates of participation in the election of 1844 were as high as those in 1976.[8] Even the Civil War did not provide elites with an opportunity to close polling places or to reduce the size of the electorate; throughout the nineteenth century, national elections remained closely contested and aroused the involvement of an overwhelming proportion of the electorate. Where every vote counted, even the outcast had to be mobilized. Not only the Irish and the German, but also the Scandanavian, Italian, and Pole were urged to vote. Naturalization occurred all the more quickly because judges and politicians needed these new Americans as partisans on election day.

These relatively egalitarian political relationships had important economic and social consequences. Indeed, were it not for widespread citizen involvement in politics, it is likely that the status differences in a culturally pluralistic society would have led to systematic repression of minorities. The significance of politics for other sectors of social life becomes fully apparent when one considers the deviant cases where politics did not soften status distinctions and repression was severe. When the Post-Reconstruction South denied blacks their voting rights, they insured that social barriers would not be breached for decades. And few groups were treated with such shameless discrimination as the voteless Orientals, whom Californians unceasingly tried to remove from their shores. Not only was the absence of political rights itself a mark of the blacks' and Orientals' pariah status, but it also denied these groups the means to redress their grievances.

Class, status, and political distinctions thus defined the stratification system of industrializing America. In many cases, they overlapped and reinforced one another, and where this occurred the structure of educational institutions was itself noticeably inegalitarian. At the same time change in social relations depended upon the partial separation of the economic, the social, and the political. Because these systems of stratification were not perfectly co-ordinated with one another, groups could use their resources in one sector to advance themselves in another. Changes were not so dramatic that at any point in time one can say social relationships were transformed. But looking back on nineteenth century institutions a century later, the cumulative impact of specific changes can be more fully appreciated.

Status Conflicts in the Late Nineteenth Century

The connection between school politics and ethnic pluralism in nineteenth century America has been widely appreciated. The controversies surrounding religion, race, ethnicity, and immigration have been noted both by Cubberley and by his latter-day critics.[9] But while earlier scholars believed that schools softened status distinctions, recent writers have argued that status politics expressed themselves in the form of cultural imperialism. Anglo-Saxon reformers used the awesome power available to them to stamp out foreign cultural patterns. Their homogenizing mechanisms included kindergartens, continuing education programs, community schools, and, more generally, compulsory education.

Although some reformers probably had a high assessment of the value of their own culture, status politics was far more competitive and complex than this view acknowledges. For centuries, education had been primarily a means of affirming one's character as a gentleman, not a way of enhancing one's employment opportunities. In nineteenth century America, educators still had not forgotten that their historical mission was the transmission of the learning of the past to a new generation. For some, "learning" meant knowledge of classical wisdom; for others "learning" meant the received wisdom contained in the Bible. For still others "learning" meant the scientific and literary classics of modern European culture. But whether defined in religious or secular terms, education was necessary for participation in the circle of the "elect."

Education was a way of declaring one's social worth. In a society where breeding did not by itself insure social standing, education assumed a special importance. When family background meant little, the one thing that distinguished the gentle man from the mere businessman or merchant was the respectability that education, learning, and cultivated taste could provide. Education was therefore prized not so much for the economic benefits it afforded as for its capacity to confer dignity and honor upon the individual.

If education was a way of confirming an individual's worthiness, it was no less a medium for the validation of the status of social groups. Educational provision was a means by which social honor was distributed among the nationalities, races, sexes, and other groups that comprised nineteenth century society. As a consequence, school conflicts in the post-Civil War period were conflicts over the criteria by which the status-conferring functions of schooling would be distributed. What language was to be the medium of instruction? What, if any, religious practices were to be allowed in school? What access to public schooling was to be provided to social outcasts? From which groups were teachers to be selected?

The competition for the honor that education could confer was accentuated by the great emphasis the most "honored" social group placed on literacy and education. The Anglo-Saxon Protestants who adhered to one or another variant of the Calvinist tradition had their own religious reasons for insisting on educational provision. Because the fundamentals of reading and writing were important for achieving a direct encounter with God's Holy Word, education became a missionary activity. Both in Europe and in the United States, these Calvinists assumed the leadership in extending primary education to the mass population.[10] In the United States, for example, common schooling expanded most rapidly in Massachusetts and other New England states, where the Puritan heritage was the most vigorous. The spread of primary education, moreover, was linked to the migration of these "Yankees" into the Old Northwest Territory and across the northernmost tier of the United States.[11]

The prestige of Yankee culture in nineteenth century America was unquestioned. If even today the Boston area remains a major cultural and intellectual center, one can only begin to envision its stature in American society at the time when that small area contained not only the great universities, the great religious thinkers, and the leaders of so many of the country's moral crusades, but also included great centers of manufacturing and major locales for finance and commerce. Throughout the United States local communities aspired to the economic and social position that Massachusetts and its sister states enjoyed. Indeed, Horace Mann became America's greatest mid-century educational spokesman not only because he provided intellectual coherence to a statewide educational program, but also because actions taken by leaders from this state were often given nationwide attention.

As the Calvinists from the Northeast were propagating their culture through schooling, other groups began to emulate their example. Groups strove to close the gap between themselves and the white Anglo-Saxon Protestants by obtaining comparable educational opportunities for their children. Schooling was not imposed on religious and racial minorities, as fashionable social commentators have so blithely claimed; education was a prize to be won by each social group in order for that group's culture to be affirmed, legitimated, and perpetuated.

A group's success in obtaining schooling for its children was a function of its place in the society's stratification system. As compared to other "minorities," women were treated quite generously from the beginning, in part because Calvinism saw literacy as necessary for their salvation, too. However, secondary education for the women of Atlanta and San Francisco was initially provided only in segregated institutions that had limited access to the higher educational system. Secondary sex integration, with the concomitant opportunity for women to pursue college training, came only after feminists had become an organized political force. Germans were also a relatively favored minority, whose children were able to obtain education in the language of their forebearers. In fact, efforts to remove instruction in the German language from schools in Illinois, including Chicago, were singularly unsuccessful until World War I. Germans had special capacities for achieving their educational objectives. Not only did they migrate to the United States in large numbers and concentrate in specific areas, thereby creating substantial constituencies for local politicians, but inasmuch as they had migrated partly for political reasons, they contained within their ranks substantial numbers of politically adept middle class leaders. Germany, moreover, was a rapidly developing world power whose culture was validated by great scientific, artistic, and literary accomplishments. A case for German instruction could be made quite independent of the linguistic background of a specific immigrant group.

At the opposite end of the status continuum stood blacks and Orientals, who were often denied any access to public schooling. When blacks petitioned for schools in Atlanta in 1872, they were grudgingly given a couple of old rented buildings while over the next eighteen years ten new structures were built for whites.[12] The Chinese of San Francisco went without public education from 1871 to 1885, when a California Supreme Court ruling resulted in the establishment of a segregated school. Future concessions by local authorities to these relatively powerless groups came only slowly and painfully.

Status politics significantly shaped nineteenth century education, but recent historiography has not characterized its form correctly. The competition among ethnic and racial groups sharpened the demand for schooling and contributed to its dispersal at a rate far surpassing anything occurring on the European contintent. The handmaiden of an experiment in political democracy was the provision of schooling even for cultural minorities. The exceptions to the pattern confirm this general relationship. When blacks and Orientals were deprived of their political rights, access to schooling was also denied to them. Cultural imperialism in its most marked and dramatic form consisted not of compulsory instruction but of the exclusion of a group from access to public schooling.

Class Conflicts in the Late Nineteenth Century

Although status politics dominated much of the discussion over schooling in the nineteenth century, class distinctions also had their impact. On this subject recent historiographers have waxed eloquent. Some have contended that compulsory schooling was devised by the middle class to force workers into a structured system so that a disciplined work force could be trained.[13] According to others, manual training, kindergartens, and evening schools were promulgated in order to socialize the immigrant child into middle class values that would reduce social tensions.[14] Worker reaction is said to have ranged from sullen acceptance to outright hostility.[15]

There is little evidence in the school politics of Atlanta, Chicago, or San Francisco to suppport these views. While individual working class families may have sent their children to work to help augment the family income, working class groups did not resist the extension of compulsory education to cover a broader age range or a longer portion of the calendar year. On the contrary, unions in Chicago, San Francisco, and Atlanta were among the foremost proponents of compulsory education. A plank supporting compulsory education appeared in all the platforms of the Illinois Labor Federation between 1884 and 1893. There is no evidence of any union opposition to compulsory education in San Francisco, and in Atlanta the Georgia Federation of Labor joined a broad coalition that finally secured passage of the legislation in 1920. In the eyes of labor leaders in both Atlanta and Chicago, compulsory education was the concomitant of child labor legislation; both were designed to preclude the exploitation of young children by profit-minded capitalists, and both had the salutary side-effect of decreasing the size of the labor force, thereby raising the price of unskilled labor. In 1890-91 working class groups in Illinois did oppose a particular piece of compulsory education legislation, but their opposition centered on the fact that the law required schooling in the English language. German Lutherans were so incensed by this insult to the legitimacy of their culture that they deserted the Republican party in droves and elected Peter Altgeld as governor, thereby installing in office the most liberal regime Illinois ever enjoyed. Subsequently, both Lutheran and Catholic Germans wholeheartedly supported the passage of compulsory education laws that did not include the restrictive language provision.

Manual training, drawing, singing, and other curricular innovations were also welcomed by unions and immigrant groups in Chicago. Instead of worker resistance to these reforms, as some modern-day commentators have implied, these "fads and frills" were the object of a vigorous attack by the arch-conservative Chicago Tribune. According to the newspaper, physical culture, music, art, and German language instruction were among the ways in which the schools were wasting the taxpayers' money. When the issue was taken up by the board of education, labor and immigrant groups led a counter offensive in the spring of 1893. Germans were particularly resentful that instruction in their native language was considered a wasteful "frill." But, significantly, their support--and the support of laboring groups in general--was not limited to the German language but included the whole range of innovations that had begun to supplement the basic curriculum.

The difficulty with the revisionists is that they thought schools were imposed on reluctant workers. Instead, schools were eagerly sought by diverse segments within the working class, who willingly embraced many of the new "fads and frills" to which they thought their children had as much right as did the children attending middle-class private schools. Reformers had a class bias, but the consequence of that bias was not the imposition of schooling on working class children against the will of their parents. For urban educators, the central issue was not providing every street urchin with proper schooling but insuring that schools attended by middle class children were sufficiently attractive to compete on favorable terms with private schooling. As a result, middle class children were given privileged access to scarce educational resources.

Organizational Interests of Schools

To understand the way in which these processes worked, the organizational interests of schools must be taken into account. Public schools after the Civil War were only beginning to establish themselves as the dominant form of education. Atlanta did not establish its public school system until 1872, and in 1865 San Francisco had only one hundred thirty-eight teachers in twenty-nine schools. Although Chicago provided public schooling as early as the 1830s and had in 1853 even created an office of superintendent, the consolidation of the system, including the passage of a state law requiring the availability of free education, did not occur until 1865. When in 1871 the Chicago fire destroyed one-third of the city's school buildings and reduced the remainder to homes for fire victims, it took two to three years before a restoration of operation was achieved.

This tenuously established public organization still had to justify its claims on the public purse. The common school did not develop automatically; it had to compete with alternative models of educational provision. It chief competitor was a two-class, dual system of schooling. This arrangement, which persisted in Europe throughout the nineteenth century, provided education to the prosperous members of the community by means of private tutoring, academies, and boarding schools. Public schools were charity schools, which served a limited segment of those unwilling or, more likely, unable to pay for their children's education.

As organizations interested in their own maintenance and enhancement, schools sought to extend their services to the children of the middle class. If public schools were defined as charity schools for the poor, they would acquire the ignominious image reserved for almshouses and homes for the incurable. If they were to depend solely on the eleemosynary instincts of the public, they would have limited scope and be starved of resources. The drive for common schooling, with which Horace Mann was so closely identified, was thus not simply or even primarily a campaign to bring schooling to the masses. On the contrary, the campaign focused on making public schooling sufficiently attractive so that middle class parents would choose these schools over private forms of education.

Although class bias in the distribution of educational provision has yet to be fully documented, the importance given to secondary education by urban school leaders gives us some valuable clues. Secondary schools after the Civil War, it should be remembered, offered a classical education to a limited, privileged segment of the population. Whereas primary education was being extended to three-fourths or more of the relevant age cohort, secondary schooling remained selective.

The most careful analysis of the class selectivity of high schools is contained in Selwyn Troen's study of Saint Louis schools. He shows, for example, that only 23 percent of the students in the Saint Louis high school in 1870 came from blue-collar families, whereas 51 percent of the pupils in the primary schools had fathers so employed.[16] On the other side, children from business and professional families comprised 43 percent of the high school, but only 29 percent of the primary school population. Quite clearly, the high school of Saint Louis had won the support of the city's middle class residents, if perhaps at the cost of providing equality of educational opportunity for working members of the community.

The secondary schools in the cities we are examining seem to be characterized by similar class selectivity. In Atlanta the high schools were open only to whites; a black high school was not built until 1924. In San Francisco in 1878 only 30 percent of the students in Boy's High School were sons of the working class.[17] The emphasis on secondary education is thus an indicator of the interest school policy-makers had in recruiting a middle-class clientele. In Atlanta, where the control of schooling was most carefully monitored by socio-economic elites, this emphasis on secondary schooling was especially visible. Although a system of public schooling was not established until 1872, from the very beginning high schools were a constituent part of that system. At a time when just three elementary schools served the white children of Atlanta, two sex segregated high schools--one for boys, one for girls--offered an almost exclusively classical curriculum. In Chicago a high school was established in 1854, even though as late as 1865 less than two-thirds of the school children of primary school age were in public schools. In San Francisco in 1870 only about half the children between the ages of six and fifteen were in public schools, yet Boy's High School was opened in 1856 and Girl's High School in 1864. To be sure, some of the primary school children were being educated in Chicago's and San Francisco's parochial schools, but overcrowding, double-shifts, and insufficient resources were a continuing concern to the parents of primary school children. Indeed, the social composition of the high school became such a political issue in San Francisco that the superintendent was called upon to defend his policies in one of his Annual Reports. If the city of San Francisco was to attract "the best class" of respectable citizens, he argued, then it must maintain excellent educational facilities. At the same time the superintendent insisted that the high school was not a socially selective institution, though a rigorous analysis of his own data shows exactly the opposite of what he claimed.[18]

If nineteenth century school officials conceived their primary missions to be the indoctrination of potentially unruly laborers into a docile work force, they could hardly have pursued their objective more haphazardly. Instead of concentrating their limited fiscal resources on the most deprived segments of the community, they ignored them until adequate facilities were extended to the more favored. Instead of insisting on attendance in publicly controlled institutions, they allowed foreigners to go to their own schools. Instead of keeping potential trouble-makers under their watchful eye, the poorest, most outcast segments of the community went uneducated altogether.

In sum, class and status had much to do with the development of nineteenth century educational institutions. But the conflict over schooling was almost exactly the opposite of what some recent commentators have suggested. The problematic was not how to bring those "wretched masses" under the control of school marms but how to distribute educational opportunities so that one's own group kept ahead of competitors. At this the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant middle class did very well. Yet other groups, eager to imitate the success of native-born Protestants, used their political influence to win concessions for their children as well. In this way public schooling became common schooling, eagerly sought by all segments of the society.

Increasing Class Conflict at the Turn of the Century

The issues in urban education began to change towards the end of the nineteenth century. Competition among ethnic groups for status and legitimation continued, but the intensity of those controversies seemed to recede. At the same time the relationship of schools to the marketplace became an increasing concern, and class conflict took a somewhat different form. With the growth of secondary schooling, the connection between educational experience and later employability became more obvious. In addition, the growth of organizations representing people in their occupational roles occurred at what seemed to be an exponential rate. Businessmen's associations, Chambers of Commerce, labor unions, and especially professional associations all became politically active. The central issues in education were no longer bilingual education and compulsory schooling, but vocational education, teachers' salaries, rights and prerequisites, and school efficiency.

These changes in urban education did not occur uniformly in all parts of the United States. Although the trends are evident in all three cities, the variations in the pattern of conflict also deserve consideration. Chicago provides perhaps the best example of class conflict in urban education in all of the United States. On the one side, the arch-conservative Chicago Tribune and an active set of business organizations, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Civic Federation, and the Association of Manufacturers, defined the interests of employers in broad, strikingly clear terms. On the other side, labor unions, allied with teachers' associations, militantly, and at times effectively, countered this coalition of business elites. Because nearly every issue in urban education was defined by these participants in class antagonistic terms, Chicago provides the analyst with an ideal laboratory for observing the way in which participants understood the class impact of numerous reforms. What can only be inferred or guessed in more subtle political contexts is openly declared in Chicago's bitter class struggles.

Not surprisingly, Atlanta falls at the other end of the continuum. The issues which polarized Chicagoans were resolved in Atlanta with minimal reference to their class implications. But if the continuity between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is greatest in Atlanta, modern political forces also were beginning to make themselves felt in what would become known as the capital of the "New South." San Francisco's experiences fell somewhere in between Chicago's and Atlanta's. Conflicts revolved increasingly around the intersection of education and the market place, but, unlike Chicago, they were not always defined in class contentious terms.

The sources of increasing class conflict in education were multiple. Of greatest importance was the rapid growth of the secondary education sector during the three decades between 1900 and 1930. Only 4 percent of Chicago's school membership consisted of high school students in 1900, but this percentage increased to 9.7 in 1920 and 17.6 in 1930. In San Francisco the percentage of school enrollment consisting of high school pupils increased at roughly the same rate. In 1900 the percentage was also 4 percent, increasing to 9.5 and 14.4 percent in 1920 and 1929, respectively.

Historians have yet to provide an adequate explanation for the growth of secondary education at this time. Many attribute this expansion to the educational needs of the new industrial economy, but comparable economic changes in Europe produced only modest impacts on education there. For example, the estimated enrollment in all secondary schools per 10,000 of population in 1920 was 247 in the United States, but only 117 in Germany, 83 in England, and 61 in Sweden.[19] It is plausible that the American economy benefited by this differential in educational opportunities on the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, but beneficial consequences are still not "causes." If one takes a competitive view of the processes of educational change, one finds a more adequate explanation in the competition of interests of various groups and organizations in late nineteenth century America.

The most obvious beneficiaries of an expanding system were the educators themselves. Any expansion meant more jobs, more promotional opportunities, and a greater claim on public resources. In addition, organizational expansion into the secondary sector was especially inviting. Not only were older children often thought to be more interesting objects of instruction, but secondary education's associations with classical culture and its connections with universities gave it a certain prestige.

Ethnic and racial groups also had an interest in expanding secondary education. As schooling increasingly became public, it was difficult in a politically democratic society to deny its provision to all who demanded such schooling. Each group wanted access to a public institution that was supplying services to others. In addition to parental demands expressed through nationality and racial groups, labor organizations were interested in extending education into adolescence. As part of its drive to limit the supply of workers, labor organizations favored the extension of educational provision as the preferable alternative to early employment.

This period was also marked by the growing power of political organizations representing occupational interests. Business, labor, and the new, middle class professions discovered that group action was a valuable tool for defending their particular interests, and they used their influence in education as in other policy areas.[20] Each of these groups had their own distinctive sets of interests; no stable alliance among any two of them was able to dominate policy choice in all situations; instead, outcomes in particular instances fluctuated as differing coalitions came together in an ever changing series of uneasy alliances. On particular questions, those who seemed to have the greatest stake in the issue had the greatest influence over the outcome. On some issues, working class groups had great influence; on other occasions, they had almost none.

Compulsory Education and Child Labor Laws

Labor's clearest victory during this period concerned compulsory education and child labor laws. Campaigns for such legislation had been spearheaded by labor groups since the 1880s, but it was only after 1900 that this goal was consolidated throughout the country. Characteristically, Chicago was the first of the three cities to operate under state legislation redirecting children from the labor market to educational institutions. Legislation in California gave San Francisco the authority to enforce compulsory education only after a strong campaign during the period 1907 to 1911. In Georgia, child labor and compulsory education were among the primary goals of the labor movement throughout the first two decades of this century, but it was not until a firm alliance was formed between labor and a number of middle-class reform groups that satisfactory legislation was finally approved. Opposition came from rural Georgia and from industries wanting to achieve a more competitive position with the North. As one cotton mill owner argued,

> The movement in favor of this legislation is inspired in New England . . . for the reasons . . . that they want to destroy the competition which arises by the erection of new mills in the South.[21]

Labor's decisive victory on this policy issue, even in the South, must be attributed in part to its declining significance for business. As the American economy was becoming more urban, more productive, and more capital-intensive, and as the need for manpower was becoming more readily satisfied both by natural increase and by waves of immigrants, the demand for child labor declined. The most successful industries found child labor wasteful and inefficient, and the smaller, more labor-intensive industries no longer had the political power to withstand the labor-reform drive.

Labor was also advantaged by the coincidence of its interests with those of school reformers. Now that schools had been clearly established as something more than just charitable institutions, school people had achieved their own autonomous base of political power. In alliance with the reform-minded women and men of the new professions, and with labor's support, they could campaign for the extension of public authority to include the entire range of the school-age population. Moreover, the definition of what was school-age could be raised regularly.

Vocational Education

If labor's greatest success was in the area of compulsory education, it could also be reasonably satisfied with the outcome of a second dispute that marked this period--the question of vocational education. This curricular innovation was originally introduced as manual training, a reform designed to develop the physical and mental capacities of the "whole" child. As time passed, business interests were more or less successful in redefining manual training as schooling for a particular form of employment.[22] Businessmen were in fact so insistent that public schools had little of commercial value in their instruction that they sought to create vocational schools separate and apart from the public school system.

Labor rightly suspected that vocational education separated from public schools could come under the close administrative control of industrial interests. They feared that children would become trained for positions in particular factories, indoctrinated in anti-union ideology, and would provide a steady, low-cost source of productive labor for dominant commercial and industrial interests in particular localities. Although trade unions did not object to vocational education per se--indeed, they thought it desirable that children be equipped with needed skills appropriate to the economic world in which they would be living--they vigorously objected to business dominated schools. If vocational schools were not to be run by the trade unions

29

themselves, then the public schools should be given jurisdictional control.

As with many issues, the conflict between business and labor over vocational education was fought with greatest intensity in Chicago. A well-organized business community, with the expert assistance of a former superintendent of schools, Edwin G. Cooley, campaigned aggressively for a separately administered system of vocational education. In a community where many issues were defined in class terms, the trade unions not only vigorously objected but succeeded in establishing the principle that vocational education was to be an integral part of the public system of education. Business and labor could only play an advisory role in policy-making.

Labor's success must once again be attributed to the coincidence of its interests with those of the school system as an organization. Had vocational education been set up under separate administrative auspices, secondary education would have been divided between classical and vocational. And the segment with the greatest growth potential would not be in the hands of public school administrators. A rival competitor for public loyalty and taxpayer resources had to be destroyed at its very conception. The school system, in an alliance with other professional groups, and with labor support, was once again able to extend its jurisdictional responsibility. At the same time its standing as an independent, autonomous system of political power was being enhanced.

Although the battle over vocational education was fought most vigorously in Chicago, the outcome in the other two cities was much the same. With backing from both business and labor, vocational education was incorporated into the curriculum of both Atlanta's and San Francisco's secondary schools in the early decades of the century. The growing numbers of pupils in secondary schools almost insured that some such curricular modification would occur. But in all three cities vocational instruction was left in the hands of school officials.

One of the consequences of the decision to leave vocational administration in the hands of the public schools was to concentrate vocational education on training a few for highly skilled trades instead of training large numbers for factory life. Recent research on vocational education in the three cities has shown that its curriculum never took the form most desired by large-scale corporate interests.[23] What mass production industry most needed were semi-skilled workers who could efficiently carry out repetitive tasks. Public schools, however, had an organizational stake in promoting a far more prestigious form of job training. If vocational education were to become attractive to teachers, parents, and students, it would have to provide access to highly skilled craft employment.

The interests of schools and trade unions once again seem to have coincided. Schools could provide training for the plumbing, electrical, carpentry, bricklaying, and other trades. Education in these areas would lead to relatively stable positions in the most highly paid blue-collar jobs. Since the strongest unions organized workers in just these areas, the unions and teachers could establish mutually accommodating relationships. Vocational schools rapidly became politically powerful institutions that attracted able graduates of the city's primary schools. In Atlanta the technical high school even became the primary point of access to Georgia Tech University. Two generations later reformers would not be as concerned that vocational schools provided only dismal, low-grade instruction that led only to dead-end jobs as they were about the extent to which vocational schools gave equal opportunity to minority groups.

Labor had the least success in conflicts over financial policy. In all three cities the schools were continuously starved for financial resources. Schools were the most costly of all locally-provided public services, and, as a labor-intensive activity, variations in the pricing of wages in this sector could dramatically affect local tax burdens. In all three cities business and commercial interests continuously resisted tax increases. Although the financial resources available to the schools continued to grow, school finance issues generated continual conflict. In the three cities taken as a whole, it seems that this was the single issue that created the most political controversy.

Not surprisingly, teachers were the group most concerned about adequate financing. Because salaries were so low, the teaching force in all three cities was overwhelmingly female. But even though they were socially and politically vulnerable, women teachers regularly agitated for increases. In the first two decades of this century the school boards in all three cities questioned the legitimacy of teacher organizations. Any organizational activity at all was treated with suspicion, and overt links with the trade union movement provoked special board hostility.

Once again, the conflicts were most intense in Chicago, where Margaret Haley provided the early teacher union movement with one of its great heroines. Not only did she develop strong ties with the Chicago Federation of Labor but she also identified numerous instances of underpayment of taxes by Chicago businesses and utilities. Board members closely allied with Chicago's well organized commercial interests responded in 1915 with the Loeb Rule, which outlawed the affiliation of a teacher organization with the union movement. Teachers, together with their labor and reform allies, countered by securing the passage of compromise legislation that guaranteed teacher tenure.

Ethnic and Race Issues

If school politics had become increasingly marked by class conflict in the first decades of this century, questions of race and ethnicity did not instantaneously disappear. Especially in the South, race relations remained so significant that class issues were never articulated vigorously. And in San Francisco the controversy over school governance split the labor movement into its Protestant and Catholic parts. Even in Chicago Mayor William "Big Bill" Thompson used ethnic antagonisms to full effect in his efforts to regain control of the schools. Yet status relationships among ethnic groups had become sufficiently stabilized so that they no longer remained the primary basis of conflict. Orientals were finally allocated a legitimate place in the California school system and secondary education was finally conceded to the blacks of Atlanta. The processes of Americanization had progressed to the point where instruction in the English language was confirmed as an integral part of public education. Catholics had adjusted to the fact that their religion could be legitimated only through a privately financed and church-controlled system of schooling.

These changes occurred most slowly and painfully in Atlanta. Concessions to black education continued to be made only grudgingly and in response to active group pressure. For example, in 1916 the school board decided to eliminate the seventh and eighth grades from black primary schools and to substitute some form of vocational education. Blacks responded to the insult by organizing an Atlanta Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) which insisted to board members that equal educational facilities be provided, including a high school for black adolescents. When the board refused to accede to these demands, the NAACP organized a campaign against the next school bond issue, succeeded in securing its defeat, and used this leverage to arrange a compromise with the board, which laid the groundwork for the black high school that opened in 1924.

Race issues in Atlanta handicapped the formation of modern class cleavages of the sort that divided Chicago's polity. For one thing, the all-white labor organizations were removed from a large portion of their working-class constituency. They therefore often came under the influence of conservative leaders, who established accommodating relations with Atlanta businessmen. At times trade unions were even part of what was known as the "conservative" faction in city politics, though the difference between "conservatives" and "progressives" often seemed to rest largely on family relations and personal contacts. Also, teacher organization was hardly assisted by the ease with which the school board could play white teachers off against black ones. When the board in 1919 hiked the dismal wages black teachers were receiving up to fifteen dollars a month, they reduced white teacher pay to cover the cost.

Just the year before in San Francisco a major, ethnically-based conflict had occurred in the midst of an attempt to replace an elected school board with an appointed one. When the Protestant principal of the city's technical high school dismissed students on the grounds that they would soon be attending parochial schools, the predominantly Catholic school board "fired" the principal. This action precipitated protest in the local community served by the high school and agitation by the Public Schools Defense Association and the American Protective Association, which took this occasion to mount a more general anti-Catholic campaign. Among Protestants in general, the action taken by the school board was so offensive that many voted in favor of a reform measure that replaced this elected board with one appointed by the mayor.

The controversy illustrates once again the way in which ethnic conflicts could interrupt a politics of class. Initially, the reform had been uniformly opposed by teachers and trade unionists, who felt that it was a plan by a business elite to capture control of San Francisco schools. Presented to the voters in these terms, it had been soundly defeated. But once Protestant voters felt insulted, the religious identifications of the old school board became a central political fact.

The Question of School Governance

But while ethnic conflicts persisted, the increasing importance of class-related issues finally resulted in a change in school governance. The decentralized, ward-based, patronage-focused, lay-controlled school board was gradually replaced by centralized, citywide, professionally directed, reform-oriented boards.[24] These changes have attracted the attention of many analysts, but they have been frequently misunderstood. The reforms in school governance were not dictated by the interests of native-born business elites, as many have thought.[25] Business interests were well served under the decentralized system that had flourished in previous decades. Instead, the changes were wrought by the combined efforts of labor, and professional, and some business leaders, all of whom would find the problems of concern to them better handled by a centralized, professionally administered system. As ethnically based distinctions yielded to class or market-based distinctions, the appropriate political institutions for resolving school issues was altered.

School governance provoked the greatest controversy in San Francisco, and at first glance it seems to provide a striking instance of business-elite sponsored reform. The Claxton Report, which called for governance reform, was prepared just before World War I at the instigation of a group of university women and endorsed by prominent business groups. Opposition came from ethnic communities, trade unionists, the old patronage-ridden school board, and the teaching staff. But before the Claxton Report recommendations were adopted, the picture had become far more complex. In the first place, the recommendations themselves addressed a significant administrative problem. Authority over San Francisco schools was formally divided between an elected superintendent on the one side, and a full-time, paid, four-member board of education on the other. Teachers were uncertain which individual or group was their formal superior. Secondly, the reforms called for an unpaid, lay board appointed by the mayor, an organizational structure that in Chicago had allowed for a good deal of variation in political control. Unless one could predict the outcome of mayoral elections, one could not be certain which social groups were to benefit from the new arrangements.

The political processes themselves added to the complexity of the situation. When the Claxton recommendations were first proposed to the voters, they were defeated. Later, the recommendations were modified somewhat, making them less offensive to the teaching staff. In their new form, they were supported by the trade unions which in subsequent years were always conceded at least one position on the seven member board. When the complexity of the situation is taken into account, the changes in San Francisco's school governance seem less an instance of business-imposed reform than a conjoint sharing of power by the new business-labor-professional group triumverate. The role of San Francisco's powerful trade unions in this controversy is particularly significant in this regard. Since they had developed a comfortable relationship with the old superintendent, their first temptation was to resist changes in governmental structure. But in the end they found it difficult to object to a more centralized and administratively more efficient system to which they would be given continued access. San Francisco's reform in school governance succeeded only because it was able to surmount class conflict.

School reform became a major issue in Atlanta politics in 1897. After a series of conflicts between school board and city council, the mayor and his supporters on the city council terminated the appointments of all but one member of the existing board, reduced the board in size, and appointed a new board which cut teachers salaries, reduced the number of board employees, and cut board expenditures drastically. A modern curriculum with specialized instruction was introduced into the Boy's High School, and a manual training program was authorized for the city's elementary schools. Power shifted from the board to the superintendent, as the number of board committees was reduced and an Assistant Superintendent was appointed. Corporal punishment was abolished.

If all of these steps were classic reform moves, they were hardly the work of dominant social elites imposing their values on a resistant working class. In contrast to the old school board, which contained some of the most prestigious members of Atlanta's social elite, the new board consisted largely of self-made men whose success owed much to their political connections.[26] Aided by the requirement that each ward be represented on the board, the connections between schools and city hall under the new regime became closer and more congenial than they had been under the old.

Much of the reform energy came from Atlanta's desire to provide progressive leadership for a "New South." The mayor who spearheaded the reform was the same man who had led the Atlanta Exhibition, and his key appointment to the school board, "Hoke" Smith, was later to be elected governor on a platform advocating progessive reforms. Apparently, Atlanta's emerging middle class felt that the school system needed "modernization" so that the city could keep pace with developments in the North. But if the movement had essentially middle class origins, opposition did not come primarily from working class groups but from Atlanta's old, established social elite.

Conclusions and the Plan of the Report

In a society that was economically and socially stratified but politically pluralistic, schools could achieve legitimacy only by separating themselves, as institutions, from particular groups and factions. Schooling was not only accepted but given perhaps unwarranted esteem by almost all segments of society, largely because it was not clearly wedded to any one group. Public schools were not charity institutions; neither were they exclusive prerogatives of the rich and well-to-do. Public schools did not offer a narrowly sectarian curriculum, nor did they refuse to legitimate the culture of ethnic minorities when these groups could muster sufficient political power. Public schools did not offer adolescents only a classical education; nor did their embrace of vocationalism subordinate all other curricular goals to this concern.

During crucial, formative periods, schools were generally responsive to those with the most political power. Middle classes received the most favored educational opportunities; strong parties had valuable patronage opportunities; the English language was strongly preferred above all others; and racial minorities were treated shamefully. But schools, as institutions, also seemed to recognize that their long-range survival required that they extend their collection of supporters as broadly as possible. Instruction in the German language was provided to the strongest of the immigrant groups; many school people developed close associations with trade unionists; and even racial minorities were finally given some access to education.

Conflicts over school policy did not have predictable outcomes. In Atlanta and San Francisco governance reforms were instituted, only to be modified and revised a few years later. Chicago vocational education policy represented a compromise among a multiplicity of interests. So did the resolution of the controversy over "fads and frills." The winners in one political contest were the losers in the next. No one social group held sufficient economic and political power that they could dictate the course of school policy.

The ultimate winners in such an uncertain contest were, of course, the schools themselves. As organizations, they could only prosper from contests and conflicts among competing interests. Because almost every group felt they had some access to the institution, few groups attacked public schooling per se. These were the politics of institutionalization. These were the processes by which the school system became an organized system of autonomous power.

We begin our study of the history of urban education with a look at the contemporary relationship between schools and society. A good deal of the revisionist literature on American education develops a view of the past that is conditioned by its belief that contemporary educational systems perpetuate stratification, immobility, and inequality. An examination of the historical processes shaping urban education thus ignores the relations between schools and society today at great peril. Thus in our initial chapter we begin not with the nineteenth century school but with the role of schools in the United States today. In preparing this picture we drew upon a new set of data provided by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), which provides more accurate information on the relationships among family background, education, cognitive ability and income than has previously been available. Analysis of this data reveals that our education system contributes more to social mobility and social change than revisionist writings have suggested.

After this brief assessment of the social significance of schools in contemporary America, the report turns in Chapter II to the politics of finance. In our view, it is remarkable that this issue, so important to schools in nineteenth century cities, has been all but ignored by recent educational historiography. When the money matter is considered, one finds that labor continually supported the free school, and that business leaders, instead of being the sustainers of education, often opposed its expansion. One also finds that reformers, though concerned about efficiency, gave the schools more fiscal support than did machine politicians.

In Chapter III we suggest that curricular reforms occurred not so much because middle class reformers believed they had new and better methods for socializing working class clientele, but because the schools, eager to build a broad base of support, changed their mode of operations whenever new, rival institutions were being established in substantial numbers. It was in part because the middle class was turning to private day and boarding schools for their secondary education that the public schools were eager to add a high school to the existing elementary program. It was in part because Germans were establishing their own schools with instruction in their native language that the public schools were prepared to teach German as well. It was in part because business began establishing its own vocational schools that manual training and vocational education became a part of the public school curriculum.

Chapter IV considers the question of "fairness" in the allocation of school resources and in the recruitment of teachers. Did native-born Americans control the school system and give most of the benefits to members of their own group? Did immigrant groups use their access to the local political machine to redirect school resources to their community? Or were all groups in the city treated more or less alike, thus allowing the school system to distance itself from the interests of any particular group? Using quantitative information from previously unexamined sources, we find a school system more open, more responsive and more "fair" than could have been anticipated on the basis of previous accounts. Apparently, the complex pluralistic politics of urban America kept schools from becoming captive of any special set of group interests.

Racial minorities were the major exception to this pattern. As Chapter V shows, both the blacks of Atlanta and the Orientals of San Francisco were given separate, inadequate facilities or excluded from education altogether. We attribute this largely to the political isolation of these racial minorities. In contrast to the European immigrants, who were fairly quickly absorbed into the country's participatory political framework, immigrants from Africa and Asia were subject to political discrimination and political exclusion. The difference between the political condition of European immigrants and these racial minorities is worth emphasizing, not only because it explains in part the racial trauma our nation continues to endure, but because it shows how dependent the educational progress of the European immigrant was upon a participatory political system. If immigrants from Europe had been treated politically the way in which racial minorities were treated, it is doubtful that America would have had, in the 1920s, the world's largest and most inclusive educational system.

In the second part of the report, we turn to the question of urban educational reform. In Chapter VI we show that reform in Atlanta was opposed by members of Atlanta's highly conservative "Bourbon" elite, not by groups and organizations representing the city's working class. Chicago's Otis Law, which produced the most significant structural changes in the city's school governance and administration prior to World War II, is the subject of Chapter VII. The law itself was a compromise that accommodated a wide range of group and political interests. But in the conflict that preceded the compromise, it proved especially significant that reformers were in alliance with the teachers and with labor, while business and machine influences worked together on the other side. Chapter VIII analyzes the contrasting policies of three Chicago superintendents who were all considered reformers. The first, Edwin Cooley, turned out to be, on closer inspection, hardly a reformer at all, even though in a good deal of the published literature he is treated as a quintessential member of that select group. On the other hand, Ella Flagg Young, who is seldom today discussed as a leading early reformer, forged close alliances with all of Chicago's major reform groups. William McAndrew, who assumed the superintendency in the 1920s provides still another perspective on the meaning of reform. The Chicago financial crisis of the 1930s is the subject of Chapter IX. It reveals what happens when machine politicians reassert their power over education once again. As in the nineteenth century, the machine politicians turn out to be neither the friend of education nor the friend of labor. Any romantic notions that might be entertained by reading abstract analyses of the machine's "latent functions" are quickly put to rest by a review of the events of the 1930s. In our concluding chapter we suggest how the early years of America's urban educational system prepared the ground for the great growth and reform that occurred after World War II.

Footnotes

1. Katz, 1968; Katz, 1971; Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Hogan, Fall 1978, pp. 227-270; Greer, 1976; Ravitch, 1978; Katz, May 1979, pp. 236-266.

2. Katz, 1971, p. xx.

3. Greer, 1976, p. 74.

4. Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 173.

5. Tyack, 1974, p. 127.

6. Cubberly, 1920, passim.

7. Riordan, 1963, p. 17.

8. Chambers and Burnham, 1967, pp. 277-307.

9. Cubberly, 1974, passim.

10. Meyer, Tyack, Nagel and Gordon, 1979, pp. 591-613; Craig and Spear, March, 1979; Craig and Spear, November, 1978.

11. Meyer, et.al., 1979.

12. Racine, 1969, p. 34; Garrett, 1954; Rabinowitz, 1978; Turner-Jones, 1982.

13. Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Katz, 1968.

14. Greer, 1976.

15. Bowles and Gintis, 1976, passim.

16. Troen, 1975, p. 120.

17. See Chapter III.

18. Ibid.

19. Heidenheimer, 1972, p. 25.

20. Kolko, 1963; Wiebe. 1967; Mowry, 1951.

21. Evans, 1929, p. 458.

22. Lazerson, 1968.

23. Peterson and Rabe, 1981 (a) and 1981 (b), passim.

24. Tyack, 1974.

25. Cronin, 1973; Gordon, 1937.

26. See Chapter VI.

Chapter I

THE EFFECTS OF FAMILIES AND SCHOOLS ON SOCIAL MOBILITY

To study the past is to attempt to explain how existing social relationships came to be established. Our historical interpretations are thus neccessarily guided by our understanding of the present world in which we live. In some cases, these connections between present and past are only implicit, but in educational historiography the connections are explicit indeed. As Ravitch has noted, much of the revisionist literature was influenced by the more general disillusionment with both American schools and other political institutions that occurred during the waning days of the Viet Nam War.[1] Schools were seen as excessively bureaucratic, class dominated, and insensitive to the forces of social change that were otherwise everywhere apparent. While in retrospect these radical themes increasingly appear to be little more than a "period piece" that captured the mood of American society at a particularly difficult time, they have unfortunately been tightly woven into the fabric of educational historiography.

Nowhere are the connections between the present and the past drawn more explicitly than in the popular and influential book by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis entitled Schooling in Capitalist America. Most of that book is devoted to the analysis of the United States' contemporary social, economic and educational structure. The relatively short, but powerfully stated section on American educational history is designed to specify exactly the way in which contemporary inequalities were historically produced. The book's most persuasive section is in fact not based on historical material at all but instead uses contemporary data to challenge the widespread American belief that a

43

combination of education and ability are the keys to success. They argue instead that connections and credentials are the factors that still determine who gets ahead. With connections much is possible, even if competence be lacking. Without them, one's chances of success are almost hopelessly diminished. It is also said that income is largely a function of the number of years one remains in school, itself a function of a person's family background. Intelligence, as measured by tests of cognitive ability, has no independent effect on a man's earnings.[2]

These new findings are a delight to radicals and conservatives alike. The widespread attention being given to this research is probably a consequence of the ease with which the findings can be incorporated into both radical and conservative understandings of contemporary society. For the radicals, evidence that ability is not rewarded by society is proof that social politics are designed by capitalists to perpetuate their control from one generation to the next. For conservatives, evidence that schools provide only credentials that "legitimate" differences in income is proof that schools--like most public services--are a parasitical luxury that drain the economic resources of an overly taxed society.

In this chapter we shall report the results of a recent study of a national sample of the U.S. adult population which calls this new mythology into question. The data show that family background is a weak correlate of the income earned by white males. When controls for education and verbal ability are introduced, family background, as a determinant of income, is hardly relevant at all. At least for white males, the group in the population with which Bowles and Gintis were primarily concerned, it seems that recent critics of American society and economy have overstated their case. With all its imperfections, the workings of the American economy and society are such that variations in economic reward are only very weakly related to an individual's family background.

Our analysis has three parts. First, we shall review the evidence that has been so influential in shaping perceptions of the relationships among ability, education, family background and economic success. Then we shall describe the data set from which our own findings are drawn, showing that they are likely to provide more accurate information concerning the relationships among these factors. Finally, we shall present the results of our investigation and discuss their implications for certain trends that seem to be occurring in American society.

The Connections and Credentials Thesis

Bowles and Gintis state their "connections-credentials" thesis boldly: "the fact that economic success tends to run in the family arises almost completely independently from any inheritance of IQ, whether it be genetic or environmental."[3] Although many people believe that competence is the basis for differential treatment in the labor market, their data seem to show that cognitive ability, as distinct from family background, plays almost no independent role in affecting the earnings an individual receives. With these results, Bowles and Gintis are able to argue that "IQ as the (apparent) basis for economic success serves to legitimate an authoritarian, hierarchical, stratified, and unequal economic system, and to reconcile individuals to their objective position within this system."[4] Schools play a crucial role in this process. Far from being irrelevant institutions in a class-stratified society, schools and universities are key legitimating agencies, handing out credentials differentially to different social groups. The number of years of schooling a man receives is strongly related to his eventual income, even when cognitive ability is held constant. Because employers recruit according to credentials received rather than to skill-level attained, "education reproduces inequality by justifying privilege and attributing poverty to personal failure."[5]

The claims advanced by Bowles and Gintis have won increasing acceptance among informed observers. Although their methodology has been criticized by specialists writing in academic journals,[6] in many circles the work has commanded considerable respect. Writing in the May 1979 issue of the Harvard Educational Review, the noted educational historian Michael Katz refers specifically to this section of Bowles and Gintis' study in his vigorous response to Ravitch, who questioned their Marxist view of American education [Ravitch] does not mention, claims Katz, that:

> . . . [their] case is arresting and compelling because it demonstrates that, with controls for socioeconomic background, IQ has relatively little independent effect upon income inequality. In other words, by its own standards the meritocracy is a failure. To dismiss Bowles and Gintis' careful and complex analysis of the relations between measured IQ, socioeconomic background, and education . . . is to caricature an important piece of serious, imaginative scholarship.[7]

Katz is not the only scholar who has found the Bowles and Gintis case compelling. Richard deLone, writing under the auspices of the Carnegie Council on Children, confidently asserts that:

> . . . [while] most people believe that the skills schools teach play a direct and critical role in preparing children for . . . occupational success, . . . in fact, a rather substantial body of research suggests that academic achievement (grades and test scores) is, at best, a weak predictor of career success.[8]

After citing the Bowles and Gintis study, deLone declares that the available evidence "suggests that the use of school credentials as a sorting and selecting mechanism is arbitrary and that the general credence given them is extravagant".[9] Aimed at both popular and policymaking audiences, this book, which has received generous attention from the national news media, seeks to convince policymakers that schools are but credential-granting agencies. The skills they teach have little market value, but the honors they confer help perpetuate a class-stratified society.

Not all scholarship supports the Bowles-Gintis findings. Working on related materials Jencks et al. published information that was not entirely consistent with Bowles and Gintis' analysis.[10] Very recently, Jencks, writing with a somewhat different group of colleagues, produced an even more comprehensive set of findings in a volume entitled Who Gets Ahead.[11] The findings from this study are even more clearly at variance with Bowles and Gintis. We shall examine some of the data from Who Gets Ahead in the concluding section of this chapter. But here it is important to note that the differences between the findings in these studies and those in the Bowles and Gintis study are generally underemphasized in the Jencks volume. In Inequality, Jencks et al. write: "While cognitive skill does have some effect on adult income, it is certainly not decisive."[12] In Who Gets Ahead, Jencks et al. write: "the correlation between adolescent test performance and adult economic success is probably somewhat higher than Inequality implied. The differences . . . are not large enough to be of much substantive significance."[13] Indeed, the differences between the findings in Who Gets Ahead and in the Bowles and Gintis book are so underplayed that Gintis in a review of Who Gets Ahead, can declare enthusiastically that Bowles' and his results "are not only confirmed, but significantly improved upon in Who Get Ahead on the basis of much more exhaustive data analysis than was available to us."[14]

Table I-1 presents the Bowles-Gintis findings which have commanded so much attention. In this table the findings are organized so that they can be viewed from three separate perspectives. First, one can identify in column one the simple relationship between income and the three independent variables: the child's verbal ability, education, and family background. Second, one can see in columns two and three the degree to which this regression coefficient is reduced when the other variables are introduced into the equation. Third, the amount of variance explained by the entire equation is presented just below the regression coefficients. By reading across this row, one can identify the extent to which the total variation in income explained increases with the inclusion of the additional variable. This provides information on the amount of variation in income which can be uniquely attributed to that one independent variable.

When the Bowles-Gintis data are displayed in this manner, the results show that whereas background, education, and the child's ability all have more or less similar simple relationships with income, the independent contribution made by cognitive ability is trivial, the independent effects of family background are somewhat greater, and the most significant determinant of income--regardless of the way in which the data is treated--is the number of years of schooling received.

There are numerous technical problems with the data analysis underlying these findings. The source for these Bowles-Gintis findings

Table I-1: The Effect on Income of Family Background, Education and Childhood Cognitive Ability for White Males, Ages 25-64, of Non-Farm Backgrounds, 1962 (Bowles-Gintis Study).(a)

Income	Family Background, Controlled for. . .		
	Nothing	Cognitive Ability	Education and Cognitive Ability
Beta$^{(b)}$	.37$^{(d)}$	.32$^{(e)}$	.20$^{(e)}$
$R^{2(c)}$	.14	.17	.20

	Education, Controlled for. . .		
	Nothing	Cognitive Ability$^{(f)}$	Cognitive Ability and Family Background
Beta	.42$^{(d)}$	.34$^{(e)}$	.23$^{(e)}$
R^2	.16	.17	.20

	Cognitive Ability, Controlled for. . .			
	Nothing	Education	Family Background	Education and Family Background
Beta	.27$^{(d)}$	.10$^{(e)}$	.15$^{(e)}$	.09$^{(e)}$
R^2	.10	.17	.17	.20

Notes:

(a) These data are taken from tables and other information given in Bowles and Gintis (1976), pp. 290-293.
(b) Beta = Standardized regression coefficient.
(c) R^2 = Total variance explained by all factors in regression.
(d) Average correlation of two age groups.
(e) Average correlation of four age groups.
(f) In this equation, Bowles and Gintis used adult cognitive ability Its correlation with child's cognitive ability was estimated as being .85.

came from a synthesized data set that brings together previous research in which Bowles and Gintis estimated that a child's cognitive ability had a .85 correlation with his cognitive ability as an adult. The measure of adult cognitive ability from which they estimated the child's ability was taken from a 1964 sample of U.S. veterans between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four, not from a sample of the U.S. population as a whole. These data on adult and estimated childhood cognitive ability were then synthesized with information on income, family background and education gathered as a part of the U.S. Census Current Population Survey in 1962. As Bowles and Gintis themselves observed: "the quality of the data precludes any claims to precision in our estimation" though they go on to say that "our main propositions remain supported even making allowance for substantive [sic] degrees of error."[15]

Not only do Bowles and Gintis work with a problematic data set, but they do not report the observed correlations obtained from the samples they explored. Instead, they "correct" for measurement error in order to obtain better "estimates" of the "true" relationships among the variables. In making these estimates they assume that measurement error is randomly distributed with respect to all of the variables in their analysis, and that therefore all measurements are underestimates of the "true" correlations.[16] They hypothesize--on the basis of scanty, scattered information--that the error in reporting family background is much greater than the error in reporting either education or the error in their estimate of the child's cognitive ability.[17] As a result, these corrections for error automatically augment the relative importance of family background as compared to cognitive ability and education. To further "improve" their measure of family background, they devise their own "estimate" of parental income for which no data in any survey had at that time been collected.[18] (This "variable" proved to have a .385 correlation with respondent's income, considerably higher than the .118 which can be observed in the actual data collected in National Opinion Research Center's NORC General Social Survey. But perhaps respondent's own reports of parent income are less accurate than Bowles and Gintis' estimates.) With all of these additions and corrections, Bowles and Gintis finally achieve a powerful measure of family background, a measure which proves durable enough to overwhelm the significance of a childhood verbal ability score estimated from an adult score which itself was obtained from a data set gathered from a decidedly different population.

Quite apart from these technical problems, Bowles and Gintis' interpretation of their data leaves much to be desired. Simply because education has an effect on income separate and apart from the effect of a person's general ability does not indicate that earnings received are merely a function of educational "credentials." Although general ability is one qualification an employer values, in addition he can be expected to look for more particular sets of skills that may well have been enhanced by specific educational experiences. Indeed, had education no effect on income independent of a person's general ability and family background, then it would be reasonable to conclude that the consequences of schooling were little more than distributing credentials and confirming inequality. Indeed, it is rather perverse to use information that finds a substantial relationship between education and income as a basis for making an argument that schools do little to equalize opportunities in American society.

Rediscovering the Importance of Education

The NORC General Social Survey

Given the current enthusiasm with which the Bowles-Gintis findings are regarded, the outdated data set with which they worked, and the problematic analytical techniques they employed, it seemed appropriate to attempt a replication of their analysis on more recently collected data. Fortunately, NORC collected relevant data from a sample of the U.S. adult population as part of their General Social Survey in the years 1974, 1976, and 1978.[19] The measure of income is the respondent's report of his earned income from his primary occupation during the preceding year. All those who report no occupation or no income from that occupation were deleted from the analysis. According to *Who Gets Ahead*, use of this measure of income is unlikely to yield results that are different from the use of such alternative possibilities as hourly earnings or the log of hourly earnings. Education is the number of years of schooling the respondent reported that he had completed. The measure of family social class background reported here is an index which weights equally father's occupation, parental income, father's education, mother's education, the number of siblings in the family, region of residence during childhood, and the size of community in which parents resided. The estimate of the respondent's verbal ability is obtained from a vocabulary test originally used by Thorndike and Gallup[20] in their study of the intelligence of the American population. Thorndike and Gallup selected this test for two reasons: 1) of all the specific tests of ability, the vocabulary test has the highest correlation with general intelligence,[21] and 2) a vocabulary test is most easily administered to a national sample of respondents by interviewers untrained in the art of psychological testing. Thorndike and Gallup estimate the reliability of their test at about .85. NORC's 50 percent sample of the Thorndike-Gallup test can be expected to have a somewhat lower coefficient of reliability. As in the Bowles-Gintis analysis, all data presented are for white males only.

Although NORC has a national reputation for the care with which it samples its populations and interviews its respondents, inevitable problems of measurement error complicate data analysis. But in several ways we are in a more privileged position than were Bowles and Gintis. For one thing, we have within a single recently collected data set information from a national sample on all the theoretically significant variables. Moreover, we have a more extensive array of family background variables than did Bowles and Gintis, thereby allowing for more precise observation of the variable for which these authors estimated the greatest measurement error.

Although measurement error is likely to persist, it is risky to make corrections that assume the error is uncorrelated with the other variables. Moreover, correction for error in the case of family background would require that one also correct for error in the case of the other independent variables included in the analysis. In our sample, adult verbal ability is measured by a ten-word vocabulary test, which was administered by interviewers without training in psychology or testing. There is no reason to believe that error in measuring verbal ability is any less than the error in measuring family background. Also, educational experiences are imperfectly measured by coding the number of years the respondent reported he was in school. This ignores variation in the quality of the educational experience and any vocational training or specialized education he may have received since concluding his formal training. Very likely, the measurement error in our data set understates the importance of all three of our independent variables, but there is no reason to believe that gross differences in the relative importance of the independent variables are a function of measurement error. As a result, we have chosen to report our observed findings rather than massage the data with a variety of statistical devices based on dubious assumptions. The simple association among all variables is presented in Table I-2.

The Findings

In order to test the hypotheses advanced by Bowles and Gintis, we constructed a recursive path model as outlined in Figure I-1. Income is treated as a function of socioeconomic status, education, and ability. It is further assumed that education and ability are in part a function of family SES. No assumptions are made as to whether ability is causally prior to education or vice versa. The region of the country in which a person worked was included as a control variable.

When information concerning white males between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four was analyzed within the framework of this model, the results failed to confirm the Bowles-Gintis connection. First, family SES, education, and income were not closely linked in such a way that perpetuated class domination across generations. Instead, the findings revealed a pattern of very loosely connected social relationships. Moreover, the effects on income of family SES were especially weak and insignificant. Not only was there no discernible direct effect of family SES on income at all, but even when the indirect effects of family background, as mediated by education and ability were taken into account, the total effect yielded a coefficient of only .12.

Table I-2. Intercorrelations Among Income, Education, Verbal Ability and Family Background for White Males, Age 25-64, NORC (1976).

	In	Ed	VA	SES	Occ	NRur	ME	FE	Sib	PIn	Fam	Reg
1. Income (In)	1.0	.26	.29	.17	.11	.14	.04	.10	.13	.12	-.03	.09
2. Education (Ed)		1.0	.61	.49	.36	.28	.38	.39	.30	.20	.00	.10
3. Verbal Ability (VA)			1.0	.44	.30	.32	.27	.28	.28	.18	-.02	.18
4. Index of Family Background (SES)				1.0	.70	.56	.68	.67	.64	.45	.15	.36
5. Father's Occupation (Occ)					1.0	.39	.37	.41	.30	.25	.06	.02
6. Nonrural (Childhood) (NRur)						1.0	.17	.17	.28	.11	-.01	.17
7. Mother's Education (ME)							1.0	.52	.33	.21	.11	.09
8. Father's Education (FE)								1.0	.27	.25	.06	.05
9. Fewer Siblings (Sib)									1.0	.22	.00	.17
10. Parental Income (PIn)										1.0	.02	-.10
11. Father's Presence in Family (Fam)											1.0	.03
12. Non-South (Childhood) (Reg)												1.0



$R^2 = .11$

$N = 731$

Total effects

SES = .12

Ed. = .19

V.A. = .28

Figure I-1

Path analysis of the determinant of income for white males (25–64), 1976. Coefficient not in parenthesis: standardized B; coefficient in parenthesis: unstandardized B solid arrow: B more than twice standard error dotted arrow: B less than twice standard error.

Second, the findings show that the marketplace values the general ability of individuals, regardless of their class or educational backgrounds. Indeed, measured verbal ability seems to be a substantially more important determinant of income than is the family's SES. Finally, education is also an important determinant of income, but access to educational systems is not a prerogative of the well-to-do. On the contrary, a long history of publicly supported educational institutions has left the relationship between family background and schooling severely attenuated. And the schooling one receives is valued by the marketplace much more than any "connections" one might have simply because of one's class background.

Analysis of these data by age cohort suggests some interesting changes over the last fifty years. In Figure I-2 white males are divided into three groups: those aged 55-64, 35-54, and 25-34. Another way of looking at these age cohorts is to understand that the oldest came of age during the depression, the middle-aged turned twenty-one during the peace and prosperity Americans enjoyed after World War II, and the youngest are the sixties or Vietnam generation. When working with data of this sort, it is difficult to distinguish the separate effects of the point in the life cycle that an individual has reached from the effects of the historical experiences of his generation. As a result, both life cycle and generational effects are very likely shaping the pattern of relationships presented in Figure I-2.



A. Ages 55–64 (Depression generation)

Family SES
Education
Verbal ability
Income
Region
.30
(1.28)
.04
(.13)
.65
.46
(.36)
.17
(.46)
.10
(.12)
.05
(.29)
R² = .31
N = 114
Variance (income) = .32
Total effects
SES = .26
Ed. = .52
V.A. = .40

B. Ages 35–54 (postwar generation)

Family SES
Education
Verbal ability
Income
Region
.19
(.80)
.04
(.11)
.65
.26
(.18)
.17
(.46)
.13
(.14)
.06
(.33)
R² = .13
N = 316
Variance = .25
Total effects
SES = .16
Ed. = .34
V.A. = .30

C. Ages 25–34 (sixties generation)

Family SES
Education
Verbal ability
Income
Region
.33
(.98)
.08
(.23)
.59
−.02
(−.02)
.12
(.30)
.15
(.19)
.06
(.33)
R² = .04
N = 301
Total effects
SES = .12
Ed. = .07
V.A = .14

Figure I-2

Path analysis of the determinants of income for white males in 1976, by age cohort.

The most striking finding in the figure is the general loosening of the American social structure across the three age cohorts. The amount of variance (R^2) explained by the model declines steadily from the older to the younger white males. Also the total effects of family SES decline over time. Third, the effects of education on income decline. Only the direct effects of verbal ability maintain themselves or perhaps slightly increase.

The differences between the youngest and the middle-age group of males are probably best explained in terms of life-cycle effects. For young males, the relationship between education and income is depressed because the educated have yet to realize their full income potential. During their early adult lives, the better educated men have less job experience than the less educated, and only when this deficiency in experience is overcome do the educated males demonstrate their full earning potential. When we controlled for these differences in experience, the importance of education for the income of the young men was not significantly different from its importance for the middle-aged group.

The differences between the oldest and the middle-aged males, on the other hand, are probably best explained as generational differences. Before World War II educational opportunities were more limited, and family background probably played a larger role in shaping the child's future. When the demand for educated labor rapidly increased after the war, the few who had received advanced training were able to realize substantial dividends on their investments in education. After World War II the educational system expanded rapidly, veterans were given an unusual opportunity to receive additional training at low cost to themselves, and the supply of educated labor increased relative to the market demand. One result seems to be a decrease in the rigidity of the social structure. In the postwar period, it seems, the family's social class background has had a declining effect on earned income.

Analysis of the determinants of the income of white women is complicated by the fact that many women are only part-time participants in the labor market, but preliminary analysis does not reveal major differences in the role of family background. For black men, the results, as reported in Figure I-3, are quite different. For this racial minority, the pattern of relationships was so different from the patterns identified among white males that we are reporting the results even though they are based on a wholly inadequate sample size. Further research is essential before any firm conclusions can be reached, but it is of interest to note that, among the small number of black males in our sample, family SES had a significant effect on earned income. At the same time, verbal ability was of trivial importance. Indeed, were it not for the fact that the sample size is small, the claim that income differences among blacks are a function of connections and credentials, not of competence, would almost seem warranted.



Figure I-3

Path analysis of the determinants of income for black males (25–64), 1976.

Perhaps because of long-entrenched racial practices, the marketplace may be unable to distinguish the competencies of blacks apart from their family background or the credentials they have obtained. Scholars such as Bowles and Gintis, who have emphasized the continuing importance of social class in white America, may have constructed an argument that is applicable instead for black

Americans. Only recently has American public policy seriously attempted to eliminate patterns of racial prejudice and discrimination, and it is premature to evaluate the success of these government programs. Apart from their continued enforcement over long periods of time, they cannot eliminate for blacks the impact of class background on income. But it is not too soon to note that the emphasis on changing the opportunity in black America remains an area of critical concern.

Except for black Americans, the influence of social class on opportunity has declined. The evidence presented thus far has been limited to comparisons among age cohorts. But in Table I-3 we present another set of data which points in the same direction. This table presents the simple correlations between a number of family background characteristics and the income of American males. In addition to the NORC data, we report findings from the publication by Christopher Jencks and associates.[22] Since the data reported by Jencks et al. are collected by somewhat different techniques, comparisons across surveys must be made cautiously. But when the annual surveys conducted by NORC are compared to one another, they reveal the same declining significance of social class for males during the last half of the 1970s that Jencks et al. reported for the preceding decade. If these results are supported by further studies, one could reasonably conclude that the importance of connections as a determinant of income, however important in the past generations, is becoming increasingly difficult to detect--at least for white males.

Conclusions

America's educational system seems to have contributed substantially to the openness of its social structure. Contrary to the work by Bowles and Gintis, it can be concluded on the basis of both the NORC survey and the research reported by Jencks that educational institutions, far from reinforcing existing patterns of stratification, have contributed to social change and social mobility. That America's educational institutions assumed such a form was no accident. Schools were popular institutions, shaped by the plurality of political forces that a thriving political democracy could bring to bear on its public

Table I-3. Simple Relationship Between Family Background Characteristics and Income of All Males, in 1962, 1973, 1974, 1975-76, and 1977-78

Background Characteristics	Correlation with Income				
	1962 (OCG)	1973 (OCG)	1974 (NORC)	1975-76 (NORC)	1977-78 (NORC)
Father's education	.220	.182	.153	.136	.030
Father's occupation	.301	.228	.196	.095	.057
Mother's education		.180	.125	.061	-.016
Parental income		.231	.049	.118	.061
Fewer siblings	.184	.162	.145	.145	.104
Non-south (childhood)	.195	.118	.029	.175	.131
Non-rural (childhood)	.166	.146	.121	.123	.115
Father's presence in family	.063	.032	.068	.045	.012
Index (all items weighed equally)			.205	.201	.119

institutions. In city after city, political parties outbid each other in favor of public education, schools won the continuing support from the ranks of labor, and ethnic immigrants crowded into school hallways as fast as new buildings could be constructed. Schools were perceived to be the avenues of social progress by middle-class and working-class alike, and they achieved widespread respectability from diverse groups and interests. It was businessmen, concerned about escalating taxes, and Catholics, who feared public competition would drive their own schools out of business, who complained the most bitterly about the increases in educational costs. To understand how the public schools fought to become a popular institution, one must first appreciate how fundamental in the history of urban education was the politics of school finance.

Footnotes

1. Ravitch, 1978.
2. Bowles and Gintis, 1976, chapter 4.
3. Ibid, p. 120.
4. Ibid., p. 16.
5. Ibid., p. 114.
6. Heyns, January 1978; Becker, 1972.
7. Katz, May 1979, p. 260.
8. deLone, 1979, p. 98.
9. Ibid, p. 99.
10. Jencks et al., 1972, passim.
11. Jencks et al., 1979, passim.
12. Jencks et al., 1972, p. 220.
13. Jencks et al., 1979, pp. 296-297.
14. Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 31.
15. Ibid., p. 315.
16. Becker, May - June 1972; Heyns, 1978.
17. Bowles and Nelson, 1974, p. 49, table A.1.
18. Heyns, 1978.
19. Davis, 1978.
20. Thorndyke and Gallup, 1944.
21. Miner, 1957: 2, 29-30.
22. Jencks et al., 1979.

62

Part II

Forming Public Schools

Chapter II

POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FREE SCHOOL

In a June, 1982 landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court, in Pyler v. Doe, ruled that the state of Texas had violated the constitutional rights of illegal alien children by denying them a free public education. For the first time, a sharply divided high court, in an opinion written by Justice William Brennan, indicated that illegal aliens are entitled to equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This "Amendment extends to anyone," said Brennan, "citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a state and reaches into every corner of a state's territory." While states may withhold benefits from those who are in the United States illegally, legislation punishing children for "a parent's misconduct. . .does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice."[1]

At issue was a Texas law, enacted in 1975, that forced illegal alien children to pay tuition to attend public schools. Brennan's opinion, focusing on the consequences of such a restrictive law, noted that "the stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our nation." He further added, "It is difficult to understand precisely what the state hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare and crime.[2]

Brennan's opinion, written in response to a case brought by the Mexican Legal Defense Fund, was widely applauded in the Hispanic community, which had regarded the Texas law as challenging their status as equal citizens of the United States.[3] On the other side, Chief Justice Warren Burger, in his dissenting opinion, stated that "the court points to no meaningful way to distinguish between education and other governmental benefits. . . .Is the court suggesting that education is more fundamental than food, shelter or medical care?"[4]

The premises upon which the opinions of the high court rested reflect arguments about the value and role of public education made over one hundred fifty years ago. Brennan's concern that children denied a basic education were also being denied the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions harks back to colonial New England. According to educational historian F. T. Carlton, this same concern was held more than a century ago by two quite different "elements"--well-educated leaders and the laboring classes--who urged that free institutions could not long exist or could not progress without wide diffusion of education.[5] Brennan's view was anticipated the most eloquently by Robert Rantoul, a Massachusetts civic leader, in an 1839 address:

> A self-governing people without education is an impossibility; but a self-governing people, imperfectly and badly educated, may continually thwart itself, may often fail in its best purpose, and often carry out the worst.[6]

Just as the Hispanic community cheered the Brennan decision, so working class leaders applauded this view one hundred and fifty years earlier. Writing in 1831 in A Manual for Workingmen, Stephen Simpson penned the following:

> Indeed, to conceive of a popular government devoid of a system of popular education is as difficult as to conceive of a civilized society destitute of a system of industry. This truth has been generally received in this country, and never, I believe, directly denied; although its force has been attempted to be evaded by the rich, who have heretofore, unfortunately, been our sole law makers, through the odious system of charity schools--the bare idea of which impresses a consciousness of degradation, and leads to results the very reverse of those that ought to be produced by popular instruction.[7]

If Brennan's view was anticipated by Rantoul and Simpson, Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion also reflects early nineteenth century arguments of a more conservative nature. In questioning whether or not the court is placing the value of education above that of food, shelter or medical care, he was, in effect, echoing an earlier argument stated in 1850 by critics like the New York Tribune: "the backbone of the opposition to free schools is hostility to be taxed to school other men's children--that is, to the free school principle in any form."[8] Another argument against taxation for common schools was found in a lecture given to a New York Study Club. "Who," asked the speaker," would want to pay taxes to educate children that should never have been brought into the world? Why should the thrifty pay for the shiftless? I am not so un-christian as to say that the child once here should not be cared for. But so long as tax-payers pay for expensive playgrounds, etc., the children of the poor will increase like rabbits in a burrow."[9]

Curiously, some revisionists find themselves in the same bed as the Chief Justice. As Carlton observed decades ago, "Liberty to the radical is assumed to be non-interference with the individual; protection and tax-supported schools look to government interference."[10] Although the precepts of radical philosophy would hardly be embraced by Justice Burger and his fellow dissenters on the Supreme Court, his argument, like that of many revisionists, disassociates the state from responsibility for its citizens. This argument, too, has roots in events transpiring a century and a half ago. In Massachusetts, in 1839, a new state government asserted that the Board of Education was trying to introduce supervision into the schools, to increase the power of the central authorities at the expense of that of the local districts, and in effect, was trying to "Prussianize" the schools.[11] The argument is based on the right of the citizen to educate his children or not, as he pleases, and to live free from restraint of any kind. As Carlton, points out, "It would not be difficult to find arguments advanced in opposition to labor unions, collective bargaining, or an eight-hour day, which rest upon the same foundations and repeat almost identical phrases."[12]

The bitterness of the arguments for and against free public schools, with accusations of immorality, illegality, irreligious tendencies, and socialism was intense in the nineteenth century.[13] But the center of the storm was, without doubt, paying to educate other people's children. Since the same arguments are still being had today, as in the case of the Plyler decision, it is instructive to analyze the political alliances formed around the issue of free schools in the nineteenth century.

First of all, we will look at the state of the nineteenth century school, from which people did not flee, but rather to which they flocked. A demand for services by all classes, with which the schools were unable to cope, was combined with a clumsy governmental arrangement in which the schools had to meet service demands with money given to them by the city council. For its part, the council had to balance the needs of the schools against the needs of other civic services. We shall find that in these disputes the working class generally supported public education. They were joined by school leaders who had some notions of social control, some notions of altruism, and some desire for organizational expansion. In opposition were elements from the business community and often the Catholic Church, the former because businessmen opposed heavy tax increases that increased business costs and the latter because it already supported a vast network of parochial schools. Finally, we will examine the role of political parties in the battle for free schools. Generally speaking, American political parties were supportive of public education, particularly after the enfranchisement of the working class and with the growth of large working class concentrations in urban areas. With an appointed school board as well as an appointed superintendent responsive to the party in power, city hall had a great deal of influence on the fiscal well-being of the school system. But while they were all supportive of public schools, political parties were not equally enthusiastic. Under city administrations run by municipal reformers, schools fared much better than under city administrations run by political machines. This pattern is particularly easy to see in San Francisco, where the fiscal fortunes of the schools followed the bouncing ball of politics from reform to machine and back again. The effect of city hall on school politics in

Chicago and Atlanta is also evident: in Chicago the machine was closely connected to business interests and in Atlanta, government was dominated by white elites, making it difficult for the working class to press schooling demands.

The State of the Nineteenth Century School

Analogous to the 1982 conflict over the education of illegal aliens was the nineteenth century conflict over educating everyone in the society instead of the few who could afford to pay for the privilege. The conflict was exacerbated by the dramatic growth of urban areas and a concomitant growth in the number of children who wished to attend school. Who the schools should serve, what sorts of services should be offered, who should pay and how much were all unresolved issues, and with the advent of compulsory education, the question of school financial policies was even more hotly debated.

The first three tables of the chapter show the expansion of the schools in Atlanta, Chicago and San Francisco. In the seventeen years between 1878 and 1895 the average daily attendance (a smaller figure than enrollment) of the schools of Atlanta more than quadrupled in size; in twenty-six years between 1870 and 1896 Chicago's average daily attendance increased by 140,700 children, a six-fold increase; and in the forty years after 1872, San Francisco's schools doubled in size, experiencing an increase of 17,664 children. While all cities experienced rapid growth, if one looks at per pupil expenditure and the number of pupils per teacher, the tables show an interesting difference in commitment to funding the public schools. During the period from 1878 to 1895, per pupil expenditure in Atlanta remained pretty much constant and in fact experienced a slight drop from 1890 to 1895. Although we were unable to obtain separate per pupil expenditure figures for blacks and whites, the steady overall pupil expenditures figure may well mask an increase in expenditures on white pupils accompanied by a decline in those for black pupils. Within the strictly segregated system, the teacher-pupil ratio in black schools deteriorated badly while the teacher-pupil ratio in white schools remained essentially the same. (See Table II-1). By 1895, whites experienced a pupil-teacher

Table II-1

Expansion of the Atlanta Public School System, 1878-1895

Year	Total Expenditures		Per Pupil Expenditures		Average Daily Attendance	Pupils per Teacher	
	Current Dollars	Constant[a] Dollars	Current Dollars	Constant[a] Dollars		Blacks	Whites
1878	38.1	92.0	10	25	3,667	91	63
1882	55.3	133.5	11	25	4,256	69	64
1885	76.3	198.0	10	27	5,571	NA	NA
1890	137.5	357.0	11	28	8,413	NA	NA
1895	138.6	388.5	9	26	14,767	118	65

SOURCE: Atlanta Board of Education, Annual Reports, 1878-1895.

NOTE: a. 1947-49 = 100.

Table II-2

Expansion of the Chicago Public School System, 1870-1896

Year	Total Expenditures (000's) Current Dollars	Total Expenditures (000's) Constant[a] Dollars	Per Pupil Expenditures Current Dollars	Per Pupil Expenditures Constant[a] Dollars	Average Daily Attendance[c]	Pupils per Teachers
1870	527.7	973.2	21	39	25,300	47
1875	662.1	1,406.0	20	43	33,000	47
1880	691.5	1,671.1	16	40	42,400	47
1885	1,093.3	2,837.7	19	49	58,000	45
1890	4,706.3[b]	12,215.0[b]	53[b]	136[b]	89,600[b]	33
1896	6,334.3	17,755.5[b]	38	107	166,000	38

SOURCE: Chicago Board of Education, Annual Reports, 1870-1896.

NOTES: a. 1947-49 = 100.
b. Large increase in all columns due to annexations.
c. Figures are rounded.

Table II-3

Expansion of the San Francisco Public School System, 1865-1895

Year	Total Expenditures Current Dollars	Total Expenditures Constant[d] Dollars	Per Pupil Expenditures[c] Current Dollars	Per Pupil Expenditures[c] Constant[d] Dollars	Average Daily Attendance[a]	Pupils per Teacher[b]
1872	667.3	1,299.0	36	70	17,588	36.6
1879	858.2	2,147.9	29	73	26,376	41.9
1885	800.0	2,076.4	24	62	31,110	47.2
1891	950.2	2,466.2	28	73	30,121	39.1
1896	1,084.4	3,039.7	32	90	31,414	40.1
1901	1,261.8	3,536.9	37	104	32,733	37.7
1908	1,809.0[e]	4,695.2[e]	54[e]	140[e]	31,835	35.5

SOURCES: San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction, Annual Reports for selected years.

NOTES:
- a. Includes high school, commercial high school, polytechnic high school, grammar school, primary school, kindergarten and special schools.
- b. Teachers of high schools, grammar schools, primary schools, kindergartens, special schools, teachers of special subjects, and regular substitutes. Principals who do not teach are excluded, as are unassigned day substitutes, evening school and normal school teachers, and substitutes for evening and normal schools.
- c. Total per pupil expenditure was computed by combining current expenditures and debt servicing.
- d. 1947 - 1949 = 100.
- e. Figures reflect the reconstruction efforts of the school department after the earthquake and conflagration of 1906.

ratio of sixty-five to one, while blacks suffered in classrooms with a pupil-teacher ratio of one hundred eighteen to one.

In contrast to the very low and relatively stable level of per pupil expenditures in Atlanta, expenditures in Chicago and San Francisco were both much higher and rose and fell over time, as did the number of pupils per teacher. In 1885 Chicago spent nearly twice as much per pupil as did Atlanta, while San Francisco's expenditures were nearly two and one half times as much. With their greater resources, the school systems of Chicago and San Francisco both paid teachers more and reduced the size of the average classroom. By the mid 1890s the number of pupils per teacher had dipped to around forty or less in the northern cities, while in Atlanta's white schools the ratio remained at sixty-five to one. But if Chicago and San Francisco, when compared to Atlanta, provided substantially higher levels of service, that level of service provision was not uniform across the decades. In Chicago the level of per pupil expenditure steadily increased up until 1890, when the annexation of a large suburban area induced very rapid increases in educational expenditure. At the same time the pupil-teacher ratio dropped significantly. In San Francisco levels of per pupil expenditure remained constant from 1872 to 1891 with a drop in 1885, but rose rapidly after that date. Pupil-teacher ratios changed inversely in much the same fashion.

What we see as figures on paper posed real problems for schools, who never quite managed to keep the supply of classrooms and teachers equivalent to the demand for education. The first year the Atlanta schools opened, white enrollments exceeded school capacity by nearly 50 percent. Those who did manage to enroll almost universally found themselves in overcrowded classrooms, instructed on reduced schedules by untrained or poorly trained teachers. Very little concern at all was manifested by the board on behalf of blacks. Instead, they had to rely on schools provided by northern missionaries and the Freedman's Association in the years immediately after the Civil War, which sometimes operated on triple shifts to accommodate as many students as possible. The limited concessions made to blacks involved accommodations which were poorly constructed and quickly overcrowded.[14]

Overcrowding was the issue which occupied the most space in Chicago annual school reports. Every report from 1870 to 1895 spoke of the large class sizes and the number of students in rented rooms or on half day sessions. Officials also conjectured about the number of students who were either out in the streets or in private schools because public facilities were inadequate.

School officials adopted several policies for dealing with population pressure. In Chicago, the earliest strategy for coping with the student influx was to draw up waiting lists, allocating students to classes as soon as vacancies occurred.[15] By the mid-1870's this approach was replaced by a more elaborate procedure instituting half day sessions and making use of rented rooms.[16] As a result, few students were actually denied admission to Chicago's public schools although many had shortened school days or were housed in unpleasant surroundings.

In San Francisco also, school officials devised measures for accommodating the large number of pupils who sought seats in the classroom. After eight days absence, students would be dropped from the rolls and others would be given their places.[17] San Francisco school officials were well aware that crowded, delapidated facilities deprived many children of an adequate education. They had seen many times the scene described by an irate parent in a letter to the San Francisco Bulletin in July of 1885. The child entered the eighth grade, and was put in a "low-ceiled room about fifteen by twenty-five feet in size with dirt and cobwebs plentiful. With him in this pestilential recess were seventy-nine others."[18]

The demand for schools was there. But while public school leaders wished to build and expand in order to meet that demand, the approval of other governmental bodies was required to obtain funding for both capital and operating expenses. Consequently, school finance became enmeshed in conflicts over local governmental priorities and issues of what sort of tax burden the public should be expected to bare.

Intra-governmental Conflicts Over Schools

With services that schools should offer still a question for debate, with voters mistrustful of the financial management of many public institutions, and with the volatile character of the nineteenth century economy which was marked by frequent periods of recession, discussions of school expenditures were often translated into calls for retrenchment. Schools were particularly vulnerable to cut-backs because they were not fiscally independent. Even though school boards were responsible for spending the money necessary to sustain the school system, these boards were dependent on the city council for funds. In the best of times, city councils had to balance the needs of the school department with the needs of other city departments, making it difficult to meet the pressing enrollment demands of the schools. At the worst of times, the lack of school board fiscal autonomy was used by political machines in cities like Chicago and San Francisco to conduct raids on the public school treasury.

In Atlanta, the political system was dominated by the "leading citizens" of the city. Lawyers and businessmen were especially well-represented among office-seekers, and this elite domination was reflected in the membership of the school board as well. The members of the board were appointed to office by the city council, "by virtue of the respect which stemmed from their wealth or success, or by virtue of their political activity."[19] Between 1869, when the first school board was appointed, and 1881, members of the board were uniformly business and professional men, and numbered among them several of Atlanta's wealthiest and most eminent citizens.[20] Many men served more than ten years on the board, and five, including the first board president, served more than twenty years.[21] This domination of Atlanta's governing structures by the "Bourbon Elite" created a tendency toward conservatism and even inertia in response to the growth issues confronting the Atlanta school during these years (See Table II-1).

Because the city council and the school board both had members drawn from the more prosperous classes of Atlanta, conflicts which emerged between them had no apparent class overtones, but rather were clearly problems of political authority. The city charter vested full authority over the school system in the school board, but power over appropriations was retained by the city council. These conflicts emerged in the first years of Atlanta's school system, and persisted well into the twentieth century.[22] The fiscal irresponsibility of the school board in matters of building construction, teacher salaries, and the addition of new subjects to the curriculum was criticized by the councilmen, while the school board, anxious to meet public demand for increasing services, attacked the callous disregard for the educational needs of Atlanta's children shown by the "penurious" council. Tensions between the two groups reached crisis proportions in 1897, culminating in the disestablishment of the school board and the appointment by the city council of a smaller and politically more responsive board.[23]

The school board in San Francisco was no freer to make financial decisions than the school board in Atlanta. It was not only powerless in determining the amount of its revenue, it was also restricted in designing and drawing up its budget. Responsibility for decisions regarding school finances was divided among the State Legislature, the Board of Supervisors, and the Board of Education and remained so until 1927. A look at the major sources of school revenue gives some indication of the extent of the divided control. Revenue was derived from: 1) interest from the state school fund, 2) the state-wide school tax, 3) city and county taxes, 4) taxes voted at special elections and 5) the poll tax.[24] The board of education did not have control over the setting of any of these rates and the numerous ceilings imposed on each revenue source restricted the actions of the board. The city and county taxes were designed to supplement the amount available for the state and fluctuated according to what was available from other sources, including rental and sale of school properties. A legal ceiling of thirty-five dollars per census child, based on the average daily attendance of the previous year, was designed to cover both operating and school building expenses.[25]

The school department was required to submit expenditure requests a year in advance of when the funds would be needed. Because of burgeoning enrollment, the board consequently found itself unable to meet unexpected expenses.[26] In addition, regulations governing school finance were closely bound up with politics at the state and local level, and restrictions became even more cumbersome after 1877 when the state legislature barred all San Francisco municipal departments from spending more than one-twelfth of the total anticipated revenues in one month.[27]

In Chicago, some of the school board's financial responsibilities were delegated directly to it by the state legislature, and some of them were shared with the city council. Among the responsibilities it handled on its own were the rental, furnishing and maintaining of school buildings, the employment of teachers plus determination of their salaries, and the direction of the routine, day-to-day operation of the schools. These obligations had to be met with "cash on hand" since deficit spending by the board was strictly prohibited by 1872 legislation. The school board's financial control was further weakened by decentralization within its own internal governance structure. A standing committee on finance and auditing oversaw expenditures, with approval by this committee considered approval by the entire board. Over the years, the number of committees on the board proliferated, however, and it became customary for individual committees to have de facto control over expenditures in the areas under their purview. This decentralization made it difficult to exercise rigorous control over expenditures or to carefully compare different areas of expenditures.[28]

The responsibilities which the board shared with the city council included the authority to sell school lands, to rent school lands, and to manage the fund created as a result of past sales and current rentals.[29] The school lands fund had been established when Chicago's city government had been formally organized; the sale of the lands was to provide an operating fund for the schools. In the period after the Civil War, this school lands fund contributed only a small portion of total revenues, leaving taxation and bonding as the two most important sources of school monies. Because it did not provide a greater share, the school fund was the most controversial source of school financing. Problems surrounding the rental and sale of school lands frequently raised questions about the relationship of the school system to the business community, particularly questions about the competence and disinterestedness of the public bodies charged with promoting the welfare of the schools when it conflicted with the interests of the business community. Even as early as 1870, the rental of school lands was being used as a political plum and when the properties were appraised that year, the city council reduced the appraised value by half. In addition, the issue of the school lands had become a partisan as well as a class issue with Republicans accusing Democrats of reducing the value of the lands to help "secessionists."[30]

So in all three cities, attempts to finance schooling generated highly predictable patterns of institutional conflict. On the one side, school boards, regularly faced with escalating enrollments and overcrowded classrooms, insisted that expenditure increases were vital. On the other side, city councils or other governmental bodies with the responsibility for levying local taxes, charged the boards with waste and inefficiency. With the responsibility for providing services divided from the responsibility for raising revenues, this pattern of contention was hardly escapable. Each side knew best the domain for which it was responsible, and each side failed to perceive clearly enough the difficulties faced by the other. No wonder that school finance became the most bitterly contested of all local issues.

Support for and Opposition to Free Schools

In political circumstances where the struggle for school expansion was so bitterly contested, it was important for the school to be able to count on support from leaders, groups, and community organizations. Which segments of the urban population gave schools their consistent backing? From where did the social sources of opposition stem? Were working class groups attacking the schools for waste and extravagance? Did they attempt to forestall elite efforts to impose schooling on their children as much of the revisionist writing might lead one to believe? Or did labor unions become stalwart defenders of the free school? How about businessmen? Did they see the free school as a cost-efficient means of providing a better educated work force, instilled with a proper appreciation of the capitalist society, more willing to fulfill the role of wage-earner and workers in the factories of the well-to-do? Or did they oppose the rapid increases in the cost of public education?

The Working Class and Trade Unions

Carlton, in his turn-of-the-century study, attempted to categorize groups into supporters and non-supporters of public education. Although recognizing that no group was unanimous in its opinion, basically he found supporters to be "men considered as: Citizens of the Republic, workingmen, non-tax payers, Calvinists, residents of cities." Those who did not support tax-supported public education were "Men considered as: Residents of rural districts, taxpayers, members of exclusive or ultra-conservative classes, Lutherans, Quakers, etc., possessing a mother tongue other than English, proprietors of private schools."[31]

Carlton (and other authors, as well) are at odds with a few studies which have appeared some sixty-five years later. Far from finding the working man to be a supporter of public education, these researchers believe he was a victim, finding education imposed by the middle and upper classes on his family. Michael Katz, for example claims that "school committees were unashamedly trying to impose educational reform and innovation on this reluctant citizenry. The communal leaders were not answering the demands of a clamorous working class: they were imposing the demands; they were telling the majority, your children shall be educated, and as we see fit."[32]

If one recognizes that within the working class, as within the middle and upper classes, there were varying views of the value of public education, then it is obvious one can find instances of working-class opposition to the establishment of free schools and especially high schools. Some such opposition can be found even among trade union writings. But most union leaders held the belief that education was the greatest hope for bringing about social equality. Indeed, labor leaders were often proud to claim primary responsibility for the development of the nation's public schools, as, for example, Samuel Gompers did in his testimony before the United States Commission on Industrial Relations in 1914:

> It is not generally known that to the organized labor movement of Massachusetts belongs the credit of establishing public schools in Massachusetts and the general public school

> system as it has since developed. Prior to that time there were schools which children of poor parents could attend but attendance at such schools carried with it the stigma of the poverty of the parents. Such poverty was a stigma then. The labor movement of Massachusetts secured the enactment of a law removing as a requirement for attendance at these schools that the parents of the children must declare that they could not afford to pay for the tuition of their children. Thus came into existence the first public school in the United States.[33]

While this claim may have exaggerated the power of labor in antebellum Massachusetts, and while one should not over-emphasize the political strength of trade unions even in big city politics of the late nineteenth century, there is little doubt that labor was both rhetorically and ideologically committed to free public education. For example, the preamble to one San Francisco union's constitution had as one of its principles, that members "keep a watchful and jealous eye upon our common school system, so that it may even be preserved to us and future generations in all its original strength and purity."[34]

In part, labor's enthusiasm for education simply reflected the wider societal belief that schools were important for political democracy and social change.[35] But labor had more immediate objectives in making the case for expanding public schools. For one thing, schools removed from the labor market young children who, by working for minimal wages, seemed to depress the wage levels more generally.

Slightly after the turn of the century, the Atlanta Journal of Labor began a major campaign to enact child labor legislation. Called a humane, wise and just act, the Georgia Federation of Labor urged the soon-to-be-convened Democratic convention to enact child labor laws, striking "the shackles from the limbs of the factory child-slaves."[36] The campaign continued through 1906, when the Georgia Legislature passed a child labor bill.[37] During this period, the Journal of Labor published articles tying child and labor and education together:

> There is one defect in our law [the 1906 Child Labor legislation], however, and the same is true of practically all of the states that have compulsory education, and that is the provision

> which permits a child, the sole support of indigent parents, to be relieved from school attendance and allowed to labor. . . .Experience has demonstrated that the majority of claims for exemption are not bona fide, and are the product of parental avarice rather than necessity. . . It is far more important that the child should be given an education and be made a useful citizen than that the parent eke out a miserable existence through the meagre earnings of an infant when the parent can be as well or better supported by the state.[38]

The campaign for public education thus went hand in hand with the campaign against child labor. Secondly, labor favored the expansion of free public institutions that serviced the broadest segments of society possible. To the extent that such public institutions were instituted, to that extent, trade union leaders believed, their people would have the same opportunities as those which the wealthy enjoyed. An attempt in 1878 to abolish the teaching of foreign languages from the San Francisco public schools, for instance, led the Turners' Union to remark that the change would "rob the poor man's child of an equal opportunity with the rich man's at acquiring an education in harmony with the modern idea, and tend to make the poor man poorer and the rich man richer."[39]

Reflecting the sentiment that education should be available to all and that the cost of textbooks should not be an inhibiting factor, the free textbook issue was discussed frequently in the labor press during these years. There was considerable agreement among the papers on this question--free textbooks should be provided to pupils in the public schools. Rationale for the position was based on the strong anti-monopoly sentiment that pervaded the labor movement during this era. The Knights of Labor asserted that "the system is in the hands of a set of conscienceless sharks and is made the means of unmercifully fleecing parents, so that though our schools are nominally "free," the constant demand for new books at monopoly prices constitutes a heavy tax on education."[40] The American system was compared with the Swiss, in which free textbooks were provided. Book manufacturers were accused of using "bribery, corruption and bulldozing to prevent any legislation that would interfere with their grasps on the people's pockets."[41] They were charged with using newspapers to mold public opinion and to create a misleading impression of popular support for their position.[42]

The solution proposed by the labor papers was some form of state production of textbooks. Periodically, legislation calling for the state manufacture of textbooks was introduced in the legislature. Those who opposed the legislation argued that state interference would destroy competition, to which the labor paper The Rights of Labor, replied that competition was impossible "under the present reign of trusts."[43] The paper also went to some lengths to show that the cost of production was far below the price charged for school books and was within the capacity of the state to absorb.[44]

Another issue frequently discussed in labor newspapers of the period, and also one which illustrated labor's commitment to a broadly-based educational system, was that of manual training. "Much of the degradation of labor," asserted the Knights of Labor, "may be traced to ignorance, and this is caused to a great extent by sending young children out into the world to battle for bread before they have been taught anything that will put them on even ground with their fellows."[45] The paper lauded the platform of the Farmer's Alliance party, which called for "a public school system that will be practical, based on moral, manual and intellectual training that will include the dignity and necessity of honest labor."[46]

Two years later the issue of manual training was raised by the Knights of Labor again, only framed much more in class conscious rhetoric. In a lengthy article which embraced a range of subjects--the eight hour day, "trade unionism and trusts" and "free speech for criticism of economic and political grievances"--the essayist inserted a discussion of the need for "universal industrial education." The article laid the responsibility for the problems of labor at the feet of the employers rather than to the changing labor market. "The American employers of our great industrial armies do not afford our boys and girls fair opportunities to learn skilled trades," the paper said. It argued that little instruction was imparted to young employees in the shop, and that foremen were hired not for trade proficiency, but for the capacity to drive men--overworking and underpaying them. The solution, in the view of the Knights of Labor, was the establishment of free manual training and public technical schools "on the same footing as the schools of natural science, medicine, law and the fine arts." These "must replace the old private and family apprenticeships." The main opposition to such a plan was "the satanic press of the 'protected', tax-gathering plutocracy" who called this socialism. The paper warned that "our entire system of public schools is socialistic in principle although not in practice," and that the people are getting aroused to the necessity of universal industrial education in public schools."[47]

Labor signified its support for free schools through its emphasis on the need for adequate taxes to support the institution. In Chicago, those who refused to support the expansion of the public school curriculum were "the millionaire element of society that never patronizes the public schools, and that is always on tender hooks for fear it may be excessively taxed."[48] In San Francisco, an 1897 controversy led labor unions to object to a proposal limiting municipal taxes to $1.00 on one hundred dollars of assessed value. Among the arguments against the limit was one claiming that "working people and small traders and manufacturers . . . have children to educate and cannot send them to expensive private schools . . ."[49] Labor support for school expenditures was also evident in its position on school bonds. In late 1899, a major controversy erupted over whether the city should float bonds for the construction of a large "panhandle park" adjoining Golden Gate Park, Citizen Improvement Associations and the Merchants Association lobbied in favor of the bonds while labor groups argued that schools should receive a higher priority than the park project. The San Francisco Labor Council endorsed the bonds for school buildings, a new City and County Hospital and a sewer system but almost unanimously condemned the Park Panhandle project. In a letter to the Star the Labor Council stated that,

> . . . the lack of school room for the city's children is breeding ignorance and vice as in California the right to vote is not any longer the inherent right of its citizens, but a privilege granted only to those able to read and write, it needs but little thought from a workingman's standpoint, as his children are always the sufferers to show the necessity of more school houses.[50]

Atlanta's labor movement was less active than those of Chicago and San Francisco in politically supporting public schools. One of the explanations for its quiescence is that from 1870 until 1900, Atlanta's political system was dominated by the "leading citizens" of the city. More than 80 percent of all candidates for municipal office were drawn from the upper end of the occupation distribution, with lawyers and businessmen especially well-represented. Only 10 percent of the candidates were drawn from the working class, with another 10 percent drawn from among white-collar and clerical workers.[51]

The predominance of Atlanta's elite in city politics is accounted for by a number of factors, among which the most important is probably the persistence of at-large, city-wide voting for all municipal offices. Mayors and aldermen ran at-large and were elected at-large; candidates for the city council, in contrast, were obliged to live in the ward they proposed to represent, but were elected at-large, and so had to campaign in every ward in the city. The principal motivation behind the retention of city-wide election of candidates in Atlanta was the fact that black voters represented a majority in the fourth ward, and a near majority in the third. Ward-based election of councilmen would have been likely to result in the direct representation of the black community in city government, a prospect unattractive to white citizens of all classes.[52]

The preservation of city-wide elections had the effect of limiting the power of Atlanta's white working class to elect its representatives to office, because the strength of a large working class constituency in some wards was more than offset by strong support for elite candidates originating in others. In an important election in 1888, for example, in which the upper-class Citizens' Ticket was strongly challenged by the working class People's Ticket, the latter slate carried the first ward, and made a strong showing in the heavily black third and fourth wards, but suffered a substantial defeat city-wide in all races because of heavy majorities for the Citizens' Ticket in remaining wards.[53]

In spite of the fact that working class organizations were largely ineffective in electing working class candidates to city offices, by virtue of its substantial voting power, labor was courted by all candidates for office, and representatives of the working class were frequently included among the Citizens' Ticket candidates. As a rule, representation on the ticket of leading citizens was the only way in which the working class could win political office at this time. Although there were a number of direct challenges to elite candidates from slates formulated and supported by organized labor, none of these challenges was successful until well after the turn-of-the-century. Labor's lack of influence over school policy should not be taken as evidence of working class opposition to schools, however. Indeed, its political weakness helps account both for Atlanta's low level of educational expenditure and the severe crowding experienced by both the white and black children of the city.

Business

While the working class viewed education as the most viable road out of poverty, large numbers of taxpayers had doubts enough about education as a remedy for the country's social problems. Among the most vocal opponents of free schools were business elites. We have already noted the political monopoly exercised by white business and professional elites in Atlanta, a monopoly which resulted in low school expenditures and high teacher-pupil ratios. The question that now comes to mind is whether business attitudes in San Francisco, and especially in highly-industrialized Chicago were similar. In Chicago particularly, events such as the Haymarket Riot of 1886 had brought to the public's mind such issues as anarchy, rebellion, and citizenship. In these two cities it might have made sense for business to make the educational investment necessary to insure a pool of well-trained workers who would be trained not to rise up against the "capitalist" system. But if such calculations may have made sense to some, Chicago and San Francisco businesses were in no way unanimously prepared to bear a large tax burden for the sake of the public schools. Even though some businessmen may have seen "schooling...as a means of producing the new forms of motivation and discipline acquired in the emerging corporate order," business leaders remained unenthusiastic about educational expansion, offering it little support in times of prosperity and coming out in strong opposition in periods of economic uncertainty. Whether or not

84

they were "alarmed by growing labor militancy" as some have suggested,[54] business leaders were especially concerned about excessive school expenditures in recessionary periods (when labor militancy was especially problematic).

The idea of expanding, ever-more-costly public schools found few friends among San Francisco's wealthiest citizens. When school expenditures came under close public scrutiny in connection with accusations of corruption, the Merchant's Association, in its Review, called the school department a "municipal calamity." It noted that "proportionately, no city spends more money upon its public school system than San Francisco, yet few cities receive less in return.[55] Despite the "exceedingly generous appropriation" given the department "thousands of boys and girls were turned away for lack of room at the opening of the present time."[56]

The response of the business community to school bond issues and special taxation was in accord with its belief that the schools were fiscally irresponsibly managed. "Economical administration and a decent saloon license," claimed the Review, "would probably provide sufficient revenue . . ."[57] Special taxes frequently were tied up for years in litigation.[58] However, the business community eventually came to accept the need for bond issues to provide funds for school building purposes when it became apparent that "no head of a family in ordinary circumstances would care to live here (if new schools are not erected)."[59] But basically, through the turn of the century, business favored lower school expenditures, arguing that schools could live within the budgetary restraints that had been imposed upon them since the early 1880s.[60]

Business in Chicago was equally unwilling to support heavy school taxes and instead insisted on economies of all sorts. Structural arrangements for financing schools theoretically could have placed a large share of the tax burden on the business community, since business rented many of the lands which remained as part of the School Fund. These rentals were to provide some operating revenue for the schools: in the late nineteenth century they contributed between 8 percent and 10 percent of the total per year,[61] far less than many groups felt they should provide.

In 1872, control of the fund was passed from the City Council to the Board of Education. Finding many of the properties underassessed and paying lower interest rates than those publicly announced, the board accused the council of mismanagement, claiming that "persons who look on the School Fund as public plunder took advantage of this. . .[62] Back rents were successfully collected, but an attempt to increase the appraisals embroiled the board in a protracted dispute with major business interests occupying the lands. After an intense legal battle, in which the judge initially ruled in favor of the lessees, an out-of-court compromise was negotiated.[63]

Controversy over school lands in Chicago reached its level of greatest intensity in the mid-1890s when, in anticipation of the 1895 appraisal, several tenants began to push for an end to the system of land re-evaluation and its replacement with a fixed or graduated rental scheme. Some tenants including the Chicago Daily News and the Chicago Tribune managed in this way to renegotiate such favorable terms on their leases that Illinois Governor Altgeld accused them of "waving the flag with one hand and plundering the public with the other."[64] In the case of the Tribune the renegotiation of the leases coincided with the fact that the paper's attorney was both president of the Board of Education and a member of the committee that negotiated the paper's new lease.[65] Writing at the time of the controversy, one commentator observed that:

> The board admitted that the appraised valuation might fall below what the property would bring in the open market were it free from all incumbrances; the appraisers were inclined to be conservative. . . .but even an untechnical examination of the leases is sufficient to show that the finance committee feels very tenderly toward the tenants and is strongly inclined to guard them from the exactions of the public whom the committee is ostensibly serving.[66]

Although other attempts would be made to increase the School Fund by reassessing rental properties, the fund never yielded a substantial operating revenue, since it would have been at the expense of key Chicago businesses.

Catholics

While the rental of school lands was not such an issue in all cities, opposition to tax-supported public schools emerged from other quarters. Among the opponents was the Catholic Church, which had established a large educational system itself. Many immigrants were Catholics, and chose to send their children to Catholic schools for various reasons including religious training, preservation of their ethnic cultures, and a belief that the quality of education in the parochial schools was superior to that offered by the public school system. And while non-Catholics were unhappy about giving money to schools in which a different religion was an integral part of the curriculum, Catholics were equally unhappy about having to support schools they did not wish to use.

The intense discourse over spending public money on parochial schools was elevated to the national level in the 1870s and 1880s, causing divisions within both the Republican and Democratic parties. In 1875, Democratic President Ulysses S. Grant declared that every child in the land should have a common school education free of secularism,[67] a position not shared by many members of his party. In the same year, his Republican opponent, James Blaine, introduced a constitutional amendment forbidding public funds to sectarian schools. It passed the House but failed to pass the Senate, where the Democratic majority, interpreting the amendment as an attack on Catholics, defeated it.[68]

With only a few exceptions Catholic opposition to the free school continued throughout the century. Some church leaders like Father Peter Yorke of San Francisco claimed that the state had no business interfering in the private life of the family, which it was doing with its insistence that all taxpayers support public schools.[69] Others did not object to the free school in principle, but believed that public funds should be allocated for parochial schools too. An editorial in the San Francisco Monitor, the official archdiocese newspaper, claimed " while the state should place primary education within the reach of all its citizens and that the majority of schools should be public or under the supervision of the State, . . . it is an injustice to those Catholics, Methodists or Episcopalians who, through religious convictions refuse to make use of the public schools, to refuse help to those institutions which alone they can use--thus imposing on them a double tax for the education of their children."[70]

The few times that Catholic opposition was not so strong were exceptional times when public money was made available for parochial schools. One of these exceptions occured in the early days of the San Francisco schools when an ordinance providing that schools "formed by the enterprise of a religious society in which all the educational branches of the district schools shall be taught. . .should be eligible to receive public funds"[71] was passed. This provision was ruled illegal by the State Legislature in 1852. Nevertheless, the following year, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, John G. Martin, recommended that the state school law should be altered to allow some public funds to finance denominational schools which were helping to ease the burden of educating the state's children. The result was the passage of the Ward School Act in 1853. In San Francisco, this meant that the Catholic schools would once again be eligible to receive public funds. There were three such ward schools in San Francisco between 1853 and 1855, providing education for 1421 students in the primary and grammar grades. These schools were apportioned nearly forty thousand dollars for the two year period that the law remained in effect.[72] In 1855, an amendment to the law marked an end to the experiment with funding denominational schools. It required that teachers in parochial and convent schools pass an examination and obtain a public school certificate before the school could receive public funding.[73] The nuns in charge of the Catholic girls' school did not take the exams but the lay male teachers who taught at the boys' schools took the exams and were appointed by the school board.

A second exception occurred in 1870, when the State Legislature granted $15,000 to the Presentation Free Schools (run by the Presentation Sisters). Considerable oppostion was engendered, with the Bulletin, a leading reform newspaper, calling the bill "one of the most objectionable passed by the Legislature" and called it a threat to the existence of non-sectarian schools.[74] Despite this isolated incidence of public funding for Catholic schools after 1855, a repeat of the ward school experiment was never put on the city agenda again.

The compromise which allowed for the hiring of Catholic teachers in the public schools after the abolition of the ward schools appeared to temper Catholic opposition to public schools. Although the city went along with the state prohibition against passing on local tax money to the Church schools, the San Francisco political situation was too delicately balanced after 1855 to permit a Protestant crusade against Catholic teachers in the public schools.

In the absence of its ability to obtain public funding for its own schools, the Church spent the later years of the century attacking the expansion of the school curriculum. Based on its objection to the "double tax", the Church argued that the public school was an institution which taxed "the poor for the benefit of the wealthy."[75] The *Monitor* suggested that the schools try to save money by paring down the scope of the curriculum and by eliminating high schools. The paper found it "no wonder that the laboring poor are filled with discontent at beholding this and many other injustices done them, nor will it remove this discontent to say to the poor man, the high school is open to your child as well as those of the rich, for he cannot make use of the privilege for many reasons sufficiently obvious."[76] The *Monitor* applauded the attempt by State Senator McCoppin to introduce a bill "providing for the exclusion of music, drawing and languages, except the English from all schools maintained at the public expense."[77]

The one institutional expression of potential working class opposition to public schools thus came from the Catholic Church. It may be argued, on the basis of this evidence, that the Church spoke for a prevasive working man's view that schools had little value. It may be that the Church voiced a widespread concern that schools offered little hope for economic advancement for working class children, and were designed by elites to "domesticate" the poor. It may be argued that it was the Church, not the trade union movement, that best captured working class views of public education. All these arguments are possible, but, in our opinion, they are in the end unconvincing for several reasons. First the Catholics themselves concentrated their own limited resources on providing religiously-based education for their parishoners. Their success in creating an institutional rival to public schools in many working class neighborhoods is inconceivable apart from a belief common to priest and parishioners alike that education was not only an aid to salvation but also a step towards a better life in this world as well. Secondly, the Catholic Church was always willing to withhold its criticism of public schools any time it could receive some governmental aid for itself. Indeed, the public schools might have gained more in fiscal terms at an earlier date had they been more willing to work cooperatively with their fellow educators within the Catholic Church. Finally, Catholics criticized the public schools not for giving working class children education they did not need but for seemingly limiting access to the high schools to middle-class children.

All in all, Catholic opposition to public schools must be understood as basically a function of the church's own organizational interests. Hoping to maintain its own parish schools in the face of an increasingly well-endowed competitor, the church, quite astutely, did its best to keep its public school rival from becoming overwhelmingly strong.

The Role of Political Parties in the Development of Public Education

Not only has the consistent struggle of the working class in obtaining free public education for its children been misconstrued by the revisionists. Not only have the business community's and the Catholic Church's positions on public education been misinterpreted. But the support of political parties and the contributions of "reformers" to the development of public education has also been "revised."

Inasmuch as workers in northern cities could--and did--vote, when the common interests of the working class touched on schooling as they did in the 1880s and 1890s, their expression, whether by community groups, trade unions or independent political parties, commanded the attention of the regular political parties. In Chicago 49.5 percent of the electorate was foreign-born. Moreover, they were spatially organized in homogeneous neighborhoods and voted in blocs.[78] In 1892, one-third of the German-born vote, which constituted 18 percent of the electorate, was concentrated in five of the city's thirty-four wards; 42 percent of the Irish voters lived in five wards; 45 percent of the Swedish vote could be found in five wards. The Bohemian and Polish communities were even more concentrated, over one-half residing in two wards. These powerful communities could be rapidly mobilized around school issues.

At various times, these voters channeled their concerns through independent labor parties, including the United Labor Party, the People's Party and the Workingmen's Party of California. In 1884, item number six on the Illinois Federation of Labor's (I.F. of L.) Committee on Platform Reform, containing sixteen legislative proposals, was "the prohibition of the employment of children under fourteen years of age in workshops and schools except as applied to industrial schools." Item number seven was "the adoption and enforcement of a compulsory education system." Although absent from the 1885 and 1886 platforms, a child labor plank reappeared in 1887, 1888, 1892, and 1893. The compulsory education plank also appeared in all the available platforms between 1884 and 1893.[79] The I.F. of L. also included a free text book plank in its 1885, 1887, 1888, 1892, and 1893 platforms.[80] The electoral strength of these independent parties was shortlived, however, leaving the Democratic Party to be the main conduit for working class interests. The sudden predominance of the Democratic party in Chicago's municipal politics during the 1880s can be attributed in part to the fact that "increasing numbers of voters of foreign background and workingmen in general gravitated toward the Democrats, "which more and more became identified as the party of the "great unwashed."[81]

But as strong as the ethnic appeal of the Democratic Party might have been, it was "the boss and his machine" which "towered over" the period's politics.[82] Revisionist literature has identified the political machine as an essentially working class institution, while its nemesis, the municipal reformer, is characterized as a middle-class do-gooder driven by the twin goals of social efficiency and social control. Power, whenever possible, was to be taken from the people. Samuel Hays asserts, for example, that the municipal progressives were a small group of upper middle class elites who wished to replace ward-based "friends and neighbors" politics with a more "efficient" government run by the best-educated, best-qualified people.[83] The 1898 San Francisco City Charter is referred to "as the first and crucial step in the process by which San Francisco's business and professional elite worked to translate their corporate ideal into social reality."[84] Machines, on the other hand, have been treated as devoted friends of the poor and immigrants. Among the many services they supposedly provided were direct relief for the poor, as well as information and influence for families unfamiliar with the red tape and overlapping jurisdictions of city agencies.[85] In cities where machines dominated school politics, bosses and their subordinates sometimes mediated between their constituents and the official school system. In addition, "through jobs and contracts in the schools the machine sometimes offered paths of social mobility to groups that otherwise might have been excluded."[86]

If these characterizations are correct then the expectation with respect to school finances would be that the machine would use its political muscle not only for distributing patronage, but also for underwriting, somewhat profligately perhaps, a growing school system. Tight-fisted reformers, with an accountant-like view of efficiency, could be expected to have attacked "unnecessary spending" in the system. Under reform regimes, school expenditures would have declined and teacher-pupil ratios would have increased.

In order to ascertain the evidence for these interpretations of urban machines and their reform opponents, we looked at policy outcomes in San Francisco where political machines, reform movements and third-party movements alternated in their control of City Hall, providing an unusual opportunity to study the effects of changing political coalitions on the fiscal well-being of the schools. Our findings did not confirm the revisionist interpretation of municipal politics. Instead, as discussed earlier in the chapter and as shown in Table II-3, teacher-pupil ratios worsened and expenditures per pupil declined between 1879 and 1885, not rising to their 1879 level again until 1891. Only after that date did per pupil expenditures increase and classroom crowding recede.

The relationship between these changes in the economic well-being of the San Francisco Public Schools and the balance of power among San Francisco's political forces is graphed in Figure II-1. The graph adopts the characterization of San Francisco's nineteenth century politics developed by McDonald, who has written a careful analysis of municipal politics and finance in San Francisco during this time. McDonald divides the period between 1870 and 1910 into five distinct political periods--the People's-Taxpayers Party, Party Irregularity, the Machine, Reform, and Union Labor. From McDonald's and other accounts, it appears that by 1885 Boss Buckley's star was rising steadily.[87] By 1890 reformers were gaining in influence and in the last years of the century they were in power.

The school expenditure data show that the single time period in nineteenth century San Francisco when the public schools suffered a precipitious decline in per pupil expenditures was the era when Boss Buckley's machine was in firm command. Constant dollar per pupil expenditures fell from a high of $73 in 1879, to just $62 in 1885. While they did climb again, they did not increase beyond their 1879 level. When reformers took control after 1891, school expenditures on a per pupil basis went up steadily, reaching $90 four years later and climbing to over $100 per pupil by the end of the century. Consistent with this expenditure pattern, the pupil-teacher ratio rose dramatically when the machine was in power in the early eighties. By 1885 there were as many as forty-seven pupils per teacher. No wonder the school crisis was a central political issue in that year. But after reformers took command the pupil-teacher ratio declined quite steadily reaching a level of 39 by the beginning of the last decade of the century. In short, detailed analysis of expenditure levels in nineteenth century San Francisco hardly shows the reformers were more concerned about cost-cutting and penny-pinching than were the city's machine politicians.

Political bosses frequently professed their support for education, of course. Christopher M. Buckley, who entered San Francisco politics as a Republican but changed to a Democrat when fortune dictated, claims in his "Memoirs" that "if there was one thing more than another that I desired to keep absolutely aloof from politics, it was the conduct of



Figure II -1 Per Pupil Expenditure and Pupils per Teacher, by Political Era, San Francisco 1870-1911

SOURCES: San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction, Annual Report.

the public schools. I wished them maintained in the highest degree of efficiency for a reason personal to myself. All my life I have had to feel the lack of early opportunities of learning. I went through the grammar school, and had to let it go at that. When my historian asked me where I acquired what he was pleased to call my gift of correct English speech, I had to tell the blunt truth--behind the bar of a saloon."[88]

Buckley's rule reached its zenith in 1885, though he continued to be a political force until as late as 1890. During these years it appeared that Buckley's support for the public schools had turned into the public schools' "support" of Buckley. Even while he was cutting school expenditures and leaving teachers with ever larger classrooms, he found good "use" for public education. In October of 1884, the San Francisco Chronicle compiled a list of accusations against the school board: teaching positions in the department were sold, janitorships hawked about, votes on replacing school text books were bought by publishers with cash, goods contracts were mismanaged and unclear, furniture was taken from the storehouse for political and personal purposes, carpenters in the school shop did work on private houses and were paid for it out of the school treasury.[89]

In the subsequent decade, reformers gained steadily in power, which culminated in 1896 with the unqualifiedly reform-minded James Duval Phelan, who moved to implement his philosophies of the public good. Phelan had come to the conclusion that "the source of most civic corruption in the United States lay in the private ownership of municipal utilities."[90] He ran for mayor on a program calling for—a new charter that would enable the city to buy and operate public utilities, with a provision restricting the conditions under which franchises would be granted in the future.[91] The charter also proposed an appointed school board and recruitment of teachers only from those who had attended public schools. Piqued by low labor representation on the committee formulating the charter, teachers joined labor and opposed the charter on the basis that only teachers who were public school graduates would be hired to teach. Heavily Catholic San Francisco had recognized the threat to parochial schools and defeated the charter, although

Phelan was elected.[92]

For a time Phelan seemed in control. Corruption was less prevalent, political turmoil dissipated and the city benefited from a healthy economic base. In the schools, per pupil expenditures began to rise and pupil-teacher ratios began to fall. But as a strong supporter of the unpopular 1898 charter and as a close friend of many of San Francisco's wealthy citizens, Phelan was never trusted by labor or the teachers. Hard pressed by bad wages and long hours, the California State Federation of Labor moved to make San Francisco a closed-shop town. They organized a massive strike, which failed when Mayor Phelan allowed police to control violence between strikers and strikebreakers. Labor retired from the struggle extremely bitter toward the reform mayor, but so did employers, most of whom believed Phelan should have moved against the strikers much earlier and with the National Guard rather than with the police.

With this major labor-employer clash as background, members of labor unions met to discuss the formation of a labor ticket in the next municipal election. Into this tense situation stepped Abraham Ruef, "with a positive genius for organizing. . . ."[93] He helped structure the new Union Labor Party (ULP) and hand-picked its first candidate for mayor, Eugene E. Schmitz, a local conductor and a member of the Musician's Union, who was elected in 1901. The Ruef-Schmitz duo ruled San Francisco through 1906. While Schmitz presented a respectable facade, both he and Ruef slowly became more and more entwined in the realities of business interests, politics and corruption, activities which finally culminated in prison terms for both men. Ruef was sentenced in March of 1907 and Schmitz in June of the same year.

The shady dealing which went on in the world of franchise-granting, however, did not manifest itself to such a great extent in the schools during the ULP administration. Ruef early on reasoned that political folly would be the result of gross mismanagement in an emotionally-charged area like the public schools.[94] At any rate, there were far bigger prizes to be had elsewhere. Therefore, he and Schmitz attempted to make reasonably competent appointments to school board positions. Among these was on Alfred Roncovieri, who went on to become one of the best and most popular school superintendents ever, whose record of seventeen years of successive service still stands for city and county superintendents in San Francisco.[95]

In part, this admirable restraint on Ruef's part was "encouraged" by a very strong public sentiment prevalent at the time--that of keeping "politics out of the schools." The Committee of One Hundred, the freeholder's charter revision committee which structured much of the 1898 charter, had tried to define the "ideal" school system, a task which proved impossible and left many members of the committee very disillusioned.[96] Nevertheless, the group did proffer a number of suggestions for school system reorganization, emphasizing "authority and accountability."[97] Among these was the suggestion that the mayor have the power to appoint board members and to remove them for cause, a position agreed on for the next twenty-two years by members of the community.

> There can be no perfect system of selecting a school board but as some system must be chose, appointment by the Mayor brings better results than any other. And if the results are bad, the people do not have to hunt through a crowd of men to fix responsibility; they have one man in plain view from whom to seek redress. As the people are more sensitive about their schools than any other part of their government, a Mayor pays close attention to their demands.[98]

The Ruef-Schmitz School Board was fairly free of corruption and patronage surrounding teacher appointments, a fact which enabled the administration to avoid public criticism in a generally highly contentious area. In 1903, upon the recommendation of a number of California educators, a civil service system had been adopted, and was safeguarded during the Ruef-Schmitz years. By 1911, when they were no longer in power, the rule was suspended. This led Roncovieri to pledge himself to work "assiduously for the adoption of any amendment" to the City Charter to safeguard what he considered a "bulwark of our educational progress and development."[99]

Certainly there were conflicts during the Ruef-Schmitz years and during the Union Labor Party administration which followed them. There were accusations of school work contracted to architects without the advantage of open bidding. The Japanese were shamefully treated by San Franciscans and the ULP, and excluded from the public schools over the protestations of President Theodore Roosevelt. Patrick Henry "Pinhead" McCarthy the ULP mayor who took office after the 1909 elections, attempted to remove what he called the "reform" board from office, even resorting to physical violence at one point. Injunctions followed his moves, and the 1909 board is known as the "In Again, Out Again" board. Dolson characterizes these years as ones of "constant political conflict," with most of the tensions existing between the Union Labor Party and the Phelan reformers.[100] The Charter which had gone into effect in 1900, caused problems with its duplicative powers in the board and the superintendent. Neither of them had the power to resolve issues, and their continual bickering, plus the glaring physical inadequacies of the schools, led the public to finally take an active part in an examination of its school department.[101]

In spite of the plethora of literature available documenting the activities of urban bosses, revisionists persist in believing that while patronage and corruption did exist, these were in fact mechanisms by which the needy and poor were served and that machine politicians spent just as much or more on municipal services than did the reformers. Rather than creating a municipality structured by the needs of the middle and upper classes, the urban boss is said to have spent public monies on working class and ethnic demands, offering them access to jobs and better services. Our data on school expenditures, which show more rapid school expansion under reform leadership runs counter to this view. Significantly so does T. J. McDonald's quantitative study of San Francisco, which analyzes the effects of bosses and reformers on municipal spending in general during the late nineteenth century.

McDonald's research attempted to ascertain whether changes in general expenditure levels by the San Francisco city government were determined by increasing industrialization and other socio-economic factors or by changes in political power that occurred in the forty-six years between 1860 and 1906. Three different patterns were possible: 1) socio-economic forces in the city were of fundamental importance, and changes in political power would have little effect on expenditure

98

levels;[102] 2) political factors would affect expenditure levels; as political machines and professional politicians gained in power, expenditures would increase, while reform "efficiency" would lead to expenditure cuts. One study of San Francisco had, without investigating actual expenditure patterns, actually made this claim (which is made more generally by much of the revisionist literature) about the politics and finances of San Francisco;[103] 3) political factors would affect expenditure levels; as reformers gained power they would attempt to provide a more complete set of public services, while machine politicians, having a different concept of the general interest, would seek to minimize business discontent by keeping taxes low. Such is the pattern we found in San Francisco school politics.

McDonald found, first of all, that expenditures climbed steeply during the period of reform governance, which began fiscally in 1893 and continued through 1902.[104] As can be seen in Figure II-2, while general fund expenditures were about $2,300,000 in 1892, they rose to as high as $3,800,000 by the turn of the century, and higher in the next decade. By comparison expenditure levels under machine rule (1883-1892) hovered between $1,900,000 and $2,300,000, a relatively constant figure over a decade of significant change. Clearly, reformers were more willing to draw upon the public purse than the machine politicians had been during the preceding decade.

These differences, to be sure, could be a function of social and economic factors rather than any difference that can be atributed to politics per se. To test for this possibility McDonald included into a single regression equation four economic variables found to be significant in a separate analysis--values added by manufacturing, number of workers per manufacturing plant, area of the city, and population density--together with information on what political regime (machine, reform, taxpayer, etc.) was in political power in an effort to ascertain whether per capita expenditure by the city government could be explained more by political or economic variables. He discovered that when economic factors were taken into account expenditure levels during the machine era were $1.10 less per capita than what was expected, while during the reform era they were $.75 more per capita. If these numbers



Figure II-2. General Fund Expenditure by Political Era

SOURCE: McDonald, p. 177.

do not seem enormous they must be understood in a context where overall per capita expenditures were very low. McDonald himself explains that the political variables were about as important an explanatory variable in his analysis as were the economic factors. In his words,

> . . . the "machines" were more fiscally conservative and the reformers more expansionary. . . . While campaigning against the machine's extravagance, the reformers of the 1890s added more expenditure then they subtracted. . . .
>
> The conclusion is quite clear and both statistically and historically significant. Not only were there expenditure differences between the eras, but these eras also produced an effect independent of industrialization and urbanization. The expansion of municipal government, in short, was not simply the result of underlying social change, but also of the decisions of political actors. Indeed, the independent effect of politics . . . was frequently larger than that of the other variables[105]

McDonald's interpretation of these findings is that machine politicians believed that fiscal conservatism was the key to political legitimacy; therefore, they held to the conception of a limited budget. Corruption existed, but it was an activity to be kept in the private sector, a matter to be conducted between franchise seekers and members of the party. "In return for their services supporters may have received certain favors; neither, however, was financed from the public sector."[106] (It should be noted, however, that the public did pay for political corruption, even if not by means of the municipal budget. For instance, rates paid to well-connected utility companies such as the Spring Valley Water Company, which had a monopoly on water supply to the areas around the city for some time, were usurious.)

On the other hand, reformers, including Phelan and a number of San Francisco merchants, believed that "the public purse" should be "harnessed to the broad goal of economic development."[107] Consequently, the reform era effected an across-the-board increase in expenditure over that of the machine period. Phelan improved the sewer system, bought supplies for the hospital and the almshouse, built new school houses and planned new parks. McDonald concludes his study with an observation on the "irony" of municipal reform. He notes that Hays accuses reform of effecting changes which stiffled democracy, all in the name of democracy. But the case of San Francisco suggests that reformers, while campaigning for economy, spent more money on the public sector. In fact, the machine had been too pernurious.[108]

Conclusions

Free schools have always been a sought-after prize. The Hispanic community in 1982 and the workingman in 1882 have fought for them. They have been aided in their quest by liberals and by municipal reformers. Working class support has extended to compulsory education, and has showed a willingness to bear the taxation burden of such an institution. People have flocked to the schools, which have found it almost impossible to match the supply to the demand.

The ability of the schools to respond to the need for services in the nineteenth century was hampered by the divided authority over school expenditures. The school board was responsible for spending the monies, but had to obtain funds from the city council. Boards in the nineteenth century were dominated by businessmen, some of whom saw schools as a necessary evil which forced them to pay for the education of other men's children, a nineteenth century objection curiously echoed by Chief Justice Burger in his 1982 Pyler v. Doe dissent.

Objections to paying for the education of other men's children were also voiced by the Catholic Church. But in contrast to the anti-public education position of the business community, the Church did not object in principle to free schools. Because they wished to give their children a religious education, however, they established a vast network of parochial schools which needed support. They objected to the "double tax" which parishoners had to pay. While certain church leaders like Father Peter Yorke of San Francisco, felt the government had no business interfering in the private lives of people, which it was doing by insisting the public pay to support public education, the times when the Church was not outspoken against public education were times when parochial schools were given public funds to operate. Quite clearly, the Church's objection to tax-supported schools was more practical than principled and, in any case, did not reflect any heightened sense of class consciousness among the religious authorities.

Nineteenth century political parties, whether machine or reform, acknowledged the electoral power of the working class by supporting public education. But in contrast to much of the rhetoric, in reality expenditures for schools during machine administrations dropped dramatically, while expenditures during reform administrations increased. Usually considered a friend of the working class, the political machine instead used school lands and funds to the advantage of political friends or wealthy businessmen, who in turn payed members of the machine some sort of fee. Reformers, on the other hand, talked efficiency but built up the bonded indebtedness of the city by improving hospitals roads, and schools. As illustrated so dramatically in San Francisco, never did schools fare better than when under reform administrations.

The following chapters in this study illustrate that these characteristics of nineteenth century school finance are characteristics which describe the twentieth century as well. Supporting the expansion of the schools were the labor unions, as the schools attempted to become more relevant to modern life. Not only did per pupil expenditures continue to rise, but the curriculum expanded to include manual training and instruction in German and French. Pressures from the middle class, many of whom chose education as a profession, led the schools to establish high schools. While some working class tax-payers objected to high schools, organized labor supported them, even when working class children were underrepresented in high school student bodies. On the other side, business continued to lobby for cutbacks in educational expenditure. Political parties continued to be supportive of free schools, but twentieth century political machines raided the school treasury as they had done in the nineteenth century. And reformers, rather than aligning themselves with business to force education on ethnic groups and the urban poor, frequently fought with labor in battles for teacher rights and for a public school curriculum financially sound and responsive to the needs of diverse groups within the community.

Footnotes

1. Chicago Tribune, 16 June 1982, p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Education Week, 23 June 1982, p. 1.
4. Chicago Tribune, 16 June 1982, p. 1.
5. Carlton, 1908, p. 50.
6. Rantoul, 1854, p. 134. Cited in Carlton, 1908, p. 51.
7. Simpson, 1831, p. 201. Cited in Ibid., p. 52.
8. New York Tribune, 17 October 1850, p. 67. Cited in Ibid, p. 67.
9. Chicago Record Herald, 16 November 1905. Cited in Ibid., p. 69.
10. Carlton, 1908, p. 69.
11. Martin, 1893, p. 178-79. Cited in Carlton, p.71.
12. Carlton, 1908, pp. 71-72.
13. Ibid., p. 73.
14. Rabinowitz, 1978, pp. 156-157.
15. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1867, pp. 81-82.
16. Ibid., 1873, p. 47.
17. Dolson, 1964, p. 180.
18. San Francisco Bulletin, 16 July 1885.
19. Racine, 1969, p. 48.
20. City Directories, 1869-1880; Ecke, 1972, pp. 49-50.
21. Racine, 1969, pp. 49-50; Ecke, 1972, pp. 49-50.
22. Urban, 1977, p. 135; Racine 1969, pp. 136-138.

23. Urban, 1977, pp. 136-38; also, see Chapter VI of this manuscript for a more complete discussion of political alignments and reform in Atlanta.

24. Dolson, 1964, p. 159.

25. *Ibid*., p. 160.

26. *Ibid*., p. 166.

27. *Ibid*.

28. Dewey, 1937, pp. 103-04.

29. Johnston, 1880, pp. 43-44.

30. Herrick, 1971, p. 48.

31. Carlton, 1908, p. 84.

32. Katz, 1968, p. 47.

33. Reuther, 21-23 May 1914, from abstract of testimony before United States Commission on Industrial Relations, New York City.

34. San Francisco *Bulletin*, 19 February 1878.

35. For example, see Atlanta *Journal of Labor*, 6 December 1907, p. 5.

36. *Ibid*., 27 May 1904.

37. *Ibid*., 27 May 1904; 17 June 1904; 1 July 1904; 5 May 1905; 18 August 1905; 13 July 1906; 3 August 1906.

38. *Ibid*., 18 May 1906; 6 December 1907.

39. San Francisco *Bulletin*, 19 February 1878.

40. *Knights of Labor*, 2 October 1886, p. 15.

41. *Ibid*., 24 January 1891, p. 1.

42. *Ibid*., 17 January 1891, p. 8; 24 January 1891, p.1.

43. *Rights of Labor*, 24 January 1891, p. 1.

44. *Ibid*.

45. *Knights of Labor*, 4 September 1886, p. 1.

46. *Ibid*., 22 October 1887, p. 8.

47. *Ibid*.

48. *Rights of Labor*, March 1893.

49. *Voice of Labor*, 9 October 1897.

50. San Francisco *Star*, 16 December, 1899.

51. Allen, 1928, p. 62.

52. Evans, 1929, pp. 258-259.

53. James, 1937, *passim*; Evans, 1929, p. 606.

54. Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 186.

55. *Merchants' Association Review*, San Francisco, September 1898.

56. *Ibid*.

57. *Ibid*., 6 March 1902.

58. Dolson, 1964, p. 314.

59. *Merchants' Association Review*, 10 March 1903.

60. San Francisco *Call*, 22 June 1881; 23 June 1881; 29 June 1881; 2 July 1881; 21 July 1881; 4 November 1881; 18 June 1882; 17 June 1882; 8 February 1883.

61. Clark, 1897, p. 64.

62. Annual Report, 1876.

63. Clark, 1897, p. 56; Chicago Board of Education *Annual Report*, 1888, pp. 29-33.

64. Herrick, 1971, p. 77.

65. Clark, 1897, p. 66.

66. *Ibid*., 1897, p. 61.

67. Tyack and Hansot, 1982, p. 77.

68. *Ibid*.

69. Yorke, 1933, pp. 271-282.

70. San Francisco *Monitor*, 25 January 1868.

71. Swett, 1872, p. 15.

72. Dolson, 1964, p. 55.

73. Swett, 1872, p. 116.

74. San Francisco Bulletin, 9 April 1870.

75. San Francisco Monitor, 1 December 1877; 20 June 1878; 7 February 1878.

76. Ibid., 7 February 1878.

77. Ibid.

78. Pierce, 1957, p. 521.

79. Illinois Federation of Labor Proceedings, for selected years

80. Chicago Tribune, March 1893; 12 April 1893, 13 April 1893, 26 March 1893; Inter Ocean, 12 April 1893; Board of Education Proceedings, 1893, p. 401.

81. Pierce, 1957; pp. 359, 380.

82. Ibid., p. 349.

83. Hays, 1974.

84. Issel, 1977, p. 342.

85. Vare, 1933, pp. 118-19; Dorsett, 1968, p. 41; McKitrick, December 1957, pp. 505-508; Merton, 1957, pp. 71-82. Cited in Tyack, 1974, p. 94.

86. Tyack, 1974, p. 94.

87. Bullough, 1979, p. 72; McDonald, 1979.

88. San Francisco Bulletin, "Reminiscences." 27 January 1919.

89. San Francisco Chronicle, 24 October 1884.

90. Mowry, 1951, p. 23.

91. Ibid., p. 24.

92. Issel, Summer 1977, p. 346.

93. Mowry, 1951, p. 25.

94. Dolson, 1964, p. 298.

95. Reller, 1935, pp. 126-27. Cited in Dolson, 1964, p. 357.

96. Dolson, 1964, p. 298.

97. Ibid, p. 298.

98. Commonwealth Club of California, December 1917, p. 441. Cited in Dolson, 1964, p. 300.

99. Dolson, 1964, pp. 310-312.

100. Ibid., p. 428.

101. Ibid., p. 101.

102. Peterson, 1981, Chapter III.

103. Erie, 1975, p. 108.

104. Although Buckley's Democrats lost the municipal election in 1890, McDonald claims that the Republicans, under boss Martin Kelly, had similar spending patterns, and he therefore considers the years 1890-92 to be years of machine-dominated fiscal expenditures.

105. McDonald, 1979, pp. 189, 193.

106. Ibid., pp. 200-201.

107. Ibid., p. 202.

108. Ibid., pp.204-205.

Chapter III

THE POLITICS OF CURRICULAR CHANGE

Public school systems in late nineteenth century urban America faced increasingly complex organizational problems as extensive immigration and continued industrialization resulted in a more diverse clientele. New bases for group mobilization were constantly forming, forcing the schools to redefine their purposes and pedagogical philosophies. The demands of politically powerful groups which had the capacity to establish competing institutions spurred a response from a public school system that regularly sought to enlarge its sphere of influence so as to achieve a monopoly position as a provider of educational services.

The expansion of the curriculum was one way in which the public schools attempted to build a wider clientele and to develop a broader base of support. Foreign languages were introduced into the schools of polyglot cities like Chicago and San Francisco, in response to the demands of large and influential ethnic groups. Middle and upper-middle class parents, whose children did not need to work to supplement the family income, found public schools receptive to their request for secondary schooling. Introduction of manual and vocational education responded to increasing business demand for labor with specialized skills.

These educational innovations were not without their critics, of course. The introduction of foreign languages (usually German and French) was opposed by other ethnic groups, by the Catholics in San Francisco, and by some school officials who felt that it was a pedagogically unsound departure from the aims of common schooling. Attacks on secondary school expansion were mounted by those who criticized the emphasis on a classical curriculum as being highly impractical, and those who opposed the diversion of resources from primary to secondary schools. Manual training was resisted by school officials who were committed to the traditional curriculum.

There was also more generalized opposition to curricular expansion. This opposition gained momentum in periods of financial crisis when calls for expenditure cutbacks were coupled with attacks on the extravagance of employing special teachers. Underlying the movement for retrenchment lay a philosophy of education that was fundamentally at odds with the organizational interests of the public school system. Those who labelled the increasing differentiation of the curriculum as "fads and frills" felt the function of public schooling was to provide practical education in the narrow sense of imparting the basic knowledge needed for citizenship and, in later periods, minimal functioning in the labor market. Others who stood steadfast behind curricular expansion argued that if the public schools did not provide instruction in special subjects, children would be forced to attend private institutions, or do without. Thus, the public school system's defenders contended that the preservation of the quality and clientele of the public schools, on the one hand, the the ideal of equal opportunity, on the other, mandated that they offer an extensive and varied curriculum.

In all of these disputes school officials attended primarily to their most urgent organizational interests. If external groups were strong enough to establish institutions that could some day rival the "common school," their concerns were given preferential treatment. When Germans began educating their pupils in German-language schools, public schools experimented with bilingual programs. In order to attract middle-class pupils away from private day and boarding schools, well-endowed public high schools were established. When businessmen set up their own vocational schools, the school system soon followed suit. In short, whenever social groups demonstrated such strong commitments to educational objectives that they began creating institutions that could some day compete with the "common school," the public school modified its curriculum accordingly.

In virtually all these diversifications of its curriculum, educators received the support of trade unions and other working-class groups. In general, the trade unions accepted the ideal of the common school and viewed with suspicion any efforts to curtail its curriculum, financing or scope of operations. Labor supported foreign language instruction, expansion of secondary schooling, and the addition of manual training and vocational programs. Unlike some business men and other large property owners, labor leaders generally felt the benefits of their innovations outweighed their potential costs to local taxpayers. And unlike Catholics, who had their own schools to sustain, union leaders felt the best route to working-class advancement was through a unified program of popular education. So continuous was labor support for expansion and the diversification of the public school that it is difficult to imagine today's complex, autonomous urban school system apart from it.

Bilingual Education

The introduction of foreign language instruction in the public schools of both Chicago and San Francisco occurred in response to the efforts of politically powerful ethnic minorities who sought to maintain continuities with their native cultures. School officials, nonetheless, had reasons of their own for favoring the policy. Quite apart from any pedagogical objective, the inclusion of foreign languages was consistent with a strategy of institution building which required seeking support for the public schools from the city's ethnic groups. Thus, while bilingual education, as practiced in the nineteenth century, was in part a by-product of the pluralistic accommodation that characterized this era,[1] it was also directly related to the school system's organizational need to expand.

Their large numbers in the population created potential for significant political leverage on the part of immigrants to the nineteenth century American city. In San Francisco, French and German-born residents comprised 11.5 percent of the population by 1870. In Chicago, at the same time, German-born residents alone made up 17.7 percent of the city's total.[2] The organizational activities of these groups enhanced their political power. In both cities, Germans were leaders in trade unions and political parties and showed a particular

112

interest in school politics. During the period 1871-73, 16.7 percent of the seats on the San Francisco school board were filled by members of German descent.[3] The capacity of these groups to establish private educational institutions in competition with the public schools increased the effectiveness of their demands.[4] When several German organizations pressed for the inclusion of their language in the Chicago public schools in 1865, the school board approved German language courses as an experiment in one school. The next year, the board elaborated a general policy on the teaching of German, stipulating that if 150 parents requested it, the language could be taught in each of the city's divisions.[5] Demand was so high that within a year of its first proposal this quota was met and German was taught throughout Chicago. By 1870, there were 2,597 pupils studying German in the Chicago public schools.[6]

San Francisco's public schools initially went even further than did Chicago's in providing language instruction for the city's major ethnic groups. In 1865, the first Cosmopolitan Schools offering instruction in both French and German were opened. In these schools, most subjects were taught in French or German from the earliest primary grades and English was taught as a second language. However, soon after they were opened, the Cosmopolitan Schools were reorganized and thereafter studies in English occupied a greater portion of the pupils' time.[7] Nonetheless, in 1871 there were 5,395 pupils in San Francisco's Cosmopolitan Schools, all of whom spent some time studying French or German.[8]

The school officials who supported language instruction spoke not only of the benefits of preserving traditional cultures but of the importance of bringing immigrants into mainstream public education. In 1877, San Francisco's school superintendent argued that although French and German were not essential to the curriculum of common schools, they were a necessary concession to the "foreign elements of our society." Before the Cosmopolitan Schools were opened, he said,

> . . . hundreds of children of foreign parents were attending private schools in order that they might receive instruction in the language of the "Fatherland." Now they are found under the care of American teachers, and being molded in the true form of American citizenship.[9]

Chicago school officials also realized that German instruction was a means through which German students would be drawn away from the private and into the public schools, causing students of German descent to transfer from private to public schools. The chairman of the committee on German languages noted that

> . . . among the scholars of German birth or parentage, who took part in the study of German, your committee observed a considerable number who formerly attended sectarian or private schools and who left those institutions as soon as the public schools gave them the opportunity to study in their native language, the number of private schools now to be found in every nook and corner of the city will decrease, and the children of all nationalities will be assembled in the public schools, and thereby be radically Americanized.[10]

The teaching of foreign languages in public schools had its opponents from the outset. Other ethnic groups who objected to preferential treatment for the Germans or French were one source of opposition; the Catholic Church was another. In San Francisco, the Catholic newspaper contended that "there is no good reason why French or German should be taught in the public schools any more than Irish or Russian."[11] Some school officials also objected to the teaching of languages on pedagogical grounds, arguing that children who were non-native speakers did not learn enough to benefit, and that language instruction at an early age was so difficult it actually harmed the child.[12] In San Francisco, the Cosmopolitan Schools remained a focus of controversy into the early 1870s. French and German were offered in all the city's public schools by 1873 but the next year, in a dramatic turn around, the board eliminated language instruction and closed the Cosmopolitan Schools. Even The Monitor, the Catholic newspaper which favored the move, noted that the dismissal of French and German teachers "was rather suddenly and discourteously accomplished. . . ."[13] The change, although rationalized in financial terms, seems to have been the result of the election of a Republican nativist majority to the school board.[14] The elimination of language instruction did not last long. The next year public protest, particularly among the German community led to the reestablishment of the Cosmopolitan Schools.[15] Attacks on the

Cosmopolitan Schools continued throughout the 1870s, but the most decisive blows to the teaching of foreign languages in the public schools came when the issue became entangled in efforts to cut back school expenditures toward the end of the decade.

The financial crisis of the late 1870s had indeed brought hard times and bitter criticism to San Francisco's public school system. As early as 1876, the school budget had been squeezed and local newspapers had blamed extravagant expenditures for the problem. In this economic context, the Catholic newspaper, The Monitor, which generally objected to taxing Catholics for public education, raised curricular issues anew, selecting instruction in German, French, music, and drawing as its targets. The paper charged that instruction in these subjects was disproportionately expensive and benefitted only a handful of students who were not required to leave school at an early age to work:

> Consequently, it is only the children of the rich who can share in the advantages of pursuing these higher branches of study and they can very well afford to pay for them; for the system practically taxes the poor for the benefit of the wealthy . . . The most strenous advocates for State secular education will acknowledge that the rudiments of a sound English education--reading, writing, and arithmetic, with perhaps a little history and geography--are all the State should be called upon to provide for by taxation. No objection should be made to also teaching the other branches, the luxuries as we may fairly call them, but they should be made special charges upon those who want them and they should cost the city nothing. The fact that there are nothing like enough of teachers of these languages and accomplishments to instruct one-fourth of the children, proves conclusively that the arrangement is made in the interest of the few, that is in the interest of the children of the rich.[16]

Catholics were joined in their opposition to the extravagances of special subjects by a majority of the state legislators, and in 1877 legislation calling for the abolition of instruction in foreign languages and music passed both houses of the state legislature. However, the bill was not enacted because the governor failed to sign it.[17] When Senator McCoppin of San Francisco tried the following year to introduce a similar bill, San Francisco school officials sent a delegation to Sacramento to express their point of view, and leaders of the German community rallied crowds at a mass meeting to demonstrate their support for the Cosmopolitan Schools, in which much of the German and French instruction took place.[18] This public pressure, plus the legislative committee's chairman's insistence that children had the right to learn languages in the common schools (rather than having to attend "private and high class" institutions for them) caused the bill to be dropped.[19] Sensitive to the cries of retrenchment, yet generally in favor of language instruction, the school board voted to eliminate special language teachers in the earliest primary grades.[20] Language instruction was continued in many of the schools but was conducted by regular classroom teachers. In this way, the school system was able to retain its organizational commitment to attracting culturally distinct groups, but at the same time was able to eliminate some of the costs involved in doing so.[21]

The move did not silence the schools system's critics. A nativist paper, the San Francisco Argonaut, added its voice to the denunciation of special subjects. It termed the school system "an extravagant and costly sham . . . a fraud . . . a crime" and decried the fact that "we are spending money to teach one class of foreigners languages while another is threatening to burn our city. We are spending money to educate in music and drawing and other accomplishments the children of men who are prowling our streets and defying our laws."[22] The leading reform newspaper, The Bulletin, criticized school expenses along much the same lines as The Monitor. It first laid out its conception of the proper tasks of the public schools:

> . . . the main object of the common school system has been to give the rising generation a thorough grounding in the English language and those accomplishments which form the basis of ordinary commercial intercourse. Anything ulterior to this may be regarded as foreign to any public obligation and belonging solely to private considerations.[23]

By these standards, the course of study of the San Francisco public schools needed "considerable judicious pruning." Once again, "special subjects" were singled out for criticism. The Bulletin charged that the introduction of French and German into "certain schools which have been designated 'cosmopolitan schools', (has) converted the latter very largely into 'class' institutions." It was finally recommended that because of their expense, "every branch not strictly consistent with the accepted idea of what popular education ought to be" should be eliminated.[24] Eventually, opponents of foreign languages would, though they lost many battles, win the war.

In the early 1880s, the San Francisco public school system was one of many municipal departments to have its budget cut. As a consequence, it trimmed its curriculum along the lines recommended by critics. Special teachers of French, German, music, drawing and bookeeping were discharged.[25] As a result the number of pupils studying foreign languages declined throughout the 1880s; in 1879, 2,917 students took German or French, in 1882, the number fell to 1,885, and in 1888, it was no more than 1,635. The number of grammar or primary schools offering foreign language instruction also shrank from nine such schools in 1875 to seven in 1879, and to only four by 1882.[26] While the decline was hastened by political opposition to foreign language instruction, it must also be recognized that as time passed the schools had less of a stake in German and French instruction. Private schools teaching the children of immigrants in their native tongue failed to develop, and San Francisco's public schools, no longer faced with competition from this sector, could afford to narrow its curriculum to English language instruction alone.

Foreign language instruction also blossomed as an issue in Chicago politics in the midst of economic and fiscal difficulties The first volley in the "way on the fads" was shot by the Chicago Tribune in early 1893, with an editorial urging that the salaries of teachers specializing in "ridiculous" subjects such as "singing, drawing, mudpie-making and modern foreign languages should be cut to the lowest figure."[27] The attack was then carried forward by several members of the board, including Alfred S. Trude, who was, incidentally, the newspaper's attorney as well.[28] The city council, responsible for approving the school board budget, became involved by passing a resolution requiring that the Board of Education's budget be itemized before council approval would be granted.[29]

Initially, the definition of fad was unclear, but in February, the Chicago Tribune chose to mention specifically the German language in another editorial attacking unnecessary subjects in the public schools.[30] The inclusion of German in the controversy was of crucial importance in determining its development. Chicago's German community was a politically potent force which, only a few months earlier, had succeeded in electing Governor Altgeld to office. City elections were only a few months off, and board members had little desire to arouse the ire of the Germans.[31]

The German community was quick to react to the Tribune's attack. Leaders of the community convened mass meetings and sent vocal representatives to school board sessions.[32] The board sought to protect itself--at first by delaying any action on the issue, and then by proposing a separate resolution on each subject included in the "special subjects" area. The Tribune began a campaign against compromising on the fads, accusing board members of engaging in logrolling to protect their "pet fads."[33]

Representatives of the labor movement next became involved as proponents of the fads. Led by Thomas J. Morgan, the Trades and Labor Assembly first adopted a neutral, fact-finding attitude and urged the board to delay action on the special studies issue. However, in mid-March, the labor group came out squarely behind special studies, claiming that the children of workers "are just as much entitled to study music, delsarte, physical culture and have a knowledge of form and shape as those . . . of the wealthy."[34] From then on, the labor spokesmen joined the representatives of the German community and women's organizations in attendance at board meetings and mass rallies in support of the fads. Chicago's only pro-fad newspaper, an immigrant-oriented paper entitled Inter Ocean, also began an earnest campaign to save the special studies.[35]

The school board, through various evasive tactics, avoided discussing the fads--especially the German language issue--until well after the late March mayoral election.[36] It then produced a compromise that was more or less acceptable to all sides. First, the school board decided by a vote of eleven to seven to eliminate German instruction from the four primary grades, but to keep the language in the higher grade levels. Many of those who opposed other fads voted to retain German instruction in the higher grades. This resolution seems to have been acceptable to the German community; the most important German newspaper editor had endorsed the plan in his mayoral campaign. Prominent Germans were also guaranteed a veto over future school board appointees by Mayor Harrison and thus were given insurance against further incursions into German language instruction.[37] In the meantime, the Committee on School Management met and hammered out a solution to the teaching of the other special subjects. The committee's report, adopted unaminously by the board on May 10th, noted that the special studies had great educational value and stipulated that the time devoted to them should be reduced but not eliminated.[38] The board's action seemed to be acceptable to all parties. Public agitation over the fads had waned after the decision concerning German language instruction and was not renewed when the board's decision to reduce time devoted to the other special subjects was announced. The Tribune applauded the board for taking action to secure more classroom space. Although the controversy over special studies "simmered and bubbled throughout the late 1890s and early 1900s, the May 10th decision marked the end of the war on fads as such.[39]

The "fads and frills" conflict is especially interesting because it pitted two basic conflicting theories of education against each other. To the Tribune and its supporters, these curricular developments interfered with the common school's primary purpose--to inculcate the minimum amount of education that would be required to prepare the children of workers for low skilled occupations and nonauthoritative political roles. The common school, the paper said, should provide for the "children of the masses" and "education for breadwinners." "The ideal of a common school education...means to lay the foundation of a practical education, of pratical education enough to fit the child for ordinary work . . ."[40] This meant restriction of the curriculum to the rudimentary subjects. Special subjects were "costly luxuries" that "fritter away" the time of the pupils.[41]

Organized groups of workers, on the other hand, embraced these curricular reforms and the ideology of "objective" or "scientific" education which they represented. In the view of Thomas Morgan, the most articulate educational spokesman of organized labor in the 1890s, the realization of the democratic ideal of government by consent of the people required the "widest, deepest, and best education of every member of the state and nation."[42] Morgan's view of citizenship did not relegate the "masses" to passive roles, but rather elevated them to active participation. Like the Tribune, Morgan saw that democracy required a particular type of citizenry, one that could be prepared in part by a public school system. This "common" education would be far from minimal, however.

> Education means the training of the whole people, the best human development, the most complete preparation for the highest earthly position, that of men and women who are required at once to govern and obey. This idea of education is the citadel of our national life, the foundation of the republic, the necessary base of the whole structure of American society.[43]

A Similar view was expressed in 1885 by P. H. McLogan, a Chicago printer:

> We consider it as the duty of the appointed protectors of our school system to provide for the mass of the people, not a scant education, instruction in those branches which may be deemed necessary for the immediate bread-winning, but a liberal one... We think that instruction in our public schools should be so ample as to dispense absolutely with the necessity of private schools.[44]

Any attempt to remove what the Tribune called "fads" from the public school curriculum was perceived by workers as being motivated by a desire to keep them in their "place." Morgan wrote:

> What has art education to do with this (working) class except to 'unfit' it for its obedience and mechanical service required of it? ...Are not the schools themselves a menace to the content which ignorance gives to those born to be drawn in harness by their masters?[45]

Many workers also thought that the quality education symbolized by the special subjects would be instrumental in providing their children with the kind of craft related skills which, as mechanization progressed, were increasingly difficult to acquire in the workplace. Thus in early 1893, in response to attacks on the special subjects by the Tribune and others, the International Machinists Union No. 16, the city's oldest and one of its most respected unions, and the Machinery Trades Council, sent the following petition to the Board of Education:

> . . . The experience of machinists engaged in one of the most intricate and important of all trades justifies the declaration that the proper training of the brain, eye, hand, ear, and body is necessary to properly fit a child for any mechanical pursuit. Therefore, the Machinist Union respectfully urges the utmost practical extension of the principle of manual training in the public schools, and respectfully insists that the coeducation of hand and brain will produce better workmen and better citizens, and that all obstacles that stand in the way of effective education, whether they be of a personal, theoretical, or financial nature, should be removed as quickly as possible.[46]

While the opponents of special studies viewed them as more appropriate for private schools or for more advanced students, the labor movement defended their place in the primary grades, which was as much of the public school system as most children ever experienced. It is said that Morgan was fond of pointing out that only 22 percent of the workmen's children ever went beyond the fourth year of school, so that unless the 78 percent received drawing, singing, and these special studies in the primary grades, they would never get them.[47] The attempt to limit the special studies to the high grades was seen by workers as an expansion of the educational oportunities open to wealthy families at the expense of the "common schools." In the words of Henry D. Lloyd, a leading figure in labor politics, "In places like the nineteenth ward, there are not enough school rooms for children, while in wealthier portions of the city, there are expenditures for high schools. The attack on fads is a continuation of this same policy."[48] Just as the postponement of quality education to higher grades was unacceptable to labor spokesmen, so was its relegation to parochial and private schools, which were beyond the financial means of most workers. The objection to the latter was stated with typical succinctness by Morgan. "The parochial schools are established to teach the youthful mind what to think. The public schools teach how to think, and that is what will revolutionize this broad land."[49]

Two aspects of the conflict over "fads and frills" deserve special emphasis in conclusion. First, in marked contrast to the portrait of curricular reform painted by some writers,[50] public school expansion encountered opposition from business and financial interests but enjoyed popular support. The strongest backing for curricular innovation came from labor and ethnic groups. Secondly, the outcome was a characteristically pluralist compromise in which all sides felt that their interests had been taken into account. As business leaders urged, the most costly aspects of the innovations were curtailed, especially during periods of financial retrenchment. But the principle of a diversified curriculum in general, and bilingual education in particular, was never conceded. Indeed, the school system, always eager to expand its role, would in the future find new ways to diversify its operations and expand its bases of social support.

Secondly, the outcome was a characteristically pluralist compromise in which all sides felt that their interests had been taken into account. As business leaders urged, the most costly aspects of the innovations were curtailed, especially during times of financial constraint. But the principle of a diversified currriculum in general, and bilingual education in particular, was never conceded. Indeed, the school system, always eager to expand its role, would in the future, find new ways to diversify its operations and expand its bases of social support.

Secondary Education and the Stratification of the Public School System

The early establishment of high schools can also be understood as an organizational response to a competitive environment. In this case public schools were not concerned about alienating any well organized ethnic interest but about a diffuse middle-class population that still generally preferred a private day or boarding school to any public institution. Anxious to avoid becoming "charity schools" educators realized that the building of the "common school" required, above all, the commitments and loyalties of this diffuse middle class. Yet the pursuit of this goal seldom pitted school officials against working-class groups. On the contrary, trade unionists often led the charge for public secondary schools, seeing these institutions as the main channel of economic opportunity for children of working-class families. Secondary school officials had more to fear from business and taxpayer opposition, especially in times of fiscal constraint, for just as foreign languages could be defined as a frill, so a classical secondary education could be defined by penny-pinching conservatives as beyond the proper scope of publically-supported institutions.

The importance attached to securing support for the public school system of middle-class segments of the population was evidenced by the early founding of high schools in most cities. Although a system of public schooling was not established in Atlanta until 1872, from the very beginning two sexually segregated high schools claimed a share of scarce educational resources at a time when primary schools remained overcrowded. Chicago's initial high school, the first in the nation to include both boys and girls, opened in 1856. San Francisco's Boys' High School opened the same year and its Girls' High School opened less than a decade later. School officials always spoke in egalitarian tones when defending the public high schools against the charge that they had an elite bias. Yet San Francisco's superintendent contended in 1880 that the need to attract "the best class" of respectable citizens required support for secondary education.[51] A Chicago superintendent also argued along these lines suggesting that "the wealth of the city" which had "furnished the means for the elementary education of the majority..." had a right to claim "the higher advantages it seeks" in secondary schooling.[52]

The fact that nineteenth century high schools were not mass institutions was evidenced by the small proportions of the school age population that attended. In Atlanta, the city's two high schools drew their students mainly from upper middle-class families. Total enrollment remained small, growing from only 295 students in 1874 to 638 in 1890.[53] Average daily attendance in Chicago's public secondary schools was only 2 percent of the population aged 14 to 17 years old in 1870 and only 6 percent by the 1890s.[54] No more than 4 percent of San Francisco's public school students were in the high schools at any point in the nineteenth century.[55]

The socio-economic status of high school students also revealed the selectivity of the institution. Students in San Francisco's high schools "came in general from upper middle-class homes in the city. In 1867, 45 percent of the students had fathers who were merchants or professional men, while only 15 percent came from the many homes of unskilled or semi-skilled workmen in the city. Children whose parents came from non-English speaking countries seldom attended high school."[56] Data on parents' occupations supplied by the students of Boys' High School show that children of artisans, skilled workers, semi-skilled workers, and unskilled workers were poorly represented in the school (see Table III-1). Because the figures are based on students' identification of their parents' occupation, they do not neatly coincide with census categories and should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, it is clear that in 1878 and 1883 both semi-skilled and unskilled workers were greatly under-represented among high school students' parents. In 1878 only 9.6 percent of the parents were employed in semi-skilled occupations, and in 1883 only 4.3 percent were so employed. These percentages are far below the 27.9 percent of the entire population that was employed in semi-skilled occupations in 1890. High white-collar workers were greatly over-represented among the students' parents. In 1878, 43.8 percent of the children listed high white-collar occupations for the parents, and in 1883, 39.0 percent did so. These numbers greatly exceed the 5.0 percent white-collar employment in the entire city.

One of the reasons that working-class children were poorly represented in the nineteenth century public high school was that few working-class families could afford to forego the immediate income that would be lost by taking young workers out of the labor market. In

Table III-1

Employment of Parents of Boys' High School Students, San Francisco, 1878-1890

Occupation	Percentage of Parents Employed		Occupation as a Percentage of Workforce
	1878	1883	1890
High white collar[a] and merchants	43.8	39.0	5.0
Low white collar	27.7	40.7	25.7
Artisans and skilled workers[a]	14.9	12.7	28.4
Semi-skilled workers	9.6	4.3	27.9
Unskilled workers	4.0	3.3	12.9
Total percent[b]	100.0	100.0	99.9
Total employed parents (n)	249	300	144,082

SOURCES: San Francisco Superintendent's Report, 1878, pp. 81-82. San Francisco Superintendent's Report, 1883, pp. 14-15.

NOTES: [a] The categorization of occupations follows Thernstrom as cited in Erie with two exceptions. Merchants are all grouped in the high white collar category because it is impossible to determine the amount of property they owned, and thus is impossible to divide them on this basis into the high or low white collar categories. Artisans are all grouped with skilled workers because it is impossible to determine if they owned their own shop, and thus should be categorized as small proprietors in the low white collar category.

[b] The 1878 total excludes thirty-six parents who are listed in the original source as having no employment, and the 1883 total excludes many widows and retired persons as well as those who could not find work. The totals also exclude several listings that are impossible to classify such as "agitator," "paperwarehouse," or "vinegar and pickle works." For most of these it was impossible to tell whether the parent owned or was employed in the enterprise listed.

addition school policy also contributed to the exclusiveness of public high schools. Until 1881, in Chicago, strict entrance exams enforced the notion that the high school was an institution distinct from the elementry school with its universal standard of admission. Although San Francisco's early high schools did not have admissions requirements other than graduation from grammar school, in the 1870s, school officials grew concerned about the number of "unqualified pupils" who, according to John Swett, were "a tax on the public, a terror to the teachers, and a discredit to the school."[57] In 1879, Deputy Superintendent Dudley Stone contended "that the High Schools contained at least a fourth more scholars than ought to be there," and he favored a separate standard for grammar school graduation and high school admission. On the other hand, the view that secondary education was appropriate for all students was also expressed. Even after the separate standard of admission was set in 1880, the principal of the Boys' High School criticized this policy, arguing that the high school should be seen as "but a continuation of the Grammar School . . ."[58] The debate over admission standards revealed the extent to which the premises underlying common school system.

The heavy emphasis on a classical curriculum also discouraged attendance by a broad clientele. Atlanta's Boys' High School provided a purely classical course of study throughout the nineteenth century. Chicago's secondary school offered three distinct programs--classical, English and Normal--until 1875. San Francisco's Boys' High School concentrated on preparing students for college. The opening of the University of California nearby drew away many of the school's pupils because a high school diploma was not required for admission until 1884. Nonetheless, the goal of providing a basis for higher education exerted a strong influence on the curriculum of San Francisco's Boys' High School. Except for the Normal program, the subjects taught in the early high schools bore little relevance to the working world, and nurtured only students whose interests inclined toward intellectual pursuits.

The select student body of public secondary schools and their heavy emphasis on a classical curriculum provided occasions for controversy, with critics charging that the public high school was an elitist institution which should not be allocated large sums of taxpayers' money. School officials staunchly defended secondary education against these attacks. With its classical curriculum, the secondary school seemed the pinnacle of public education, an inspiration to students in the lower grades and a means of attracting the "best class" of students, who might otherwise attend private boarding or day schools. In spite of the low representation of their children among high school student bodies, working-class groups joined the supporters of public secondary education because they viewed public education as their main chance of obtaining a better life for their children.

Attacks of the critics on secondary education were strengthened by periods of financial stress. In San Francisco, as the financial crisis of the late 1870s deepened, social unrest which accompanied depressed economic conditions prompted many to blame popular discontent on education. John Swett, then principal of the Girls' High School, cited the source of public criticism--hard times, high taxes, and the feeling that social discontent and disturbances, "vice, crime, idleness and poverty are the results of overeducation."[59] Critics included the San Francisco Call which suggested that "there is a limit to the capacity of the mind and too much indiscriminate feeding leads to mental dyspesia."[60] "There seems to be no good reason," the paper argued, "for introducing into public education a learning which belongs appropriately to an academic course."[61]

The high schools became a major focus of this attack partly because San Francisco's secondary education was in a precarious position. The use of state funds for secondary education was forbidden by the state constitution, so high school expenditures were a disproportionate drain on the local school system's resources. The Call editoralized that "a very small proportion (of students) can devote their time to study the fourteen years required to go through the entire course," and thus the paper questioned whether "it is equally the duty of the taxpayer to furnish the means for the high education which but one hundred would avail themselves of." The Call contended that sufficient schooling to enable students "to perform the ordinary duties of citizenship was necessary, but that beyond that level other considerations must justify the expenditure of public funds on secondary education."[62] The 1878 San Francisco Superintendent's Report summarized these concerns:

> Some hold that higher education is a luxury, and should be enjoyed, if enjoyed at all, as other luxuries are, by those who are able to pay for it. Others think that the middle and lower classes are educated to discontent, if they pass beyond the grammar school. Still others object that High Schools are maintained at public expense for the educational support of the children of the wealthy; that in fact, the middle and lower classes are not largely represented in the High School.[63]

In support of the high schools, the superintendents and principals argued that the poor must have an equal chance at education in order to maintain "open avenues of success" and "prevent the existence of an aristocracy of education."[64] The interest of the State, both in securing intelligent supporters of republican government and a prosperous citizenry, called for public secondary education. School officials endeavored to prove that high schools drew students from a cross-section of the community, and were a force for equality because of the strong support for them by the poor and middle classes. In 1880 the Superintendent said:

> . . . an examination of all the state and city reports at hand, which represent nearly every section of the Union, proves, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the children of mechanics, tradesmen and laborers attend the High Schools in a ratio equal to their attendance in the grammar schools. . . . If the opposition in certain quarters to the liberal maintenance of High Schools should take on the character of a warfare against the secondary system of education, the main strength and support of the system would be drawn from the ranks of the poor (i.e., people of moderate circumstances).[65]

While the superintendent's own data indicate that the workers' children were underrepresented in the public high schools, (see Table III-I), school officials seem to have been correct in their assertion that working-class parents defended the public high school as a necessary component of educational equality. Representatives of working-class organizations took just such a stand at the state constitutional convention of 1879. There, a delegate from the Workingmen's Party spoke on behalf of public funding for high schools. He said ". . . if the state can only provide for the education of its children to a limited degree, then from that point on must education be limited to children of the rich . . ."[66]

In the early 1880s, municipal budget cuts in San Francisco left the high schools emerged relatively unscathed. Although the debate over high schools continued throughout the 1880s, instead of cutting secondary school expenses, the school board made the curriculum of the high schools more practically oriented. The addition of commercial classes and later, the establishment of a separate Commercial High School in the mid 1880s, silenced the critics and protected the expanding organizational prerogatives of San Francisco's public school system. The superintendent revealed that the new school was designed to meet the demands of parents and businessmen who claimed that public schooling did not teach children skills appropriate to business. "The Commercial High School," he said, was established "for our graduates from the grammar school who cannot afford or do not wish a three-year scientific or classical course but . . . (would like) such instruction as will help them make a living and which in the future will be beneficial to the great mass of traders."[67]

With this decision, repeated and affirmed in subsequent decades, the importance school officials placed on organizational expansion becomes even more apparent. Faced with a choice between a classical curriculum for a small, elite segment of the population or a more differentiated curriculum serving a larger range of the teen-age population, public schools seldom hesitated. They increasingly welcomed children of working-class, immigrant groups to the high school, and they increasingly softened and broadened their curricular offerings. Vocational education was soon the central curricular issue for the public schools.

Manual Training, Vocational Education, and the Relationship between Schooling and Work

In the words of Lawrence Cremin, "The 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exposition was a tribute to industry and an acknowledgement of its success in the world wide competition for industrial supremacy."[68] The relation of education to progress was one of the exhibition's main themes, and part of the education display included displays of tools from Russia. Seemingly only interesting to a few craftsmen, in reality these tools marked the beginning of a far-reaching pedagogical change in American education because they represented a systematic, "progressive" way to teach the skills necessary for learning a trade. The Russian workshops, developed by Victor Della Vos, were divided into shops for each individual art or trade, and the skills with accompanying tools were presented to the students in pedagogical order, with the student gradually progressing toward "a requisite standard of skill."[69]

One of the American educators attending the exhibition was Calvin M. Woodward, a faculty member at Washington University in Saint Louis. While teaching a course in applied mechanics, Woodward decided to have the students make wooden models in order to illustrate a particularily difficult point to them. When the college carpenter came in to help supervise the work, Woodward realized the students were unable to use the tools in the simplist way. Putting first things first, he began teaching tool work, not with any immediate vocational goal in mind but as an important component in learning larger concepts.[70] During the 1870s, Woodward became an outspoken critic of the public schools, challenging them to recognize the need for teachers of manual skills as well as cognitive skills.

Woodward's challenge to educators of "educating the whole boy" did not go unmet. William T. Harris, the former Saint Louis school superintendent, argued that Woodward's ideas were a "dangerous survival of Rousseauism," because they failed to distinguish between higher and lower faculties in the individual. Harris noted that "marbles, quoits, baseball and jackstraws were educative as well as tools, but that did not mean their place was in the classroom." To Harris, the difference between teaching manual education and general subject matter was "the difference between a piece of baked bread, which nourishes for the day, and the seed-corn, which is the possiblility of countless harvests.'"71

While educators debated these issues in pedagogical terms the organizational interests of public schools greatly shaped the eventual outcome. As the school system expanded its secondary role, its curriculum inevitably adapted to its new clientele. In addition, public schools could not ignore the increasing number and prominence of non-public institutions which had taken some forms of vocational training as their central goal. Prodded in separate directions by both business and labor, the public schools accepted Woodward's arguments not necessarily because they were pedagogically more sound than those of Harris but because they made institutional sense.

Establishment of Rival Institutions

Many business leaders were among the most vigorous and effective proponents of manual training and vocational education in the late nineteenth century. They not only had the desire to see a better trained workforce, but they also had the resources to establish rival institutions if the public school system did not fulfill this need. Chicago's business community began to agitate for manual training earlier than San Francisco's. In 1881, the Citizen's Association of Chicago, whose members included some of the most important businessmen in the city, issued a report criticizing the public schools for failure to provide "practical training, that training of hand and eye which would enable those leaving our schools to be useful and productive members of society almost immediately after leaving high school." "The whole spirit of the education given there," the report alleged, "is against forming any taste whatever for manual training of any kind."72 At the same time, the Chicago Tribune took up the cause. For over a year, weekly articles advocating "practical education," "manual training," and "industrial education" in the public schools appeared in the paper. In 1882, several prominent businessmen including Marshall Fields, Richard Crane, George Pullman and John Crerar began efforts to open a private manual training school. Over the next two years, the plans were carried out by the Commercial Club and in 1884 the Chicago Manual Training School was opened. Although the school's curriculum included some traditional academic subjects, its major focus was on the use of "shop work" to train both the hand and mind. In establishing the school and maintaining close watch over it as members of its board of directors, Chicago's leading businessmen were interested in more than educational reform. As one observer who was close to the leaders at the time put it, "being men of large experience in practical affairs they recognized that the destruction of the apprenticeship system would tend to a decline of American industrial power, hence they instituted an inquiry on the subject "How to increase the supply of skilled labor? . . . (they) founded this school to secure better mechanics--more skillful workers in iron and wood . . ."73

By the early 1890s, San Francisco's business community also showed considerable interest in industrial training. Instead of pressuring the public schools to reform their curriculum, leading businessmen concentrated on founding private industrial arts schools. The Lick school opened in the early years of the decade and offered training in the machinery trades. At the same time, an endowment had been procured from a leading San Francisco merchant, J. Clute Wilmerding, who desired to found a school where "our boys shall be trained to earn a living with little study and plenty of work." The major business organizations in the city, the Merchants Association, mounted a drive to locate donors to supplement the endowment. When it opened at the turn of the century, the Wilmerding school offered a course of instruction geared primarily to the building trades. Both the Lick and the Wilmerding schools were private institutions but did not charge tuition. These actions by the local business community prompted changes in school policy concerning manual training.

Response of Public Schools

Although public schools in time responded to the challenge these rival institutions posed, educational leaders in Chicago and San Francisco were initially divided in their estimation of the inherent value of manual training. As early as the 1870s, some school officials in both cities proposed altering the curriculum to incorporate more practical subjects. Among the educators who supported the idea of manual training in the public schools was California State Superintendent Ezra Carr, who argued that the establishment of industrial education would help America gain economic supremacy. He claimed that industrial education was "the only manner in which the Asiatic hordes would be conquered in the strife for industrial supremacy in the State," and was "the only cure for the evil of hoodlumism."[74] The following year, Carr laid out more clearly his conception of the proper tasks of public education:

> I hold it to be a correct principle that while the common school does not aim to make farmers or mechanics, but leaves this to special schools, that it is the business of the common schools (which educate the masses of the industrial population) to teach the elements of technical knowledge both scientific and artistic. And I hold it to be quite as much the duty of the state and municipal governments to provide special schools of an industrial character, as to support high schools.[75]

Chicago's school superintendent saw vocational training as a means to modernization. In 1877 he spoke of the necessity to change the curriculum, saying that students should be provided with "a wider intelligence and a more facile hand," including "manual skill" and the habits of industry."[76]

At first most educators neither heeded these calls for modernization nor responded to appeals to national pride. Although the bulk of the educational community accepted the notion that schools had a utilitarian function, many officials felt this did not require specialized education for trades. Tradition-minded school officials recoiled at the suggestion that the curriculum should be so differentiated, seeing such attempts as a violation of the common school ideal. The same California State Education convention which heard Superintendent Carr urging the introduction of industrial education into the public school curriculum voted for a resolution stating that "the attempt to combine practical instruction in agricultural and mechanical pursuits with the course of study in our public institutions of learning, except for purposes of illustration or experiment, is erroneous in theory and a failure in practice."[77] A committee appointed to study the matter reported on some of the difficulties which would arise were such schools to be established. Workers "would rise in rebellion against a course which if carried out, would result in flooding the country with a class of workmen entering into direct competition with them." Furthermore, such schools would probably produce poor workmen due to "irregularity of attendance (and) a lack of interest in the work, (imposed at) an age at which manual labor is usually irksome and to a certain extent unnatural." When the full convention adopted a resolution proposed by the committee, it emphasized "that it would be unwise and inexpedient for the State with its present educational endowments and appliances to do more than give the pupils of the primary and grammar schools that kind of educational training and mental discipline that is necessary to make them intelligent citizens." It continued, "We, as friends of public school education, deprecate any and all attempts and projects to divide up and fritter away our but too scant school fund, on experiments of doubtful value or expediency."[78]

By the time the decade of the 1880s rolled around, many educators had become more receptive to the notion of manual training. In 1886, the Chicago school board voted to establish an optional course of manual training in the schools, starting with mechanical drawing and woodworking, even though its board president complained that the move was a blow to the common school ideal; Chicago's public schools, he said, had been transformed into "trade schools" where learning is measured in terms of its "value in dollars and cents".[79] However, the next board president, Alan Story, a strong advocate of manual training, contended that a truly democratic, common school system would offer "the children of our working population" an education that would make them better workmen "than their parents in the same occupation." It would recognize "the great intellectual and social differences of the pupils in our schools . . ." and eliminate the single-minded focus on English grammar which was useful only to "a favored class--whose lot in life it will be to gain intellectual culture . . ."[80] In the next few years manual training was included in the curriculum of the first two years of high school, and, more importantly, the board founded an English High and Manual Training School which emphasized a distinctively work-oriented curriculum. The final acceptance of manual training came in 1895 with the official recommendation of the school board that manual training be taught in all elementary schools.[81]

While the 1870s and 1880s were in San Francisco a period of argumentation, rationalization and compromise concerning vocational education and its place vis-a-vis the public schools, by the 1890s the introduction of manual training was a fait accompli. Certainly, critics of all kinds were just behind every corner, but now educators had established a pedagogical justification for taking a position that was also necessitated by organizational maintenance. We have already seen that the board had established a Commercial High School in 1883. A decade later it formed a Committee on Manual Training which recommended that manual training be provided in two or three of the city's high schools and in one-half of the grammar schools. The report stated that "such training does not attempt to manufacture mechanics, but to give practical ideas to all pupils . . . and to obtain proper respect for manual labor."[82] It was clear that educators were influenced by the efforts of businessmen who set up private institutes training pupils for specific trades. The justifications of the school board committee certainly contained echoes of Horace Mann, who believed that universal education would be a great equalizer of human conditions, and that education had the power to shape the destiny of the young. Private efforts, they argued, "stand upon a plane above the reach of a majority of boys . . . for one boy they may educate and save, thousands get away." If the public schools were to establish a sufficient manual training department, the vast majority of pupils would benefit. Thus, spurred by competition from private industrial schools, educators began to recognize that "if we are to carry more pupils beyond the grammar schools we will find the greater proportion of them attracted to the business and manual training courses rather than the classical."[83] During these years, the board oversaw the construction of the Polytechnic High School which was equipped with machine forging, carpenter and woodturning shops, laboratories for physics and chemistry and rooms for instrumental and free hand drawing, etc. The superintendent called the offering an "act of justice" to boys who desired to enter mercantile or industrial life.[84]

Thus, manual training was fully incorporated into the public school curriculum only when educators became convinced that it was necessary to attract and hold a new organizational clientele. Yet, efforts to make the public school course of study more closely related to the needs of the workplace brought the school system critics as well as supporters. As the concept of manual training became more clearly defined in school policy, many of those who had supported it in principle attacked it in practice. Businessmen who emphasized the skill-specific aspects of vocational education criticized the more pedagogical formulation that appealed to school officials, basing their arguments on accusations of extravagance. As manual training became identified more closely with preparation for specific trades, a craft union conscious labor movement began to perceive threats to its control over the labor market and apprenticeship systems. The issues identified by the various protagonists would continue to be addressed in the early twentieth century, and eventually would lead, with the entrance of the federal government into the vocational education debate via the Smith-Hughes Act of 1912, to an essentially three-tiered system of vocational training which is now in evidence in the 1980s.[85]

The Voice of Labor

While school officials were prompted to expand their vocational programming largely in response to the growing number of rival private institutions, their actions were not taken in the face of organized labor opposition. While the trade unions were sometimes ambivalent about the value of vocational education, their support steadily grew as the idea became increasingly popular. In the end, labor, which feared the formation of "scab factories" controlled directly by businessmen became one of the most vigorous proponents of publically controlled vocational education.

Initially, labor was uncertain about vocational training. While recognizing the failures of the existing apprentice system in recruiting new workers, they nevertheless saw its abolishment as a threat to labor control of recruitment, and along with it, a loss in the gains they had made for higher wages and better working conditions. But vocational education was very popular and seemingly fulfilled a need, and the question for labor eventually became not whether or not to have it, but how to run it and what should be taught.

As early as the 1880s, Truth, the leading labor paper in San Francisco, expressed admiration for manual training schools, though its more general position on education was vague, declaring that "schools must be free and the education of all compulsory and uniform and (based) upon principles such as these in conjunction with practical useful knowledge."[86] On the other hand, a number of prominent citizens who were supporters of labor argued more specifically for vocational training. In the words of John Hittel, who wrote in the San Francisco Alta, that "if America is to compete with England, Germany and France in the industrial production or in the honors of the inventions and scientific discoveries of the future, her children must be more highly educated. Improved industrial schools are indispensible to wealth and glory to prosperity and progress."[87] Basically most working-class organizations had been early supporters of some kind of manual training, and as early as the first years of the 1870s, the Mechanics Deliberative Assembly had recommended a bill to the state legislature proposing that "labor schools be attached to the public school system."[88]

In Chicago, the rhetoric of working-class support for manual-training reflected the broad social struggles in which labor was involved at the time. Manual training was seen as an important way to bring about the "justice that was due to a class that has heretofore been discriminated against in the matter of education."[89] The Knights of Labor urged that "those who are destined to labor for a living should be given a chance to learn the use of tools and machinery at schools provided by the state, the same as the state now provides an education in the higher branches to those who are now preparing for professional life."[90] Indeed, the paper went so far as to blame the failure to enact universal industrial education on the "satanic press of the 'protected' tax-gathering plutocracy."[91]

By the turn of the century labor's diffuse support for vocational education would become more focused. As businessmen rallied behind former Chicago School Superintendent Edwin Cooley's proposals for a separate system of vocational education, labor formed a close alliance with other public school officials on behalf of a "common school" that would provide both academic and vocational training. The pedagogical justification for linking industrial and traditional education emphasized the value of conjoint training of hand and brain. But the labor-school alliance was held together by forces more powerful than any educational philosophy. Labor recognized it could have greater influence over the curriculum of public school programs than it could have over any separate set of institutions closely watched by business elites. School officials, still concerned about the formation of rival institutions, welcomed labor support. That the alliance was largely successful in shaping the terms of the Smith Hughes Act of 1917 testifies not only to the power of the alliance but also to the prestige public schools had achieved by this time.

Conclusion

Curricular expansion in the public schools occured in response to demands from different groups who had the political power to force such an expansion, or who had the resources to set up systems which would compete with the public schools unless their demands were met. These external pressures caused conflicts within the school system itself as well as conflicts between the schools and various societal groups. The ideology of a common, undifferentiated public school curriculum, the legacy of Horace Mann, was a strong influence on educational thought throughout the nineteenth century, and school officials were frequently unwilling to accept other than the traditional classical curriculum. Accordingly, the one curricular innovation which received unqualified support from educators was the classical secondary school.

In the larger community, fundamental conflicts over the purposes of public education and the degree of public financial responsibility for it manifested themselves. The "fads and frills" controversy found business interests and much of the local press attacking special view that education should be limited to the basic, practical subjects. Labor took the stance that all children were entitled to "enrichment" courses, and if the public schools did not teach them, they would not be available to the children of the working class. Because of their large numbers and politically adept leadership, the German community was able to have the issue of teaching German in the public schools treated differentially.

The secondary schools found many critics among the press and various respectable citizens, who argued that the primary schools, which served a broader clientele were not adequately financed and there was certainly not money available for elite secondary institutions. In addition, the social unrest of the times was frequently blamed in the local press as being a consequence of overeducating the masses. But in the course of these debates, organized groups representing workers, supported an expanding high school. Even though their children did not attend the high schools in large numbers, the workers viewed education as giving a chance to their more able children for a better life. Educators themselves provided unflagging support for the secondary schools, although controversies did erupt from time to time as to whether high schools should be separate institutions or extentions of grammar schools.

The public schools did not attempt to establish manual trade schools until industry took the lead and established a number of institutes first. Attempts were then made to incorporate manual training into the more traditional curriculum, by teaching skill-oriented courses such as woodworking. When these types of courses were attacked by businesses who wanted trade-specific, practical skills taught and criticized anything else as needless extravagance, labor groups once again defended the schools against conservative criticism.

In periods of financial recession, of course, cries for retrenchment could be heard from large sections of the community. At these times those who wished to limit the size and range of public schools pressed their case with special vigor. Although it was not eliminated, language instruction was cut back, as were other special studies such as music, drawing and more pedagogical forms of manual training which did not conform to the rising expectation that the curriculum should be made more pratical. Consequently, by the end of the century, the debate over the purposes of public education was subtly shifted from questions of cultural incorporation and citizenship to those of compatibility with the demands of the labor market. Thus, business could attack language instruction, music and some forms of manual training as frivolous departures from the fundamental purposes of public education at the same time that they called for additional courses in the practical skills required for growing industrial economies. Working-class and ethnic groups, on the other hand, defended the differentiated curriculum in rhetoric which appealed to considerations of citizenship and a culturally-based liberal education. At the same time, they sought practical courses which would widen their avenues of economic opportunity. School officials, for their part, maneuvered to protect and expand their organization in the context of these changing political cleavages.

Footnotes

1. Tyack, 1974.

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population 1870.

3. Based on data in Shradar, 1974, pp. 33, 38, 53-54.

4. For a discussion of the pervasiveness of German schools in Chicago, see Townsend, 1927.

5. Herrick, 1971, p. 61.

6. Currey, 1912, p. 297.

7. Hawley, 1971, p. 75; San Francisco, Superintendent's Report, 1871, p. 76; San Francisco Superintendent's Report, 1879, p. 318.

8. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction Annual Report, 1871, p. 76.

9. Ibid., 1878, p. 54.

10. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1867, 191-192.

11. San Francisco Monitor, 17 January 1874.

12. San Francisco Superintendent's Report, 1875, pp. 145-148.

13. San Francisco Monitor, 17 January 1874.

14. Hawley, 1971, p. 52; also see Shradar, 1974, pp. 33, 38, 53, 54.

15. Hawley, 1971, p. 55.

16. San Francisco Monitor, 26 February 1876.

17. San Francisco Examiner, 11 February 1878, p. 2.

18. San Francisco Monitor, 8 March 1878, p. 3.

19. Ibid, 16 March 1878, p. 78.

20. Ibid., 16 April 1878, San Francisco Call, 27 October 1878, p. 7.

21. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction Annual Report, 1878, p. 97.

22. San Francisco Argonaut, 13 March 1880.

23. San Francisco Bulletin, 21 July 1880.

24. Ibid.

25. San Francisco Call, 1 July 1881.

26. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction Annual Report, 1879, p. 74; 1882, p. 49; and 1888.

27. Chicago Tribune, 4 January 1893.

28. Chicago Board of Education Proceedings, 1892-3, p. 243.

29. Chicago Tribune, 20 January 1893, p. 9; 23 January 1893, p. 4.

30. Ibid, 7 February 1894, p. 4.

31. Chicago Inter Ocean, 22 January 1893, p. 7-8.

32. Chicago Tribune, 23 February 1893, p. 4.

33. Ibid., 9 March 1893, p. 4.

34. Chicago Inter Ocean, 3 March 1893, p. 12.

35. Chicago Inter Ocean, 13 March 1893, p. 4; Chicago Board of Education Proceedings, 1892-3, p. 243.

36. Chicago Board of Education Proceedings, 1892-93, pp. 12, 385-6; Chicago Tribune, 12 April 1893, p. 3; 13 April 1893, p. 12.

37. Chicago Tribune, 28 April 1893, p. 11; 18 February, 1893, p. 12.

38. Chicago Tribune, 25 April, 1893, p. 6.; Chicago Board of Education Proceedings, 1892-93, pp. 424-425; Chicago Tribune, 12 May 1893, p. 12.

39. Hogan, Fall 1978, p. 58.

40. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1890, p. 104; Chicago Tribune, Letter from Helen Heath, 26 February 1893, p. 26.

41. Chicago Tribune, 18 February 1893, p. 4; 11 January 1893, p. 4; 13 January 1893, p. 4; 12 February 1893, p. 29.

42. Hogan, Fall 1978, pp. 52-53.

43. Ibid.

44. Chicago *Inter Ocean*, 20 March 1893, p. 6.

45. Quoted in Hogan, Fall 1978, p. 54.

46. Chicago *Inter Ocean*, 20 March 1893, p. 12.

47. Hogan, Fall 1978, p. 56.

48. Chicago *Tribune*, 12 March 1893, p. 1.

49. Chicago *Inter Ocean*, 13 March 1873, p. 4.

50. Lazerson, 1971.

51. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction *Annual Report*, 1880, p. 55.

52. Chicago Board of Education *Annual Report*, 1876-77, pp. 50-51.

53. Atlanta Board of Education *Annual Report*, 1874, p. 10; 1890, p. 15.

54. Chicago Board of Education *Annual Report*, 1870 & 1895; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Population* 1870 & 1900.

55. Hawley, 1971, p. 10.

56. *Ibid*.

57. Dolson, 1964, p. 182.

58. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction *Annual Report*, 1880, p. 188.

59. *Ibid*., 1878, p. 95.

60. San Francisco *Call*, 7 September 1878, p. 2.

61. *Ibid*., 7 October 1878, p. 2.

62. *Ibid*., 9 November 1880

63. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction *Annual Report*, 1878, p. 79.

64. *Ibid*., p. 80.

65. *Ibid*., 1880, p.420.

66. Cloud, 1952, p. 293.

67. Chicago *Inter Ocean*, 3 March 1893, p. 12.

68. Cremin, 1961, p. 23.

69. _Ibid_., pp. 24-25.

70. _Ibid_., p. 26.

71. _Ibid_., p. 31.

72. Hogan, 1978(a), p. 251.

73. _Ibid_., p. 252.

74. San Francisco _Bulletin_, 22-23 September 1876.

75. San Francisco _Post_, 25 October 1877.

76. Chicago Board of Education _Annual Report_, 1877.

77. San Francisco _Bulletin_, 27 September 1876.

78. _Ibid_., 27 October 1877.

79. Hogan, 1978(a), pp. 254-55.

80. _Ibid_., p. 257.

81. _Ibid_., pp. 259-260.

82. San Francisco Board of Education, 14 March 1894, p. 8.

83. _Ibid_., p. 16.

84. _Ibid_.

85. Peterson and Rabe, 1981.

86. _Truth_, 7 March 1983.

87. San Francisco _Alta_, 11 March 1873.

88. _Shop and Senate_, 6 December 1873.

89. _Knights of Labor_, 4 September 1886, p. 1.

90. _Ibid_.

91. _Ibid_., 26 January 1889, p. 3.

Chapter IV

THE POLITICS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION

In the late nineteenth century, cities in the northern part of the United States were places of extraordinary human diversity. As immigrants from all the countries of Europe and from many other parts of the world made the United States home, villages became great metropolitan centers harboring large foreign concentrations. For example, in 1896 in the city of Chicago there were fifteen different ethnic groups which had reached a size of at least 16,000 people or one percent of the city's population.[1]

The way in which the schools adapted to this ethnic pluralism is a complex and contentious issue, and one of the questions with which the "revision" of American educational history has concerned itself. Some revisionists explain an increasing level of educational attendance among Chicago's immigrant groups as a complex adjustment to a capitalistic wage labor system; that is, immigrants saw the connection between education and well-paid jobs, thereby being forced to take an extremely utilitarian view of education.[2] Others discuss the issue of inequality, engaging the reader with anecdotes about ethnic discrimination and conflict in the school rooms of Boston and New York.[3] Still others present scattered quantitative information on school expenditures for the education of children of different socioeconomic backgrounds. Less well-off children, they proport to show, not only go to school for fewer years but are treated less benevolently when they are there.[4] The harshest claim of all comes from Michael Katz, who believes that not only do the children of the affluent "get the best marks and the best jobs," but that in fact discrimination against any attitudes that reflect ideas other than dominant social and industrial values has been built into the structure and purpose of American education.[5]

Few of these studies have found a way of systematically assessing how schools as organizations responded in general practice to ethnic change. Instead, we have been left with broad generalizations drawn from quite specific incidents and situations. But while ethnic and class discrimination certainly occured in classrooms, and while many school leaders undoubtedly had mixed motives in desiring to educate foreigners, the pervasiveness of the problem of intolerance and its institutionalism in the public school system as a whole cannot be inferred from events transpiring in places like Beverly, Massachusetts in 1860.[6]

One way to assess the level of historic ethnic discrimination more systematically is to estimate the way in which the nineteenth century school system allocated its limited resources. Much valuable information on resource allocation is, of course, forever lost. We cannot use survey techniques to discern how pupils were allocated among classrooms within schools, how teachers related to individual pupils, or which children were given favored access to extra curricular activities. However, archival sources do allow for some gross estimates of school practices, and, in the absence of more refined information, these are worth exploration. In this chapter we shall focus on two indicators of school allocative policies: 1) the pupil-teacher ratio in individual schools, and 2) the characteristics of the teaching staff. These data will allow us to consider the evidence that bears on three different understandings of how the school system responded to European immigration. These understandings or perspectives we shall identify as native dominance, pluralist and universalistic.

The native dominance understanding claims that people born in the United States and others of Anglo-Saxon descent (for convenience we shall call them Anglos)[7] were able to maintain control of public schools despite the influx of new immigrants. In the view of these analysts, Anglos maintained control of the schools because of their greater wealth, better education, and their historic control of strategic institutions such as the state legislature and the school system itself. Bowles and Gintis state that "the unequal contest between social control and social justice is evident in the total functioning of

U.S. education. The system provides eloquent testimony to the ability of the well-to-do to perpetuate an arrangement which consistently yields to themselves disproportional advantages, while thwarting the aspirations and needs of the working people of the United States. . . ."[8] If this argument is correct, one would expect Anglos to have received more than their share of the resources of the public school system. That is, Anglo children would have attended less crowded classes, more education dollars would have been spent on Anglo children than on the children of the immigrants, and Anglos would have held more and better jobs in the school system, in proportion to their numbers in the population, than did immigrants.[9]

The pluralist perspective claims that certain powerful immigrant groups wrested control of the city's schools away from the native born Americans and arranged the distribution of resources so that their own children received a disproportionate share. In the late nineteenth century, for example, Germans comprised one third of Chicago's population and were in a position of influence within the labor union movement. During this period, the Germans succeeded in introducing their native tongue as a second language into the public schools, something which no other ethnic group had been able to accomplish. If this view is more generally correct, the more powerful immigrant groups would have received the best treatment from the school system. In Chicago, where the Irish and the Germans were politically the best connected, one would expect the children of these groups to have enjoyed higher expenditures per pupil, less crowded class rooms and a larger percentage of the available teaching and administrative positions.

The universalistic perspective suggests that the bureaucratization of school systems led to the adoption of a norm of universalism in the distribution of school resources. Professional educators, it is contended, tried to remove the control of schools as far as possible from the realm of political parties, placing decision-making in the hands of professionals instead. Since the norm of educational opportunity for all was the justification for professional control, bureaucracies would not have discriminated against or in favor of particular groups in their allocation of public resources or their recruitment of staff. Rather one would find as the basis for universalistic decision-making examples such as the following formula, used to allot teachers to districts and individual schools in Chicago in 1968:

> In the elementary school the class size from room to room should not deviate any more than is absolutely essential. As a "rule of thumb," the class size from room to room should not deviate by more than 10 percent--15 percent as a maximum. In a large school this deviation should be far less than the 10 to 15 percent.[10]

In addition, conflicts within the organization would be better managed if all the members of the organization subscribed to the norm of universalism. Outside actors would be more easily controlled and demands by specific groups for special treatment could be more easily buffered. Given this view of the nineteenth century school, the distribution of resources among groups would be fairly equal. Children of all ethnic groups would study in classrooms of roughly the same size and teachers would be recruited from the ranks of all ethnic groups in roughly equal proportion to their numbers in the population.

Data that allowed for a test among these competing hypotheses were available in both Chicago and San Francisco. Both cities were the home of numerous ethnic concentrations which competed for power within their respective local political systems throughout the late nineteenth century, and both cities reported data on the allocation policies of the school system. Before presenting the information in detail, it may be helpful for the reader to know in advance our overall findings. In brief, the evidence with respect to pupil-teacher ratios is most consistent with the universalistic perspective. While schools varied greatly in average classroom size as a rapidly changing urban population placed uneven burdens on school resources, this variation was only slightly related to the ethnic composition of the school. If native-dominance theorists can be pleased that Anglos did slightly better than average, and if pluralists can applaud the slight success of the Irish, the findings in general best support the claim that schools were uninterested in (or incapable of) systematic ethnic discrimination. Jobs for adults were another matter. In patronage-ridden school systems, public employment was the currency of local politics, and who directed the school board had consequences for teachers and administrators. In the decade after the Civil War, native Americans held the trump cards in the political crap game, but by the turn-of-the-century immigrant groups, the Irish and the Germans in particular, were making rapid gains. Native dominance eventually gave way to a more pluralistic picture.

Universalistic School Policies: The Evidence on Classroom Size

Classroom size, as measured by average daily attendance (ADA) per teacher was high in the nineteenth century, and classroom crowding was a concern of parents and school people alike. That overcrowding was the norm can hardly be contested; differences of opinion have arisen only with respect to the social correlates of school crowding. To test the validity of the three perspectives on the public schools' treatment of immigrants we obtained data relating classroom size to ethnic characteristics of the population in Chicago for the 1898 school year. We found wide variations in average classroom size among the city's schools. Class size for the two hundred fifteen elementary schools in a random sample varied from 30.7 to 69.8 students per teacher. Examination of the data revealed no clear geographic patterns in the degree of crowding. Areas near the center of the city were no more likely to have crowded schools than outlying areas. However, it was still possible that crowding was greater in ethnic neighborhoods than in Anglo neighborhoods, even though geographic patterns were difficult to identify.

Determining the levels of crowding experienced by students belonging to the various ethnic groups was a multi-step process. Using data on student attendance school by school from the Superintendents' Annual Reports, plus lists of teacher appointments by school as recorded in the Proceedings of the Board of Education, we were able to determine an average classroom size for each elementary school. Next we determined the distribution of ethnic groups among schools by making use of the school census taken by the Chicago school system in May of 1898. In this census the school board reported the number of persons belonging to each of twenty-seven ethnic groups (including native Americans born of native-born parents) residing in each of the city's more than one thousand precincts. (See the Appendix for a fuller discussion of the data sources and treatment.) Assuming that the ethnicity of the student in a school would correspond to the ethnicity of the population of the precinct in which the school was located, we used data from two hundred fifteen of Chicago's two hundred twenty-two elementary schools.[11] The number of students of each ethnic group attending each school was estimated using the following formula:

$$S_{es} = (P_{ep}/P_{p}) * ADA_{s}$$

where S_{es} = Students (S) of ethnic group (e) in school (s)

P_{ep} = Population (P) of ethnic group (e) in precinct (p) (the precinct where school is located)

P_{p} = total population (P) of precinct (p)

ADA_{s} = Average Daily Attendance (ADA) reported for schools (s)

Given these estimates of the number of students of each ethnic group in each school in the sample, we estimated the average crowding experienced by each group by computing a weighted average using the following formula:

$$ADA/T_e = \sum_{s=1}^{215} (S_{es}/S_e) * ADA/T_s$$

where ADA/T_e = Average Daily Attendance/Teacher experienced by ethnic group (e)

S_{es} = an estimate of the total number of students (S) of ethnic group (e) in school (s)

S_e = an estimate of the total number of students (S) of ethnic group (e) in all schools, obtained by summing the S_{es} estimates for each school

ADA/T_s = ADA/Teacher for school (s) computed as follows: ADA for school divided by number of teachers in school

When the data were analyzed according to these formulae, the results showed little difference in school crowding among Chicago's ethnic groups. Table IV-1 divides Chicagoans into six major categories--Anglos, Irish, Swedish, Germans, Italians and all others (including Poles, Russians, Norwegians, Bohemians, and all the other smaller groups listed in Table IV-3). Except for the Italians, who were selected because the literature has identified them as an ethnic group particularly subject to educational discrimination,[12] these were the largest and politically most prominent groups in late nineteenth century Chicago.

But even though the political competition among these groups was sometimes fierce, the allocation of school resources among them was essentially the same. On the average, the Italians had two students per

Table IV-1

Average Classroom Size for the Largest Ethnic Groups, Chicago, 1897-1898

Group	Average Daily Attendance per Teacher	Group as a Percentage of City Population
Italians	46.9	1.2
Anglo[a]	47.6	32.1
Irish	47.7	13.4
Swedish	48.3	6.0
All Others[b]	48.5	20.7
Germans	48.9	26.5

NOTES: a. Includes American, English, Scottish, Welsh, and Canadian.

b. Includes remaining immigrant groups listed on Table IV-3.

classroom less than the Germans and the other three groups--Anglos, Swedes and Irish--fell in between, all averaging about forty-eight students per classroom. One should not conclude from these findings that the Italians were especially favored, because the percentage of Italians in the sample precincts is too small to allow for a precise estimate. One can say with considerable confidence, however, that variation in crowding in Chicago's schools was largely unrelated to the ethnic background of the students.

Another way to analyze the information that was collected is to divide ethnic groups into Anglos, Irish, persons from other northern European countries, and those from eastern and southern Europe. As can be seen in Table IV-2, such an arrangement of the information also reveals little difference in the treatment of children from varied ethnic backgrounds. While the Anglos had an average class size of 47.6 and the Irish 47.7, the Eastern and Southern European groups, the most recent and, supposedly the most poorly treated of the immigrant groups, had only a slightly larger average class size of 48.1. Clearly, the data support a universalistic rather than either a pluralist or native-dominance interpretation of the school system's allocative behavior.

The variation in classroom size increases as one divides the data into smaller categories. When all twenty-seven ethnic groups into which the Chicago survey divided its respondants are separately analyzed, the results, as shown in Table IV-3, reveal that the most favored group averaged nine fewer students per classroom than did the least favored group. But while stating the finding in this way suggests considerable ethnic variability, more careful examination of Table IV-1 cautions against making any claim that ethnic groups were treated differentially. In the first place, much of the range is accounted for by three deviant cases, the Lithuanians, who had a class size average of 3.6 more than any other group, and the blacks and the Mexicans, who had the two smallest class size average. When these unusual cases are put to one side, the variation among groups is 46.8 to 49.6, or less than three pupils per classroom, well within the 10 percent range of variation the Chicago public schools felt was permissable as late as 1968.

Table IV-2

Average Classroom Size for Ethnic Groups, Chicago, 1897-1898

Group	Average Daily Attendance per Teacher	Group as a Percentage of City Population
Anglos[a]	47.6	32.1
Irish	47.7	13.4
East and South Europeans and Others[c]	48.1	15.8
North Europeans[b]	48.8	38.7

NOTES:
a. Includes American, English, Scottish, Welsh, and Canadian.
b. Includes Belgians, Danes, French, German, Hollandish, Norwegians, Swedish, and Swiss.
c. Includes Bohemians, Chinese, Colored, Greeks, Hungarians,
Italians, Lithuanians, Mexicans, Polish, Russian, Spanish,
Mixed, and Other.

Table IV-3

Average Classroom Size for 27 Ethnic Groups, by Precinct, Chicago, 1897-98

Group	Classroom Size	% of Population
Blacks[a]	43.9	1.4
Mexicans	45.0	0.008
Mixed[b]	46.8	0.3
Italians	46.9	1.2
Russians	46.9	2.1
Canadians	47.5	1.9
Greeks	47.5	0.1
Americans	47.6	26.4
Irish	47.7	13.4
Other[c]	47.7	0.09
Welsh	47.8	0.2
Belgians	48.0	0.11
French	48.0	1.2
Polish	48.1	5.2
Scottish	48.1	1.2
Chinese	48.3	0.13
English	48.3	2.4
Swedish	48.3	6.0
Danish	48.5	1.2
Germans	48.9	26.5
Hungarians	49.0	0.2
Hollandish	49.1	1.0
Swiss	49.1	0.2
Norwegians	49.4	2.5
Bohemians	49.6	4.8
Spanish	49.6	0.03
Lithuanian	53.2	0.08

NOTES:
a. These are called "colored" in the data. We are assuming they are black Americans.
b. Mixed refers to those of Mixed Parentage.
c. Other refers to groups not listed.

These unusual cases, moreover, could very likely be due either to sampling error or to various defects in the historical data set with which we were working. Two of the extreme cases are ethnic groups that consisted of less than one-tenth of one percent of the population in the sample precincts. Estimates based on such a small percentage of the population are not sufficiently reliable to warrant any substantive interpretation. And the third unusual case, that of the American blacks, who, according to this data set, were in the most favored schools, must be interpreted cautiously. It may be that blacks, who served as servants for some of the city's wealthiest residents, were domiciled in adjacent areas and their children thus lived in parts of the city where the class size was smaller. But while this is a possible explanation, it is equally likely that blacks, constituting but 1.4 percent of the population in the sample precincts, were also not present in sufficiently large numbers to permit a reliable estimate. In any case, even if the data is taken at face value, blacks had only four fewer students per classroom than the median ethnic group. Overall, there seems to have been little discrimination among ethnic groups in the allocation of teachers among Chicago's public schools.

Several aternative hypotheses that could account for variation in class size come to mind. Distance from the center of the city might be one reason why the most favored school had less than thirty-one students per classroom and the least favored nearly seventy. While we attempt no quantitative measure of this variable, visual inspection of the data nonetheless revealed no obvious relationship between centrality of location and crowding. Data limitations precluded our examining another possible explanation--the income or wealth of a neighborhood. But given the strong relationship between ethnicity and income, it is unlikely that a more direct measure of wealth would have found strong relationships where ethnicity identified virtually none.

To us, the most convincing explanation for our finding that ethnicity had such a weak correlation with crowding, even in the face of considerable uneveness in class size across the city, is that crowding was a more or less randomly distributed characteristic over which the school system had, in the short run very little control. In the late

1890s neighborhoods changed rapidly as the city was undergoing one of its largest growth spurts. Immigrants were arriving faster than they could be counted, which gave urgency to a school census of the sort from which our data was taken. By the time the school board identified the need, planned a response, contracted for a new school building, supervised its construction, and drew new attendance boundaries, another neighborhod could well have become inundated by urban newcomers, causing great crowding in another part of the city. Information on social change, always as scarce as it is needed by public officials, was particularly a problem for the nineteenth century school system, which was both highly decentralized and without modern means of communication. It may well be that the only way Chicago school officials could have discriminated among ethnic groups, even if they had wanted to, would have been to establish a separate and unequal set of schools for immigrants, a policy which was followed in the treatment of blacks by cities in the South.

Pluralistic School Policies: The Evidence on Teacher Ethnicity

In his "Memoirs," Christopher A. Buckley, Republican boss of San Francisco from 1882-1891, mentions a young woman, who called at the Buckley residence one evening with the information that she had been granted a teaching position in the school department. "I have been just a little slow in coming around, Mr. Buckley," she went on. "I was told to bring it to Mr. _______ (a friend of education), but I thought it would be ever so much nicer to give it to you in person and thank you for your kindness. Here are the two hundred and fifty dollars." Buckley questioned her about the gift, to which she replied, "Why, Mr. Buckley, you ought to know. That was the amount agreed on with Mr. ________ for getting me my lovely position as teacher in the public schools. All the girls who are appointed pay you, don't they?" Buckley, inquiring into the matter at once, went to a person of prominence who took deep interest in the school department. "See here, boss," said the friend of education. "Better not turn over these old affairs. One cannot tell what may be uncovered. But you can bank on one thing. Your name will never be mentioned again." Buckley's story concludes on the sobering note that the friend of education later turned out to be the main broker in the appointments scandals.[13]

While Buckley's own role in this autobiographical account has probably been sanitized, the story illustrates the pervasiveness of the patronage system in nineteenth century urban schools. Jobs were obtained through political connections not only in San Francisco, but in Chicago and other cities throughout the country. One superintendent said in an 1896 article on teachers in the Atlantic Monthly, "Nearly all the teachers in our schools get their positions by what is called 'political pull.'"[14]

These anecdotes and observations, as interesting as they are, do not identify the intensity or exact locus of patronage practices. Were politicians particularly interested in higher paid, influential positions, such as that of principal? Was patronage the means by which the Anglos maintained their dominance? Or was patronage the mechanism by which immigrant groups obtained a toe-hold in the educational system? Did patronage practices decrease over time? Did the amount vary from one city to another?

In order to obtain some estimate of the extent and focus of patronage in nineteenth century urban schools, the home addresses of teachers and principals, obtained from the Annual Reports of the school system, were analyzed in order to determine whether teachers lived in the same political ward as the school in which they worked was located. According to most studies of machine-style politics, these political parties were, in the nineteenth century, highly decentralized organizations, with aldermen and ward committeemen holding great discretion over public employment opportunities within their particular ward. Since these political leaders were primarily interested in maximizing political support from within their own neighborhood, they had an incentive to recruit job holders from their own community. To be sure, such a practice was not invariant. A teacher might win a job because her uncle, living in another part of the city, had good political connections. Or a particular ward committeeman might have influence outside his own neighborhood or ward. Nonetheless, on average and taken altogether, it seemed not unreasonable to assume that where political patronage was a more widely practiced form of recruitment

Table IV-4

Percentage of Educators Residing in the Same Ward in Which They Worked, Chicago, 1867-1915

Ethnicity[a]	1867-68		1882-83		1893-94		1914-15	
	Percent	(N)	Percent	(N)	Percent	(N)	Percent	(N)
	Teachers[b]							
Totals	30%	(281)	28%	(95)	35%	(199)	21%	(169)
Anglo	31	(234)	31	(63)	34	(118)	22	(90)
All non-Anglo	28	(47)	19	(32)	36	(81)	20	(79)
Irish	33	(15)	29	(17)	24	(31)	22	(32)
German	30	(10)	17	(10)	34	(36)	18	(33)
Other	23	(22)	20	(5)	66	(14)	21	(14)
	Principals and Assistant Principals							
Total	46%	(39)	41%	(91)	30%	(180)	19%	(178)
Anglo	49	(35)	38	(73)	31	(121)	22	(100)
All non-Anglo	25	(4)	50	(18)	27	(59)	14	(78)
Irish	0	(1)	44	(9)	28	(29)	11	(44)
German	33	(3)	50	(2)	31	(16)	17	(24)
Other	0	(0)	57	(7)	21	(14)	20	(10)

SOURCE: Annual Reports, Board of Education, Chicago.

NOTES:
a. Ethnicity is determined by surname.
b. Includes teachers of the German language. Figures for teachers for the years 1882-83 and 1893-94 are weighted, as teachers of the German language were sampled at a different rate than regular teachers for those years.

for school positions, one would find a greater tendency for teachers and principals to live and work in the same political jurisdiction.

Disproportionate tendencies to live in the same ward in which one works can therefore be taken as an indicator of a partisan-based recruitment system. As can be seen in Table IV-4, such a tendency was pronounced for both Chicago teachers and principals during the years between 1868 and 1915. Even though educators could have lived in any one of sixteen wards in 1868, fully 30 percent of the teachers lived in the same ward in which they worked. Even though teachers could have lived in any one of thirty-four different wards in 1915, the percentage living in the same ward remained at 21 percent, a particularly high figure given the great enlargement of Chicago's boundaries and the improvements in mass transportation that had occurred in the intervening period. Until 1894 the better paid, high prestige principals' positions were even more likely to be held by someone living in the same ward, a finding quite consistent with contemporary claims that principal appointments were especially likely to be influenced by political considerations.

Given the prevalance of patronage practices in both Chicago and San Francisco, and given the fact that many have regarded the political machine as particularly responsive to the concern of immigrant groups, it is interesting to note that teachers with ethnic surnames were no more likely to be recruited to either the teacher or principal positions on the basis of political favoritism. In three out of the four years for which comparisons were made, Anglo teachers in Chicago were more likely to live in the same neighborhood as the school in which they worked. Even the Irish did not stand out as being especially likely to be politically connected. Nor were localistic tendencies any greater for principals of ethnic as compared to Anglo descent. For San Francisco, available data allow for comparisons only in the years 1875 and 1885, but even at this early period, sharp differences between ethnics and Anglos are difficult to discern. (See Table IV-5). While ethnic teachers were slightly more likely than Anglo teachers to live in the same ward as the one in which they worked in 1875, the reverse was the case in 1885. In general, it seems that patronage was as important

Table IV-5

Percentage of Educators Residing in the Same Ward in Which They Worked, San Francisco, 1874-85

Ethnicity[a]	1874-75		1884-85	
	Percent	(N)	Percent	(N)
	Teachers			
Total	30%	(230)	30%	(317)
Anglo	28	(163)	34	(196)
All non-Anglo	34	(67)	23	(121)
Irish	33	(21)	21	(72)
German	25	(20)	28	(29)
Other	42	(26)	25	(20)
	Principals and Assistant Principals			
Total	27%	(44)	32%	(59)
Anglo	28	(39)	33	(46)
All non-Anglo	20	(5)	31	(13)
Irish	0	(2)	50	(4)
German	0	(1)	20	(5)
Other	50	(2)	25	(4)

SOURCE: Annual Reports of the Common Schools, San Francisco.

NOTE: a. Ethnicity is determined by surname.

to the city's Anglos as it was to the ethnics.

While the nineteenth century political machine has been romanticized by some as a primary channel of political mobility for ethnic groups, little other than anecdotal evidence has ever been produced in support of these claims.[15] In fact some of the more careful scholarship on political patronage and corruption has shown that machine style politics thrived in New York City well before the arrival of immigrant groups,[16] that patronage practices flourished in non-ethnic cities as much as in cities where ethnics predominated,[17] and that its political style was in every way consistent with the well-established individualistic political culture that pervaded American society in the nineteenth century.[18] Political parties in Chicago and San Francisco had as much incentive in keeping the native-born population politically satisfied as in capturing the vote of the ethnic immigrant. Native-born Americans voted more frequently, were more aware of the political stakes involved, and were courted by both of the dominant parties. Immigrants often were ineligible to vote, and when they did participate, they often tied their fate to just one of the two parties, limiting their leverage. There is every reason to believe therefore that Anglos were as likely to benefit from the patronage system as were the immigrants. Accordingly, the Anglo teachers were as likely to live in the politically appropriate place as were teachers with other ethnic surnames. Political pluralism prevailed in Chicago, but it was a pluralism at least as open to Anglos as to any of the other ethnic immigrants.

Given this openness of the political system to both Anglos and ethnics, one should not expect to find either Anglo dominance of the teaching staff or rapid inroads by in-migrating ethnics. Given the diversity of claims on political leaders, the processes of change can be expected to have occurred at a slow but steady pace. Thus when one looks at the composition and structure of the teaching staff, one expects to find that not one of the three understandings outlined earlier would quite capture the nuances of social change in the city. The native dominance perspective anticipates that Anglos would be able to keep control of jobs in the school system, obtain classroom assignments with favorable ratios, and receive higher salaries. The pluralist perspective expects groups among the immigrants to be able to wrest control of patronage away from the Anglos, obtaining more and better jobs. The universalistic perspective assumes all ethnic groups to be represented proportionately in the ranks of teachers and administrators and to be assigned to classrooms without regard to their ethnicity.

In order to test these alternative hypotheses we collected data on teacher ethnicity, classroom size, teacher salaries and teacher residences within Chicago and San Franciso for selected years during the period 1896-1915. The indicators of differential treatment of an ethnic group were the proportion of jobs obtained by each group, the level at which members of each group were paid (i.e., job status), and the size of the classrooms to which they were assigned, assuming that teachers from favored groups would be assigned to smaller classrooms.

Our data on jobs within the school systems, while less precise than the data on ethnicity and classroom crowding in Chicago, indicate that by the latter part of the century, members of larger ethnic groups such as the Germans and Irish, were able to obtain significant numbers of jobs within school systems. While they were not paid as well as their Anglo counterparts, this appeared to be mainly a problem of seniority. The Anglos had been in the system longer and had risen to higher paid positions. Over time, new immigrant groups seemed to be moving to a position of greater equality with the Anglos.

In order to determine the numbers and types of jobs held by members of the various ethnic groups, we inspected lists of teacher appointments from Chicago and San Francisco. Data for Chicago is from the school years 1867-68, 1882-83, 1893-94 and 1914-15.[19] We collected similar data from San Francisco for 1874-75, 1884-85, and 1910-11.[20] Ethnicity was determined by the country of origin of the individual's last name.[21] Since only the large ethnic groups had many members, we used a consolidated set of four ethnic groups to categorize the teachers. These groups were Anglos, Irish, Germans, and Others. (Since very few teachers were of Swedish or Italian ethnicity, these two groups were collapsed into the "Others" in the analysis.)

To obtain a sense of the degree to which the teaching staff was representative of a city's overall population, we compared the teacher ethnicity data with United States census data on the foreign born. While we do not have population data which is directly comparable to our teacher ethnicity data, since the censuses determine ethnicity on the basis of place of birth while we estimated ethnicity by the origin of the individual's last name, it is apparent that in both Chicago and San Francisco, Anglos held a disproportionately large part of the early teaching jobs. (See Tables IV-6 and IV-7) Anglos comprised 72 percent of San Francisco's teaching force in 1874-75 and 83 percent of Chicago's teachers in 1867-68. We have assumed that the native born population in 1870 was, in both cities, primarily Anglo. Taken together with the percentage of Anglo foreign born, it is obvious that the number of teaching positions held by Anglos in the early period was disproportionately large compared to their numbers in the city population as a whole. By 1910, the assumption that the native population is primarily Anglo can no longer be made. At the same time, the number of teaching jobs as well as the number of principalships given to Anglo teachers steadily declines, becoming more proportionate to their numbers in the city population.

Although the Irish started with few jobs, their numbers increased rapidly in both cities. Fourteen percent of the teachers and 16 percent of the principals had Irish names in Chicago in 1893-94, roughly the percentage of Irish stock in the city's population at that time.[22] Increasing Irish representation continues over the next two decades in both cities. By this time, the Irish hold 25 percent of the teaching jobs and 34 percent of the principalships in San Francisco, percentages which, in all probability, were greater than the percentage of Irish in the city as a whole.

Both Germans and particularly the other ethnic groups had fewer teaching jobs through 1883. The Germans dominated one special group, the teachers of the German language, but German language teachers were only a small fraction of the system's teachers (1-3 percent). However, the number of positions held by the two groups does show an increase, particularly for the Germans in Chicago, as the fraction held by Anglos

Table IV-6
Ethnicity of the City Population and of Public School Educators, San Francisco, 1870-1910

Ethnicity[a]	Total Population		
	1870	1880	1910
Native Born	44%	58%	72%
Foreign Born	56	42	28
Anglo	6	5	*
Irish	17	13	6
German	9	9	6
Other[c]	24	15	16
	100%	100%	100%

Ethnicity[b]	Educators		
	1874-75	1884-85	1910-11[d]
Teachers			
Anglo	72%	61%	54%
Irish	9	23	25
German	9	11	11
Other[c]	11	6	10
	101% (247)	101% (339)	100% (265)
Principals[d]			
Anglo	89%	77%	54%
Irish	4	7	34
German	2	8	6
Other[c]	4	8	6
	99% (46)	100% (61)	100% (108)

SOURCES: Percentage foreign born figures are from the U. S. Census, *Population*, 1870, 1880, 1910.
Data on ethnicity of principals are from the *Annual Reports of the Common Schools*

NOTES:
a. Ethnicity determined by place of birth.
b. Ethnicity determined by surname. All figures include native born as well as foreign born persons.
c. For a list of ethnic groups included in the Other category, see Table IV-3.
d. Includes vice principals.
* Insignificant numbers.

Table IV-7
Ethnicity of the City Population and of Public School Educators, Chicago, 1867-1915

Ethnicity[a]	Total Population			
	1870	1880	1890	1910
Native born	52%	59%	58%	68%
Foreign Born	48	41	42	32
Anglo	3	3	3	1
Irish	13	9	6	3
German	20	18	18	7
Other[c]	12	11	15	21
Total Percent	100%	100%	100%	100%

Ethnicity[b]	Educators			
	1867-68	1882-83	1893-94[d]	1914-15
Teachers[d]				
Anglo	83%	65%	60%	51%
Irish	6	19	14	19
German	3	11	20	20
Other[c]	8	5	7	10
Total Percent	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	(288)	(101)	(233)	(286)
Principals and Assistant Principals				
Anglo	88%	80%	69%	56%
Irish	3	11	16	25
German	5	2	8	14
Other[c]	5	7	7	5
Total Percent	101%	100%	100%	100%
Number	(40)	(95)	(193)	(183)

SOURCES: United States Censuses, Population, for selected years. *Annual Reports*, Board of Education, Chicago.

NOTES:
a. Ethnicity determined by place of birth.
b. Ethnicity determined by surname.
c. See Table IV-1.
d. Figures for teachers are weighted, as teachers of the German language were sampled at a different rate than regular teachers.

declines, indicating that these groups were slowly being assimilated into the ranks of teachers.

A similar pattern that shows how ethnic groups gradually worked their way into the system of public education emerged in an examination of salary levels. In 1882-83 the teachers of German and Irish ethnicity in Chicago were paid less than Anglo teachers, but by 1893-94 this difference had narrowed. (See Table IV-8) The percentage of non-Anglo teachers who were paid the higher salary increased substantially from 63 percent in 1882 to 80 percent a decade later. In 1893-94 the German principals were even with or ahead of the Anglo principals in terms of salary, while Irish principals were behind both of the other groups. (See Table IV-9). However, many more Irish than Germans were principals, particularly when their numbers in the population are taken into account, indicating that the Irish may have had the political power to obtain principal positions though they did not have the seniority to achieve the highest salary rates. Apparently groups of newcomers, such as the Irish and Germans, slowly worked their way into the public employment system, with the more powerful groups leading the way. However, many Anglos still held principalships in Chicago, even in 1914-15, well after their share of the population had begun to dwindle. (See Table IV-7.)

Salary patterns in San Francisco vary somewhat from those in Chicago. (See Table IV-10.) In 1874-75 the few teachers of German background were actually better paid than the more numerous Anglo teachers or the few Irish teachers. By 1910-11 all the groups had moved up the salary scale, but the Irish were still somewhat behind the others in terms of compensation. However, the differences in the compensation of the ethnic groups was minimal. Finally, the table shows that, regardless of ethnic background, principal salaries were also essentially the same.

For San Francisco information on the average classroom size at each school within the system enabled us to determine whether teachers of particular ethnic groups were discriminated against by being assigned to schools with more crowded classrooms. In general, the results indicated that non-Anglo teachers were no more likely to teach in crowded schools

167

Table IV-8

Salary Range for Teachers, by Ethnicity, Chicago, 1882-1894

Salary Range	Ethnicity			
	Anglos[a]	Non-Anglos[a]		
		Total[b]	Irish	German
1882-1883				
$ 500-599	15%	37%	42%	47%
600 +	85	63	58	53
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(77)	(35)	(19)	(11)
1893-1894				
$ 500-599	15%	20%	23%	27%
600 +	85	80	77	73
	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(120)	(74)	(31)	(30)

SOURCES: Chicago Board of Education *Annual Reports*.
Lists of teacher appointments.

NOTES:
a. Ethnicity determined by surname
b. Includes individuals with other ethnic surnames as well as Irish and German.

168

Table IV-9
Salary Range for
Principals and Assistant Principals by Ethnicity,
Chicago, 1867-1894

Salary Range	Ethnicity				
	Anglos[a]	Non-Anglos[a]			
		Total	Irish	German	Other[b]
1867-68					
$500-999	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1000-1599	52	33	0	67	0
1600-2199	42	50	100	33	50
2200+	3	17	0	0	50
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(33)	(6)	(1)	(3)	(2)
1882-83					
$500-999	36%	47%	70%	50%	14%
1000-1599	29	21	10	0	43
1600-2199	32	32	20	50	43
2200 +	4	0	0	0	0
	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(76)	(19)	(10)	(2)	(7)
1893-94					
$500-999	11%	17%	24%	0%	21%
1000-1599	54	56	59	50	57
1600-2199	14	14	3	38	7
2200 +	21	14	14	13	14
	100%	101%	100%	101%	99%
	(127)	(59)	(29)	(16)	(14)

SOURCES: Chicago Board of Education Annual Reports. Lists of teacher appointments.

NOTES: a. Ethnicity determined by surname.
b. For a list of ethnic groups included in the Other category, see Table IV-1).

Table IV-10

Salary Range for Teachers and Principals by Ethnicity, San Francisco, 1874 - 1911

Salary Range	Principals and Assistant Principals				
		Non-Anglos[a]			
	Anglos[a]	Total	Irish	German	Other[b]
1874-75					
$700 1599	23%	17%	50%	0%	0%
1600-1999	48	33	0	50	50
2000 +	30	50	50	50	50
	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(40)	(6)	(2)	(2)	(2)
1910-11					
$700-1599	33%	34%	32%	43%	33%
1600-1999	36	32	32	29	33
2000 +	31	34	35	29	33
	100%	100%	99%	101%	99%
	(58)	(50)	(37)	(7)	(6)

Salary Range	Teachers				
		Non-Anglos[a]			
	Anglos[a]	Total	Irish	German	Other[b]
1874-75					
$500-799	38%	41%	48%	33%	41%
800-899	27	17	29	10	15
900-1199	21	22	14	38	15
1200 +	14	20	10	19	30
	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%
	(178)	(69)	(21)	(21)	(27)
1910-11					
$500-799	6%	10%	11%	0%	19%
800-899	6	6	5	7	7
900-1199	38	48	56	34	41
1200 +	49	37	29	59	33
	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%
	(143)	(122)	(66)	(29)	(27)

NOTES: a. Ethnicity determined by surname.
b. For listing of groups included in Other, see Table IV-1

than Anglo teachers. The differences between the classroom size for Anglo teachers and that for Irish teachers (the next largest group of teachers in each of the three sampled years) were minimal, the largest difference being .5 (one half of one student in daily attendance per teacher). (See Table IV-11.) While Italian teachers were assigned to somewhat larger classrooms in 1894 and 1910, even here the differences are modest and, moreover, the number of Italian teachers in our sample is so small that the differences are not even statistically significant. Table IV-12 presents more detailed information on the relationship between class size and ethnicity in San Francisco. It, too, shows how modest and irregular is the relationship between the two factors.

Thus the investigation of teacher ethnicity, salary and classroom size revealed a pattern of slow assimilation of new groups into the corps of teachers and principals. Though Anglos still held over half the teaching positions and principalships even in the early twentieth century, a more equal distribution of jobs was emerging. The Irish, the most powerful of the immigrant groups, were beginning to achieve a disproportionate share when their numbers in the population were taken into consideration. Italians, Swedes, and other recent immigrants whose native tongue was not English had much greater difficulty in securing employment as teachers. Once hired, teachers seemed to be assigned to larger or smaller classrooms without regard to their ethnic background.

Conclusion

Taken together, the information presented in this chapter forms a picture which lends little support to the claim that the schools blatantly discriminated against ethnic, working class groups. School resource allocation policies, as seen in levels of classroom crowding and the number of teaching jobs held by ethnic groups, provide us with the data to more systematically determine the real extent of institutionalized discrimination, at least in so far as resource inequality is concerned.

Three differing perspectives on how school systems adapted to the nineteenth century influx of immigrants motivated our analysis. The

Table IV-11
Average Classroom Size by Ethnicity of Teacher, San Francisco, 1874-1911

Ethnicity of Teacher	Classroom Size		
	1874-1875	1884-1885	1910-1911
Anglo	46.5	49.3	35.5
Irish	46.6	49.2	36.0
German	44.0	47.5	37.0
Italian	47.5	52.5	37.6
Other	45.0	50.0	35.0
Average	46.1	49.2	35.8

Table IV-12

Classroom Size by Ethnicity of Teacher, San Francisco, 1874-1911

Classroom Size	Ethnic Group of Teachers					
	Anglo	Irish	German	Italian	Other	Mean
1874-1875						
25-43	31%	45%	42%	25%	44%	35%
45-48	37	20	37	50	38	36
49-64	32	35	21	25	19	29
Number of teachers	(151)	(20)	(19)	(4)	(16)	(214)
1884-1885						
29-47	30%	28%	43%	0%	50%	32%
48-51	38	45	30	50	6	37
52-59	33	27	27	50	44	32
Number of teachers	(202)	(74)	(30)	(2)	(16)	(326)
1910-1911						
5-33	32%	27%	28%	43%	47%	31%
34-39	41	45	64	14	33	44
40-59	26	27	18	43	20	25
	(136)	(62)	(28)	(7)	(15)	(251)

native dominance perspective, which claims that early on Anglos gained control of the system, assumes that school systems hired primarily Anglo teachers and arranged preferential treatment for Anglo children. A pluralist understanding sees immigrant groups becoming larger and more politically powerful, gradually working themselves into positions of authority, gaining more jobs and a larger share of the available resources for their own children. The third perspective, that of universalism, assumes the development of a bureaucracy which was uninterested in systematic discrimination, promoting instead the relatively equal distribution of resources throughout the system.

With respect to the issue of classroom crowding, our data was most consistent with the universalistic perspective. There was little difference among the various ethnic groups in Chicago in the ADA per teacher experienced by Chicago's various ethnic groups. What differences did exist favored first the Anglos, then the Irish who differed from the Anglos by less than one child per classroom, then the Scandinavians, eastern and southern Europeans and Germans who were essentially treated exactly the same by the school system. A few of the smaller groups varied from this general pattern, but the small percentage of their numbers in the population makes it difficult to determine their ADA per teacher accurately.

While in our sample analysis of two hundred fifteen schools important differences did exist (student-teacher ratios varied from less than thirty-one to nearly seventy), these differences are only weakly related to the ethnicity of the pupils. When the groups were clustered by language and cultural similarity, the resulting pattern was one of tightly bunched classroom crowding levels with culturally dissimilar southern and eastern Europeans experiencing slightly less classroom crowding than Western Europeans. A more likely explanation for classroom crowding is that rapid population growth in particular parts of the city placed unusual burdens on particular schools.

The data with respect to teaching jobs and principalships is most consistent with the pluralist perspective. Teachers belonging to the larger ethnic groups received increasingly equal treatment during the late nineteenth century. Few non-Anglos held teaching or principal positions just after the Civil War, and those who did were poorly paid. However, later in the century, as increasing numbers of immigrants entered the cities, members of the new populations did obtain jobs in the educational system. Rather than a long-term pattern of favortism, we see early discrimination giving way to increasing acceptance for the larger immigrant groups.

The results of this analysis give support to the perspective that certain non-Anglo ethnics achieved sufficient political power to obtain substantial resources for themselves from the public school system. The one ethnic group which was known for specializing in politics, the Irish, eventually achieved more than its proportionate share of positions within the school system, and its children may have gone to slightly less crowded schools than did the children of any other large immigrant group.

On neither the issue of job discrimination or that of classroom crowding are our data consistent with the native-dominance perspective. By the late 1890s, schools attended by Irish pupils were no more crowded than those attended by Anglo pupils, and other large ethnic groups were not far behind. While the Anglos still held many teaching jobs late in the century, even after they were no longer the largest ethnic group, this was in part a function of their earlier predominance in the population. While many immigrants who came to the United States were themselves rarely qualified to take jobs in the school system, their children, being educated in that system were more able to compete with the members of earlier immigrant groups for those jobs. Thus, as an immigrant population became established, its members increasingly competed for employment on an equal basis with groups of longer standing.

Finally, classroom size and the structure and composition of the teaching staff do not address the question of the quality of the educational experience of children from varying ethnic groups. Interaction within classrooms and between home and school were extremely important for student achievement in school. But the analysis of school resource allocation at least provides information about over all school policy in the treatment of immigrant children by a major public institution. Certainly the schools of Chicago and San Francisco treated European immigrants differently from the way the schools of Atlanta treated blacks. While in the city, black men and women eventually were hired as the teachers of the children of their race, few other concessions were made by the board to the city's racial minorities. While the teacher/pupil ratio for whites remained basically constant between 1878 and 1895, ranging only from 1/63 at the beginning of the period to 1/65 at the end, the teacher/pupil ratio in black schools fluctuated wildly from 1/91 in 1878 to no less than 1/118 in 1895. (See Table IV-13.) Black teachers, moreover, were placed on a sharply lower salary schedule than were white teachers.

Because they had the vote, immigrants in northern cities fared better than blacks in southern cities. Boldly inegalitarian treatment such as that which prevailed for blacks in Atlanta would have ruined the careers of northern politicians. Even in Atlanta, blacks fared better educationally when they could vote and lost ground late in the nineteenth century when white primaries were instituted. Since these points require elaboration, we examine, in the next chapter, the extent to which race politics and race relations in urban education were resolved so differently from the politics of European immigration.

Table IV-13

Atlanta's Primary School Enrollment by Race, 1878-1895

Year	Black Primary Enrollment	White Primary Enrollment	Black Students per Teacher	White Students per Teacher
1878	1,269	2,081	91	63
1882	1,111	2,813	69	64
1885	1,533	3,659	N.A.	N.A.
1890	2,373	5,402	N.A.	N.A.
1895	4,705	9,042	118	65

SOURCE: Atlanta Board of Education Annual Reports, for selected years

177

Appendix

Data Resources for the Analysis of Classroom Size in 1897-98 Chicago

Every two years during the period 1872-1916, the Chicago School Board conducted a census of the population of the city in order to determine the number of school age children in the city. For two of these years, 1896 and 1898, population ethnicity was reported. Population within each precinct was broken down into twenty-seven ethnic groups, which are listed in Table IV-3. Members of twenty-four of these groups (the three exceptions being native Americans born of native born parents, and the black and Chinese racial groups) were classified as to whether they were foreign born, native born with both parents foreign born, or native born with one parent American born and the other foreign born. Assuming that the ethnic composition of the school would be similar to the ethnicity of the precinct in which it was located, the May 1898 census data served as a proxy measure for student ethnicity during the 1897-98 school year. The May 1898 school census is reported in the Proceedings of the Board of Education for 1898-99.

Chicago school attendance data, used in determining classroom crowding, was reported in the 44th Annual Report of the Board of Education for 1897-98. We used the average daily attendance figures to determine the number of pupils in a school. In order to ascertain the number of teachers assigned to each school, we examined lists of teacher appointments for the upcoming school year as voted by the Board of Education at its June meeting and printed in the Board Proceedings. The June 1897 list of teacher appointments for the 1897-98 school year is printed on pp. 640-658 of the 1896-97 Proceedings. Using this report, we counted the number of regular teachers assigned to each school. Head assistants, German teachers, special teachers, and others were not counted, for the ratio of regular teachers to pupils would be the best measure of classroom size.

We determined in which precinct each of the public elementary schools was located by using the following resources: addresses reported in tables of "School Sites--Location, Size and Value of Lots and Improvements" in several different School Reports, school addresses reported in city directories, street guides contained in old city directories, plus period maps of streets, precincts and wards. These were taken from the collections of The University of Chicago, the Chicago Historical Society, the Municipal Reference Library of the City of Chicago, and the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners.

Determining Teacher Ethnicity and Home Address

For each school year in the two cities, lists of the names of teachers and principals working in the respective school systems were available. We selected random samples of both teachers and principals (see Tables IV-6, IV-7, and IV-8 for sample sizes), then determined the ethnic background of each educator by looking up his/her name in Smith's New Dictionary of American Family Names. The first country listed after the educator's name was assigned as the country of the educator's ethnic origin. In the 1884-85 San Francisco sample, for example, 95 percent of the names were identified directly or under a variant spelling of the name Smith. In the 1910-11 San Francisco sample, 90 percent were identified in this way.

Another step was necessary when a name did not have a direct entry and was not crosslisted under a variant spelling. Using Smith's New Dictionary and Dellquest's These Names of Ours, we determined if the name contained any distinctive spellings or endings which would identify it with a particular national origin. For each of the San Francisco data sets mentioned above, less than 2 percent of the names remained unidentifiable after this second step. These names were assigned to the "Other" category.

Educators in Chicago and San Francisco were randomly sampled using a fixed interval method. A twenty-five percent sample, for example, was drawn by selecting every fourth name. Sampling rates were as follows:

San Francisco	1874-75	1884-85	1910-11	
Principals and Vice Principals	100%	100%	100%	
Teachers	50%	50%	25%	
Chicago	1867-68	1882-83	1893-94	1914-15
Principals and Asst. Principals	100%	100%	50%	50%
Regular Teachers	100%	10%	6%	3%
German Language Teachers	100%	100%	50%	none

Regular teachers and German language teachers were sampled at different rates in Chicago in 1882-83 and 1893-94. The percentage and N's reported in the tables are weighted to take into account the differing rates at which the two populations were sampled.

The home addresses for Chicago teachers were obtained from the Annual Reports of the Board of Education. For San Francisco, the Superintendents' Annual Reports provided us with information on teacher addresses and the location of schools. Using ward maps printed in 1879, located in the collections of the Bancroft Library at the Berkeley Campus of the University of California, we were able to ascertain in which ward teachers lived and in which ward schools were located.

Footnotes

1. In order of descending size, these groups were: Germans, native Americans born of native born parents, Irish, Swedish, Polish, Bohemians, English, Norwegians, Scottish, Canadians, Russians, Colored, Italians, Danes, and French. This information is taken from the 1896 School Census as reported in Public Schools of the City of Chicago, 1895-96. The School Census classified people into twenty-seven ethnic and racial groups according to the place of birth of the individual and his/her parents.

2. Hogan, Fall 1978.

3. See Tyack, 1974, pp. 229-255.

4. Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 33.

5. Katz, 1971, p. xviii.

6. Katz, 1968, part 1, chapter 1.

7. We use the term, Anglo, because in our quantitative analysis we were generally unable to distinguish native-born Americans of British descent from English, Scottish and Welsh immigrants.

8. Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 30.

9. However, the reverse does not hold true. The presence of a relatively equal distribution of services does not necessarily imply the presence of strong universalistic norms. If the various groups in the city each had roughly equal political status, they might obtain equal treatment from the schools through the normal processes of political conflict and negotiation, and not through the intervention of bureaucratic norms. The likelihood of this outcome, although low, is a theoretical possibility.

10. Peterson, 1976, p. 124.

11. Two of the omitted schools were special schools (e.g., for the deaf). The other six reported either no data or obviously erroneous data.

12. Tyack, 1974, p. 181.

13. San Francisco Bulletin, "The Reminiscences of Christopher A. Buckley," 27 January 1919.

14. Tyack, 1974, p. 97.

15. Merton, 1969, pp. 223-233.

16. Bridges, 1980, passim.

17. Wolfinger, 1974, pp. 122-129.

18. Elazar, 1970, passim.

19. Chicago Board of Education Annual Reports, for selected years.

20. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction Annual Reports, for selected years.

21. Determination of teacher ethnicity is discussed in the Appendix.

22. The percentage of the population born in Ireland was 6 percent in 1890. We are unable to determine the percentage of foreign stock because the United States census did not give information on the ethnic background of native-born Americans at this time.

23. Dellquest, 1938.

24. Smith, 1973.

Chapter V

THE POLITICS OF RACE AND EQUITY

Few chapters in educational history indicate the intensity of popular demands for public schools better than those that consider the race question. While the story in the three cities is largely one of frustration and denial, blacks, Japanese, and, to a lesser extent, Chinese minorities all demonstrated repeatedly their unalloyed desire for public education. Even the almost equally intense white resistance to minority demands clarifies the importance the public at large placed on education. Equal educational facilities were denied to minorities not just because school officials were racially biased, but because many whites from all classes actively challenged minority claims. Inter-group rivalry was so intense, and educational opportunity was valued so highly, that minorities could win concessions only when they had the political strength to do so. Most clearly, it cannot be said that any group of economic elites forced schooling down the throats of black Americans.

The single most important determinant of the kind of access and the quality of educational facilities which minorities received were the political resources the group had. If a minority group could not impose sanctions on elected officials, the school department was content to provide only the legal minimum, safely ignoring the barrage of pleas and petitions from minorities. In most cases, political resources were difficult to accumulate because racial minorities were often either explicitly denied the right to vote or were left out of the dominant political coalitions. Consequently, minority groups devoted considerable energy to finding alternative methods of influencing decisions about schooling. In many cases significant benefits were secured in this way but devising and implementing new strategies required tremendous community organization and persistent pressure on school officials.

The capacity to inaugurate and sustain organized activity was imperative if potential sources of political leverage were to be fully utilized. The extent to which a minority group mounted an organized effort to secure better schooling was partly a function of how the group ranked public education among the array of issues confronting it. Once they defined education as a central value, minorities faced strategic choices about how to obtain it. The extent of white resistance to education for blacks was a major consideration in the formulation of specific objectives: where local economic and political institutions were founded on racial exclusion, demands for integration were infrequent. Thus, political leverage, group organization and white resistance interacted to produce a history of minority schooling that not only was quite different from that of whites but also varied for differently situated racial minorities.

An examination of the history of race and schooling covering a range of local settings and encompassing several minority groups reveals the variety of experiences within the overall pattern of discrimination. In all three cities, blacks consistently demonstrated a strong and organized demand for public schooling, although the precise nature of the objectives varied. In the South, where all social arrangements were predicated on the structure of racial inequality, school segregation did not become a focus of struggle until the 1950s. Instead, blacks used their infrequent political opportunities to wrest promises of better black schools from reluctant boards of education. In the West and North, where inclusion of the small number of blacks in the city posed little threat to existing arrangements, racial integration reached the agenda very early. The cases of the Chinese and Japanese in San Francisco highlight the importance of political power in obtaining access to schools. Although the school board attempted to exclude both groups, the Japanese used outside leverage to challenge successfully the policy, while the Chinese were forced to suffer exclusion and separation for over eighty years.

The struggle for equal education facilities - whether it took the form of the drawn out battle waged by southern blacks or was telescoped into one dramatic episode as in the case of the Japanese--has been the dominant theme in the history of minority education in the United States. Our discussion will focus on these struggles for better schooling as we attempt to account for the kinds of educational policies adopted toward minorities and the circumstances under which the minority groups successfully challenged those policies and secured increased benefits from the schools.

Politics and Black Schools in the Nineteenth Century South

Atlanta was the only city of the three which contained a significant minority population--it was 40 percent black at the inception of its school system in 1872.[1] Unlike Chicago and San Francisco, Atlanta had long established conventions regarding relations among races. There was, accordingly, no open conflict over the policy of racial segregation, which was adopted when the public school system was founded. Integration was never contemplated; in fact the inauguration of the white school system was briefly delayed by the presence of Federal troops in Atlanta and the attendant fear that the Reconstruction government of Georgia would compel racial mixing in the schools.[2]

Blacks were not only educated separately from whites, they also were relegated to schools of markedly inferior quality and were altogether excluded from secondary schooling until 1920. Little effort was made to close the gap between the number of schools offered to whites and those provided for blacks; between 1872 and 1900, ten new primary schools were built for whites, while only two were opened for blacks.[3] The problems of overcrowding which plagued the entire system were considerably worse in the black schools. The pupil-teacher ratio in black schools was dramatically higher than in white schools and the difference continued to grow as the century drew to a close.[4] Double shifts entailing reduced schedules were the rule in black schools and there were always larger numbers of blacks than whites who could not find places in the school at all. The black schools were housed in buildings of lower quality, and in numerous other ways blacks had access to poorer facilities than white students. Likewise, black teachers earned much lower salaries than their white counterparts. For much of the nineteenth century, the lowest paid white teacher received a higher salary than the highest paid black teacher.[5]

Political Pressures Yield Modest Educational Dividends

Despite this bleak picture, the schooling available to Atlanta's black community might have been considerably worse had not the structure of local politics occasionally placed blacks in a strategic position in which they could trade their votes for better educational facilities. This occurred three times in the nineteenth century--in 1871, 1888 and 1891--despite the best efforts of Atlanta's white political leaders to obstruct black political participation.

In 1868, the year that blacks became eligible to vote, Democrats replaced the ward-based system of elections with at-large selection of candidates for all city offices, a move which effectively prevented blacks from holding any positions within municipal government. However a split in the Democratic party in 1870 made the vote of the Republicans decisive in city government. The Radical Republicans reinstituted ward elections and actively sought to attract black support by advocating the financing of public education and by running Reverend William Finch, a prominent member of the black community, for Councilman.[6] During his one-year term, Finch, reflecting the deep interest in public education prevalent in the black community, strongly supported the establishment of public schools that would presumably include blacks.[7] Although the public school system had been formally founded by the City Council in 1869, schools had not yet begun operating nor was it clear what provisions had been made for black children. The newly-formed board of education had made no plans for blacks. There were charges that blacks did not need public education since free education for blacks was already available in the four black schools operated by church and missionary organizations.[8] The City Council of 1871 resolved to support financially the school system devised by the board of education and pledged to provide teachers for the black schools if the current trustees of the private black schools would put their buildings at the disposal of the board of education.[9]

By the following year, 1872, the Democrats had patched up their differences and were once again firmly in control of city government. At-large elections were reinstituted and black participation was discouraged by excluding blacks from Democratic ward meetings and primaries.[10] The school system, which finally began operating that year, provided no accommodations for blacks. Only under the persistent pressure of ex-Councilman Finch and his Radical Republican supporters did the board of education negotiate the take-over of two privately-owned black schools.

Over the next sixteen years obtaining even the most modest schooling facilities required blacks to place constant pressure on the board of education. In their efforts to persuade the board to provide more facilities for black children, black ministers offered their churches for sale or rent to the school board, which was reluctant to construct new buildings for blacks.[11] Even in cases where buildings were offered at small cost the board expressed reluctance at allocating any of its admittedly strained resources for black schools. In one instance the board turned down the offer of a free school building, claiming that it could not cover the cost of the teacher to staff it.[12] After close to a decade of black petitioning, the board finally decided in 1880 to construct one new school for black children.[13] The following year, a decision was made to replace one of the older schools, the condition of which had been termed "dangerous," with a new structure.[14] By the end of 1883, there were three black grammar schools, only one more than had existed when the school system had begun. The combined capacity of the three new schools was woefully inadequate: the 1883 superintendent reports noted that only half of the black children who wanted schooling could be accommodated.[15]

Meager as these elementary provisions were, blacks were less successful in acquiring access to public secondary schools. Black petitions for secondary schooling began the year the school system was established and continued unanswered until the 1920s. In 1872, ex-Councilman Finch and several other prominent blacks requested the board to establish secondary schools for blacks or to make an arrangement with Atlanta University to provide secondary education free of charge to black students. The board turned down these requests and black students wanting a high school education had to pay tuition at Atlanta University.[16]

Confronted by a united white electorate there was little blacks could do to obtain schools other than keep up a steady stream of pressure and hope for the best. Once cracks appeared within the white alliance, however, opposing factions used education as an issue to lure black voters into their camp. The political divisions which would allow blacks some influence in the 1888 election were already evident in 1886. In that year a coalition of workers, blacks and anti-prohibitionists proposed an alternative to the so called Citizen's Fusion Ticket, which granted equal representation to both supporters and opponents of prohibition and would therefore defuse the question as a political issue. The People's Ticket, put together under the auspices of the Mutual Aid Brotherhood (the political committee of the Knights of Labor), differed from the Citizen's Ticket by only two candidates for city council; but the two alternative candidates were apparently both foes of prohibition, and one was publicly acknowledged as the "candidate of the working men."[17] Divisions within the labor movement and the black community over the issue of prohibition undoubtedly weakened the People's Ticket candidates, and they both lost; nevertheless, the races were close.[18]

By 1888, the divisions in the white community had sharpened. The election that year was marked by overtly class-conscious rhetoric, the vigorous solicitation of black support by candidates from both tickets, the emergence of concerted black demands for direct representation in municipal government and the continuing battle over the question of prohibition.[19] Supporters of the People's Ticket candidate, Walter Brown, organized a Committee of Seventy, nineteen of whom were prominent blacks. In exchange for their support, blacks demanded that four members of the board of education be blacks, a school for black children be opened in the fifth ward and that a member of Council be from the black community.[20] The People's Ticket responded with a platform which promised the construction of schools for each race and "just treatment for all citizens." However, when questioned about

188

how pledges to black voters would be fulfilled, Brown's vague responses raised suspicions among blacks that the People's Ticket would or could not live up to its promises.[21]

Meanwhile, the Citizen's Ticket was making contacts with blacks who would ultimately swing the black vote to its side. Hoke Smith, then president of the school board, approached a black leader who had organized a Committe of 1,000 in support of Brown and asked what it would take to win the black vote. After being told that a black school in the fifth ward would be the price of support, Hoke promised that it would be built and, in fact, paid for the lot upon which it would be constructed.[22] When the conservative Citizen's Ticket candidate proved victorious, the board of education ordered the new school built. In 1889, the fifth ward was provided with a black school--a school which for the first time approached white schools in value.[23]

In 1891, blacks were once again placed in a brokers role when the Citizen's Ticket received a strong challenge by the prohibitionist 1890 Club. For a second time, the Citizen's Ticket used the promise of additional black schools to win black support. Candidates for the ticket were selected by a Committee of 100 which included three black representatives, one of whom introduced a resolution for the establishment of additional schools for blacks. Once the resolution was adopted by the Citizen's Ticket, black leaders set about mobilizing black support for the ticket.[24] After its victory, the new administration purchased and repaired a building to serve as a new black school.[25] However, this was the last time blacks were able to trade their political support for concrete benefits for the following year, in 1892, the establishment of the white primary effectively excluded blacks from electing municipal officials in a city controlled by the Democratic Party.[26]

The ability of blacks to win these concessions was not solely a function of the opportunities available in the political structure, it also crucially depended upon the degree of organization of the black community and or the corporate demand for better educational facilities among blacks. Atlanta's black community was a relatively cohesive group, and, under the leadership of its ministers, defined better

189

educational facilities as one of its key goals. Petitions signed by black ministers and other community leaders requesting more and better schools for black students were frequently presented to both the school board and the city council in this period.[27] Although these pleas were ignored, the concessions secured when black votes were needed suggests that, under particular political circumstances, insistent black pressure for educational rights made a difference in the kinds of educational facilities available.

Given the history of race relations in the South and Atlanta's political climate, demands for integrated schools were never voiced by blacks. Instead, educational demands centered on obtaining better facilities and more control over black schools. The latter aim was evident in demands that black teachers be employed in black schools. As early as 1874, the board of education began receiving petitions from blacks requesting that black teachers be employed in black schools.[28] After 1876 pressure for the employment of black teachers mounted. This renewed effort was at least partially due to the failure of the Civil Rights Act passed that year to outlaw segregated schools.[29] Left in their own schools, black leaders were determined that these schools should meet the needs of black pupils as far as was possible. They argued that black teachers would be more familiar with and congenial with their students and take more interest in them, consequently providing them with a better education.[30] There were, moreover, a growing number of graduates of black colleges willing and apparently qualified to teach in black schools.

These requests were initally resisted by a board that was both reluctant to replace white teachers and fearful that black instructors would use their position to stir up racial unrest. However, the board was induced to reconsider its position when efforts to replace missionaires with southern white teachers were resisted by both blacks and missionaries currently teaching in black schools. Some board members had begun to worry that the teachings of the northern white missionaries were subversive of established patterns of race relations in the South. Compared with this threat, the alternative of hiring southern black teachers seemed preferable. One board member accused the

190

missionaries of "poisoning the minds of the colored people and raising them so much above their proper position that they will not be house servants etc. any longer."[31] Another factor which weighed heavily in the decision to employ black teachers was the greater economies to be realized because black teachers could be paid substantially less than their white counterparts. After consideration of these arguments in 1878, the board hired three black and three Southern white teachers.[32]

Although black leaders and white board members were satisfied with this arrangement, a petition signed by several hundred black citizens protesting the removal of the missionaries, suggests that the ministers who led the movement to hire black teachers defined black interests differently than did a significant portion of that community. Nevertheless the ministers continued to press for the appointment of black teachers to all the city black schools and by 1887, all of the teachers and principals in the black school system of Atlanta were black.[33]

Throughout the nineteenth century, then, a dual, racially segregated system of education afforded blacks markedly inferior educational facilities compared with whites. However a substantial degree of organization and a strong corporate demand for educational facilities existed in the black community. The demands for better education were themselves shaped by decisions about what was possible in Atlanta's political environment. Instead of requesting integrated schools, blacks focused their demands on obtaining more schools and securing increased control over schools which did exist by the employment of black teachers. Effectively barred from sharing in direct political power, blacks were nonetheless able to exercise some influence when shifting political coalitions placed them in a broker's role. In these instances, especially in 1888 and 1891, blacks were organized and prepared to trade their support for concessions on one of the issues of foremost importance to them--more and better schools for black children.

The White Primary Slows Educational Progress

After the institution of the white primary in 1892, there was little incentive for white politicians to upgrade the educational facilities provided to blacks. Thus, in the period from the turn of the century to the 1940s, improvements in black schools required substantial organization and persistent pressure by the black community. Although some advances were made, black schools continued to lag far behind the schools for whites and black teachers continued to be paid at rates substantially lower than those for whites. Improving black schools and equalizing teacher salaries provided a major focus of activity for Atlanta's black community in this period. In its effort to meet these goals, blacks were forced to devise tactics within the very small range of political power which remained with them. The most successful and innovative of these tactics consisted of voting down bond issues which did not allocate sufficient funds for black schools. However, substantial gains were not possible until blacks began to utlize the federal courts to enforce their rights. The ability to draw on this outside source of power completely overturned established patterns of school politics which had existed since the end of the Civil War.

The struggles of this period in which black political influence was at its nadir, paradoxically served to unify and to heighten the political sophistication of the black community. The intensification of official efforts to maintain white dominance and privilege and the continued refusal of white politicians to acknowledge black demands led to increasingly strong black protests and to the articulation of a fundamentally new set of demands in the black community, namely that the entire structure of segregation and discrimination be dismantled.

Despite the increased political leverage provided by these new tactics, taken as a whole, the first half of the twentieth century saw only minor improvements and modest expansion of black schools. New schools were built and blacks were finally provided with a high school, but, compared with the facilities offered to white students, blacks were far behind. In 1900, there were five schools for black and eighteen for white children; in 1930, there were thirteen and fifty-three respectively. The number of schools for black children had actually declined in the 1920s, from fifteen to thirteen. There were four high schools and six junior high schools for whites, and only one high school and one junior high school for blacks.[34] Moreover, facilities were far less adequate in the black school system: a survey of the Atlanta public schools undertaken in 1922 found that eleven of the fifteen schools provided for blacks were "unfit for human habitation" and should be evaculated immediately, and that the remaining black schools should be replaced at the earliest possible time. Conditions were considerably better in the white system, where only 10 percent of the schools were found to be uninhabitable.[35]

In the decade after the institution of the white primary, black participation in educational politics declined sharply. Fewer petitions were presented to the board of education and those that were submitted were ignored, now that white politicans were shielded from possible reprisals by black voters. After the turn of the century, however, black newspapers frequently denounced the inadequacies of black schools, deficiencies made particularly glaring by the recent efforts to upgrade white schools. However, black leaders continued to adopt a conciliatory posture toward the board, advocating tactics which presumed the good faith of white board members.[36]

While most of these requests were ignored, small advances were made. Not all board members condoned the neglect of black public education. In 1908 the board president warned that the failure to provide public schools for blacks would lead to crime or worse, that blacks would be taught notions of social equality in private schools run by Northern philanthropists.[37] Accordingly, in 1909, blacks were not altogether excluded from the proceeds of the first bond issue which allocated part of its funds to public school construction. Voting on bond issues was one of the few avenues of political participation left open to the black community, and black leaders urged blacks to cast their ballots in favor of the bonds.[38] Black schools received much smaller allocations than did white schools. The new black school built barely made a dent in the vastly overcrowded black system.

Blacks responded by intensifying pressure on the board of education, using their traditional tactics of delegations and petitions. Together with others, the Neighborhood Union, whose membership consisted of faculty wives of Atlanta's black colleges, undertook a six-month survey of Atlanta's black schools. Publicizing the wretched conditions which the study revealed brought more petitions and delegations to the board on behalf of black schools. Finally, in 1913, the board responded with plans to construct six new black schools. At the same time, however, it attempted to make clear its own conception of black education by recommending that manual training and domestic science be added to the curricula of the seventh and eighth grades in black schools. The recommendation was justified by the need for "more industrially trained workers and fewer professionals among the Negro population."[39] Strenuous protest throughout the black community caused the board to abandon this plan, but in its place the board introduced a course of study that involved deletion of eighth grade from black schools.[40]

In 1914, the first rumblings were heard of what was to become a major change in tactics by blacks in their dealings with the school board. In that year, black leaders counseled their followers not to support two proposed issues and urged them to use the political process to force concessions from white officials.[41] Although this strategy was not implemented because the bond issues were not put on the ballot, the tempo of the debate in the black community concerning school issues had risen considerably.[42]

When, in 1916, the school board proposed to eliminate the seventh grades from black primary schools and substitute a vocational curriculum, a new spirit of militance was evident in the reactions of some black leaders. While the older generation advised caution, representatives of Atlanta's growing middle class black community responded in a more forceful manner. Officials of a black-owned insurance agency wrote to the NAACP seeking advice and aid.[43] A group of black leaders composed a petition to the school board and sent a delegation to appear before the board which not only insisted that the board *not* eliminate the black seventh grades but "boldly demanded the Negro children educational facilities in every way the equal of those enjoyed by their white contemporaries."[44]

As a result of the delegation's appearance, the board backed down on its plan to eliminate the black seventh grades, but ignored the petitioners' demands for equal treatment for black children. A decision was subsequently taken to finance improvements in the white school system by floating a bond issue, and a representative of Atlanta's fledgling branch of the NAACP appeared before the board demanding equal consideration for black children. He was told "with brutal frankness and considerable profanity that none of the bond money was to be spent on Negro schools and that there was nothing colored citizens could do about it."[45]

The cavalier attitude of the school board toward black requests helped to produce a consensus around black opposition to the bonds. At the same time a NAACP investigation of the City Charter revealed that approval of bond issues required the assent of two-thirds of the registered voters, rather than of those who bothered to vote. The incipient branch of the NAACP began a voter registration drive which met with an overwhelmingly positive response in the black community.[46] The campaign was a success and the black vote was sufficiently large to defeat the bond issue both times it was submitted in 1919. A third issue was proposed in 1921, and the city council made sure of black support by promising improvements in the black elementary schools and the construction of a black high school. City officials met extensively with the numerous black organizations which had mobilized around the issue and the Bond Commission vowed that one-third of the bond proceeds would be allocated to black schools.[47] While considerably less was spent on the black schools than had been promised, several new schools were constructed and the first black high school in Atlanta opened in 1924.[48]

After 1921, black support was required for approval of Atlanta's frequent bond issues, and it was actively solicited by the school board and the leaders of the white community. To ensure approval of an issue in 1926, $350,000 was promised to the black school system and the issue was approved by a landslide vote.[49] In allocating these bonds, however, city officials made little attempt to fulfill promises made to black leaders, and the best efforts of black organizations only succeeded in redirecting a small proportion of the funds to black schools.[50]

With the onset of the depression, the school board proposed to eliminate several black night schools and elementary schools. Vigorous black protests succeeded in preventing many of these cuts, but some reductions, particularly in the night schools, could not be prevented.[51] Nevertheless, considerable mobilization of the black community took place in the 1930s, and many new groups were formed which would later play an important role in school struggles and the larger effort to transform Atlanta's racist social structure. The NAACP grew stronger and several new political organizations were founded including the Atlanta Civic and Political League, the Colored Voters League of Atlanta and Fulton County. For the first time since 1870, black candidates ran for city office.

Accordingly, when in 1935 the city council proposed a new bond issue, the proceeds of which would benefit schools, the black community was prepared. Mass meetings were held, a voter drive launched, and pressure was placed on the Bond Commission to apportion an equitable share of the funds to black schools. Despite these efforts, black schools received less than what had been promised. When the city proposed a new bond issue in 1938, black leaders protested against the small amount slated for black schools. Angered by the disregard for the educational needs of Atlanta's black children shown by the city's white leaders, the leaders of the black community organized a publicity campaign to acquaint white and black citizens with the conditions prevailing in the black school system. In addition, the Urban League organized a voter registration drive among blacks in order to raise the number of votes required for passage of the new bond issue beyond an attainable level. The campaign was a success: 22,703 votes were required for passage of the bonds, and only 15,986 votes were cast.[52]

Refusing to admit that black votes were required for the passage of bond issues, Atlanta's white leaders proposed a second bond issue in 1940. As if challenging the black community to defeat the new issue, they allocated even less to the black school system in the second issue than they had in the first, setting aside just $100,000 out of the $1,800,000 to be allocated to educational uses. Once again blacks--

under the leadership of the NAACP, the Civic and Political League, and the Baptist Ministers' Union--registered to vote and refused to turn out at the polls, with the result that only 50 percent of the city's registered voters cast ballots. As the approval of two-thirds of the registered voters was required for the passage of the bonds, the second proposed bond issue went the way of the first.[53]

Encouraged by this show of strength, black organizations moved to support the city's black teachers in their efforts to equalize salaries between the races. As the first major campaign which defined equality as its goal, this movement was a precursor to later demands to establish equality in all respects and also foreshadowed the tactics to be used in the future: reliance on federal courts and other agencies outside the city to resolve local conflicts.

The issue of unequal salaries had been simmering since the early 1900s when the board of education devised a new salary schedule which raised the pay of white teachers by cutting that of their black colleagues.[54] The increasing gap between the races led to demands for equalization by 1917. As the board of education considered salary increases in 1919, the Gate City Teachers' Association, the black union, began to press for equal pay.[55] Petitions, protest and active support in the black community continued for the next fifteen years and became particularly intense in the 1930s, when cutbacks in teacher salaries meant that black teachers were barely making a living wage. In 1938 when a concerted and organized campaign was undertaken by the NAACP, the tempo of the issue increased. Community support was mobilized by the formation of the Atlanta Citizens Committee for the Equalizaton of Teachers Salaries. The board, however, maintained that it would not be possible to equalize salaries. Finally, in 1942, with the backing of the NAACP and the Citizens Committee, a black teacher filed suit against the city in federal district court.

The board of education, acting in close cooperation with Superintendent Sutton and Ira Jarrell of the Atlanta Public School Teachers' Association (APSTA), responded to this first suit in two ways. First, with the approval of the membership of APSTA, the board abolished the salary schedule which the white teachers' union had fought to win in the 1920s, in order to destroy strong *prima facie* evidence of inequality. Second, the board dismissed the teacher who had filed the suit from his position in the school system, thus depriving him of standing in court. These steps only delayed the campaign for salary equalization, however, and in December of 1942 another black teacher filed a class action suit against the city in federal district court on behalf of all the black teachers in the public school system.

The suit filed in federal court in 1943 marked the entry of the federal government into local school politics in a decisive way. After 1943, key school issues were no longer raised or resolved strictly, or even primarily, at the local level; as the issues of equalization and desegregation raised by Atlanta's black community came to occupy the central place in local school politics, the federal courts and the agencies of the federal government came to play an increasingly important role in the definition and resolution of local conflicts.

In short, Atlanta blacks, in the first half of the twentieth century, acted in a political context which afforded them very little influence. But because education was among the most highly valued prizes in the community, black leaders persistently sought new ways to influence the school board's decisions. As the decade progressed and black schooling suffered, blacks moved from "polite" strategies of petitions presented by leading citizens to more organized and militant tactics which used whatever political muscle blacks had. Although tactics grew more militant, demands remained within the Jim Crow framework of "separate but equal." Blacks were demanding better schools, not integration. The intransigence of the white community finally led Atlanta's blacks to look for support outside the city. Once the federal government had entered the conflict, dramatically altering the balance of power, blacks began to voice demands that would eventually undermine the entire Jim Crow structure.

The Struggle for Black and Asian Schooling in the West

On the other side of the continent, in San Francisco, a similar dynamic was occurring, yet the differing positions of minorities in the social structure and the fluid character of social relations in the

American West led to somewhat different outcomes. The diverse sources of political leverage and differing attitudes towards public education of San Francisco's blacks, Chinese, and Japanese communities, led each group to have quite different experiences in the San Francisco public schools. Although blacks were originally placed in segregated schools, early on they were integrated into the larger system. The Chinese occupied a position somewhat analogous to Atlanta's blacks, but, practically devoid of political resources and with a more ambivalent group position toward public education, the Chinese were actually denied access to public schools for nearly fourteen years. The case of the Japenese presents a unique combination of a group without political leverage within the city but with a strong corporate demand for integrated public schooling and the ability to exert political power at the national level. An examination of the experiences of each of these groups will help to reveal some of the variations in the dynamics of race and schooling.

Blacks Win Integrated Schools

The social and political position of blacks in nineteenth century San Francisco was quite different from that of their counterparts in Atlanta. Throughout this period, blacks comprised less than one percent of the total population of the city.[56] The number of school age children was less than .5 percent of the total school age population of the city.[57] While in Atlanta the entire social structure was predicated on white supremacy, black-white relations had no such salience in San Francisco.

The founding fathers of California's school system did not envision blacks as among the recipients of free education although no mention of race was made in the early school laws. Nevertheless, a separate black school was established in San Francisco and by 1860, three new elementary schools had been built.[58] These segregated schools were markedly inferior to those attended by white children, and blacks, as in Atlanta, were barred from high schools. Compounding this inequality was the precarious status of black schools, a fact which became glaringly evident to San Francisco's blacks when the school board arbitrarily closed two of the city's black elementary schools in 1868. No official reasons were given by the board but one school director remarked that one of the schools was a "nuisance." "It was too close to a white school on the same street."[59] In many respects therefore, the early experience of San Francisco's blacks mirrored those of Atlanta's black community. Yet, in 1875, the San Francisco school board voted to abolish the segregated black school and allowed blacks to attend the same schools as white children--something never contemplated in Atlanta. To account for the differences we must look at the socio-political situation of San Francisco's black community and its demands on the educational system.

Because of its small size, the black population of San Francisco had very little opportunity to exercise political influence in electoral contests. In 1880, there were probably fewer than 450 black voters in the city.[60] In the labor market, blacks were concentrated in unskilled occupations and this, coupled with their small numbers rendered them insignificant competitors in the labor market.[61] Lacking any immediate cause for antagonism toward blacks and without the long-established patterns of race relations in the South, the attitude of San Francisco's white population toward blacks was characterized primarily by indifference.

Against this indifference were pitched the unceasing efforts of San Francisco's blacks to obtain better educational facilities for their children. Although they had little electoral power and slight chances of increasing their political influence, black leaders kept a steady stream of pressure on the school board and the state legislature to provide more schools for blacks. In response to such pressure the first black school was established in 1854 despite a lack of legislative authorization.[62] Efforts--ultimately unsuccessful--then turned to establishing secondary schooling for blacks. Most of the early demands for better schooling sought improvements within a segregated framework. After the 1868 closing of two black elementary schools, however, blacks launched a concerted campaign for integrated schools. Community meetings were held, petitions sent to the board, a bill proposing school integration was introduced in the Assembly in 1872 and finally, in 1872, a test case was entered in the Supreme Court of the State.[63]

Although none of these efforts was successful in establishing the right for blacks to attend integrated schools, the fact that integration constituted a demand at all marks a sharp contrast with Atlanta. Several factors already mentioned help account for the difference--including lack of political power, meaning that the chances of blacks getting better schools in a segregated system would be slim, and perhaps more importantly, the demand for integration, not being perceived as a fundamental challenge to the social system as it would have been in Atlanta.

Thus, while there was not a great barrier to integration as in the South, neither was there any incentive for the board to implement desegration. That impetus seems to have finally been provided by the severe and widespread economic depression that struck California in the 1870s.[64] By the middle of the decade, the expense of maintaining separate schools for blacks outweighed the benefits and in 1875, the board voted to abolish the "Colored School." There were no incidents accompanying integration and the status of blacks in the San Francisco public schools remained unchanged until the post-World War II influx of blacks established a pattern of de facto segregation.

Exclusion and Isolation of the Chinese

The experience of the Chinese community was quite different. With virtually no political influence, due to treaty laws which prevented them from becoming citizens, San Francisco's Chinese were even more politically powerless than the black community. Moreover, because they constituted a larger portion of the population--9 percent in 1880 and still a larger percentage of the work force, up to 25 percent by some estimates--considerable opposition to their very presence in the country grew, especially among the white workers with whom they competed.[65] Because they posed a threat to established social and economic relations, the situation of the Chinese was analogous to that of Atlanta's blacks. However, the position of the Chinese was not regulated by any set of established social practices as were Atlanta's blacks - a situation which was responsible for the volatility of the Chinese question in San Francisco. Moreover, important differences in the Chinese relation to local politics and in the centrality of education within the Chinese community led to a distinct experience with public schooling.

The extreme powerlessness of the Chinese community was reflected in the schooling facilities which were made available to them. The first Chinese school was opened in 1859, after thirty Chinese parents petitioned the board of education, but the school was closed three months later due to "lack of funds."[66] Several months later it was reopened as a night school and was attended primarily by adults who wanted "to learn a little English, . . . to obtain lucrative positions as clerks and interpreters for their countrymen."[67] This left Chinese children without public schooling facilities. The Chinese night school operated until 1871 when the Superintendent recommended that it be closed. It was not until 1884, under court order, that the board began to provide public education for Chinese children. Thus, the Chinese experience differs from that of the blacks in Atlanta and from those of the other minorities we shall examine: in no other case was a policy of total exclusion from public schooling adopted for such a prolonged period.

The reasons for exclusion lie in the Chinese community's aims with regard to public education. Public education never had the same centrality for San Francisco's Chinese community as it did for blacks, either in San Francisco or Atlanta. There are several major reasons for this: first, children comprised only a tiny percentage of the Chinese population in San Francisco. Chinese immigrants were overwhelmingly male sojourners seeking work in the United States but not planning to settle permanently.[68] One of the primary benefits of public schooling from this perspective was to gain minimal competence in English in order to secure better employment. Second, as the intensity of the opposition to the presence of the Chinese in California grew, most other concerns were subordinated to the overriding issues of personal safety and the right to remain in the country. Third, the kind of education offered in the public schools did not conform to the needs of the Chinese community. Particularly as hostility to the Chinese presence mounted, parents sought a traditional Chinese education for their children in private schools. These schools not only showed more respect for Chinese cultural values than did the public schools, they also enabled the children to receive an education which would be useful when they returned to China, a journey generally contemplated by Chinese families. Thus, while private school enrollment figures indicate that education was, in fact, a high priority of Chinese parents, a variety of factors dictated that a high value on education would not produce insistent demands by the Chinese on the public education system for much of the nineteenth century.[69] However, towards the end of that period, as a more permanent community with families began to establish itself, Chinese parents increasingly voiced demands for educational rights.

Before the turn of the century, most Chinese requests for improved educational facilities were routinely ignored. However, within this overall context of neglect, the treatment of Chinese by the school board varied with the general tone of Chinese--white relations and with the party in power. Setbacks in educational opportunities were especially severe when Democrats were in power. Indeed, the California Democratic party only overcame the disasters that befell it during the Civil War by taking a strong anti-Chinese stance.[70] This position was especially valuable in solidifying its labor support, for white workers were increasingly hostile to the cheap competition that the Chinese represented.

A look at some of the major decisions regarding Chinese schooling reveals the interplay between the demands of the Chinese community, their relationship to the community in general terms, the political party in power as well as the change in all of these factors over time. The establishment of the first Chinese school in 1859 occurred before any organized or widespread opposition to the Chinese existed.[71] The closing of the school three months later coincided with the election of Democrat James Denman as Superintendent of Schools. The Chinese night school which was opened several months later was the only educational facility open to the Chinese throughout the 1860s. The school was sparsely attended with an average daily attendance of

203

approximately thirty pupils throughout the decade.[72] One notable controversy which arose during the course of the night school's operation is indicative of Chinese concern with the public schools. In 1866, a petition was presented to the school board by fourteen Chinese merchants asking that the Chinese school teacher be removed. The Chinese objected to "the strong Christian bias in his teaching methods and materials."[73] This demand was, in fact, favorably received by the Democratic Superintendent John Pelton and the board dismissed the teacher, replacing him with a teacher more acceptable to the Chinese community. However, this action does not fit the typical pattern of Democratic behavior toward the Chinese; it is more a reflection of Pelton's strong belief in the importance of cultural pluralism than of any change of heart by the Democratic party.[74]

More characteristic of the growing anti-Chinese rhetoric of the party was James Denman who was elected Superintendent in 1869 and 1874. In his campaign, Denman exploited the simmering resentment of San Francisco's workers against the Chinese by taking a stand against the Chinese school. In 1871, on Denman's recommendation, the school was closed. Three factors probably account for the fact that this move did not evoke any organized protest by the Chinese community. First, the intensity of anti-Chinese agitation at this time lead the Chinese to adopt a "wait and see" attitude toward the schooling question. Second, the strong network of missionary schools operating at this time offered an attractive alternative to public schooling. Third, the virulence of the anti-Chinese movement had dampened much of the interest in Americanization, making exclusion from public schooling less important for San Francisco's Chinese residents.[75] A year after the closing, several influential Chinese family organizations presented a petition to the board of education requesting the establishment of an evening school for Chinese boys.[76] This request was ignored as was a later petition for public schools.[77] In 1877, a petition signed by 1,300 California Chinese residents was sent to the state legislature requesting amendment of the state law to allow Chinese children to attend the public schools or "what we would prefer, that separate schools may be established for them."[78] Submitted, as it was, at the height of the anti-Chinese movement in California, it is not surprising that this request was ignored. Even Republicans who had been "soft" on the Chinese question began to advocate an end to Chinese immigration as the only means to restore industrial peace.[79] The only allies the Chinese had left were American missionaries, who defended the rights of Chinese residents to send their children to the public schools. However, the urgings of the Ministerial Union of San Francisco were rebuffed by the school board which professed ignorance of any attempt by the Chinese to enter the public schools.[80]

Once the foes of Chinese immigration had achieved their aim with the passage of the first set of Exclusion Acts in 1882 and 1884, the Chinese community began to direct its attention to the rights of American-born Chinese, including the right to public schooling.[81] A new state education law passed in 1860 paved the way by declaring that schools should be open to all, save children of "filthy or vicious habits" or diseased children.[82] In 1884, exclusionary policies of the board were challenged in court by a Chinese family which had tried, unsuccessfully, to enroll its daughter in the public schools. In the case, Tape vs. Hurley, both the municipal court and the State Supreme Court ruled that the child must be admitted. City Superintendent Moulder, a Democrat, responded by rushing a bill through the state legislature designed to permit the establishment of segregated schools for "Mongolians."[83] With the passage of this bill, a separate school for Chinese children was established in San Francisco. However, attendance was sparse. In 1885, only 3.9 percent of school age Chinese children attended the school; five years later the figure had only climbed to 8 percent.[84] After enduring years of vicious attacks by white residents and repeated rebuffs by the school board many Chinese turned their backs on the public schools. Most Chinese parents preferred to send their children to missionary schools and private Chinese language schools. Attendance at these institutions was over four times greater than attendance in the public schools.[85]

With its right to exist secured by the courts, there were no further attempts to close the Chinese School but the policy of segregation was enforced and Chinese students were not permitted to attend public high schools. No formal attempts were made to challenge

205

the segregation until 1902 when the father of two American-born Chinese children brought a complaint against the school board in court. The case protested the children's expulsion from a non-Chinese school which they had been attending for over a year. The only grounds for dismissal was the race of the children.[86] The challenge was not successful - the court denied the request, thereby upholding the policy of segregation.

A 1905 attempt to gain admittance to secondary schools met with more success. In that year, Chinese parents threatened to boycott elementary schools if the board would not permit Chinese pupils to attend high schools. Because such a boycott would have resulted in a substantial loss of state aid for San Francisco schools, the board reluctantly reversed its policy and opened the high schools to Chinese pupils.[87]

The formal abolition of a separate school for Chinese students did not occur until 1936. By that time, organized opposition to the Chinese presence had ended, the threat of Chinese workers as significant competition to white labor had diminished and China had become a U.S. ally. Moreover, abolition of the law calling for segregation did not result in a flood of Chinese children entering previously all-white schools. Because of residential restrictions which remained in force until after World War II, most Chinese children continued to attend schools which were predominantly Chinese.[88]

Throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then, the Chinese in San Francisco were powerless. Disenfranchised, their only consistent allies were local ministers. This lack of political power was exacerbated by a virulent anti-Chinese sentiment, which became a focal point of political activity. Together these factors made it difficult for Chinese to secure even the minimal schooling facilities which were legally due to them. Moreover, these obstacles served to dampen Chinese interest in public schooling - an interest which for a variety of cultural factors was somewhat ambivalent from the start. Instead, Chinese parents preferred to send their children to private institutions. In this period, public schooling facilities were nominal or nonexistent. After the Exclusion Acts, the waning of anti-Chinese activities and the appearance of "Americanized" elements in the Chinese community paved the way for fewer overt attacks on the Chinese by city officials and for more demands on the school system by Chinese residents. Although formal disenfranchisement persisted, Chinese parents began taking advantage of the avenues of power which were open to them--first, the courts in 1884 and 1902--and, in 1905, the use of a school boycott. Only in this way were Chinese pupils able to obtain concessions from the school board.

Politics and International Pressures Give Japanese Access to Public Schools

The case of the Japanese in San Francisco provides an interesting contrast to that of the Chinese. While the two groups shared many characteristics, two important differences led the Japanese to have considerably more success in pressing their claims on the public school system. Most decisively, the San Francisco Japanese community could exercise political leverage by appealing to Tokyo. The Japanese government took a keen interest in the status of its citizens abroad, and as a growing naval power and trade center, Japan had the political and economic capacity to negotiate vigorously with other governments on such issues as the well-being of its nationals living abroad. In addition to possessing a source of power unavailable to the Chinese, the Japanese also benefited from a more tolerant community attitude to their presence in San Francisco. The opposition to Japanese immigration was both less widespread and less prolonged than the anti-Chinese agitation. Anti-Japanese activities in San Francisco did become an important part of the Union Labor Party's activities at the turn of the century, but neither the Democratic or Republican party focused on them. Finally, the small Japanese community residing in San Francisco clearly defined integrated schooling as a high priority, one to which they would devote considerable energy and resources.

The tale of the Japanese and public schooling in San Francisco centers around the 1906 "school board incident" in which a school board order requiring the Japanese to attend the Oriental School provoked international attention and resulted in federal intervention into local school politics. Prior to that time, the few Japanese children--only ninety-three were in attendance in 1906--that lived in San Francisco attended regular public schools.[89] No complaint was ever raised about this until after 1901 when the Union Labor party, a newly-formed group which had hoped to become the party of labor, brought the issue to public attention by advocating the segregation of Japanese pupils.[90]

Once in office, the Union Labor party officials did not pursue this issue. The board of education, however, "began to receive letters from the parents of white scholars, complaining of the enforced association of their children with children of Japanese immigrants in the public schools.[91] Most of these protesting letters were concerned that older Japanese boys were attending primary grades where they were in daily association with young white girls and boys.[92] In May 1905, the board of education passed a resolution calling for separate schools for

> Japanese pupils, . . . not only for the purpose of relieving the congestion at present prevailing in our schools but also for the higher end that our children should not be placed in any position where their youthful impression may be affected by association with pupils of the Mongolian race.[93]

The resolution appears to have been mostly for rhetorical purposes. The Chinese School was too crowded to permit entry of Japanese pupils and there were not sufficient funds to establish a new segregated school. Nor did the board take any steps to implement its resolution. Later that year, the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, an anti-Japanese organization composed of representatives from local labor unions, took up the issue and began petitioning the board to segregate the Japanese pupils.[94] This deadlock over implementing an exclusionary schooling policy was broken in April 1906 when the San Francisco earthquake and fire decimated the population of the Chinese School, creating room for Japanese pupils. The Japanese and Korean Exclusion League revived its agitation around separate schools in August 1906, launching a propaganda campaign and petitioning the board of education.[95]

The board was not long in responding and in October 1906, ordered Japanese students to attend the Oriental Public School--as the old Chinese School was now to be called. Japanese parents flatly refused to send their children and held numerous community meetings to develop an organized response. The secretary of the Japanese Association appealed to the board to rescind its decision, threatening legal action. When the board declined to reconsider the issue, the Japanese community publicized the issue in Japan where the incident was widely discussed as a grave humiliation to Japanese national pride. Through its consul in Washington, Tokyo lodged a formal protest to the U.S. government.

Roosevelt highly valued the amity of the Japanese government, both as a trading partner and as a major naval power in the Pacific. Critical of the board's decision, he dispatched an emissary to gather information and in the process to try to convince the Board to open its schools to the Japanese. When the board refused, the federal government decided to press legal action. In December, the U.S. Attorney was instructed to prepare a test case against the board. Legal proceedings which had been initiated by the Japanese were withdrawn in favor of the federal government's case - Aoki v. Deane.

The reasons which the San Francisco board of education gave for excluding Japanese students were that they were keeping out white students because of their great numbers and that the Japanese pupils were mainly overage men. Much noise was made about Japanese men sitting next to "girls of tender years."[96] A careful study by George Kennan refuted both of these claims. In December 1906, he found that of the 28,736 pupils in the San Francisco public schools, ninety-three (.3 percent) were Japanese. Of this number, twenty-eight were girls and thirty-four were boys under fifteen. Only six Japanese males over fifteen years old were in primary schools.[97]

After considerable negotiations, a compromise was finally worked out calling for the board to rescind its decision forcing Japanese pupils to attend the Oriental School. A provision against overage pupils in the primary grades was retained. Roosevelt, in return, committed himself to negotiate a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan to end immigration of Japanese laborers to the United States. The legal action was dropped. On March 13, 1907, the segregation order was rescinded. Thereafter, Japanese pupils attended the same schools as did white pupils. The compromise was not viewed favorably by labor or by the Exclusion League. Their displeasure with the outcome was not due to the fact that Japanese pupils would not attend non-segregated schools but rather over the anticipated ineffectiveness of the Gentlemen's Agreement. Labor wanted exclusion based on law or treaty so as to ensure its effectiveness.

As early as 1909, the California legislature tried to pass a bill providing for the resegregation of Japanese in public schools. The attempt failed--but only after a second vote and heavy federal pressure.[98] When, in 1921, a state law was passed providing for the segregation of Japanese pupils, San Francisco continued to allow Japanese pupils to attend the city's public schools without complaint. The fire of anti-Japanese sentiment in San Francisco did not outlive the Union Labor party.

Because of their small numbers, the Japanese never posed a serious threat to established social and political relations in San Francisco. In the schools, their presence went unnoticed until the Union Labor party raised it as an issue. The party particularily exploited the concern among whites about older Japanese boys in the primary grades. Even though the effort to segregate the Japanese owed its existence primarily to the manuvers of a political party, and even though no strong anti-Japanese movement developed in San Francisco during this period, without access to political power outside the city, the Japanese would have had little more than their own group cohesion and commitment with which to fight the segregation order. With a strong government in Tokyo behind them, however, the Japanese successfully challenged the attempt to force their children into segregated schools.

The Emergence of Struggles around De Facto Segregation in the North

In Chicago, racial issues held a minor place in school politics throughout most of the nineteenth century. However, as the black population grew in the early 1900s, friction between the races began to develop as more black children entered previously all-white schools. Some whites began to call for formal resegregation of the schools, a move steadfastly resisted by blacks. Nevertheless the massive wave of black migration to Chicago after World War I combined with the restrictive covenants in housing to create a largely _de facto_ segregated school system by the 1920s. Dissatisfied with both the segregated nature of the schooling facilities and the inferior conditions in all-black schools, the black community consistently fought a two-pronged battle to gain entry into white schools and at the same time to upgrade the educational facilities in their own neighborhoods. While the increased black presence in white schools provoked a militant defiance on the part of white parents, Chicago's blacks, in contrast to blacks in Atlanta, held a degree of political power. As voters whose increasing numbers made them difficult for politicans to overlook, blacks were often able to achieve some political gains, although their successes were usually only partial. Chicago's Democratic political machine and its school board appointees responded halfway to demands for better facilities within black neighborhoods, but sought to sidestep the politically explosive issue of integration.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the relationship of blacks to public education in Chicago was quite similar to that of blacks in San Francisco. As in San Francisco, Chicago's blacks comprised only a tiny fraction of the city's population--1.3 percent in 1900--so that the small number of black children in the public schools helped to keep race off the school agenda.[99] In each school system, there was an early policy of racial segregation although the events leading to the policy of segregation and eventual desegregation were different in each case. Whereas San Francisco schools were segregated at their founding and continued to be segregated for the next fourteen years, Chicago schools were integrated from the start, experiencing only a brief interlude of segregation in the 1860s. Anxious about increased black migration from the South, members of Chicago's Irish community pressured the city council into passing the "Black School Law" in 1863, requiring all black children to attend segregated schools. This experiment was shortlived. however, as black parents refused to remove their children from the white schools and brought about the law's repeal in 1865.[100]

In the first decade of the twentieth century the issue reemerged. In that period changes in school boundary lines and pupil transfers occasionally brought black pupils into previously all-white schools, provoking strong and sometimes violent reactions from whites.[101] In 1905, a group of white children rioted when they were transferred to a largely black school. Three years later a similar move caused white students to boycott schools. In some schools, racial strife was endemic. For instance, the first predominantly black high school was the site of numerous interracial conflicts.[102] Accompanying these incidents were calls for formal resegregation of the schools. White groups, especially those adjacent to black communities brought segregation proposals up at school board meetings and the issue was discussed in the press.[103] The proposals did stir up enough concern among black leaders to induce them to submit a formal protest to the board. In general, however, educational officials did not seriously contemplate reimposing racial segregation as a formal school policy.[104]

By 1920, demographic trends and restrictive housing policies had worked to produce a practically segregated system. The flood of new black migrants who reached Chicago during and immediately after World War I resulted in a near-doubling of its black population.[105] Restrictive covenants signed by property owners caused the black community to be increasingly concentrated in an area known as the "black belt." In the 1930s, it was estimated that 85 percent of the city's black population lived in this area.[106]

Apart from producing segregated schools, this extreme residential concentration also meant that the schooling facilities in the black neighborhood were overcrowded and inferior. According to the Strayer Survey's ratings of elementary school buildings in 1931, 39.2 percent of the black schools were regarded as "so inferior ... that it is not advisable to expend any considerable amount of money on them in an effort to make them acceptable plants."[107] The school board's failure to keep pace with the rapid growth of the black community meant that these inferior physical plants were strained beyond capacity with students. In 1910 there were only 4,160 blacks in the city's school system. By 1930 this number had grown to 33,856.[108] A 1939-40 survey found that ten predominantly black elementary schools enrolled 21,000 even though they had a capacity of only 15,000. In that year, thirteen of Chicago's fourteen double-shift schools were black and according to one estimate, three-fourths of Chicago's black school children attended part-time sessions.[109]

Blacks in Chicago, as in San Francisco and Atlanta, placed a high value on education. As Harold Gosnell observed, many blacks "migrated to Chicago in order to obtain better school facilities for their children than were available in the South. Education was looked upon as the key to freedom."[110] Because of the importance they attributed to education, blacks defined better and integrated schools as a central priority and fought tenaciously to achieve that goal. Unlike their counterparts in Atlanta, Chicago's blacks could vote and in the 1930s were a constituent component of the Democratic machine; black demands for better schooling could not be ignored as they were in Atlanta. Nevertheless, Democratic responsiveness to black demands occurred within narrowly circumscribed bounds. When major racial conflicts over schooling pitted whites against blacks, the school board attempted to defuse conflict by partially responding to black demands for better schools at the same time that it pursued policies which reinforced the structure of segregation.

Many of the conflicts over integration stemmed from the board's practice of shifting school district boundaries to conform with the changing racial composition of neighborhoods. The formal opposition of black organizations to this gerrymandering of school district boundaries was matched by vigorous protests by the black parents and students who were directly affected by boundary changes. In most cases, however, the school boardtment was responsive to the wishes of the white community. Thus, despite calls by the Chicago Council of Negro Organizations and the Chicago and Northern District Association of Colored Women to redrawing of the school boundaries to remove segregation and to allow children to attend the schools nearest their houses, the board retained segregated boundaries in response to pressure from the restrictive covenant groups supported by the Chicago Real Estate Board.[111] Nor was the active mobilization of many black community parents and students sufficient to induce the board to reconsider. One boundary change in 1933 particularly enraged the black community. One thousand mothers met to protest the segregation and over seven hundred black students signed a protest petition. Parents organized the Fifth Ward Civic and Protection Association, whose activities kept the segregation issue alive and eventually succeeded in gaining permission for some black students to enter the schools. The board of education did not redraw the boundaries.

A second source of conflict was the board's practice of putting blacks into separate branches of high schools. In order to promote more efficient use of facilities, school officials could establish branches of overcrowded high schools in elementary school buildings with empty seats. School officials frequently assigned all black students to a single branch school to prevent racial mixing. On one occasion this practice sparked vehement protests from neighborhood residents, the Chicago Urban League, the NAACP and a state representative. When Mayor Kelly overruled the school board and ordered black freshmen to the main high school, whites responded with a massive boycott of the school.[112] Although white students returned after schools superintendent Bogan threatened them with loss of course credit, deep racial tension characterized relations in the school for the next two decades.

A third board practice which drew black protests concerned the issuing of transfers. School authorities permitted white students living in predominantly black areas to transfer to schools that were mostly white. Because such transfers were rarely granted to black students and were clearly used as tools of segregation, blacks opposed them. School officials made occasional efforts to resolve the transfer problem. In 1933, Superintendent Bogan cancelled all transfers of high school students and ordered them to enroll in their home district. Bogan's order was unenforced and ineffective.[113] In 1944, a similar order issued by Superintendent William Johnson was followed by city-wide protests after which the board of education overruled the superintendent and modified his order.[114]

As these episodes illustrate, integration of large numbers of blacks was no more politically possible in the North than in the South. Despite the persistent efforts of blacks, the school board rarely responded to protests against segregation. In instances when school officials did take action, the vehement reaction of the white community usually forced them to back down. Blacks were somewhat more successful on their second focus of agitation--that of improving predominantly black schools. This was an issue with which white politicians could attract black votes without driving away white supporters. Even here, however, achieving success required a great deal of persistence. One major struggle around better facilities concerned the construction of a second black high school. By 1930, the single black high school was seriously overcrowded with 3,400 students packed into a building created for 1,900.[115] Despite the fact that a new high school in the heart of the black belt would intensify segregation, blacks were in this instance more concerned about improving accommodations for their secondary school students. A new school was finally built five years behind schedule and when it was opened enrollment exceeded capacity by 1,400.[116] Black parents lobbied unsuccessfully for an addition to the school until the beginning of World War II. In three consecutive budgets, the board of education set aside appropriations for the addition but failed to authorize construction.[117]

Overcrowding and inferior facilities in elementary schools was also a major concern. In one episode the blacks of Chicago's Lilydale neighborhood staged a drive that secured the construction of an elementary school building for their children but only after recourse to picketing and vandalism. The black residents of Lilydale sent their children to a cluster of portable school rooms that one resident described as a "strange looking assortment of packing box structures which might easily be mistaken for one of these abortive hobo villages which occasionally springs up on city dumps."[118] Rather than demanding admittance to the white elementary school, Lilydale's blacks limited their efforts to replacing the portables with a new school building.

In 1939, overcrowding became a contentious issue in municipal elections for the first time as ambitious politicians sought to garner black support. At the annual board of education budget hearings, thirty-eight speakers complained of the conditions of black schools.[119] During the mayoral campaign that spring, Republican Dwight Green attempted to incite dissatisfaction with the Democrats among black

215

voters by asking them if their children were "compelled to attend overcrowded schools in shifts from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. because by 'unwritten law' the present School Board . . . designates these schools 'colored' when near you are schools with adequate room."[120] Green also advocated a black appointment to the board of education.[121] In response to Green's campaign, Mayor Kelly attempted to appease black voters by appointing Midian A. Bousefield, husband of the first black school principal as one of the seven members of his new Citizens Advisory Committee on Schools. The appointment raised black expectations that their longstanding demands for a black school board member would soon be fulfilled. In October of 1939, Kelly satisfied black aspirations by making Dr. Bousefield the first black member of the board of education.

Several aldermanic candidates during the 1939 municipal elections also raised the issue of the overcrowding of south side schools. During his successful independent campaign for alderman, Paul H. Douglas pledged "to use every bit of influence I can muster to see that the terrible overcrowding of these schools is corrected."[122] Even Benjamin Grant, the Democratic machine candidate from the third ward called for "a full day of schooling for all the children. Seats for every child."[123] Perhaps the most militant opponent of the overcrowding of black schools was second ward Democratic alderman Earl Dickerson. Soon after taking office in 1939, Dickerson called for an investigation of black belt schools " . . . with reference to an inadequacy of facilities and a consequent denial of equal educational facilities to children in that district."[124] In June, a special subcommittee including Dickerson, Douglas and Grant began to hold hearings. While black civic leaders testified to many inadequacies of school facilities, spokesmen for the school board defended themselves claiming that they had "not been fiddling while Rome burns. We know the conditions; we know the cause of them; and we are striving to overcome them."[125]

Despite these reassurances, overcrowding continued to plague black schools and in 1940, Aldermen Dickerson, Douglas and Grant all complained about the problem before the Board of Education's Budget hearings.[126] When double and triple shifts became intolerable, the board of education began a program to build portable school rooms and begin construction of schools within black neighborhoods in order to ease the situtation. Although building new facilities in black school districts had considerable support among the black community, Dickerson advocated a more radical program. Arguing that building additional classrooms within black school districts would reinforce segregation, he proposed redistricting, permissive transfers and an end to restrictive covenants as the means to alleviate the overcrowding problem.[127] Dickerson's plan was given a cool reception by the board of education and the Democratic party withdrew its support for him because he was "too hard to handle."[128] In the 1943 primary it backed a more manageable candidate who defeated Dickerson.

The black experience in Chicago's schools mirrored their political position within the city. Because they constituted an important voting bloc, blacks could not be totally ignored by the Democratic machine during its period of consolidation. Yet blacks occupied a second-class status within that machine: the demands of white voters commanded priority. On the issue of schooling, violent opposition by whites to integrated schools and the equally insistent and organized activities of the black community constrained the course of action followed by school officials. The aim of the school board was to alleviate the worst instances of overcrowding while avoiding integration of blacks with students in surrounding white neighborhoods. Attempts were made to appease black demands for educational equity by redressing only the most flagrant instances of discrimination and by giving blacks representation on the school board. Although they continued to press for an end to segregated schools, when confronted with choices, blacks recognized the obstacles, and often opted for improvement of black facilities at the expense of integrated schools. By the 1950s and 1960s however, demands for educational equity in the form of school integration would be a central black concern in Chicago as it was in San Francisco and Atlanta.

Conclusion

The struggle for equal access to public schools dominated the minority experience with the American educational system. For over a century blacks and other minorities tirelessly pressured local school officials to provide decent facilities for nonwhites. Because local political arrangements generally set narrow limits on black political participation, the quest for better schooling called for considerable community mobilization and organization. Concerted and persistent effort, along with strategic use of meager political resources, produced only modest results in the battle to upgrade minority education. Even when demands were tempered so as not to disrupt prevailing social arrangements, benefits were minimal, unless minorities could threaten public officials with political sanctions. Local school officials' continued disregard for minority schools eventually led to demands for integration, which now seemed to be the only way to achieve true equality.

The history of Atlanta's black community clearly shows the struggle as a three stage process: first for the right to attend public schools, second for improvements in minority schools and finally for integrated classrooms. The timing of these phases differed in the North where blacks enjoyed some political influence. While southern blacks did not frame demands challenging segregation until the 1950s their northern counterparts denounced segregation as soon as the de facto pattern of exclusion became evident. Yet when faced with the choice, northern blacks usually settled for better schools in their own neighborhoods rather than jeopardize the benefits they could win. In neither the North nor the South, however, did local school boards seriously contemplate admitting large numbers of blacks into white schools. Integration was only permitted in the North when blacks composed a handful of the population. At the local level, blacks lacked sufficient leverage to induce school officials to consider integration.

The contrasting experiences of the Chinese and Japanese in San Francisco underscored the indispensability of political leverage on the local level: the two cases also demonstrated the need for resources outside the city when demands for integration faced local opposition. San Francisco's Chinese shared the black experience of exclusion and separation which they could not successfully challenge. In contrast, the unique situation of the Japanese allowed them to demand and win integration despite the objections of the San Francisco school board. Federal intervention on behalf of the Japanese made the crucial difference.

The quest by racial minorities for equal educational opportunity displays the widespread popular demand for schooling which existed. Elites did not "compel" children of racial minorities to attend school, as some recent scholarship has stated, but instead denied them access to schools or crowded them into poor, inadequate facilities. Ironically, these actions were often taken largely because of the popular demand for education within the racial majority as well. Working-class whites were loathe to find public monies used in support of black or Oriental education when schools for whites were frequently overcrowded and inadequate. The intensity of inter-racial conflict over school policy clarifies once again that public education was a popular priority, not any elite conspiracy.

The differential success of racial minorities in the three cities also emphasizes that political relationships critically shaped the direction taken by public schools. Schools were opened to blacks and Orientals when political pressures dictated such action, not when the labor market needed more servile dark-skinned workers. Changes in school policy followed changes in the political status of racial minorities much more than any changes in their economic place. When blacks lost political status, as they did in Atlanta after 1892, they also lost educational opportunities. When blacks gained political strength, as they did in Chicago in the 1930s, they also won better school facilities. The correspondence between school policy and private sector economic change was a good deal more ambiguous.

This does not mean that economic conditions were of no importance to race issues. Quite clearly, working whites feared market competition from poorly paid, racially differentiated neighbors, and racial tension frequently increased during times of economic stress. Yet what was decisive for resolving these conflicts was the political status that minorities had achieved in American society. As blacks and Orientals gained their political rights, their rights to equal public service also came to be recognized.

Our analysis of the political forces shaping race relations in education has moved from the nineteenth into the first decades of the twentieth century. In the third part of the study, we focus even more decidedly on the growth and change that occurred in urban schools after 1900. In so doing we cannot escape considering once again the much studied, much maligned reforms of American urban education. In the process of looking at these reforms in urban education we shall discover that many of the shibboleths and verities about school reform cannot be sustained by a careful look at the Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco experience. Reform, it now seems to us, has been understood in too narrow a set of categories. Reform was much more--and much less--than a class struggle, and reformers were often much more--and much less--than a class-conscious elite who imposed their interests and values on a resistant working-class majority. Reform was itself as complex, uncertain and pluralistic as many of the other forces shaping urban schools.

Footnotes

1. U.S. Tenth Census, 1880.

2. Writers' Program of the Works Project Administration, 1942, p. 90; Rabinowitz, 1978, p. 155.

3. Racine, 1969, pp. 34.35.

4. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Reports, 1878-1910.

5. Ibid., 1891, p. 17; Ecke, 1972, pp. 34-35; Racine, 1969, pp. 45-46.

6. Racine, 1969, p. 10; Epps, 1955, p. 11; Watts, 1974 p. 273.

7. Bacote, 1955b, p. 258.

8. Atlanta City Council Minutes, 26 November 1969; Benson, 1966 p. 28; Ecke, 1972, p.11.

9. Atlanta City Council Minutes, 5 March 1971.

10. Wotton, 1977 p. 365.

11. Atlanta Constitution, 23 September 1972; Atlanta City Council Minutes, 22 September 1972, 27 November 1972, 29 September 1972, 11 October 1972.

12. Atlanta City Council Minutes, 6 September 1975, 20 September 1975; Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 30 October 1975.

13. Atlanta Constitution,20 July 1980, 3 August 1980, 5 October 1980; Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 22 January 1980, 29 April 1980, 29 June 1980, 3 September, 1980, 25 August 1981; Atlanta City Council Minutes, 4 October 1980.

14. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 2 February 1982.

15. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Report, 1883, p. 10.

16. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 29 November 1972, 26 December 1972, 20 April 1971; Atlanta City Council Minutes, 13 September 1972; Atlanta Daily Sun, 14 September 1971,21 September 1971, 5 October 1971, Racine, 1969, p.33.

17. Watts, 1978, p. 27-28.

18. Atlanta Constitution, 2 December 1886.

19. Watts, 1969, pp. 196-205.

20. Atlanta Constitution, 20 October 1888.

21. Bacote, 1955a, p. 335.

22. Gordon, 1937, p. 152.

23. Atlanta City Council Minutes, 6 January 1890.

24. Bacote, 1955a, p. 336.

25. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 24 December 1891, 28 January 1892, 25 February 1892, 28 April 1892; Racine, 1969, p. 10.

26. Racine, 1969, p. 41; Watts, 1969, pp. 217-218.

27. Racine,1969, pp. 33-35; Rabinowitz, 1978, pp. 171-172.

28. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 22 August 1974.

29. Rabinowitz, 1978, p. 172.

30. Racine,1969, pp. 35-37; Rabinowitz, 1978, p. 174-175.

31. T. Chase to M. E. Strieby, 28 August 1978, AMA papers cited in Thornberry, 1977, p. 122.

32. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 2 October 1977, 9 October 1977; Thornberry, 1977 pp. 110-112.

33. Racine,1969, p. 35-37; Rabinowitz, 1978, pp. 174-175.

34. Rabinowitz, 1978, p. 98; Gordon, 1937, p. 8.

35. Gordon, 1937, p. 9.

36. Atlanta Independent, 10 September 1904.

37. Unidentified newspaper clipping found in Atlanta Girls' High School Scrapbook, p. 1908.

38. Atlanta Independent, 9 October 1909; 29 January 1910; Atlanta Constitution, 27 January 1910.

39. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 26 November 1913.

40. Ibid., 4 August 1914.

41. Atlanta Independent, 25 April 1914, 19 May 1914, 15 December 1914.

42. Racine, 1969, p. 179.

43. White, 1948, p. 29.

44. _Ibid_., p. 31.

45. _Ibid_., p. 32.

46. _Ibid_., p. 33.

47. Atlanta _Constitution_, 9 January 1920; Atlanta _Independent_, 3 February 1921.

48. Ecke, 1972, p. 196.

49. _Ibid_., p. 207.

50. Atlanta _Constitution_, 10 October 1928; Atlanta Board of Education _Minutes_, 9 October 1928.

51. Racine, 1969, p. 253, Ecke, 1972, pp. 214, 237-238, Newman, 1978, p. 158-159.

52. Newman, 1978, p. 243; Racine, 1969, pp. 257-258.

53. Newman, 1978, pp. 243-4; Racine, 1969, pp. 257-258.

54. Ecke, 1972, pp. 69-70; Racine, 1969, p. 116.

55. Atlanta Board of Education _Minutes_, 25 January 1919.

56. U.S. Bureau of the Census, _Ninth Census_, 1870, _Population_, p. 91; U.S. _Tenth Census_, 1880 _Population_, pp. 416, 447.

57. San Francisco _Municipal Reports_, 1870, p. 275; San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction _Annual Report_, 1880, p. 300.

58. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction _Annual Report_ 1864-1865, p. 31.

59. Beasley, 1919, p. 181.

60. Lortie, 1973, p. 53, footnote 57.

61. _Ibid_., pp. 12, 49.

62. Beasley, 1919, p. 173.

63. Wollenberg, 1976, pp. 18, 20; Lortie, 1973, p. 14.

64. Wollenberg, 1976, p. 25.

65. Saxton, 1971, p. 7.

223

66. Chang, 1936, p. 263.

67. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction Annual Report, 1869, p. 43.

68. Saxton, 1971, p. 17.

69. The number of Chinese children who attended private schools was over four times greater than the number attending public schools. In 1890, for example, 372 Chinese pupils attended private schools and 473 did not attend schools at all. When we consider that the Chinese traditionally did not believe in educating girls, the percentage of children takes on greater significance. In the 1890 School Census, girls comprised almost forty-eight percent of the total number of Chinese children. If we assume that the greater part of these girls were not being educated, it appears that a large percentage of boys attended schools of some sort.

    While exact figures are not available, Chinn's estimate of attendance in private language schools indicates that the great majority of Chinese boys attending private schools attended Chinese language schools; San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction Annual Report, 1890, pp. 24-25; Chinn, 1969, p. 68.

70. Saxton, 1971, p. 106.

71. Chang, 1936, pp. 229-230.

72. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction Annual Report, 1865, p. 32; Ibid., 1869, p. 43.

73. Chang, 1936, p. 297; Wollenberg, 1976, p. 33.

74. Hawley, 1971 passim, discusses Pelton's unique view of education.

75. Chang, 1936, pp. 294-296.

76. Ibid., p. 297.

77. Ibid., p. 298.

78. Wollenberg, 1976, p. 37.

79. Nee and deBary, 1972, pp. 43, 53.

80. San Francisco Call, 8 July 1882, 5 August 1882.

81. Chang, 1936, p. 306.

82. Thompson, 1931, p. 72.

83. Wollenberg, 1976, p. 40.

84. Thompson, 1931, p. 76.

85. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction *Annual Report*, 1890, pp. 24-25.

86. San Francisco *Call*, 19 June 1902.

87. Wollenberg, 1976, p. 44.

88. *Ibid*., p. 445.

89. Kennan, 1907, p. 247.

90. Thompson, 1931, p. 143.

91. Kennan, 1907, p. 247.

92. U.S. Senate, 1906, p. 4.

93. Wollenberg, 1976, p. 53.

94. Thompson, 1931, p. 50.

95. *Ibid*., p. 127.

96. Kennan, 1907, p. 247.

97. *Ibid*., p. 249.

98. Thompson, 1931 p. 160.

99. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Twelfth Census*, 1900, *Population*.

100. Herrick, 1971, p. 53.

101. Spear, 1967, p. 44.

102. *Ibid*.

103. *Ibid*.

104. *Ibid*.

105. Katznelson, 1976, p. 86; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fifteenth Census*, 1930, Vol. 3, pt. I, p. 363.

106. Drake and Cayton, 1945, p. 204.

107. Homel, 1972, p. 120.

108. *Ibid*.

109. *Ibid*., pp. 110-111.

110. Gosnell, 1935, p. 280.

111. *Ibid*., p. 48-49.

112. *Ibid*., p. 77.

113. Homel, 1972, p. 81-2.

114. Levit, 1947, pp. 37-38.

115. Homel, 1972, p. 113.

116. *Ibid*.

117. *Ibid*., p. 134.

118. *Ibid*., p. 128.

119. *Ibid*., p. 118.

120. *Ibid*., p. 116.

121. *Ibid*., p. 256.

122. *Ibid*., p. 116.

123. *Ibid*.

124. *Ibid*., p. 117.

125. *Ibid*.

126. *Ibid*.

127. *Ibid*., p. 119.

128. Drake and Cayton, 1945, p. 356.

PART III

Reforming Public Schools

Chapter VI

URBAN REFORM WITHOUT CLASS CONFLICT

Though the pressures for change had been building for some time, reform came suddenly to the Atlanta public school system. On May 28, 1897, in a City Council meeting ostensibly called to consider some routine matters pertaining to the city's water works, a resolution was introduced by Alderman James G. Woodward which replaced the sitting seventeen-member school board with a new board comprising one member from each of the city's seven wards. Despite a recent escalation in the level of conflict between the school board and Mayor Charles Collier, the move came as a complete surprise to virtually everyone in Atlanta, including all of the members of the school board.[1] The entire operation took only a few minutes. As the Atlanta Constitution observed the next day:

> A Texas hanging couldn't have gone off with the precision and nicety of the sudden execution . . . . The ax revolved and the heads were basketed.[2]

The action of the City Council raised an immediate public outcry in Atlanta: a mass meeting held the following day denounced the move as "illegal, revolutionary, despotic, and dangerous," and the city's newspapers gave the unfolding story front-page coverage and banner headlines for several days.[3] Within a week of the "astounding coup," however, the new board had organized itself and won the endorsement of both city newspapers, and the new members were setting themselves to the tasks of educational reform in the city's public school system.[4]

In this chapter we assess the adequacy of the class-conflict model of progressive educational reform for understanding the 1897 reform of the Atlanta schools. We show that many of the classic school reforms were carried out in Atlanta in that year: the school board was reduced

228

in size, the administrative powers of the superintendent were increased, economy measures were implemented, and progressive curricular innovations were introduced. We also show, however, that the political process which led to reform in Atlanta was quite different from the class-conflictual process described by revisionists. While the reformers in Atlanta were members of the middle and upper classes, as the class conflict model would suggest, the Atlanta school reforms were carried out not over the objections of working class politicians but rather at the expense of the city's most prestigious civic leaders. In contrast to the efforts of urban elites to "get the schools out of politics" described by revisionists, the political connections of Atlanta's reformers were so blatant that their opponents justifiably accused them of introducing politics into the public school system. In addition, we show that the political consequences of school reform in Atlanta were the direct opposite of those predicted by the model. On the basis of these findings, we conclude that class conflict is not a necessary condition for urban reform, and that the sources of progressive reform were more complex than the revisionist model has often implied.

The Revisionist Model of School Reform

Urban reform in general and school reform in particular have frequently been interpreted in bi-polar class conflict categories. The forces behind the reform drive are said to have been social and economic elites, who had become disturbed by the rising power of working class, immigrant politicians and organizations. The ideology of efficiency and democracy which justified the reforms has been identified as an ideology of elite interests and consistent with elite values. Attacks on corruption and patronage, calls for efficient administration and scientific management, and demands for good government and citizen participation have been seen as more or less well disguised campaigns to dismember institutional bastions of working class power.[5] In the face of the reform steamroller, working class and ethnic politicians defended pre-reform institutions and practices on behalf of the working class community as best they could.

Specific institutional changes are seen as consistent with the reformers' larger political objectives. Reformers introduced at-large elections because ward-based campaigns emphasized the neighborhood attachments and ethnic connections important to working class politicians. They called for non-partisanship, because the patronage-fed political parties were "machines" which not only mobilized working class votes but, in return, distributed special favors to workers and immigrants when they needed help. Reformers called for the initiative, referendum, and recall because these more participatory mechanisms of citizen involvement were more likely to be used by middle and upper class voters. Scientific administration required the professional expertise which only the educated middle class could provide.[6]

Recent interpretations of school reform have also been based on a class-conflict model.[7] Katz has described educational reform movements in the Progressive Era as a "class effort . . . largely controlled by old stock first citizens," and motivated by "an anti-immigrant and anti-working class attitude."[8] Following Hays, Tyack has asserted that "the chief support for reform 'did not come from the lower or middle classes, but from the upper class,'" and that "the reformers wished 'not simply to replace bad men with good (but) to change the occupational and class origins of decision makers.'"[9] The major changes in urban school governance--smaller school boards, fewer board committees, at-large elections, a professional superintendent directing a large central-office staff, blue-ribbon advisory committees--have been described as devices by which upper class elites sought to break working class influence over school policy. The curricular and other innovations introduced by the reformers--compulsory schooling, manual training, school testing--are said to have embodied a similar bias.

Most of these analyses of urban reform have been carried out in northern cities, and when attention has been paid to the South the racist twists to populist and reform efforts have received the greatest emphasis.[10] Yet the southern experience with reform requires broader consideration. At the turn of the century southern cities differed dramatically from their northern counterparts in a variety of ways. Foreign immigrants represented a negligible fraction of the population in most southern cities, while blacks were nearly as numerous as whites. Industrialization was barely underway in the region, and the urban working class was racially divided and politically weak. Economic and political power remained firmly in the grip of the traditional, white, "Bourbon" elite. It has not yet been shown, however, what consequences these differences had for the character of reform movements in the South.

In an initial effort to determine whether the divergent political and economic characteristics of northern and southern cities spawned reform movements which differed significantly from one another either in the political process through which reform was carried out or in the content of the reforms which were implemented, we regard the Atlanta experience with reform as an especially promising test case. Atlanta has always been the southern city most attuned to developments in the North, and it has styled itself as the "Gate City" and the capital of the progressive "New South." If the class conflict model of urban reform is appropriate for analyzing reform movements in any part of the South, it would presumably account for developments in Atlanta. Our finding that the content of the reforms instituted in the Atlanta public school system in 1897 was similar to the content of contemporaneous reforms elsewhere, while the political process through which reform was carried out in Atlanta was decisively different from that described by the proponents of the class-conflict model, suggests that this model inadequately accounts for reform politics outside the major cities of the industrialized North. This finding also calls into question the claim that the "class content" of particular reforms is determined by the social background of reformers, for we shall see that policy innovations not unlike those promulgated in the North were implemented in Atlanta without the appearance of class divisions. On the basis of this evidence we conclude that the primary sources of urban school reform are not to be found in bi-polar class conflict but rather in the new administrative requirements created by increasingly large and multi-faceted educational organizations and the rising political strength of middle-class professionals who were as suspicious of traditional social elites as they were of working-class politicians.

Social and Economic Change in Nineteenth Century Atlanta

At the end of the nineteenth century, Atlanta was a relatively small but rapidly growing city. The city had barely 20,000 residents in 1872, when the public school system was inaugurated. As Table IV-1 shows, the population had more than quadrupled to nearly 90,000 in 1900, and growth continued apace in the succeeding decade. Though the black population of Atlanta grew at a slower rate than the white population, at the turn of the century nearly 40 percent of the city's residents were black. Immigrants represented a small and declining percentage of Atlanta's population throughout this period.

The city's economy was also growing and changing in these years, as can be seen in Table VI-2. Between 1880 and 1890 the aggregate product of Atlanta's industries nearly tripled, as the locally-oriented food processing and construction industries were surpassed by industries producing for regional and national markets. Though aggregate economic growth was slowed by the national depression between 1890 and 1900, technological and organizational changes in this decade greatly increased the productive efficiency of Atlanta's industries, and the amount of value added in the production process by each employee grew by more than 60 percent.

The demographic and economic development of Atlanta was reflected in the growth of the city's dual public school system. Table VI-3 shows that grammar school enrollments more than doubled between 1878 and 1900 and nearly doubled again in the following decade. At the secondary level there were no facilities provided for black children and enrollments increased rapidly and less steadily than at the primary level. Between 1878 and 1900 enrollments in the system as a whole grew by nearly 300 percent, and at the turn of the century more than half of the eligible children in the city were enrolled in school. The rapid growth of the city and its public school systems set the stage for educational reform in Atlanta in 1897.

TABLE VI-1

The Population of Atlanta, 1870-1910

Year	Population	Percent Black	Percent Foreign-born
1870	21,789	45.6	6.5
1880	37,409	43.7	3.8
1890	65,533	42.9	2.9
1900	89,872	39.8	2.8
1910	154,839	33.5	2.8

SOURCES: 1880, 10th Census of the U.S., Compendium, Vol. 0, pt. 1, pp. 453, 382-83.

1890, 11th Census of the U.S., Compendium, Vol. 0, pt. 1, p. 543.

1900, 12th Census of the U.S., Population, Vol. 1, pt. 1, p. 612.

1910, 13th Census of the U.S., Population, Vol. 2, p. 403.

TABLE VI-2

Economic Growth of Atlanta, 1880-1910

Year	Leading Industries (By value of Product)	Total Value of Product		Value-Added/Employee	
		Current	Constant[a]	Current	Constant[a]
1880	Flour and grist milling Carpentry Slaughtering/meat-packing Planed lumber Confectionary	$ 4,861,727	$ 6,077,159	$ 462.63	$ 578.29
1890	Cotton goods Men's clothing Foundry and machine shop Planed lumber Railroad cars and products	$13,074,037	$16,761,586	$ 482.96	$ 619.18
1900	Cotton goods Planed lumber Foundry and machine shop Patent medicines Furniture	$16,707,027	$20,883,784	$ 803.42	$1,004.28
1910	N.A.[b]	$33,038,002	$34,414,585	$1,128.76	$1,175.79

SOURCES: 1880, 10th Census of the U.S., Manufactures, Vol. 2, p. 382.
1890, 11th Census of the U.S., Compendium, Vol. 0, pt. 2, pp. 720-21.
1900, 12th Census of the U.S., Manufactures, Vol. 8, pt. 2, pp. 142-43.
1910, 13th Census of the U.S., Manufactures, Vol. 9, pp. 230-31.

[a] 1913 = 100, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Cost of Living Index.

[b] Census regulations against revealing data on individual firms prevented the inclusion of information on Atlanta's leading industries in 1910, because several of the most important were dominated by one or two firms. According to Deaton, the leading industry in Atlanta in 1910 was printing and publishing. Other industries with production valued over $1,000,000 were cotton goods, men's clothings, foundry and machine shops, lumber and timber, patent medicines, confectionery, flour and grist milling, steam railraod cars and products, cordial and syrup, and boxes.[10]

TABLE VI-3

Atlanta Public School Enrollments, 1878 - 1910

Year	Black Primary Enrollment	Black Students per Teacher	White Primary Enrollment	White Students per Teacher	Secondary Enrollment (White)	Secondary Students per Teacher	Total[a]	Percentage[b] of Cohort in School
1878	1,269	90.6	2,081	63.1	317	45.3	3,667	
1882	1,111	69.4	2,813	63.9	332	41.5	4,256	
1885	1,533	N.A.	3,659	N.A.	379	42.1	5,571	
1890	2,373	N.A.	5,402	N.A.	638	49.1	8,413	39.2
1895	4,705	117.6	9,042	64.6	901	50.1	14,767	
1896	3,566	89.2	9,330	76.5	860	47.8	13,937	
1897	3,484	87.1	9,558	64.6	941	49.5	14,328	
1900	4,069	92.5	9,047	55.2	922	41.9	14,236	51.4
1905	4,164	74.4	10,066	46.4	810	31.2	15,359	
1910	5,346	75.3	14,146	40.81	1,271	28.2	21,418	50.1

SOURCES: Atlanta Board of Education, Annual Reports, 1878 - 1910.
1890, 11th Census of the U.S., Population, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 114.
1900, 12th Census of the U.S. Population, Vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 122.
1910, 13th Census of the U.S., Population, Vol. 1, p. 450.

[a] Includes night students, all of whom were white.

[b] School age cohort, 5-19.

The Content of School Reform

In some ways the Atlanta school reform fits rather well with the class-conflict model. In keeping with the model, the instigators of the reform movement were Mayor Charles Collier and Hoke Smith, both of whom were well-established members of the city's economic and political elite. Collier was a noted proponent of Henry Grady's "New South" ideology and an active advocate of Atlanta's economic growth and civic improvement. In this connection he had served as president of the corporation which had staged the Cotton States and International Exposition in Atlanta in 1895, an event intended to attract entrepreneurs and northern capital to the Gate City and open up the city and the region for increased development and industrialization.[11] Smith was the editor of the Atlanta Journal, and an increasingly important political figure known for his "progressive" sympathies. He had served as Grover Cleveland's Secretary of the interior in the early 1890's, and he was to be elected Governor of Georgia in 1906. Like Collier, Smith was a vigorous proponent of Southern development and industrialization, and he maintained a lifelong interest in educational reform and especially vocational education.[12]

Collier had been elected in 1896 at the head of the Chamber of Commerce-dominated ticket of the J. W. English faction in city politics, and he came into office determined to administer the city according to "sound business principles."[13] Among his earliest legislative accomplishments was the passage of a substantial property tax cut, which benefited wealthy Atlantans considerably and reduced the expected revenues of the city by nearly $200,000.[14] The lingering effects of the national depression required cutbacks in the level of city services and the salaries of municipal employees, and Collier--like the leaders of reform movements in other cities--was quick to demand that Atlanta's public school system be operated more economically and efficiently. Expressing his unhappiness with the school board, the Mayor observed,

> I have been surprised and mortified to find that this department was the only one disposed to hamper us in our efforts to put the city government on a business basis.[15]

In a further parallel with educational reform movements elsewhere, the general concern for economy and efficiency within the Atlanta public school system expressed by Mayor Collier was coupled with a specific demand for reductions in school system expenditures. Shortly after his inauguration, Collier persuaded the school board to pass a 9 percent pay cut for all of the city's teachers. In addition, he pushed an ordinance through the city council which prohibited the school board from purchasing any supplies for the schools without the express authorization of the Mayor and the council.[16]

These efforts to enforce economy in the public school system were resisted by the school board and Atlanta's teachers. In his annual report to the Mayor and council, board president W. S. Thomson asserted the rights of the school board against those of the city's elected leaders:

> I ask for the schools the best financial support that the condition of the treasury will admit of, and that the Board be permitted to exercise its judgement not only as to what shall be taught and who shall teach, but also what shall be paid, keeping within such appropriation as you shall make for the schools.[17]

Though the board acquiesced to the Mayor and reduced teacher salaries, the cut was not as large as Collier had wanted, and Thomson chose to resign from the board rather than submit to Collier's demands.[18] Understandably concerned about the effects which the Mayor's economy measures would have on their standard of living, Atlanta's teachers supported the school board in its resistance to the Mayor; a few days after the salary reductions demanded by Collier had been passed, a petition signed by every teacher in the school system asked the board president to withdraw his resignation and return to office, and expressed the appreciation of the teachers for the board's efforts to protect the interests of school system employees.[19]

The drive for economy in the administration of the school system was intensified after the abolition of the original school board. The newly-appointed board responded to the Mayor's demands for reduced expenditures by firing several teachers (including a number of principals) cutting the length of the school year by a week, and

238

imposing additional salary cuts on the teachers in 1897 and 1898.[20] The approach of the new board was summed up by its president, Hoke Smith:

> As a rule the teachers are doing good work. The Board found it necessary to give up the services of some, and it may be necessary to give up the services of others, to the end that the best talent which we can obtain from the amount appropriated by the city may be found in all the school rooms.[21]

As Table IV-4 makes clear, the economy measures implemented by Mayor Collier and the new board of education had a profound impact on the public school system of Atlanta. Instructional expenditures were reduced absolutely in 1897, and they remained below the level reached in 1896 until after the turn of the century. The level of total expenditures (including building and other capital expenses) was affected even more dramatically. Total expenditures were reduced more than 25 percent between 1896 and 1897, and in constant dollars they did not regain their former level until 1905. These reductions in the level of appropriations to the school system occurred in a period in which the population of Atlanta was increasing rapidly, and the cuts in educational expenditures thus resulted in increased class sizes and the exclusion of substantial numbers of would-be students from the schools for lack of space. Per pupil expenditures were reduced almost 10 percent between 1896 and 1897, and further reductions were made in succeeding years.[22]

The content of the Atlanta school reforms corresponds closely to the content of reforms described by the class-conflict model in other respects as well. The change in board membership resulted in a shift of administrative power away from the school board to the professional staff of the school system. The reduction in the number of members on the school board from seventeen to seven and the reduction in the number of board committees from ten to two served to limit the extent to which board members could personally involve themselves in the day-to-day administration of the system. This shift in power was further encouraged by the addition of a full-time Assistant Superintendent to the administrative staff and by an extension of the rights and responsibilities of the Superintendent. He and his assistant were

TABLE IV-4

Atlanta School Expenditures, 1878-1910

Year	Instructional Expenditures		Total Expenditures		Instructional Expenditures per Pupil	
	Current	Constant[a]	Current	Constant[a]	Current	Constant[a]
1878	38,082	47,604	38,082	47,604	10.39	12.98
1882	44,780	52,070	55,265	64,262	10.52	12.23
1885	57,638	75,841	76,305	100,401	10.35	13.61
1890	89,309	114,500	137,530	176,321	10.62	13.60
1895	136,173	186,538	138,581	189,837	9.22	12.63
1896	151,834	205,181	198,747	268,578	10.89	14.72
1897	141,999	189,322	141,999	189,332	9.91	13.58
1900	143,960	179,951	168,698	210,873	10.11	12.64
1905	215,345	247,523	249,018	286,228	14.02	16.11
1910	343,710	358,031	475,763	495,586	16.05	16.72

SOURCE: Atlanta, Board of Education, Superintendent's Reports, 1878-1910.

[a] 1913 = 100. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Cost of Living Index.

permitted to participate fully in the meetings of the school board for the first time, and a variety of administrative tasks which had previously been handled by board committees--including the adjudication of disputes between parents and teachers and the ordering of supplies--were also placed under his authority.[23] As was often the case in other cities, the Atlanta school reform thus resulted in an increase in the power of the administrative staff of the school system at the expense of the school board itself.

One further parallel between the reforms in Atlanta and those in other cities deserves mention. The members of the new board came into office committed to the introduction of manual training courses into the curriculum of all the public schools. In his first annual report to the Mayor and council, board president Hoke Smith expressed his desire "to see industrial work introduced all through our schools, and the minds of the children so trained as to fit them for the practical utilization of what they learn."[24] This wish was reiterated in the two succeeding years, and in 1900 a director of manual training was employed and a workshop was constructed in the Boys' High School. According to Smith, this was "simply the beginning of manual training. We hope to see it gradually develop until manual training for boys and girls will help to prepare the children of our schools for practical work."[25]

In sum, Atlanta's school reform removed the sitting board of education from office, strengthened the Superintendent and his staff at the expense of the board, imposed economy measures on the schools and salary reductions on the teachers, and added manual training courses to the curriculum of the school system. The list makes the Atlanta experience sound very much like the tales of reform movements in northern cities, where an increasingly powerful elite has been said to have seized control over the public school system, centralized power in the office of the Superintendent, and rationalized procedures throughout the system over the protests of the poor and working classes. A closer look at school reform in Atlanta, however, shows that the process of reform differed decisively from that described in the prevailing class-conflict model.

The Politics of School Reform

While the content of the school reforms in Atlanta was similar in many respects to that in other cities, the political process through which the reforms were carried out in Atlanta was quite different from that described by the class-conflict model. Traditional politics in the city were not organized in terms of class divisions, and civic and governmental institutions had been dominated since the Civil War by members of the traditional social and economic elite. School politics, in particular, were the almost exclusive preserve of the most eminent members of the city's business and professional classes. The issues which precipitated the school reform movement differed from the issues which reportedly led to educational reform in the North, and the political consequences of school reform in Atlanta were in several important respects the direct opposite of those predicted by the class-conflict model.

Pre-Reform Politics

Politics in Atlanta prior to the reform of the school system were hardly working class politics. Power in the city was virtually monopolized by members of the business, commercial, and professional elites. Atlanta's black citizens were not represented in city government after 1870, and they were deprived of what little political influence remained to them after the institution of the "white primary" in the early 1890s.[26] The white working class was significantly underrepresented in office as well, though the rival factions of Atlanta's elite required the support of the city's workers for electoral success and therefore competed for working-class votes.[27]

The pre-eminence of the city's elites in municipal politics was facilitated by the absence of party competition in Atlanta, where the Democratic Party was the only recognized political organization. Their pre-eminence was reflected in the putative ideological consensus which governed political discourse in Atlanta. The consensus was maintained in large part because of the ostensible need to maintain racial solidarity and keep Atlanta's black citizens out of power, and therefore to prevent the emergence of divisions in the white electorate.[28] The consequence was a political system based on the distribution of graft and patronage, divided along factional lines.[29] As the Atlanta Journal explained:

> The city council is elected in Atlanta on the theory that it is a non-political body; that it is to attend strictly to the city's business strictly on business principles.
>
> We regret that in its practice the council so often violates this theory. It is well-known that for several years past there have been two factions in the council.
>
> They have alternated in the control of that body, and the faction that has a majority for the time being has everything its own way so completely that the minority might as well not be there so far as the choice of department officials is concerned.[30]

The two factions were led by J. W. English and W. H. Brotherton, and they exhibited considerable continuity over time in membership. Brotherton was a prosperous dry-goods merchant with strong ties to the local branch of the American Protective Association and Atlanta's organized working class, while English was one of the region's leading industrialists and a large scale employer of leased convict labor, with his political base in the Chamber of Commerce.[31] Brotherton was the leader of the powerful Prohibition Club in city politics, while English often worked with Atlanta's liquor interests.[32] At the same time, however, the composition of the two factions was subject to dramatic changes. In the municipal election of 1906, for example, a dispute between the labor and prohibition elements in the Brotherton faction caused the Atlanta Federation of Trades to break its customary political ties and endorse the English ticket.[33] In general, though, the factional split marked a division within the civic elite, rather than a division along status or class lines, with the English faction tending to enlist the support of somewhat wealthier and more prestigious citizens and to present the more eminent candidates for office.[34]

Another factor of importance in the factional division was the part played in the struggle by Atlanta's two newspapers, the Journal and the Constitution. Rivalry between the two was to emerge as the predominant feature of Georgia politics in the 1900s, when the "progressive" faction led by Hoke Smith and the Journal vied with the "conservative" faction led by Clark Howell and the Constitution for political and economic control of the state. In the 1890s, however, political competition between the two was largely confined to the local arena, with the Journal generally allied with the several elements of the Brotherton faction and the Constitution with the traditional elites who dominated the English faction.[35]

A complicating factor in the municipal politics of Atlanta in these years was the persistence of "friends and neighbors" ties, which eroded factional divisions and occasionally transcended them altogether. The political ascendancy of Clark Howell's brother Albert within the Brotherton faction in 1896, for example, caused the Constitution to sever whatever ties had traditionally bound it to the English faction and to work vigorously for the election of the Brotherton ticket.[36] This in itself would probably have been enough to bring the Journal to endorse the English candidate, but the nomination of C. A. Collier for mayor by the English faction assured the new alignment, for Hoke Smith had studied law in Collier's father's law firm, and Collier himself had been a member of the original corporation organized by Smith to purchase the Journal in the mid-1880s.[37]

The portrait of Atlanta's political system which emerges from this account is thus one in which the principal function of municipal politics was to distribute economic and political favors among competing factions of the city's social and economic elite. Political conflicts were not based on disputes over issues with the possible exception of prohibition but rather over the control of city government and the economic and political advantages which could be reaped from that control. Blacks and the white working class played virtually no role in city politics; they were unable to take part in the definition of issues or to contest seriously for office, and their political activities were largely restricted to trading votes to one faction or the other in return for a share of the favors which were to be dispensed. Blacks were deprived of even this power after the institution of the white primary, but white workers continued to gain occasional concessions from the factions. Though the factions were in some respects definable entities, their boundaries remained relatively fluid, and dramatic shifts in membership could and did occur. Personal antagonisms were frequently at the root of political rivalries, and "friends and neighbors" relationships frequently determined the alignment of forces within the factional struggle.

Thus, in contrast to the picture of urban politics described in the literature which develops the class-conflict model of urban reform, Atlanta politics in this era were not controlled by working-class leaders or defined by conflict between classes. The city's business and professional leaders were in firm control of the economic and political institutions of the city, and such political conflicts as did emerge in these years emerged within the city's elite.

Elites and Traditional School Politics

The school board, in particular, was a bastion of power for Atlanta's traditional civic elite. In contrast to the history of many northern cities, where the public school systems were stitched together over time from a motley assortment of village, borough, and proprietary schools, the Atlanta school system was created by an act of the city council in 1872, and was therefore unified from the start. The school board was uniformly composed of members of the city's business and professional elites, and included some of Atlanta's wealthiest and most eminent citizens. Among them were men like L. P. Grant, the president of the Atlanta and West Point Railroad; Logan E. Bleckley, Georgia's best-known lawyer and subsequently Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme Court; E. E. Rawson, a pioneer industrialist who had made his fortune in real estate; S. M. Inman, a cotton merchant and reputedly the wealthiest man in Atlanta; and J. W. English.[38] Most important among the members of the school board, however, was Joseph E. Brown, who served as president of the board until his election to the U. S. Senate in 1888 and continued to dominate its deliberations until his death in 1894. Brown had served as the confederate Governor of Georgia, and he reigned as a member of the state's "Bourbon triumvirate" after Reconstruction, serving terms in the United States Senate and as Chief Justie of the

Georgia Supreme Court. He was also president of the Western and Atlantic Railroad, the Southern Railway and Steamship Company, the Walker Iron and Coal Company, and the Dade Coal Company, which made him one of the wealthiest and most powerful men in the southeast.[39]

Members of the school board were appointed for seven-year terms, and they were routinely re-appointed if they were willing to serve.[40] With the exemption of authority over annual appropriations to the school system, which was retained by the city council, power over the school system was fully vested in the board.[41] Exempted from political controversy by the wealth and status of its members, the nature of its charter, and the duration of its members' tenure, the pre-reform school board was essentially free to administer the schools according to its own conservative preferences, without regard for the exigencies of local electoral politics. Thus, in contrast to the situation commonly described in the literature on educational reform, in which traditional school politics were ward and neighborhood based and business and professional leaders imposed reforms on the poor and working classes, in Atlanta the school system was unified under the direction of "city-wide" interests from its inception, and reform was carried out at the expense of the traditional civic elite.

Issues in School Politics

The issues which precipated the reform of the Atlanta schools also differ from those described by the advocates of the class-conflict model of reform. While the demands of Mayor Collier for economy and efficiency in the administration of the school system were paralleled in other cities, other issues in contemporary school politics were unique to Atlanta. Disputes over textbook selection and the costs of textbooks to parents stimulated conflict between the school board and the city council, while the unavailing effort which was made to modernize the curriculum of the school system served to draw a clear line in local school politics between "progressive" reformers and the conservative majority on the school board. By far the greatest conflict was generated by the issue of corporal punishment, however, and the failure of the school board to abolish the practice in the Atlanta public school system led directly to the removal of the board members from office and to the subsequent reform of other aspects of the system.

Efforts to change educational policies in the Atlanta public school system proved largely unavailing in the years prior to 1897. The school board was dominated by conservative members of the city's traditional civic elite, and it was therefore effectively insulated from political pressures. Demands for changes in the school system were uncommon in these years, however, (with the notable exception of continuing efforts by Atlanta's black community to win more and better school facilities for its children,) and the "inertia" in the system caused relatively little controversy.

In the mid-1890s, however, a number of educational issues emerged with a new intensity in Atlanta. Public protest arose over the board's policies of textbook selection and the frequency with which new textbooks were assigned in the schools, because parents were obliged to bear the high costs of these textbooks.[42] This dispute culminated in the passage of a city council ordinance which required that textbooks--once selected--were to be used in the schools for a minimum of five years, and that the same books were to be used in all of the schools of the system.[43]

Controversy also arose over issues of curricular reform: the city's traditional elites were opposed to nearly all changes in the curriculum of the system, while other Atlantans were angered by the school board's refusal to improve the public schools by instituting a departmental organization of the faculties in the Boys' and Girls' High Schools or by adding manual training and vocational subjects to the curriculum of the primary and secondary schools. Although some changes had been introduced, the school board was generally inflexible, and the efforts of the Mayor, the city council, and other concerned citizens to modernize the curriculum in the public school system proved largely fruitless in the years prior to 1897.[44]

By far the largest public dispute arose over the issue of corporal punishment in the schools. Protest over the thrashing of recalcitrant children increased dramatically after 1890, and demands that the practice of corporal punishment be forbidden in the public school system were directed to the school board by middle class parents, prominent citizens, and members of the city council with increasing frequency and impatience as the decade passed.[45] Atlanta's teachers, however, argued that the right to resort to a hickory switch was essential to the maintenance of order in the city's classrooms, and the school board sided with them.

Opposition to the school board found its champion with the inauguration of Mayor Collier in 1897. As was noted above, Collier was quick to protest against the prodigality of the school board in its administration of the public school system, and he joined in the public controversy over other issues as well. From his position as an *ex officio* member of the board, he tried unsuccessfully to encourage curricular and other reforms in the system, and he worked hard for the abolition of corporal punishment. Declaring that no living man or woman would ever whip one of his children, the Mayor explained that the retention of corporal punishment in the public system had led him to enroll his own children in private schools.[46] Taking over the leadership of the forces opposing the practice in the city, he circulated a petition among the influential citizens of Atlanta which demanded that teachers in the public schools be prohibited from whipping children. When he had collected over one hundred signatures--from "persons whose names it was believed would have weight with the Board of Education"--he submitted the petition to the board.[47]

The public outcry against corporal punishment was heightened further by noisy press coverage of a sensational case involving a student at the Boys' High School who had been severely beaten by a teacher after alledgedly drawing a knife in the classroom. The controversy between the boy's father and the teacher was heard by a committee of the school board over a period of weeks, and a number of columns appeared in the city's newspapers in which the opinions of prominent citizens on the "all-absorbing topic of the hour" were published.[48] These too demonstrated increasingly widespread opposition to the practice, but the Grievance Committee of the school board nevertheless ruled in favor of the teachers, and a measure introduced by Mayor Collier to abolish corporal punishment in the school system was defeated by a board vote of twelve to four.[49] Speaking for the majority, D. A. Beattie asserted:

> This movement is all nonsense. They don't do half enough whipping in the schools now, and it's foolish to talk about stopping it altogether.[50]

The day after the vote was taken the city council voted to abolish the school board, and among the first actions of the newly-appointed board were the prohibition of corporal punishment in the Boy's High School and the introduction of strict regulations governing its application in the city's elementary schools.

The Political Consequence of Reform

In further contrast with the class-conflict model of educational reform, the restructuring of the Atlanta school board was engineered not by a civic elite intent upon seizing control of the public school system from the working class and its political allies, but rather by a coalition of groups within the civic elite, including Mayor Collier, who sought to exercise greater political control over the schools. The effect of school reform in Atlanta was thus to shift power over the educational system out of the hands of the traditional civic elite and into the hands of somewhat less prestigious men, including professional politicians and men with ties to the local labor movement.

The public response to the change in boards makes this apparent. The Atlanta Journal, formally allied with the English faction in city politics, greeted the change with equanimity despite the key role played by the Brotherton faction. The editor's "progressive" sympathies and his ties with Mayor Collier, who had instigated the reform movement, offset concern about the introduction of politics into the public school system. In contrast, the Atlanta Constitution expressed violent outrage at the council's action, despite its recent affiliation with the Brotherton faction, because its editors had traditionally close ties with the conservative elites who had predominated on the "exterminated" board.[51] The Constitution devoted considerable attention to a mass meeting held on Saturday, May 29, which denounced the council's "illegal, revolutionary, despotic, and dangerous" action and attacked "the ring controlling our city government." The paper also published editorials which condemned the "odious conspiracy" which had planned the "extermination" of the school board and the "Star-Chamber procedure" through which it had been carried out.[52] While the Constitution called upon the citizens of Atlanta to rise up and force the council to rescind its action, the Journal declared that the response to the council's "coup" had for the most part been "of a pacific nature," and otherwise refrained from editorial comment.[53]

The members of the newly-appointed school board met the morning after their sudden election, and drafted a letter in which they called upon the council to reinstate the old board and find a more peaceful and less offensive method of accomplishing its goals for the school system. At the same time, however, the members of the new board expressed their gratification at having been appointed, and they ratified the council's right to do as it saw fit in the matter:

> No fairminded citizen can question the zeal, fidelity, and courage with which you are discharging the duties which the votes of your fellow citizens placed upon you.[54]

In response to the public uproar, three of the new board members who had especially close ties to the old board and the city's traditional elite declined to serve, but replacements were quickly elected by the city council.[55] After a meeting with Mayor Collier the following Monday, the members of the new board were duly sworn into office, and they held their first meeting that afternoon. In the familiar cadence of reformers, they proclaimed,

> We believe it to be true that the strongest thinkers upon the subject of municipal public school advocate boards of education composed of a small number of members.[56]

With the new board in place, both Atlanta newspapers urged resignation to the new dispensation. The Atlanta Journal was especially sanguine:

> The matter so unexpectedly precipated has been settled in the best way possible for the time being and in the way that will result in the least possible harm to the schools.[57]

The Constitution contented itself with a call for the passage of an amendment to the city charter which would forbid the city council from removing school board members from office before the expiration of their terms. This proposal received the endorsement of the Journal and of Mayor Collier, and such an amendment was passed by the legislature the following December.[58]

The new members of the board differed but little from their immediate predecessors. A longer view, however, shows that the 1897 change in boards ushered a new era in Atlanta school politics. After the change, the school board was no longer controlled by the city's traditional social and economic elites, but by men of substantially lesser prestige, as can be seen in Table VI-5. Members were appointed to shorter terms, and they remained on the board for shorter periods than their predecessors had done. The average term of board members prior to 1897 was just over four years. In addition, members were appointed by wards after 1897, and they were chosen more for their political connections and sensitivity toward concerns than for their prominence in the city as a whole, as had been the case in the earlier period. While the old school board had been dominated by members of the civic elite, the new board was dominated by lawyers and minor politicians, and included representatives from a variety of interest groups, including organized labor.[59] Thus, in further contrast to the reform movements described in the literature informed by the class-conflict model, the political changes which accompanied the reform of the Atlanta public school system removed the city's traditional "downtown" elite from power over the school system and replaced them with men of lesser status and more particularistic, ward-based concerns, thereby increasing the political responsiveness of the educational system. Whereas in New York, Saint Louis, and other cities reformers ostensibly worked to "get the schools out of politics," in Atlanta reformers accomplished the opposite result, and the schools became more closely integrated with the other institutions of city government.

While speculation as to the causes of the council's "astounding coup" was rampant in the midst of the controversy, two major viewpoints quickly emerged. Mayor Collier, as spokesman for the "combine" which

TABLE VI-5
Social Composition Of Atlanta School Board, 1872-1918

Occupation	1872-1897		1897-1918	
	Members	Board Years	Members	Board Years
Bank and corporation presidents	20%	31%	--	--
Lawyers	29	24	36%	43%
Other professionals	16	15	7	7
Other bank and corporation officials	11	6	18	18
Realtors and insurance men	5	5	20	16
Proprietors	18	20	13	11
Employees	--	--	4	5
Unknown	--	--	2	1
Total	99% (44)	101% (347)	100% (45)	100% (184)

SOURCE: Atlanta, City Directories, 1872-1918.

NOTE: Totals may not add to 100% because of rounding.

252

had carried out the reform, asserted that the council had acted only in order to make the administration of the schools more efficient:

> There is no significance to the movement except that the board was too large and we thought to cut it down. None of the old members were re-elected because we did not want to offend half of them by leaving them off.[60]

This explanation satisfied the Atlanta Journal, which stated:

> The real meaning of the present action . . . is that the mayor and the general council think the present board of education is organized on a wrong principle, and have taken the foregoing method of bringing about a change.[61]

In addition, the Journal reminded its readers of the recent disputes over the questions of teacher salaries and corporal punishment, and even suggested that "the entire school system of the city may be revolutionized by this change of boards."[62]

If the Mayor and his allies explained the changes largely in terms of improving the efficiency and accountability of Atlanta's schools, the Constitution took a much more narrowly political view of the council's action, asserting that the restructuring of the school board meant the end of the political independence of the public school system:

> The most vicious feature connected with it . . . is the fact tht it throws our entire public school system into the very center of the whirlpool of political agitation. . . . At any hour of the day or night--expecially night--it may become the victim of some political combination and suffer the deadliest results of secret deals, jobs, and manipulations.[63]

These fears were quieted somewhat by Mayor Collier's endorsement of the proposal to amend the city charter to protect the future independence of the school board, and they were quieted even further by the protestation of the new board members that they consented to serve only to safeguard the continued well-being of the school system and to ensure that the schools were not disrupted by the surprising events of the past week. The conservatism of the new board was emphasized by acting president Howard Van Epps:

> I smell no smoke of revolution. I believe the new board will prove as conservative as the old board had shown itself to be . . . . We have no object in view save the public good.[64]

He was seconded in this view by Hoke Smith, who was to dominate the new school board as Joseph E. Brown had dominated the old:

> I wish to act with an extreme degree of conservatism. I believe it would be unwise and injurious to inaugurate any radical changes. I remain on the board temporarily only with the intent to prevent, as far as possible, any change in the schools calculated to jar or in any way injure the schools.[65]

Reassured, the Constitution conceded that the new board members were all conservative and respectable men who would no doubt administer the schools as independently and wisely as had their predecessors. Conclusive evidence of the conservatism of the new school board was provided when the board re-elected W. F. Slaton to the office of Superintendent. Slaton had filled the post since 1879, and he had generally sided with the old board of education in its disputes with the mayor and council. Despite his skepticism toward educational innovations, he endorsed the reforms which had been carried out by the new board, and he continued to serve as Superintendent of the Atlanta public school system until 1907, when he was replaced by his son.[66]

The competing explanations of the Atlanta school reform offered by the participants in the dispute were both partially correct. The narrowly political causes of the reform were the conflicts which had arisen between the city council and the school board in the mid-1890s. These were brought on by the apparent unwillingness of the members of the school board to abolish corporal punishment, adopt curricular innovations, or modernize school administration, despite the demands of the Mayor and other politically influential citizens. In addition, the board's resistance to Mayor Collier's efforts to put the school system on a "sound business basis" through cuts in teacher salaries and other economy measures was intolerable to the Mayor and the city council, especially in light of the ongoing national depression and the recent reduction in the city's anticipated revenues. The intractability of the board and the persistence of these conflicts caused the Mayor to replace the sitting board members with men more closely attuned to his own political principles.

But if immediate political conflicts triggered the change, broader pressures for efficiency and modernization in education provided the context within which particular political circumstances could engender large-scale organizational consequences. Mayor Collier and other members of the "combine" which engineered the reform of the school system--especially Hoke Smith--were self-conscious advocates of a modern, industrialized, and prosperous "New South," with Atlanta as its regional capital, and they worked throughout their lives to bring their vision into reality. They were cognizant of contemporaneous reform movements in other cities, and aware of the ideas of educational experts and reformers elsewhere. Dedicated to the modernization of their region, they were alive to the contributions which a modern, reformed school system could make to the development of Atlanta and the South, and they chafed at the obstacle to development posed by the traditional, inefficient organization of the public school system and the domination of the system by the city's older civic elite. The city had grown beyond the point at which it could be well-served by the older system of public education, and the school system had grown beyond the point at which it could adapt to the needs of the growing city under its traditional mode of organization and administration. Recognizing the political opportunity presented by the conflict between the school board and the city council, the Mayor acted in 1897 to implement administrative and organizational changes which made the public school system more responsive to the changing economic and political circumstances of Atlanta and the South.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have shown that the Atlanta school reform is described only poorly by a class-conflict model of urban reform. Despite the temporal coincidence of the Atlanta reform with similar movements elsewhere, and the parallels between many of the Atlanta innovations and those carried out in other cities, we have shown that the changes in Atlanta were not carried out against the opposition of a locally-oriented working class, as was apparently the case in some other cities. Instead, the Atlanta reforms were brought about by a younger faction of the city's elite which was dominated by professional men and concerned with the modernization and development of the city and the region. Reforms were carried out at the expense of precisely the sort of economic and political elites whose interests were supposedly so well served by the reformer in other cities. As opposed to the shift in power from ward politicians to city-wide elites and educational experts which occurred elsewhere, the Atlanta reforms resulted in a shift of power from the city's traditional civic elite to men of lesser status who were better attuned to the demands of ward and patronage politics. While the working class was not a visible participant in the reform movement, either in support or in opposition, the faction ordinarily supported by the city's labor movement was the one which engineered the reform.

Clearly, the political process through which educational reform was carried out in Atlanta in 1897 was distinctly different from the contemporaneous political processes which brought reform to the public school systems of New York, Philadelphia, Saint Louis, and other cities; and many of the political consequences of reform elsewhere. The overwhelming political significance of the racial division in the southern population and the persistence in power of a conservative, paternalistic, "Bourbon" elite established a context in which urban politics in the South was very different from urban politics in the North, and southern movements for reform took dramatically different courses from their northern counterparts. The absence of a large immigrant population, the political weakness of the white working class, and the importance universally assigned by whites to the maintenance of white supremacy and black exclusion created a political environment in the South in which educational reform was necessarily sponsored by different groups and directed to different ends than was often the case in the North.

At a minimum, this finding suggests that the utility of the class-conflict model of education reform is limited to those large cities of the industrialized North which shared a number of economic and political attributes, including a sizable immigrant population and a large and politically-organized working class. The general applicability claimed by some of the bolder proponents of the class-conflict model of reform is thus shown to be unwarranted: the political process of educational reform was constrained by the political environment within which reform took place, and divergent political contexts generated dissimilar movements for reform.

At the same time, the similarities between the Atlanta school reform and reform movements in other cities are as significant as the differences between them. In spite of the marked contrasts between the political processes of reform in Atlanta and elsewhere, the content of the reforms which were implemented in various urban school systems was essentially the same. The size of the school board and the number of board committees were reduced, and administrative power over the school system was centralized in the office of the Superintendent and his staff. The curriculum was modernized, and manual training and other vocationally-oriented courses were added to the offerings of elementary and secondary schools.

The fact that practically identical reforms were implemented in Atlanta and in a number of northern cities, despite dramatic differences in the political contexts in which reform movements were successful, represents an anomaly which the class-conflict model cannot explain. According to the model, conflicting class interests generate political controversy between two social classes, and the dominant social class secures a policy outcome favorable to its interests. But if the same policy consequences occur in all cities, whether reform is opposed by conservative elites or by organized workers, then in what sense can the policy reforms in any context be attributable to class-based political conflict? If progressive educational reform came about as a result of the victory of economic and social elites over working-class groups and organizations, then why did reform occur where no such class struggle was visible? If Y was a function of X in northern cities, then how could Y have occurred in Atlanta in the absence of X?

There are two possible responses to this question. The first suggests that the political processes through which reform occurred in particular cities were essentially epiphenomenal. The changes which were implemented in school organization in the late nineteenth century were required by contemporaneous socio-economic changes in American society. The explosive growth of urban populations, the rapid expansion and diversification of urban economies, and the increasing complexity of urban social relationships, common to all regions at the turn of the century, imposed rapidly rising enrollments and a broader range of social responsibilities upon big-city school systems. As these systems grew larger and undertook to provide a new and diverse array of services, their management became increasingly complex. Organizations which once had been directed by a small group of part-time lay board members now required the full-time attention of a highly-trained professional staff.

Although this functional argument is persuasive in many ways, it is theoretically problematic to identify the "causes" of a structural arrangement with its functions or "consequences." No matter how beneficent a social institution may be, the desirable consequences of its presence cannot constitute an explanation for the structure's coming into being.[67] Therefore, a second, more persuasive explanation, identifies a strong social group with an interest in urban educational reform. Because it distinguishes a pattern of social interactions more complex than that suggested by the bipolarities of class conflict, it can resolve the apparent contradiction between the political processes of reform in Atlanta and in the cities of the industrialized North.

The difficulty with the class-conflict model is that it reduces complex, multi-party political contests to simple two-sided disputes. Even in northern cities, as we shall see, debates over urban reform involved Protestants, Catholics, teachers, administrators, businessmen, professionals, and politicians, as well as workers and social elites. Especially important was the emerging autonomous role of middle class professionals, who may have introduced urban educational reform for their own distinctive reasons. In class-conflict models the interests of middle class professionals are treated as almost synonomous with those of the business community, yet campaigns for urban reform pitted middle class professional groups against business elites as often as they divided the middle class from labor unions and other working class organizations. Especially important was the emerging autonomous role of middle class professionals, who may have introduced urban educational reform for their own distinctive reasons.

As urbanization and industrialization progressed in the late nineteenth century, these processes generated an increasing demand for a wide variety of professional services, including those provided by lawyers, doctors, social scientists, journalists, social workers, teachers, and public administrators. Professional associations represented the interests of these and many other emerging occupations with increasing effectiveness. In addition, many professionals felt confident enough of their growing social esteem to argue that public policy was an arena for professional expertise, scientific administration, and the exercise of high levels of technical proficiency. While those offering class-conflict interpretations of urban reform have emphasized the differences between these middle-class values and interests and those of working-class, immigrant groups, few have appreciated the simultaneous challenge which these professionals offered to businessmen skeptical of any claim to expertise that was not market-tested, and wary of the likely costs of a new array of professionally-administered public services. The more politically sophisticated leaders of the emerging professional class understood their role to be located mid-way between the interests of capital and labor. If they felt unions were often too self-interested, they were at least equally alarmed at the increasing concentration of power in the business community. Their effort to reduce politics to administration was inspired in part by a desire to rationalize and subject to scientific scrutiny what had previously been decided by campaign rhetoric and political muscle.

Progressive educational reform is difficult to classify in class categories simply because the innovations which were implemented had been designed by a social group which saw itself standing apart from class-based controversies. Administrative efficiency, curricular modernization, and reliance on professional expertise were politics that were essential if urban school systems were to function effectively in the emerging economic and social order, and most reformers felt that they were without substantive class content. While the understanding of the reformers was in some ways myopic--in their public rhetoric, for example, they seldom mentioned the new jobs for professionals that would be required by their proposals--they nevertheless correctly understood that opposition to their suggestions came as often from business as from labor. In Atlanta the principal opposition came from traditional social and economic elites who, like machine politicians in the North, wished to protect the institutional arrangements which ensured their power and privilege. If the political conflict over urban reform is understood as at the very least a three-party controversy, and not just as a bi-polar confrontation between business leaders and the working class, then the apparent differences between northern and southern reform movements can be readily reconciled.

There remains the question of the effect of reform on school expenditures in Atlanta. Reform here (but not in Chicago or San Francisco) meant not just organizational and administrative modernization, but severe cutbacks in the level of school services provided to the children of the city. Was this reform effort a sign of business hostility to the increasingly widespread popular demand for public schooling, which at the time expressed itself in overcrowded classrooms and, in the black community, in continuous, organized efforts to gain better facilities? Was all the reformers' talk about efficiency simply a disguise for a conservative, business-oriented concern with the rising costs of public education?

The issue is in fact more complex than it at first appears. At the time of the 1897 reforms, Atlanta and most other American cities were in the midst of a nationwide depression, which forced service reductions and economy measures in all sectors of society, both public and private, and these were necessarily implemented in the public school system as well. In subsequent years of reform rule, as prosperity returned to the city and the nation, Atlanta's school expenditures regained and then surpassed previous levels.[68] Tables VI-3 and VI-4 show that for white students at least, and to a lesser extent for blacks, reform resulted in reduced class sizes and increased levels of expenditures per pupil after the turn of the century. The penuriousness of Atlanta's reform thus proved to be among its least enduring consequences.

Advocates of the class-conflict model of urban educational reform have argued that the reform movements which transformed many big-city school systems around the turn of the century not only reflected the values and interests of social and economic elites but were hostile to the values and interests of the poor and working classes. On the basis of our analysis of the Atlanta experience with educational reform, we have argued instead that many of these reforms were seen as functional requisites for the maintenance of rapidly growing, increasingly complex educational organizations. Moreover, they were designed and implemented by middle-class professionals who were as antagonistic toward traditional business elites as they were toward working class groups. Indeed, in Atlanta, the substance of educational reform embodied no discernible class content at all.

Footnotes

1. Atlanta *Journal*, 28 May 1897; Atlanta *Constitution*, 29 May 1897.

2. Atlanta *Constitution*, 29 May 1897.

3. Atlanta *Constitution*, 30 May 1897.

4. Atlanta *Journal*, 31 May 1897; Atlanta *Constitution*, 1 June 1897.

5. A classic statement of the class-conflict model together with a valuable summary of the literature can be found in Banfield and Wilson, 1963. Other important contributions include Burnham, 1970; Holli, 1969; Hayes, 1972; Merton, 1957; Hawley, 1973; Hofstadter, 1955; Mowry, 1951; Hays, 1964; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Shefter, 1977; Kolko, 1963; Chambers and Burnham, 1967; Wiebe, 1962 and 1967.

   A critique of the class-conflict model and some compelling negative evidence are provided in Wolfinger and Field, 1966, pp. 306-326.

6. Within this general consensus on the sources and consequences of urban reform there is, of course a good deal of variability in interpretation. For some analysts, including Hofstadter and Lazerson, reform movements represent a reactionary effort by a declining social elite to retrieve some of the presumed moral virtues and social harmony of a rural past. For other analysts, notably Wiebe, reform is an effort by a rising middle-class to stabilize conflicts between big business and big labor. For still others, reform is the mechanism chosen by monopoly capitalists to depoliticize the working class, thereby making possible a level of capital accumulation necessary to finance ongoing industrialization. Nevertheless, all of these perspectives interpret urban reform in basically class-conflict categories: in nearly all the major accounts working-class groups are perceived to be the "victims" of reform movements sponsored by middle and upper class groups.

7. Among the many studies which deal with school reform, the following are of particular interest: Katz, 1971; Katz, 1968; Tyack, 1974; Cronin, 1973; Salisbury, 1970; Callahan, 1962; Ziegler, Jennings and Peak, 1974; Lazerson, 1971; Greer, 1976; Bowles and Gintis, 1976.

8. Katz, 1971, pp. 115-16.

9. Tyack, 1974, p. 128.

10. Deaton, 1969, pp. 82-83.

11. Cooper, 1896, passim and especially p. 13; Grady, 1890, passim; Martin, 1902, pp. 645-46; Southern Historical Association, 1895, p. 750; Cooper, 1934, pp. 853-54.

12. Grantham, 1958, pp. 25-26, 29-31; Urban, 1978, pp. 4-7; Southern Historical Association, 1895, p. 937; and Cooper, 1934, pp. 44-46.

13. Atlanta Journal, 28 August 1896.

14. Atlanta Journal, 6 February 1897.

15. Atlanta Journal, 28 January 1897.

16. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 15 February 1897.

17. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Report (1897) pp. 12, 18. Atlanta Journal, 28 January 1897.

18. Atlanta Journal, 28 January 1897.

19. Atlanta Journal, 1 February 1897.

20. Atlanta Board of Education Minutes, 15 February 1897; Atlanta Board of Education Annual Report, 1899, p. 22.

21. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Report, 1898, p. 14.

22. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Reports, for the years 1896-1910.

23. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Report 1898, pp. 82-104. A full list of the new rules governing the public school system is presented in the 1898 Report. Also Ecke, 1972, pp. 55-56, provides a summary of the most important changes made by the new board.

24. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Report, 1898, p. 14.

25. Atlanta Board of Education Annual Report, 1900, p. 21.

26. Watts, 1978, pp. 71-72, 74-76, and 160-164; Watts, 1974, pp. 282-85.

27. Watts, 1978, pp. 71-72, 74-76, and 160-164.

28. This consensus was maintained on very much the same terms into the middle of the twentieth century. See V. O. Key, 1949, Chapter 1 and especially pp. 5-9 for a discussion.

29. Atlanta Journal, 1 March 1897.

30. Atlanta Journal, 11 August 1896.

31. Atlanta *Journal*, 2 February 1897 and 19 February 1897. See also Watts, 1973; Jenkins, 1974, pp. 4-5; and especially Bolden, 1978, pp. 11-27 for an authoritative discussion of the factional split and its salience in Atlanta politics.

32. Atlanta *Journal*, 3 February 1897.

33. Atlanta *Journal*, 8-12 August 1896.

34. On the 1897 city council, for example, all five of the English partisans were mentioned in contemporary honorary biographies, while only one of the ten Brotherton representatives was mentioned.

35. Grantham, 1958, pp. 31-35 and 131-155; Bolden, 1978, pp. 64-65, and Appendices B and C, pp. 268, 270, and 273.

36. Atlanta *Constitution*, 29 August 1896.

37. Southern Historical Association, 1895, p. 937; Grantham, 1958, pp. 26-27; Bolden, 1978, p . 15 provides evidence of another tie between Smith and Collier.

38. For Grant, see Martin 1902, pp. 55, 657; Southern Historical Association, 1895, pp. 793-95; Cooper, 1896, pp. 858-59. For Bleckley, see Southern Historical Association, 1895, pp. 715-718; For Rawson, see Martin, 1902, pp. 693-694. For Inman, see Southern Historical Association, 1895, pp. 767-69; and Cooper, 1896, pp. 852-53.

39. Martin, 1902, pp. 633-37; Cooper, 1896, pp. 837-39; and Woodward, 1971, pp. 13-14.

40. Strickland, 1980, p. 4.

41. Racine, 1969, p. 11-12.

42. Strickland, 1980, pp. 5-14; Turner, 1979, passim; Racine, 1969, chapters 2 and 3.

43. Atlanta City Council *Minutes*, 19 April 1894.

44. Racine, 1969, pp. 81-91.

45. Strickland, 1980, pp. 11-13.

46. Atlanta *Journal*, 19 April 1897.

47. *Ibid*.

48. Atlanta *Journal*, 5 April 1897.

49. *Ibid*., 28 May 1897.

50. Ibid., 22 April 1897.

51. Atlanta Constitution, 30 May 1897 and 1 June 1897.

52. Ibid., 29 May 1897.

53. Ibid, 30 May 1897; Atlanta Journal, 29 May 1897.

54. Atlanta City Council Minutes, 29 May 1897.

55. Ibid. Among the three was ex-president W.S. Thomson, the sole member of the old board to be reappointed by the Mayor.

56. Ibid.

57. Atlanta Journal, 31 May 1897.

58. Atlanta Constitution, 1 June 1897; Atlanta Journal, 30 May 1897; Georgia State Legislature Legislative Report, 10 December 1897.

59. Information on the occupations and addresses of board members was obtained from the annual editions of the Atlanta City Directory, 1872-1918.

60. Atlanta Constitution, 29 May 1897.

61. Atlanta Journal, 28 May 1897.

62. Ibid.

63. Atlanta Constitution, 30 May 1897.

64. Atlanta Journal, 31 May 1897.

65. Ibid.

66. Atlanta Constitution, 15 June 1897; Racine, 1969, pp. 44-45, and 101.

67. In biology it is possible to argue that the "survival of the fittest" ensures the emergence of eufunctional properties, but only an extreme Social Darwinist would argue that competition among organizational structures is so intense that random change can in a short period yield functional structural innovations.

68. Moreover, Atlanta schools reforms in the 1910s and 1920s brought about major increases in per pupil expenditures.

Chapter VII

CLASS CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE REFORM

Reform in Atlanta meant the triumph of an emerging class of professionals over a traditional conservative elite. But because Atlanta lacked strong unions, active political machines, and an immigrant population, it is difficult to claim from the Atlanta story alone that the class-conflict model presents a distorted vision of school reform in urban America more generally. To elaborate our argument that reform was produced by a more plural set of forces, and that reformers were as often in alliance with labor as in opposition to its interests, it is important to examine the processes of reform in Chicago, a rapidly growing industrial city where class conflicts regularly erupted in school affairs. In that city the most important legislative effort designed to reform the schools was promulgated prior to World War II. This was the Otis Law, passed by the Illinois legislature in 1917, the year the United States entered World War I.

The Otis Law, with provisions which changed power relations between teachers, superintendents and the school board, was in many ways a classic school reform law. The office of the superintendent was strengthened by extending its term from one to four years, by giving it the power to initiate teacher hiring and firing, and by more clearly defining its responsibilities for the day-to-day administration of the system. The school board gained increased independence from the city council, including both a newly acquired power of eminent domain and the authority to buy and sell school lands. In addition, the board was given the power to borrow funds up to 75 percent of the taxes to be collected the following fiscal year. For the teachers there was more job security. Teachers were to be granted tenure after three years of service, with dismissal for cause only upon written charges. Teachers who were fired had recourse to a board investigation into the matter.

In spite of the scope of its provisions and the importance of its passage for the internal administrative reorganization of Chicago's schools, the Otis Law was not a "triumph" for school reformers. Rather it was a compromise law--a settlement reached after business leaders, working with machine politicians failed to pass a more conservative Baldwin bill in the face of opposition by middle-class school reformers, who had been working with teachers and labor groups on behalf of more sweeping reforms. As in all compromises, parties to the dispute settled for what was the most important to them. For the teachers that meant legally established tenure; to Mayor William "Big Bill" Thompson it meant continued control of the schools through an appointed board; and to the middle-class school reformers it meant increased responsibilities for the superintendent from whom improved administration was expected.

Compromise on the school law was necessitated by political events which had transpired in Chicago in the preceding two years. Thompson had been elected mayor in 1915 and his two year reign was a period when "the spoils system swept over the city like a noxious blight, and the city hall became a symbol for corruption and incompetence."[1] A solid faction of aldermen had begun to oppose every measure bearing the stamp of city hall, among them Charles Merriam from the University of Chicago's political science department and Robert Buck, a former labor reporter for the Chicago Tribune and the Daily News. When the council under the leadership of Buck began an investigation into relations between Thompson's administration and the school system, Thompson vowed to defeat Buck, Merriam and the other aldermen who opposed him in the 1917 municipal election. The campaign became extremely vitriolic, keeping supporters and opponents of school reform fighting for their political lives at home in Chicago. Both the reformers and the Thompson machine suffered enormous losses, with the regular Democrats emerging as the clear victors. With matters in Springfield not being attended to, and with America's involvement in the war softening passions on domestic issues, a compromise bill--the Otis bill--was passed by the legislature.

Pre-reform Politics

On Mayor Thompson's first inauguration day in April 1915, Fred Lundin, the mayor's campaign director and behind-the-scenes brain of his rise in politics, staged a massive Prosperity Day parade in Thompson's honor. The parade consisted of about fifty thousand marchers, three hundred fifty floats and six thousand automobiles. Education was depicted as an important part of the new administration by a little red school house, surrounded by children, and a float with several girls holding a banner, which read, "The Chicago Schools--We Teach the 3R's to 331,567 children."[2] In fact, under Big Bill's rule, education was to have a prominent place, but probably not the sort of prominence anticipated by the fanfare in Lundin's planned showcase. During Thompson's years in office, Chicago was witness to some of the most outrageous school controversies in the history of the United States, including a period when two different boards of education vied for authority; a time when board members were convicted of embezzling funds; a time when a superintendent was locked out of his office by the board; and an episode when Thompson absurdly accused a superintendent and the king of England of attempting to take over the schools of Chicago.[3]

Thompson's political history had not been particularly noteworthy before his ascendance to the mayoralty in 1915. He had served one term in the city council, had been elected a county commissioner in 1902; had supported Mayor Busse until a split developed in 1907 and had lost a bid in the primary of 1911 for a seat on the Cook County Board of Review. During these years Thompson had also developed close ties to Republican boss William Lorimer, the United States Senator who was voted out of office in 1912 for allegedly bribing his colleagues. Lorimer had suggested Thompson as a mayoral candidate as early as 1902, and again in 1905 and 1909, but each time Thompson refused.[4] Thompson did support Lorimer and worked with him in Republican politics, and helped support the Senator during the probe into the bribe allegations. Thompson was a co-founder and treasurer of the Republican Club of Illinois, and he also served in the Lincoln Protective League, formed to raise funds to protect Lorimer's name.[5] Indeed, it was through his activities with Lorimer that Thompson became acquainted with Fred Lundin.

Lundin had been associated with Lorimer since the 1890's, and had served as a state senator and United States Congressman. Although he had been defeated for re-election to Congress in 1910, he remained active in support of Lorimer and was the leader in movements to support his mentor's name. Lundin had been successful in his business pursuits and, both financially and with great political savvy, was able to support candidates of his choice. Following the elections of 1912, when the split between Theodore Roosevelt and Howard Taft allowed the election of Woodrow Wilson, state Republicans in Illinois were also split and went down in defeat. With Lorimer's troubles in the Senate, Lundin reasoned that a new personality was ready for emergence on the scene. Privately, Lundin told friends that "Big Bill" Thompson would be the next mayor of Chicago, a man whom he could "mold and guide and control."[6]

All during 1913 Lundin worked to put an organization together for Thompson. On the south side of Chicago, for example, he recruited Samuel Ettleson, a lawyer for utilities magnate Samuel Insull. Ettleson would become a state senator and eventually corporation counsel for "Big Bill." Lundin also labored to make Thompson as attractive a campaigner as possible. When Thompson publicly welcomed the support of the now disgraced Senator Lorimer, Lundin, who had worked so hard to build a machine without the taint of Lorimer's name, was horrified. He told Thompson, "From now on you don't make speeches unless I know about them and write them for you. We can't take chances." Still unsure of his political skills, Thompson is said to have replied,"You know best, Congressman."[7]

To secure victory, Thompson had both to defeat Judge Harry Olson in the Republican primary and Robert Sweitzer, the Democratic challenger who had overcome incumbent Mayor Carter Harrison. In both campaigns Thompson was the candidate reformers feared the most. Although Thompson assured the public "that I would not, if nominated and elected, use the power of the mayor's office to build up political machines," reform leaders knew better. In the primary Charles Merriam, Robert Buck and Jane Addams all backed Judge Olson, railing at Thompson's record while on the city council. Buck was particularly incensed at Thompson's support of a bill that had been stoutly opposed by the Municipal Voters' League, saying "the boodlers lined up solidly. Party bosses cajoled. The ordinance passed.... This is the most serious blot upon the council of 1900-1902."[8] But the reformers were better at decrying corruption than corralling votes, and Thompson overwhelmed both Olson in the primary and Sweitzer in the general election.

The public schools figured in the election in several ways. First, Thompson, knowing the increasing size and popularity of the city's schools, campaigned as its greatest supporter. Anticipating that the schools issue would help gain votes from newly enfranchised women, he promised to "put a mother on the board of education."[9] He also promised to remove corruption from the schools and provide them with good business administration. But, secondly, Thompson also used the schools issue as part of his campaign against his opponents. Quite unfairly he accused Judge Olson, who was married to a Catholic, as being committed to destroying deliberately the public school system.[10] The same changes were made in the general election against Sweitzer, who was himself a Catholic. A quasi-secret organization known as the Guardians of Liberty took a militantly Protestant position in the campaign. Their chronicle, The Illinois Guardian, supported Thompson because of his stand for the efficiency of the public schools, and warned that Sweitzer, a Catholic, couldn't support the public schools because his church was the schools' sworn enemy.[11] Lundin, aware that a rough campaign was necessary, had thousands of pamphlets mailed out during the last week of the campaign, detailing Sweitzer's Catholic affiliations and his high rank in the Knights of Columbus.[12] As the campaign got more bitter, Thompson got stronger. He won in a landslide.

Thompson lived up to the worst fears of Chicago's reformers. He handed Lundin the city payroll, told him to "play with it," and both the city cabinet and city payroll were taken over by Thompson's and Lundin's loyal troops. The merit rule was pushed aside, and temporary but indefinitely renewable appointments were made. Within four months of election, nearly ten thousand temporary appointments were made. The two politicians also used the device of eliminating a specific job and incumbent, only to create a newly-titled position for a more loyal job

270

holder. Commenting on the new appointments, the city papers denounced Thompson as having "a low sense of responsibility," of "betraying the public trust," of having "reverted to his previous self."[13]

Throughout the first two Thompson years, newspapers continued to publishing charges of widespread corruption and patronage abuse. In June, 1916, the Daily News summarized city hall's record:

> --The head and other members of the efficiency division of the civil service commission were removed. Their places were filled with temporary appointees. This action was denounced as illegal by the Civil Service Reform Association, and on December 27, 1915, the Circuit Court ruled that the head of the division's removal was illegal.
>
> --Removal of the Superintendent of the Bureau of Social Surveys in the Department of Public Welfare was also held to be illegal by a court. His discharge bore on its face the memorandum, "this is in accordance with instructions from Mayor Thompson."
>
> --In December of 1915, the city council by a vote of forty-four to twenty, adopted a resolution that the head of the Bureau of Boiler Inspection--a Thompson appointee--"did violate the civil service law of the state of Illinois governing cities," and recommended his discharge.
>
> --A Thompson political aide was put in the position of Superintendent of Streets via means of repeated sixty day appointments. Meanwhile, no civil service examination was held to fill the place and no examination was even called.[14]

Apart from the newspapers, Thompson's chief opposition came from the group of reform-minded alderman. Quite shrewdly, they concentrated their attack on Thompson by calling to the public's attention his attempt to use the schools for patronage purposes. The reformers seemed to believe that even if the public accepted patronage and corruption in most quarters, there was at least a chance they would rebel at the thought that their children's welfare was being jeopardized for political purposes. Their first attack on Thompson thus focused on his nominees to the Board of Education, who were criticized for not having the necessary educational and residential qualifications. So successful was this counterpunch that they were able to get all but one of Thompson's initial nominees disqualified.[15]

But the conflict over nominees to the school board was only the beginning of the battle between Thompson and the reformers over the Chicago schools. In the ensuing two years the school board would fire union activists; the reformers, in alliance with teachers and labor leaders would call for sweeping governance reforms; the machine-backed mayor and his business allies would counter-attack with their own so-called reforms; and the Otis compromise would eventually become law.

Reformers Respond to the Union-Busting Tactics of the Chicago School Board

While Buck and his allies resisted Thompson's appointees to the school board, eventually the mayor prevailed and Chicago witnessed a full-scale, direct attack on public school unionism. The Board of Education began its campaign in January 1916 by announcing that an impending school deficit could be avoided only by cutting teacher salaries 7 1/2 percent. When the Chicago Teachers Federation (CTF) mounted a city-wide counter-attack to safeguard salaries, the board countered by challenging the educational commitments of the teacher's union, claiming they were putting their salaries ahead of the welfare of the schools. A state Senate committee, chaired by Perceval Baldwin, undertook an investigation of the Chicago public schools apparently at the behest of the Thompson organization, and the committee's attorney found that the CTF's ideals were "salaries first, increases second and the schools very last."[16]

Inspired by these Senate committee findings, Jacob Loeb, chair of the school board's Committee on Rules, presented a resolution forbidding teachers to hold membership in organizations affiliated with labor unions. The Board of Education adopted the rule by an eleven to nine vote. Known as Loeb Rule 1, the rule was aimed at the CTF, although the Principals Club and other groups also fell under its influence. Loeb went out of his way to say publicly that he did not mean the Principal's Club, and that the CTF was his target.[17] It was his claim that "a union in the public schools was intolerable."[18]

272

Response to passage of the rule was vociferous and came quickly. However, in spite of public outcry and in spite of court injunctions temporarily restraining the Loeb Rule, matters worsened for the teachers. Jacob Loeb was elected board president. He now promoted the passage of rules which permitted him to dismiss teachers he opposed. The board had been operating since the 1890s under state laws which called for teacher appointment on a yearly basis. Yet, the board had its own established informal "meritous service" rules, which set up a tenure system that provided for an examination, a four month trial, a three year probation and then tenure. Loeb's new rule made all teaching positions elective at the end of each year by the board. Loeb's intentions became obvious to all when he presented to the board a list of teachers to be dropped; thirty-eight out of the sixty-eight eventually dismissed were CTF members, including nearly every officer of the CTF--the president, the secretaries, the treasurer, the organizer, the vice-presidents, and four members of the board. The list also included Margaret Haley's sister. Passage of the Loeb rules and dismissal of the sixty-eight teachers sparked an uproar in the city, in spite of the mayor's contention that the rule was intended to increase efficiency of the staff. Since all of the CTF members had been graded good or excellent by their superiors,[19] it was clear that the board's decision was an anti-union policy.

Those who came out in favor of the Loeb rules spoke of the need for efficiency in operation of the schools and expressed anti-union sentiments. A group of Methodist ministers, for example, said that the "old rule made it possible for inefficiency to become entrenched," while a businessman's magazine argued that the Loeb activity was designed, "to save the schools from the labor politicians, by discharging teachers who held labor union team work of more importance than public school class work.[20] Indeed, a group of leading businessmen from the Illinois Manufacturers Association, who supported the Loeb rules, organized the Public School League (PSL) in the fall of 1917 with the understanding that, "any efforts to improve materially the conditions now existing in the public schools of Chicago must be based on the elimination of the CTF and its politico-labor activists."[21]

Meanwhile, reformers around the country came out against the Loeb rules. The American School, a journal for educational administrators, criticized the rule because the discharge was done by a businessman, not a schoolman. The New Republic attacked Loeb for making himself the spokesman for "the least enlightened and least intelligent section of the manufacturing and commercial class in the country which makes the destruction of unionism its chief aim and glory." Assistant Superintendent McAndrews of New York, at an American Federation of Teachers convention, called the act, "tragic" and "stupid."[22] In Chicago, reform groups, including the City Club, Women's Club, CFL, Hull House, PTA's and others were aroused to action against the school board rule. A large group of these reformers came together at a mass meeting in June to form the Public Education Association (PEA). At this mass gathering, one of the principle speakers was Alderman Buck, who reminded the audience of 4,000 that the Board of Education had a direct connection to the visible government of Chicago, and that the purpose behind the rules was, "to make the jobs of the teachers political spoils, to crack the whip over the teachers and tell them which way they shall jump politically in order to save their jobs."[23]

This was neither the first nor the last time Alderman Buck and his reform allies would rush to the defense of the teachers. When the 7 1/2 percent salary cut had been proposed, Buck had demanded full and complete access to books of the Board of Education in order to determine how the board's management of money had caused the crisis. Not surprisingly, the board rejected the demand,[24] but Buck then instituted court proceedings to force the board to open its records. Throughout this controversy the City Club, the Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL) and the Chicago Women's Club joined Buck in pressing the teacher's case.[25]

As the issue ripened and the salary dispute turned into an ugly anti-union drive, Buck took stronger measures. As chairman of a subcommittee of the City Council Committee on Schools, Fire, Police and Civil Service, Buck was in a position to carry out his own investigation. In Buck's words, "not even the peril of political death" would prevent him from getting to the bottom of the ousting of the

274

teachers."[26] The work of the council committee was supported by the CTF, the CFL and a variety of other reform groups including the PEA. University of Chicago professors George Mead and Charles Judd, both PEA members, would eventually assist Buck in selecting experts to appear before the committee. The committee heard from past board members, present board members including Jacob Loeb, the board secretary, Victory Olander of the CFL, Mrs. Haley and Meyer Stein, the attorney for the Baldwin Commission. Education experts from around the country who were also invited to appear included Superintendent William H. Maxwell of New York City, Superintendent Blewett of Saint Louis, Superintendent Spaulding of Minneapolis, Superintendent Chadsey of Detroit, Leonard Ayres of the Russell Sage Foundation and Dr. Charles Judd of the University of Chicago.[27] Others included President Charles Eliot of Harvard, Ella Flagg Young, John Dewey, Ellwood Cubberley of Stanford and Professor Roman of Syracuse University.[28] The committee list produced an all-star cast of educational reformers.

The Buck committee was so clearly the major vehicle for educational reformers that it encountered the stiffest possible resistance from the mayor and his machine allies. The Board of Education was adamant in its disapproval of the committee's work. Under the leadership of President Loeb, who argued that the council had no right to investigate school matters, the board voted once again to deny the subcommittee access to its records and passed a motion appointing a committee of its own to consider the advisability of the board making its own educational survey. Four of this committee's five members were Loeb supporters who had favored the ousting of the sixty-eight teachers. Although these actions certainly had Mayor Thompson's blessings, the mayor himself was silent during the early weeks of the controversy. According to one source, the mayor wasn't about to comment openly because such overt activity had hurt previous mayors.[29] Yet there can be little doubt that Thompson backed Loeb's efforts. For one thing, one of his close supporters, Morton MacCormac, the newly appointed statistician for the schools, was said to be urging the dismissal of all CTF, Catholic and anti-Thompson teachers.[30]

When the Buck report finally came out, it was clearly a statement of the goals and objectives of the Chicago school reformers. The report was written by one of the city's leading reformers, who had been actively supported by most, if not all, of the city's reform organizations. Moreover, Buck had all but sacrificed his political career by frontally attacking the Thompson machine, which had recently won an electoral landslide. The report, influenced by the testimony of leading educational reformers from across the country, received the endorsement of the CTF, the Chicago Federation of Labor, the Illinois Federation of Women's Clubs, PTAs and numerous other clubs and reform-minded organizations. Finally, the committee was treated hostilely by Thompson's political allies.

The Buck report listed twelve findings concerning the operation of the public schools, concluding with recommendations for reorganization. Not surprisingly, many of the recommendations were directed at removing the influence of the mayor and other city politicians from schools, enhancing teacher rights and status, and putting checks on the conduct of the board. The Committee recommended an elected school board, thereby putting an end to direct mayoral influence. The number of board members was to be reduced from twenty-one to seven, to be elected on a non-partisan basis and salaried for six-year terms. Teachers were to be initially appointed for three one year terms as a probationary period after which they could be removed only for cause. Dismissal could occur only after notice had been given, the teacher had had an opportunity to improve, and a full hearing had been held. The Committee also recommended teacher councils, a standard salary schedule, and some means of measuring teacher efficiency. The superintendent, who was to assume complete authority (under the board) over the entire system, was to have the power to appoint and dismiss teachers. Finally, the board, whose powers were specifically enumerated, was urged to spend more time on general policy and less on specific details. All powers of the board were to be exercised at public meetings, and records of the system were to be made public. It was suggested that standing committees, where Loeb had conducted much of his activity, be abolished. The report concluded that any bill or bills submitted to the city council for its approval also provide for a referendum by the people of Chicago.[31]

The recommendations, while drawing on the advice of the experts, strongly reflected Alderman Buck's ideas. Power was to be taken away from the mayor, and the operation and records of the board were to be open to public scrutiny. The influence of Haley and the CTF is seen in the tenure provision for teachers and the call for teacher councils and a single salary schedule. The measure also contained a commitment to enhancing the independence and authority of a professional superintendent, an innovation that received broad reform backing both within and without the city. On February 21, 1917 a bill encompassing all the recommendations was introduced into the Illinois House of Representatives.[32]

The Content of the School Reform Bills

The Buck committee investigation so agitated Chicago school politics that the legislative recommendations based on its investigation could not simply be ignored. The Thompson forces thus countered with their own version of reform known as the Baldwin bill. Senator Baldwin, it may be recalled, had chaired the Senate committee that had investigated the CTF. Working together with the Public Service League, the business-backed organization that had been formed to eliminate unionism in the schools, Baldwin proposed to change the governing arrangements in order to give the board more financial autonomy. This he did by providing the board the power to sell school property. However, in all other key respects the Baldwin bill kept existing arrangements intact. In other words, the Baldwin plan was essentially a defense of the status quo.

A third bill, and the one which eventually became a law, was sponsored by Ralph Otis of the school board. As befits the framer of compromise legislation, Otis was not identified strongly with either side to the dispute nor did he play an active role in any of the public debates or forums. He had originally been an ally of Jacob Loeb, but he became disturbed when the school board, at Loeb's urging, passed a law (by an eleven to six vote) providing for annual review of teacher employment. When the annual review culminated in the removal of the sixty-eight teachers, and when board members were not granted a postponement of the decision to review the list, Otis and several other board members understood Loeb's ulterior motives. Said Otis, "It makes it possible, if not everybody connected with the board is honest, to remove teachers without notice."[33] In his view, Loeb, Thompson, and the anti-union forces had simply gone too far. But since he was no ally of Buck's, Otis arranged for a third reform bill to be included on the legislative agenda.

It is worth comparing the Otis bill, which passed the legislature, to the Buck bill, which had strong reform backing. As can be seen in Table VII-1, both pieces of legislation reduced the size of the board, both gave the superintendent an increased role in teacher recruitment, both extended the length of the superintendent's contract, and both limited the board's power to dismiss teachers. However, the Otis Law failed to give the superintendent authority over the school system's business manager, failed to provide many procedural safeguards for teachers, left the final power of teacher appointment in the hands of the school board, and continued the tradition of a board appointed by the mayor. Moreover, it gave the board authority to sell school lands and to borrow money in anticipation of taxes to be paid, changes sought by Thompson and his machine allies. In short, the Otis Law was both less supportive of a professional superintendency and less firm on teacher rights than was the reform-backed Buck bill. On the other hand, it did give the teachers some guarantees against political dismissals without any procedural safeguards. To that extent at least, reformers preferred the Otis Law to nothing at all.

The Politics of School Reform Legislation

The prospects for passage of the Otis bill in the Spring of 1917 were not very great. When three highly contrasting pieces of legislation pertaining only to one city are introduced in a state legislature, the elected representatives usually throw all three into a committee until a basis for compromise is found. But in this case, compromise was far from the minds of any of the three sides to the contest. Initially, the backers of the Baldwin bill seemed to have the

Table VII-1
Selected Comparison of Education Bills Before Illinois Legislature, 1917

Provisions	Present Law	Buck Bill	Baldwin Bill	Otis Bill
Board of Education	21 members-appointed by by mayor	7 members-elected, $5000 annual salary	21 members-appointed by mayor	11 members-appointed by mayor, unpaid
Recall of Board Members	———	Petition of 5% of votes cast last election	———	———
Taxes	Council levies and collects.	Council levies and collects. No tax anticipation borrowing.	Council levies and collects. No tax anticipation borrowing.	Council levies and collects. Board could borrow 75% tax anticipation.
Sale of Property	Consent of Council	Section 16 lands subject to referendum on petition of 3% of votes at last board election.	Vote of 3/4 of members of the board. Council approval not required.	Vote of 3/4 members of board. Right of Eminent Domain. Council approval not required.
Teachers	Appointed by board. No definite term.	Appointed by superintendent each year. After 3 years, tenure. Board approval.	Appointed by board. No definite term. No tenure.	Appointed by board on recommendation of superintendent. Tenure after 3 years.
Examinations for Teachers	———	Board to make provisions	———	Create special examining board
Teacher Dismissal	———	Only for cause, inefficiency or neglect of duty on written charges. Requires due notice and hearing. Legal council permitted.	———	Only for cause. Written charges. Teachers may request a board investigation whose decision is final.
Educational Councils	Optional with board	To advise superintendent on textbooks courses of study, questions of policy. May initiate questions of policy. These duties and powers statutory.	Optional with board	Optional with board
Superintendent	1 year term	4 year term	Optional with board	4 year term. No authority over business manager or attorney.

Source: Public Education Association Bulletin No. 2. March 3, 1917.

upper hand. With the full power of the Thompson machine behind him, Baldwin pushed his bill through the State Senate in February, almost before the Otis bill had even arrived in Springfield. Meanwhile, Jacob Loeb, the Public Service League, and the Chicago Tribune joined in attacking the Buck bill, arguing that it would give the CTF control of Chicago schools.[34] While the most severe criticism was saved for the Buck bill, Loeb was not happy with the Otis bill either. Instead, he emphasized its similarity to the Buck bill and other reform measures. Even in the face of the Thompson juggernaut, the CTF fought bitterly for their own alternative legislation. Margaret Haley and a former school board member campaigned in Springfield for an elected school board.[35] At the same time Buck and Merriam were campaigning hard for re-election to the Chicago city council, and school issues arose repeatedly during the course of the campaign. The Otis bill itself had the quiet but increasingly effective support of several members of the school board and the board attorney. The fact that this bill had the support of key figures with responsibility for the Chicago schools would in the end prove decisive.

The Otis compromise probably would not have passed, however, except for the peculiar set of circumstances that combined to weaken both the CTF and its reform allies, on the one side, and Mayor Thompson, Jacob Loeb, and the machine-business alliance, on the other. The CTF lost organizational capacity and the reformers were sent into virtual political exile. At the same time, America's increasing involvement on the British side of the war divided Thompson from his erstwhile lieutenant, Jacob Loeb. Within a few months both sides were so weakened, that a compromise everyone could accept seemed by far the best alternative, and the Otis bill became law.

The Weakening Reform-Labor Alliance

Fundamentally, the dismissal of the CTF members from the schools had taken a severe toll on the organization. The CTF felt that it had no choice but to pay its members their salaries while the board's actions were being challenged in court. These salaries, together with the court costs of the union's legal action, were rapidly absorbing all

280

of its funds. Moreover, the CTF lost membership steadily in 1915 and 1916, as the union was constantly under attack by daily newspapers and leading community groups and individuals. Nor could the CTF be confident that the legal suit would restore its financial losses. Nothing in a teacher's contract guaranteed him or her anything more than a year' tenure, and, though malice was apparent, it was difficult to show that the Board of Education had acted illegally. As it turned out, the Illinois Supreme Court, in a decision made shortly after the passage of the Otis law, ruled that the board's actions had been legal making it unnecessary to restore the salaries of the sixty-eight teachers. While Jacob Loeb rejoiced--"there isn't a happier man in Chicago than I am today,"[36] the CTF was broken by the decision. In a month, it was forced to withdraw its affiliation with the Chicago Federation of Labor, and while it remained the dominant teacher's organization for another decade, its power and influence waned steadily.

The CTF's reform allies were hardly in better shape in the early months of 1917. City primary elections scheduled for February 27 pitted Buck, Merriam and four other reform alderman against the Thompson juggernaut. Buck was especially vulnerable to political reprisals for he was but a one-term alderman. In addition, his chief antagonist, Alderman Michaelson, lived in the ward Buck represented. But it was not simply Buck who was in trouble. The high-water mark of reform had already passed, and every reform alderman struggled to maintain his position. The exception seemed to be Charles Merriam, who represented the area near the University of Chicago, and who had had a long, prestigious council career.

School issues were prominent in the campaign. Indeed, they were a critical basis for the evaluation of candidates by the Municipal Voters' League (MVL), the city's most politically active reform organization remaining unalterably opposed to Thompson's machine-style politics. Among the criteria used to rate aldermen was whether or not "they stood with Alderman Buck in the fight to place the school board under the investigating jurisdiction of the city." In their fight for cleaner schools Buck, Merriam and the other reformers won not only the praises of the MVL but also the backing of the Women's City Club, whose leadership included Jane Addams, Grace Nicholes and Sophonisba Breckinridge.[37] Leaders from various religious organizations, labor and other reform minded groups supported the aldermen, and a reform-minded member of the Board of Education spoke for each candidate.[38] In their supporting comments, the reformers emphasized the opposition of the Thompson forces: in Victor Olander's words, "the same old gang," was opposing reform once again.

The tactic used to arouse voters against Merriam and Buck was to charge them with aiding labor domination of the schools. Both the aldermen's support of an elective board and for making the sale of school lands conditional on a voter referendum were cited as evidence that party politics would be able to dominate the schools, and that interest groups such as the CTF and CFL would have the power to swing elections. Because of his high visibility during the school controversy and council investigation, Buck was easy to tie in with the teachers and with labor. Merriam had voted with Buck in the council on all the school related issues, though he was not terribly outspoken in this support. Yet Merriam had also antagonized business leaders concerned with the school issue when he refused to head a movement in the city council to place businessmen in control of the school system. Merriam believed that an inquiry by experts into the facts was reasonable. The business leaders told Merriam that they were uninterested in facts. "We have made up our minds," he was told, "and we are going ahead. Those who are not with us will be against us." In Merriam's words:

> Willingness to cooperate in the very fullest inquiry into the facts, and in a policy based upon these facts, and upon sound expert advice, was conceived to be hostility. And so the dogs of war were loosed.[39]

The campaign ultimately developed into the kind of contest on which the Thompson regime thrived. City hall politicians, businessmen, board members and the Chicago Tribune campaigned aggressively against the aldermen, forcing Buck, Merriam and their supporters to respond defensively. Loeb actively campaigned against both Buck and Merriam, calling Buck a tool for Margaret Haley, and Merriam a "high-brow hypocrite" who was the "foe, the enemy of the Chicago public school system."[40] Former alderman Snow, a close ally of the mayor, campaigned against Merriam, tying him in with Mrs. Haley.[41] Thompson's floor leader in the city council, Alderman Michaelson, only one of two to work against the Buck legislation in the council, campaigned actively against Buck, calling him an "obstructionist."[42] Dwight Loughborough, the chief investigator for the Baldwin Commission, claimed that Buck and Merriam were allied with forces operating in Chicago, "to undermine American democracy and the public schools."[43] William Fetzer, Merriam's opponent, continually harped on Merriam's support of labor and elective school boards, and demanded that the alderman clarify his attitude on the CTF and CFL, the elected board, and the right of the council to question prospective board members on their views about the teacher's union.[44] The Chicago Tribune came out very strongly against the aldermen, calling Buck's legislation vicious and tying him to Haleyism, while criticizing Merriam for never responding to Fetzer's charges.[45] And the Public School League, the organization of businessmen formed to eliminate the CTF from the schools, whose executive committee included the mayor's brother-in-law, charged that Buck and Merriam were part of a plot to give the CTF control of the schools.[46] The Daily News would ultimately describe the election by asserting that "seldom has there been more bitterness injected into an off year aldermanic canvass."[47]

Given all these allegations, Buck and Merriam were forced to defend themselves. Along with their supporters, they tried to deflect attention away from the school issue and to display the connection between their opponents and city hall. Buck, vainly attempting to show how the real issues were being ignored, explained:

> The grafters and sportsmen are trying to keep the people from thinking of the real issues. The Thompson-Lundin-Hitzman-Michaelson-DePriest outfit . . . are trying to sneak a candidate into office without letting you know what he thinks about graft, gas, street car service or other pressing needs of the city. They have used the school issue to divert attention from the real issues. . . . They don't tell you whether they are for breaking down civil service, white washing paving funds, stuffing payrolls and such things.[48]

Similarly, Merriam denounced the city hall leaders for using "the sacred cow of public education as a mask for political grand larceny." He criticized Loeb and Corporation Council Samuel Ettelson, while attempting to highlight the many positive results of his, Buck's, and others' efforts in the city council.[49] But these claims could not overcome all challenges, as Buck lost in a landslide, and Merriam, after several recounts, was declared the loser by five votes.

Along with Merriam and Buck, two other reform aldermen were also defeated. The mayor explained that the four were beaten because they were "destructive not constructive."[50] But the defeated aldermen attributed the loss to the elective school board issue. While they reiterated that it was used to obscure the real issues, the losers knew that they were unable to overcome the prejudices raised against them because of their association with the CTF, CFL and Haley. The *Daily News* editorialized that the good aldermen lost because of false issues,[51] the outcome of the primary clearly demonstrated that support of the teachers was not a popular campaign position. The Buck bill never got out of the legislative committee to which it had been referred.[52] Senators and representatives, spotting the most obvious of losing causes, quickly disassociated themselves from this piece of unpopular educational reform. Labor and its well-meaning but politically ineffective reform allies had seldom been so badly routed. School politics, supposedly the "Achille's heel" of the machine proved to be its area of greatest success.

The Thompson Machine Weakens

Following such an overwhelming victory over the reform alderman in the Republican primary of February 1917, it is surprising that the Thompson forces did not simply force the Baldwin bill through the Illinois legislature in the ensuing months. But victory over fellow Republicans in the primary did not guarantee a Thompson success in the general municipal elections in April. Indeed, Thompson was so pressed by the political campaign that legislative matters, such as the Otis bill, were simply put to one side. Supporters for Buck and Merriam urged them to mount independent candidacies, but Buck refused, and a three thousand signature petition for Merriam was thrown out on technical grounds.[53] Merriam supporters including State's Attorney

Maclay Hoyne, a staunch Thompson enemy, the Women's City Club and the MVL urged voters to write in for Merriam. Some ten thousand voters did but Merriam fell short of victory by about fifteen hundred votes.[54] Although neither Merriam nor Buck actually continued campaigning for themselves, they did work against city hall candidates and stump for Democrats, making a special effort against Ira Hazen in Buck's ward.[55]

City hall forces also conducted a vigorous campaign. The mayor sent out a special message denouncing the MVL, who continued their activity against anyone connected to Thompson. Both Corporation Counsel Ettleson and Jacob Loeb carried on with their campaign activity, with Loeb still attacking Merriam to offset the expected write-in vote.[56] In the end, the Democrats swept the city, defeating the majority of Thompson-backed candidates, though Hazen and Fetzner both won. The mayor even remarked that the reduction of Republicans in the city council was due to the "guerilla warfare" that had been waged against him.[57]

More likely, Thompson's defeat was affected by the changing political climate produced by America's increasingly close alliance with Great Britain. Thompson was one of the country's most enthusiastic pacifists, and he expressed well the German, Italian and Irish sentiment that neither side in the European conflagation was deserving of United States support. While this position had undoubtedly won votes for Thompson in 1915, by the Spring of 1917 pacifism was giving way to war fever. German submarines were roaming the Atlantic, threatening to sink ships that were bringing food and munitions to Britain. Wilson and his advisers had succumbed increasingly to pro-war pressures. In late January, Germany, reasoning that American shipments of food and munitions had been so valuable to the British that formal United States entry into the war would be of little additional consequence, announced that it was embarking upon an unrestricted submarine campaign against all ships, neutral or belligerent, cargo or passenger, entering the war zone. This news was followed a month later by the British announcement that a German telegram had been sent to the Mexican ambassador, instructing him to encourage Mexico to enter the war on the side of the Germans in order to recover southwestern portions of the United

States. These two events stirred such a public outcry that by April 4, 1917 Congress overwhelmingly voted formally to declare war on Germany and the other Axis Powers.

The Chicago general election, which occurred shortly after the declaration of war, could not help but be influenced by these events, and the Chicago Democrats, flying high the patriotic banner, overran Thompson and the remnants of pacifism in the city. Even Thompson's own supporters turned against him. School board president Jacob Loeb broke with Thompson and began his own anti-German campaign, eliminating German language instruction from the schools and searching for pro-German sympathizers among the staff. In short, Republicans of all stripes were in disarray in the spring of 1917. While the reformers had been routed in the primaries, the Thompson machine collided with Wilsonian Democracy in the general election.

War buried the school conflagration in still another way. For months the battles between Haley and Loeb, Buck and Thompson had figured prominently in the local press. Now the only news reported was war news. Indeed, domestic disputes were seen as unpatriotic, a sapping of national energy at a time when unified effort was needed. If the world was to be saved for democracy, business and labor needed to learn to work co-operatively at home and political machines and urban reformers needed to put their petty disputes to one side. War abroad brought peace at home. Waving the white flag of reconciliation Ralph Otis' moderate compromise seemed increasingly attractive.

Compromise Legislation

Since the Senate had already approved Baldwin's bill, the Otis compromise was first considered in the house of representatives. So strong were the currents of domestic compromise that even before the general election and even before the formal Congressional declaration of war, the House overwhelmingly approved the first major restructuring of the Chicago school board in decades.

On April 5, one day after war had been declared, the bill arrived on the Senate floor, the arena where Thompson forces had previously been dominant. Thompson's corporation counsel and close ally, Senator

286

Ettelson, made one last effort to ditch the Otis bill. He tried to have the bill sent back to committee on the quite reasonable grounds that the Otis compromise was so different from the Baldwin bill that it needed committee consideration before a floor vote could be held. Ettelson noted that even such a fervent supporter of the CTF as the Chicago Daily News objected to portions of the bill, saying that the triple-headed executive (superintendent, business manager, board attorney) was an inefficient administration. He complained further that the Senate was about to act without hearing from Jacob Loeb, the board president, and he argued once again that the Otis bill would lead to union control of the schools.

Ettelson's protestations failed to convince his colleagues. They insisted that the bill had been debated for five or six weeks in the house, where interested parties had plenty of opportunities to make their views known. Why had not Loeb made his objections known at that time?[58] The fact that Loeb, Ettelson, and other Thompson supporters had been fighting for the machine's political life in the Chicago elections was not a persuasive enough reason for senators now convinced that Thompson's influence was on the wane and that Loeb's union-busting had gone too far. In a spirit of compromise and moderation, the Senate approved the Otis bill with only Ettelson dissenting.

As in the nature of compromise legislation, no one was entirely satisfied but everyone secured what they most desired. The teachers won a degree of job security, which to union leaders justified the bitter struggle they had undertaken. The Thompson machine kept the power of board appointments in the hands of the mayor and won for the school board the power to sell school lands and to borrow money in anticipation of taxes, measures which in the short run would ease fiscal crises. Even the reformers could take a degree of satisfaction from the outcome. The Otis law reduced the size of the school board and gave the school superintendent some increment of direction and control over school affairs. While the teachers would have preferred more procedural safeguards, and while the Thompson machine disliked the reduction of patronage opportunities, and while the reformers saw only marginal progress toward a professional, autonomous public school system, it can hardly be said that anyone lost, and many could claim at least a partial victory.

In historical perspective the longer range consequences of the Otis law are a good deal more ambiguous than the immediate participants could have envisioned. If the Thompson machine won new borrowing rights for the school board, these would be most extensively used by reform superintendent William McAndrew, who spent the school system to near bankruptcy. It was then left to a new group of machine politicians, the Kelly-Nash machine, to fend off another host of teacher organizations in the pursuit of fiscal prudence during the depression years, a matter discussed in Chapter IX. But if the borrowing authority of the school system proved to be a mixed blessing for the machine politicians, neither did the CTF's troubles come to an end. Jacob Loeb remained on the Chicago school board, the CTF lost its court suit, it disaffiliated from the Chicago Federation of Labor, and after fighting new battles for one more decade it collapsed altogether. Only when teachers regrouped within an entirely new trade union, the Chicago Teachers Union, would teachers win the rights and prerogatives they had long demanded. Finally, the reformers had to wait until after World War II to see their cherished ideals firmly put into place. While the Otis Law enhanced the power of the school superintendent, his role very much depended upon the particular personality and goals of the officeholder as well as his relationship to the board and to City Hall. From the reformers perspective, even though the Otis law was the high water mark of legislative reform in Chicago, there was still room for improvement. Allen Pond, head of the Progressive Education Association, summed up the effects of the Otis law the best when he urged its amendment in the next legislative session: "The bill carries," he said, "a perpetuation of the present unfortunate administration."[59]

Conclusion

Whatever the consequences of the Otis Law, the politics of its passage surely lay to rest the oft-repeated but seldom demonstrated claim that reformers were invariably close allies of business elites in an effort to build an educational system that promoted patterns of corporate domination and control. The conflict in Chicago was exactly the opposite of what many have come to accept to be the dominant pattern. Instead of establishing links to the business community, Chicago reformers, including Buck, Merriam, the Municipal Voters League, the women's clubs, and the PTA, were firmly allied with the CTF and the Chicago Federation of Labor. They opposed cuts in teacher's salaries, sought to protect the CTF from the union-busting tactics of the board, and pushed for passage of the Buck bill that provided extensive protection for teacher rights and prerogatives. Reform support for labor objectives was not undertaken for any mere tactical political advantage. On the contrary, Buck and Merriam sacrificed their political careers by backing the teachers to such an extent that they were placed on the defensive by the Thompson machine in the 1917 Republican primaries, and lost to the machine candidates.

Similarly, events reveal that while the Thompson machine exploited ethnic issues to its political advantage, it was hardly a challenge to the business elite of Chicago. On the contrary, Thompson gave full support to Jacob Loeb's union-busting campaign, and he worked closely with the Public Service League, a businessman's organization formed by the Illinois Manufacturers Association, to campaign openly against the CTF. The school board appointed by Thompson was as business-dominated as any reform-oriented group ever could be. In the decade between 1910 and 1919, of the seventy-one persons who served on the board, it was possible to identify the occupations of fifty-eight. All but three of these were corporate officials, proprietors, lawyers, physicians or other professionals. Only three were nonmanagerial employees or labor union officials.[60]

Finally, in the Otis law struggle, reformers revealed themselves to be committed to improved school efficiency, more protection for teachers as professionals, and greater direct citizen involvement in policy-making. They proposed a strengthened superintendent and a board more removed from personnel and other day to day decisions, hoping thereby to eliminate patronage and corruption from school practice. They favored teacher tenure legislation in part for the same reason and in part to allow teachers to act as responsible professionals dedicated solely to the welfare of their charges. And they favored an elected school board, recall provisions and a referendum on the sale of school land so as to distance the schools from City Hall and direct mayoral involvement. Together these provisions of the Buck bill stated the faith of the reformers that science, expertise and professionalism could be put to the service of the democracy, and the voters would respect that service.

From another era we can wonder at the naivieté of that faith. Would not a professional superintendent's office turn into a self-aggrandizing bureaucracy? Would not the teacher's use their union power to protect the ineffective as well as the dedicated among their ranks? Would the voters always be able to appreciate dedicated public service when professional reformers provided it? But if the reformers' political realism is open to question, in the Otis law controversy, at least, they can hardly be accused of acting as "front men and women" for Chicago's business elite.

One of the dimensions of the conflict was, of course, the fight between business and labor interests with respect to public sector unionism. The Chicago Federation of Labor backed its teachers union and the Illinois Manufacturers Association responded with the Public Service League. The reformers, middle class professionals that they were, preferred to stand somewhat to one side from this direct clash of interests, calling for facts and expertise to resolve the conflict of interests. Yet in the end when businessmen attempted to crush unionism in the schools the reformers rushed to the teacher's defense, even at great political sacrifice.

It might be said that not too much should be drawn from this one incident in a long struggle for political power in Chicago. Even though the Otis law was the only legislated reform enacted for Chicago's schools prior to World War II, Chicago schools flirted with reform on other occasions as well. If the reformers were aligned with the union movement at the time of the Otis law, it hardly means that such an alliance was invariant. We could hardly agree more. As middle class professionals, reformers sought to enhance the autonomous status of the school system in a world of competing values and interests. If they were at times the proponents of labor's cause, at other times they felt business concern for public efficiency was equally worth espousing. In the next chapter we shall see how three influential reform-minded superintendents in Chicago gave quite distinct meanings to the term reform.

Footnotes

1. Merriam, 1929, p. 22.
2. Bright, 1930, pp. 119-120.
3. See Counts, 1928, and Herrick, 1971 for discussion of Thompson's relationship with the schools.
4. Wendt and Kogan, 1953, pp. 47, 51, 67, 69 and 73.
5. *Ibid*., p. 75; Bright, 1930, p. 38.
6. Wendt and Kogan, 1953, p. 81.
7. *Ibid*., pp. 87-88.
8. Bright, 1930, p. 50.
9. Wendt and Kogan, 1953, p. 90; Reid, 1968, pp. 161-162.
10. Bright, 1930, p. 59.
11. *Illinois Guardian* 1, April 1915.
12. Wendt and Kogan, 1953, p. 107.
13. Bright, pp. 73-78; Wendt and Kogan, 1953, pp. 126-133.
14. Chicago *Daily News*, 17 June 1916, p. 8.
15. Bright, 1930, p. 84.
16. Chicago *Tribune*, 17 July 1915; Reid, 1968, pp. 167-168.
17. Chicago *Tribune*, 2 September 1915, p. 1; Dodge, 1941, pp. 83-84; Counts, 1928, pp. 53-54.
18. National Education Association, *NEA Proceedings*, LIV, 1916, pp. 352-354; Chicago *Tribune*, 6 July 1916, p. 15; *Ibid*., 14 July 1916, p. 8.

19. Robert Buck Papers, File 2. Contains a flier dated 27 June 1916, with a list of the teachers dropped and grades they had received; Chicago Teachers Federation *CTF Files*, Box 45. Contains *The Day Book* 5, 28 June 1915, with an article, "School Board Hits Teachers' Union-68 Fired."; See also the Chicago *Tribune*, 28 June 1916.

20. Chicago *Tribune*, 27 June 1916, p. 17; *Chamberlin's* 159, July 1916, p. 26.

21. *President's Papers*, Box 14, Folder 23. Contains letter from Scholz to Judson, 23 March 1917; Kelly, 1938, pp. 2-21; Reid, 1968, p. 185.

22. *The American School* 2, July 1916, p. 196; The *New Republic*, 15 July 1916, p. 267; Chicago Teachers Federation *CTF Files*, Box 45. Contains stenographic report of A.F.T. mass meeting in New York City, 6 July 1916, p. 45.

23. Chicago Teachers Federation, *CTF Files*, Box 45. Contains a stenographic report of a mass meeting, 17 July 1916; See also the Chicago *Tribune*, 18 June 1916, pt. 2, p. 1, and 4 July 1916, p. 15. The P.E.A. met in early July and called for putting merit into teacher selection and for the board to reconsider their action. A statement was signed by Mary McDowell (University of Chicago Settlement), Mrs. Henry Kuh, Mrs. Raymond Robins, Grace Abbott, Mrs. William Hefferan (Women's City Club), Bernard Flexner, Allen Pond (The City Club), Carl Thompson, George Mead, Charles Judd (The latter two were both professors at the University of Chicago), Victor Olander (State of Illinois Federation of Labor) and E.O. Brom.

24. Chicago Board of Education *Proceedings*, 26 May 1915, pp. 1152-1153; *Ibid*, 3 June 1915, pp. 1191-1193; *Ibid*., 16 June 1915, pp. 1238-1244; *Ibid*., 23 June 1915, pp. 1259-1262.

25. Chicago Teachers Federation, *CTF Files*, Box 43. *CTF Salary Bulletin*, 22 May 1915, quotes Board of Education Committee on Efficiency and Economy, Report No. 27330. See also Chicago City Council *Council Proceedings* 21, June 1915, pp. 992 and 996.

26. Chicago *Tribune*, 7 July 1916, p. 1; Chicago *Daily News*, 7 July 1916, p. 3.

27. Herrick, 1971, p. 132.

28. Robert Buck Papers, File 3. Contains letters from Buck to Mead and Buck to Judd. Also invitations to and responses from the experts.

29. Chicago Teachers Federation, *CTF Files*, Box 45. Contains letter from Albertine Raven to Haley reporting on results of interview with board member, Clemensen. 29 July 1916.

30. Chicago *Tribune*, 15 July 1916, p. 1.

31. Committee on Schools, Fire, Police and Civil Service of the City Council, 9 December 1917, pp. 2-8.

32. Chicago City Council, Council Proceedings, 19 January 1917, pp. 2904 and 2929-2930; Chicago Teachers Federation, CTF Files, Box 46, Pamphlet No. 681. Contains copies of two bills approved by city council; Illinois House Journal, 21 February 1917, p. 225.

33. Chicago Daily News, 15 June 1916, p. 7.

34. Chicago Tribune, 10 February 1917, p. 6; Ibid, 18 February 1917, p. 10; Ibid., 20 February 1917, p. 9; Chicago Teachers Federation, CTF Files, Box 46, contains a stenographic report of a mass meeting against the Haley-Buck bill.

35. Chicago Daily News, 20 February 1917, p. 3; Ibid., 21 February 1917; Chicago Tribune, 21 February 1917, p. 10.

36. CTF Files, Box 46. Contains a copy of a Supreme Court Decision, 19 April 1917; Counts, 1928, pp. 54-55; Chicago Daily News, 19 April 1917, p. 1; Chicago Tribune, 20 April 1917, p. 15.

37. Chicago Tribune, 9 February 1917, p. 3.

38. Chicago Tribune, 19 February 1917, p. 13; Ibid., 20 February 1920, p. 9; Ibid., 22 February, 1917, p. 5; Ibid., 24 February 1917, p. 8; Ibid., 25 February, 1917, p. 11; Chicago Daily News, 10 February 1917, p. 3; Ibid., 20 February 1917, p. 3; Charles Merriam Papers, letter from Merriam to Max Loeb, 10 February 1917; Ibid., transcript of address by Dr. M.P. Boynton to Woodlawn Baptist Church, 18 February 1917.

39. Merriam, 1929, p. 129.

40. Chicago Teachers Federation, CTF Files, Box 46. Contains a stenographic report of a mass meeting against the Haley-Buck bill, 23 February 1917; Chicago Tribune, 24 February 1917, p. 8.

41. Chicago Daily News, 12 February 1917, p. 15; Ibid., 26 February 1917, p. 4; Chicago Tribune, 22 February 1917, p. 5; Ibid., 27 February 1917, p. 13; For Snow's connection to Thompson, see Wendt and Kogan, 1953, pp. 254 and 263.

42. Chicago Daily News, 14 February 1917, p. 13; Chicago Tribune, 20 February, 1917, p. 9; Ibid., 24 February 1917, p. 8; Chicago Teachers Federation, CTF Files, Box 46. Contains Austinite, 2 February 1917; Michaelson is called Thompson's council floor leader in Wendt and Kogan, 1953, pp. 132 and 159 and in the Chicago Tribune, 7 February 1917, p. 10.

43. Chicago Teachers Federation, CTF Files, Box 46. Stenographic report of mass meeting against Haley-Buck bill, 23 February 1917.

44. Chicago *Daily News*, 12 February 1917; Chicago *Tribune*, 3 February 1917, p. 15; *Ibid*., 26 February 1917, p. 9.

45. Chicago *Tribune*, 25 February 1917, Part 2, p. 4, editorial; *Ibid*., 10 February 1917, p. 6, editorial.

46. Chicago *Tribune*, 20 February 1917, p. 9; President's Papers, Box 14, Folder 23, letter from Scholz to Judson, 3 March 1917; Reid, 1968, p. 185.

47. Chicago *Daily News*, 26 February 1917, p. 1.

48. Chicago *Tribune*, 25 February 1917, p. 11; Chicago *Daily News*, 26 February 1917, p. 8.

49. Chicago *Tribune*, 24 February 1917, p. 8; *Ibid*., 25 February 1917, p. 11; *Ibid*., 26 February 1917, p. 8.

50. Chicago *Daily News*, 28 February 1917, p. 1.

51. Chicago *Daily News*, 23 March 1917, p. 8; Chicago *Tribune*, 28 February 1917, p. 1; *Ibid*., 1 March 1917, p. 6.

52. *Illinois House Journal*, 16 May 1917, H.B. 416, p. 971.

53. Chicago *Tribune*, 17 March 1917, p. 3; *Ibid*., 31 March 1917, p . 9; Merriam, 1929, pp. 235-236.

54. Chicago *Tribune*, 7 March 1917, p. 7; *Ibid*., 29 March, p. 13; Chicago *Daily News*, 31 March 1917, p. 1; *Ibid*., 4 April 1917, p. 1; Merriam, 1929, p. 236.

55. Chicago *Daily News*, 16 March 1917, p. 6; Chicago *Tribune* 23 March 1917, p. 13; *Ibid*., 24 March 1917, p. 10.

56. Chicago *Tribune*, 27 March 1917, p. 9; *Ibid*., 1 April 1917, p. 12; Chicago *Daily News*, 27 March 1917, p. 5.

57. Chicago *Daily News*, 4 April 1917, p. 1.

58. Chicago Teachers Federation, *CTF Files*, Box 46. Contains extracts from Senate debate, 5 April 1917.

59. President's Papers, Box 54, folder 4. Contains letter from Pond to Judson, 18 April 1917.

60. Chicago Board of Education, *Proceedings*, for selected years; *Lakeside Annual Directory of the City of Chicago*, for selected years.

Chapter VIII

REFORM AND THE PROFESSIONAL SUPERINTENDENT

The Progressive Era was marked by many attempts to reform educational administration. In Chicago, the Harper bill first tackled the ticklish problem of school governance in 1898 by seeking to restructure through legislation the relationships between school boards, superintendents and teachers. This zeal for reform culminated in the Otis Law of 1917, a law which gave teachers tenure after three years of satisfactory teaching. But the law also gave the superintendent more authority over staff hiring and firing and over day-to-day decisions involved in running a school system.

The powers given to superintendents through such legislation have been seen by revisionists as part of reform attempts to bureaucratize education, taking the reins of power from the people and placing them in the hands of the professional school administrator. Rather than responding to the ethnic diversity of big cities, "administrative" reformers are said to have helped create cultural homogeneity through the centralization of power in the school administration. Rather than seeing the schools as a means of upgrading the quality of life for all members of the community, reformers are said to have seen the system as a means of social control, citizenship training and job training for industry. Rather than involving the teachers in educational decision-making, reformers are said to have sought to establish a line and staff communication procedure, thus keeping the teachers at the bottom of the educational pecking order. Rather than emulating educational leaders like Horace Mann and John Dewey, reformers instead are said to have admired businessmen and their success at establishing an efficient corporate structure with a clear delineation of decision-making. As in a corporation, power would flow from the top down, with all important decisions made by the superintendent.[1] This then, was, in Tyack's words, the "one best system" sought by schoolmen, a system of centralized power and autonomy with the ability to make decisions free from political influence.[2]

But the Progressives cannot so easily be characterized as undemocratic. The progressive education movement actually began as a "many-sided effort to use the schools to improve the lives of individuals."[3] Reformers wished not only to improve the administration of growing school systems, but also to enhance the teacher's role as a professional with respect to pedagogical philosophy, classroom management, and the relationship of the schools to the needs of America's changing population. And the administrations of progressive era superintendents were as varied as the movement which spawned them, although they are as a group often perceived to be an all-powerful patrician elite.[4]

As diverse, ambiguous and politically limited as educational reform certainly was, two major themes repeat themselves with such regularity that they must be considered central components or virtually inevitably concomitants of this political movement. First, reform meant educational expansion--more for the schools to do and more resources to carry out the expected tasks. From a purely organizational perspective, therefore, reform was good for the schools. We have already seen in Chapter II how nineteenth century reform drives typically enhanced public school resources, while machine style politics had the opposite effect. In this chapter and the next we shall see that the same pattern held for Chicago schools in the twentieth century.

Secondly, school reformers encouraged the professionalization of the educational enterprise, a goal that at times forced them to choose between two, not altogether compatible, programmatic objectives. On the one side, reformers demanded more efficient administration; they preferred a strong superintendent with responsibilities for the entire system, and they also wanted a well-delineated, and perhaps limited, role for school boards to play. On the other side, reformers encouraged teachers to think of themselves as professionals who had a distinctive body of knowledge that could be applied to pedagogical processes. When teachers and administrators joined together against external political influences, reformers generally backed them both with unqualified support. Reformers had more difficulty when asked to choose between teachers and their administrative superiors, because they never did confront directly the question of the appropriate organizational role of the professional. From the point of view of organizational efficiency, the professional educator must subordinate his or her judgments to the expectations of the superintendent and his aides. But from the point of view of professional autonomy, teachers had to be given the discretion, the support, and the independence to apply the skills they were learning in teachers colleges as well as in the classroom. The difficulties reformers had in resolving these questions are evident in the experiences of three of Chicago's strongest administrative figures.

Edwin G. Cooley, superintendent from 1901-1909, Ella Flagg Young, from 1909-1915, and William McAndrew, from 1923-1927, were all progressive era school administrators. In some ways their administrations share what has become known as "administrative progressive" characteristics. They were all interested, for example, in centralizing power in the office of the superintendent. They were also all interested in making education relevant to more members of the society through such means as vocational training. But important differences existed as well, and among these was the fact that the social composition of their political support varied signficantly, a fact which also affected the longevity of their administrations and of their pedogogical reforms. Indeed, one of Chicago's strongest superintendents--Edwin Cooley-- can hardly be considered a reformer, as can be seen from the sources of support he received during his administration.

Two factors with broader social implications shaped the conflicts present in all three of these administrations. One of these was the antagonism which existed between business and labor in heavily-industrialized Chicago. During the Cooley administration, the conflict over vocational education engendered many intense public debates with business and labor freely hurling epithets at one another. Ella Flagg Young as superintendent was more responsive to the wishes and concerns of elementary classroom teachers, thereby displeasing her increasingly business-oriented school board. McAndrew's situation was particularly interesting. Two of the educational innovations he attempted, the platoon plan and junior high schools, were vigorously opposed by labor, which felt the first was a method of putting children on an assembly line and turning them out like so many cogs on a wheel, and that the second was a capitalist plot to divert working class youngsters into the labor market at the end of their eighth year of school. One of these reforms, that of the junior high, proved to be an organizational innovation of long-duration in other cities and towns without any obvious class consequences. Had its initiation been in a situation other than the conflict-ridden atmosphere of Chicago, its reception would probably have been much different.

Another factor underlying school conflicts was the male-female dichotomy. The teaching force was primarily female, but the administrative force was disproportionately male. Even positions at lower levels of the school administrative staff were likely to be staffed by males. As late as 1894, nearly half of all Chicago's principalships were held by males (at a time when a male elementary teacher was a rarity). Moreover, the male principals held the highest paid positions. As can be seen in Table VIII-1, 17 percent of male principals in 1894 earned more than $2000 a year, while only 8 percent of the female principals did. Fifty-seven percent of the females received less than $1500 per year, while only 18 percent of the males were so poorly paid. So, better paid and in positions of authority, male administrators were suspected of looking out for their own interests at the expense of the many elementary female school teachers, whose jobs were neither as well-paid nor as secure as the teachers would have liked. Further, until 1920 women did not have the vote, and indeed the Chicago Teachers' Federation was very active in the suffrage movement. School systems in the United States were organized along sexist lines from the very beginning, and the position of the female teacher was usually insecure. But rather than Progressivism legalizing this status, the open political climate of the era enabled female

TABLE VIII-1

Salaries of Principals, by Sex, Chicago, 1867 - 1893

Salary Level	School Year					
	1867 - 1868		1882 - 1883		1893 - 1894	
	% Male	% Female	% Male	% Female	% Male	% Female
Low ($1,000 to $1,599)	--	100	11	71	18	57
Middle ($1,600 to $2,199)	95	--	89	28	64	36
High ($2,000 to $2,699)	5	--	--	--	17	8
Total Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number	(19)	(5)	(27)	(32)	(48)	(51)
Not Available	--	--	--	--	3	3

SOURCES: Information obtained from the Annual Reports of the Chicago Board of Education for the relevant years.

teachers to speak out against discrimination.

In The Search for Order, Robert Wiebe describes how it was to be a nineteenth century school teacher. "Ridiculed...as Ichabod Cranes and fussy school marms, teachers embodied the apparent paradox of exceptionally low prestige in a land that acclaimed universal education."[5] Few could afford to live "on the teacher's starvation salary, few saw opportunities for advancement and therefore very few--often the Ichabod Cranes and futile old maids--devoted a life to it." Teaching became a station for men in search of administrative careers and young ladies in search of husbands.[6]

By 1905, things had begun to change, and by 1910 teacher and reformer Ella Flagg Young of Chicago had become president of the National Education Association. Teachers, interested in upgrading the status of their profession, became active members in professional asociations and supported specific academic training for teachers by attending colleges and universities for graduate and supplementary training. The teachers' quest for professionalization led them to conflicts with school boards and superintendents over salaries, performance rating and educational policy-making. Their 1917 dissassociation with organized labor only a temporary setback, teachers in Chicago became steadily better-paid and more powerful. Their bargaining position by McAndrew's superintendency was dramatically altered from what it had been during the Cooley Administration.

Just as teachers were becoming professionalized, the field of educational administration was becoming increasingly self-conscious and internally disciplined. Indeed, some have suggested that progressive era education was the product of an "educational trust," an old-boy network of educators whose friendships and connections with each other succeeded in establishing a meritocratic group-think which had a hold on powerful city superintendents' positions throughout the country. These men, all inundated with the ideas of George Strayer from Columbia and "Dad" Cubberley from Stanford, succeeded in imposing much the same bureaucratic reforms on school systems from New York to California. They, like George Washington Plunkett of Tammany Hall, who rewarded "his Irish-Catholic boys with jobs because he knew their ways and could trust them," set up their own systems of patronage.[7]

That such a network existed would be hard to deny. That big city superintendencies frequently went to members of the network is also convincing. But the extent to which this group could impose "reform from the top down" must be questioned. As we have seen in previous chapters, reform did not take any single thrust, but varied greatly in its objectives, in its social sources of support and in its eventual shape. Professional administration was but one of its objectives. It also wished to extend the quality and quantity of education to as many citizens as possible and, in pursuit of this objective, it was as much concerned about professional capacities at the classroom level as in the superintendent's office. Progressive era superintendents, their relationship to reformers, teachers, machine politicians and businessmen, and the outcomes of policies implemented at the level of the superintendency will be the concern of this chapter.

Edwin Cooley: the Strong Superintendent Reformers Failed to Support

Edwin G. Cooley as a school superintendent fits most closely of these three educators the model of a progressive as defined by the revisionists. His attempts to centralize power in the office of the superintendency, his zeal for the establishment of vocational education and the political alliances he chose in trying to get his vision accepted, plus his establishment of the merit system for determining teachers' salary raises, have been accepted as the sine qua non of administrative progressives. Yet Cooley's political base never extended itself beyond Chicago's business community, reform groups regularly opposed his plans and proposals, and it was a reform board which welcomed his resignation. Moreover, two of his so-called reforms engendered intense public debate, with labor firmly set against a narrow conception of vocational training and the teachers firmly set against the merit system. The first reform attempt never got off the ground; the second was short in duration.

The one sense in which Cooley was a reformer was his (not surprising) commitment to a strong superintendency. He selected from the recommendations of the 1898 Harper Report, a blueprint for reform in the Chicago schools, those proposals that would centralize authority in the office of the superintendent. He reduced the power of district superintendents by cutting their number from fourteen to six while at the same time creating his own central staff of three assistant superintendents. He succeeded in gaining the authority to appoint and promote teachers, a function previously performed by the school board and the loss of which severely undermined the power of the board.

The Question of Vocational Education

Cooley is not remembered for his interest in centralizing power in his office, however. He is remembered for his attempts to establish two reforms which were opposed by teacher and labor groups with the backing of school and municipal reformers. This, plus Cooley's strong identification with a business group, the Commercial Club, casts doubt on his supposed reform credentials. As the head of the Commercial Club's Education Committee once stated, the club had unreserved respect for Cooley:

> Please let it be understood that Mr. Cooley in his educational efforts is the Commercial Club, and when he goes out to speak and when he writes on matters concerning our problem, it is the Commercial Club that is speaking and writing.[8]

His association with the Commercial Club was closely linked to his interest in a system of vocational education outside the auspices of the public schools. Cooley felt a system of vocational education would be more popular than the traditional academic course of study among the large numbers of students who left school between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. Persuaded by Commercial Club members that such a system would be better supported and managed outside the public schools with craftsmen rather than teachers in the classrooms, Cooley pushed for passage of the Cooley bill in the state legislature. The bill proposed a European dual educational system with two high schools, one of which provided a "classical" education and one of which specialized in vocational education.

The duality of the system was not acceptable to a large number of Chicagoans, however, including labor and, significantly, most reform-minded educators. While they recognized that many teen-agers had left school and were unemployed, and while they knew the nation needed some trade instruction and continuation schooling and that such instruction should be funded with public money, they were nevertheless adamant in their belief that vocational education should remain part of the public school system. Their distrust of the business community surfaced in accusations that business was motivated by the desire to have a well-trained pool of cheap, submissive labor.

In 1914 the Illinois State Federation of Labor (ISFL) published, through its committee on vocational education, a report strongly opposed to radical differentiation of education. Although it declared that the "dual system of administration is a menace," it reported that "workers (still) desire vocational and technical training." The committee's report concluded:

> We believe that vocational school courses should at all times be under the guidance and control of the school authorities having the direction of general education as the best system adapted properly to educate our children for their future activities as citizens, as workers, and as men and women capable of participating in all the benefits and enjoyments.[9]

Others were aware of the need for vocational education and responded by drafting bills to be presented to the legislature. Among them was the City Club, a group which would later support the superintendency of William McAndrew in 1924. Its membership was a quientessential reform organization that included a large number of professional people including one hundred sixty-four educators who dominated its education committee. In 1912 this group published a report on issues involved in proposed legislation for vocational education in Illinois. Written by George H. Mead, Frank Leavitt and Earnest Wreidt who were all academics from the University of Chicago, it contained a "suggestive draft" of a bill for vocational education. Offering the draft as a compromise substitute for the Cooley bill, the bill's proponents stated that everyone wanted a bill on vocational education so that state funds could be allocated to facilitate the expansion of these programs. They hoped that only one bill would be presented to the legislature in order to enhance changes of passage.[10]

In contrast to the Cooley bill, the City Club proposal kept the administration of vocational schools under the auspices of the public schools. Furthermore, while the Cooley bill called for compulsory education in continuation schools, the City Club bill made this optional with the locality. When a member of the City Club's Committee on Public Education, as well as secretary of the NEA's Committee on Standardization of Commercial Studies, made further attempts to reach a compromise with the sponsors of the Cooley bill, his efforts ended in failure. He concluded that there "has developed a clear and sharp difference of opinion between the businessmen who have offered the bill put forth by the Commercial Club and the professional educators throughout the state."[11]

There was indeed a major conflict over vocational education between businessmen on the one side, and professional educators and labor leaders on the other. Educators claimed that a dual system of administration would be wasteful and inefficient. They also argued that the dual system contradicted the democratic value of general education by creating a segregation of social classes. Ella Flagg Young, Cooley's successor, used all her infuence against it, claiming it would train youth to accept a lower status.[12] John Dewey opposed it:

> No question at present under discussion in education is so fraught with consequences for the future of democracy as the question of industrial education. Its right development will do more to make public education truly democratic than any other one agency now under consideration. Its wrong treatment will as surely accentuate all undemocratic tendencies in our present situation, by fostering and strengthening class divisions in school and out.[13]

Though this democratic ideology of education referred to by many educators was undoubtedly a sincere belief, it must also be pointed out that a dual system of education would attract many students away from the public education system, a consequence naturally seen as undesirable by public school educators.[14]

Cooley, on a number of occasions, replied to the criticisms of his opponents. He believed that his proposal would definitely help the large numbers of persons between fourteen and eighteen who were "unable or unwilling to continue longer in the present elementary or secondary school." Anticipating the opposition of educators to changing the existing system, he instead proposed a system primarily aimed at those who had already left school. In a 1914 response to John Dewey, he states:

> The ultimate aim of these schools is character development and civic efficiency, gained through the increase in the personal efficiency of the pupils. Joy in work, the result of efficiency in work, satisfaction in doing a good job is an absolute essential to contentment, happiness, honesty, and self-respect. These schools, therefore, are schools for character-building, schools for training citizens.[15]

However, with the alliance between organized labor and professional educators cemented, the Cooley bill stood little chance of passing the state legislature during the 1915 session despite the fact that the Commercial Club sent fifteen of its members to Springfield to lobby for the bill. Once again, in 1917, the Commercial Club attempted to pass the Cooley Bill, but compromise with educators and labor broke down when supporters of the bill insisted on administrative autonomy for local vocational school boards.[16] The deadlock killed the chances for the passage of the Cooley bill or any other state vocational education legislation in 1917. By that time, however, Congress had passed the Smith-Hughes Act along much the same lines as the City Club had proposed and vocational education programs were established within public schools throughout the country.

Merit Pay for Teachers

A second issue which caused intense conflict during the Cooley Administration was a change in the promotional and salary advancement procedures used by the Chicago public school system. And here again, one finds a coalition of educators and reformers unified in opposition to Cooley's policies. Under the Cooley plan, teachers having seven years of service were promoted on the basis of "merit," determined by the efficiency ratings of principals and by written exams testing both pedagogical and subject knowledge. The results of the testing were not shared with the teacher, and no attempt was made to inform those who did not earn their "merit" raises as to what the cause might be. The teachers disliked the system immensely, since it implied that they would not do their best unless motivated by some external reward, and because it put female teachers in a position of being continuously judged by a disproportionately male administrative staff perpetuating an image of teachers that the CTF felt needed to be changed. Not only were male administrators and male teachers paid more and given more authority, but school men seemed to have a vision of women teachers as passive inferiors; they needed to be improved, be dismissed, be selected, and be directed by those in authority.[17]

The growth of teaching as a profession and its change from the Cooley years to the McAndrew years is a vital part of understanding these progressive school administrations. In fact, in many ways, the relationship between an administration and its teachers has defined the "hero" and the "villain" of the revisionists' "Progressive." One author has gone so far as to label anti-teacher policies as progressive and pro-teacher policies as anti-progressive.[18] But as difficult and powerless as the teachers were in the early part of the century, before 1900 it was much worse. Salaries were dismal, averaging $650 a year for a woman elementary school teacher in 1905, half of what a male earned in the same position.[19] Classes were very large and consisted of children of some variance in age representing many different ethnic groups. Many could not speak English. Teachers were hired by school boards on the basis of personal knowledge and political connections. There were no provisions for job security and teachers could be and were frequently dismissed for political reasons at the end of the school year, replaced with someone having better connections.

Along with the lack of standards for working conditions came the lack of standards for teaching as a profession. Institutions training teachers for their jobs were scarce. Between 1877 and 1902 no such institution even existed in Chicago, lending fuel to scathing indictments like those of Joseph Rice in 1893.

> In the public school of Chicago I found the instruction, in general, so unscientific that in judging them by the minimum requirement I should

> regard their standard as very low. Some of the teaching was by far the most absurd I have ever witnessed.[20]

Upon taking office in 1900, Superintendent Cooley addressed the question of poorly trained teachers. Believing that a large part of the problem was the way in which teachers obtained their jobs--that patronage appointments did not always go to the best qualified applicants--he first secured from the board the right to appoint and promote teachers. Previously, members of the school board had divided themselves into groups of two or three to form district committees which submitted lists of nominations for appointment, transfer and promotion of the teaching staff. Now written and oral communications from board members and others in favor of specific individuals had to be made public. His next move was to institute the merit system under which teachers' salaries would be determined by tests and ratings.

Because the system was so unpopular with the teachers and caused so much bitterness, early in 1906 Cooley had to present an alternative for those who did not wish to take the examination. The plan allowed teachers to substitute five courses of thirty-six hours each for the examination; these courses were to be taken at an accredited institution. Also in that year, reform mayor Dunne added seven new appointees to the board. The new members inquired into the secret marking and merit system. Claiming that if one held constant experience and grade level, there were no differences between the average efficiency marks of those who passed the examination and those who did not, they abolished the Cooley system and adopted a new promotion plan. The secret marking plan was discarded. Principals were to share their evaluations with teachers, who were to be rated as either "efficient" or inefficient." Teachers in the latter category were to be given a probationary period. Those who were dismissed had recourse to a hearing before the board. "Efficient" teachers automatically advanced toward the maximum level of the salary schedule.[21]

In 1907 under the influence of a reform school board the previously secret ratings were made public. Virtually all the teachers had been rated at 80 percent sometime or another during their careers. Consequently, two thousand six hundred teachers were advanced on the salary scale, which erased many of the bitter feelings. The newspapers also reported that the board would be looking for a new superintendent, which pleased the teachers.[22]

Cooley's most severe problems with the teachers had begun around six years after the start of his administration. Although he had been appointed by Mayor Carter Harrison II, a man concerned that the municipal tax rate remain low in order to attract businesses, by 1906 Cooley had to deal instead with reform mayor George Dunne and his board appointees. The Dunne board consisted of a number of municipal reformers including Mrs. Emmons Blaine, Colonel Parker's mentor, and Miss Jane Addams, president of Hull House. It was under the leadership of these reformers that the Cooley "merit plan" was modified, so that those teachers who wished could take five courses of thirty-six hours each as a substitute for the examination. Further, the reform board prepared a plan for a ten-year schedule without promotional tests. It never went into effect, however, because Dunne lost the 1907 mayoral election to Fred Busse.[23]

Busse demanded the resignations of twelve board members. When only three complied, he arbitrarily removed seven from office, and five others resigned in protest.[24] Salary schedules were temporarily abandoned as were the raises for the 2600 teachers. But by 1908, the Supreme Court had returned the Dunne board to office. They were thus in a position to aid fifteen teachers in an attempt to circumvent the modified Cooley promotional plan. In October of 1907, the fifteen teachers had enrolled in five thirty-six hour courses each at the Art Institute. In January, just in time for the first meeting of the reinstated Dunne board, they submitted their course grades and requested advancement in line with Cooley's modified promotional plan. Cooley, approved the requests in routine fashion and sent recommendations to the board. Proceeding with care, the Dunne board members checked the promotions with Cooley in a written communication. When he acknowledged the advancements, probably paying little attention to this small item in his enormous volume of routine paper-work, his letter was put into the record.[25] Margaret Haley, head of the Chicago Teachers Federation (CTF) then called for a meeting with union building representatives, presenting them with copies of Cooley's letter. By early May approximately fifteen hundred teachers had completed five concurrent thirty-six hour courses at the Art Institute, and their requests for advancement were all honored by the reform board. When Cooley returned from a European trip in September, he was furious. There was nothing he could do, however, and the issue became one of a number leading to his resignation in 1909.

Upon his resignation Cooley began a national campaign for vocational education with the enthusiastic endorsement of Chicago's Commercial Club. In part because of the national visibility this undertaking gave him, he has since appeared in numerous educational histories as a noteworthy example of progressive reforms. Backed by business, insistent on the merit system, attacked by teachers, and disliked by labor, Cooley has been presented as the single most convincing illustration of the class bias of urban reform. Yet Cooley was continuously and successfully challenged by Chicago's own reform movement during his superintendency. The City Club opposed his plans for vocational education, the school board appointed by Chicago's reform major rejected his teacher merit plan, and the teachers who criticized him had many close ties to Chicago's reformers. In short, it is difficult to see in what war Superintendent Cooley earned his reform stripes.

Financing the Schools

While issues such as vocational education and teacher evaluations were the most contentious aspects of his superintendency, and the topics that generated the most explicit reform opposition, Cooley also failed to keep the schools of the city expanding at a rate necessary to keep pace with the growth of the city. During the early years of his superintendency (1900-1905) the number of teachers in the system declined even while students in average daily attendance increased by 6.4 percent. (See Table VIII - 2). As a result the pupil-teacher ratio in the schools increased from 36.6 to 40.5 and per pupil expenditures in current dollars fell by nearly 17 percent. In constant dollars the drop

Table VIII-2

Average Daily Attendance and Per Pupil Expenditures, Chicago Public Schools, 1890-1925

Year	Average Daily Attendance			Per Pupil Expenditure in Current and Constant[a] Dollars	
	Number of Teachers	Average Daily Attendance	ADA per Teacher	Current	Constant
1900	5,701	208,841	36.6	$ 42	$118
1905	5,514	223,203	40.5	35	91
1910	6,101	229,997	37.7	44	110
1915	7,272	273,845	37.7	53	122
1920	8,447	300,349	35.6	94	110
1925	11,672	386,810	33.1	113	151

SOURCES: ADA and number of teachers from Proceedings, Board of Education.
Per pupil expenditure computed using ADA and data from the Department of Finance, Annual Statement of the Finances of the City of Chicago, 1890, 1895, 1900; and Comptroller's Annual Report: Finances of the City of Chicago, 1905-25

NOTES: a. 1947-49 = 100

was even greater--nearly 23 percent. All this was occurring in a decade of national expansion and prosperity. Cooley was constrained by a variety of external factors, to be sure. Deficit spending was absolutely prohibited by state law, and Chicago was unable to obtain more funding from the state legislature. Yet it may be of more than passing significance that these downward trends reversed themselves after 1905 when Dunne, the reform mayor, appointed a new school board, which allowed for expansion in the latter years of Cooley's superintendency and opened the door to Ella Flagg Young's superintendency, a period when the Chicago schools enjoyed one of their more sustained periods of reform. Between 1910 and 1915 the pupil/teacher ratio dropped back almost to its 1900 level and per pupil expenditures in constant dollars climbed by 22 percent, all but making up the losses of the preceding five year period. Under Young's leadership, the years 1910-1915 showed a growth in staffing that kept pace with enrollment expansion and per pupil expenditures which continuously climbed upward, This was but just one of the ways in which Young would demonstrate reform credentials that Cooley never had, a topic to which we shall now turn.

Ella Flagg Young: the Reformer Teachers Loved

Ella Flagg Young, a long-time teacher and administrator within the Chicago Public Schools, was chosen as superintendent by Republican Fred Busse's 1909 school board, a liberal board that still had numerous Dunne appointees, although since its reconstitution in 1908, not as friendly to CTF policies as the 1906-07 board had been. The principals had wanted a Chicago man for the new superintendent, and it was reported that the mayor wanted a man from outside the city.[26] Although the board was in disarray and found it hard to make a decision, they finally offered a one-year term to Young. Margaret Haley, Catherine Goggin and the Chicago Teachers' Federation were delighted.

Mrs. Young is remembered for her support of teachers, and for her belief that an effective school system needed a more democratic administrative environment than that which presently existed. In order to bring teachers into educational decision-making, she encouraged the growth of teacher councils, formed to give administrators advice on educational matters. But while she was concerned that teachers and principals have a collegial role in policy decision, and felt the councils were one of her most meaningful accomplishments,[27] she was nevertheless anxious to have rights and responsibilities reserved for the office of superintendent. In Isolation in the Schools, she wrote:

> If . . . the superintendent upon the receipt of the report believes the majority of teachers and principals mistaken, there should be no further effort made to secure the adoption of his views by a vote of the councils. He should act in accordance with his own judgment, and be held responsible for the outcome.[28]

Young was also interested in developing a more scientific basis for educational practice. She argued that a theory ought to be developed and applied to each level of the educational enterprise. Pointing to weaknesses in educating and selecting Chicago's teachers she felt that a theory of teaching would aid those who trained teachers. She also felt that reform in the city's schools would be difficult to achieve until the role of the superintendent was clearly defined and until a theory which governed the actions of the superintendent was established. In the end it should be this theory which would guide the superintendent, making his or her decision a product of deliberation and consultation, not one based on mere preference.

In her doctoral dissertation, Young attacked the kind of organization she saw developing in the school system--the separation into kindergarten, elementary, secondary, college and university.

> The parts have been brought together mechanically thus making the accepted conception of this great social institution that of an aggregation of independent units, rather than that of an organization whose successful operation depends upon a clearly recognized interrelation as well as distinction between its various members and their particular duties.[29]

Young disapproved of administrator-staff relationships in which supervisors announced their conclusions in theory and ideals in practice and then said to teachers, "take these thoughts of mine and be original in using them."[30] Her idea for giving teachers freedom to discuss their own thoughts evolved into the establishment of the councils. When she first proposed them in 1899 she was an assistant superintendent. The board expressed approval of the idea but did nothing to give the councils any official standing other than to appropriate a sum of one hundred dollars to cover the cost of publicity.[31] The councils until 1913 were voluntary organizations independent of the Board of Education, holding their meetings outside of school hours,[32] but by 1913, the teachers and principals had been organized into a total of sixty-four councils, which met on a regular basis to discuss changes in the course of study.[33]

Young also wanted a clear definition of rights and responsibilities vis a vis the school board. She supported lengthening the term of office of the board and the superintendent from three to five years. This, she felt, would somewhat remedy the problems brought about because of frequent changes in the personnel of the board. She also urged

> . . .a definite statement both of the duties of the superintendent as the educational executive of the Board and of the authority delegated for the purpose of meeting these duties. . . .[34]

As a reformer, Ella Flagg Young enjoyed the support of her administrators, her teachers and the parents in part because of her credentials as a pedagogue. She brought to the office years of experience as a public school teacher, university scholar and public school administrator, using her sophistication to define where improvements could be made in the curriculum to bring it more into line with the needs of a changing society. While she was a supporter of vocational education, even in the elementary school where she advocated the teaching of handcrafts,[35] she was firm in her insistence that control of vocational education programs not be taken from the public schools. During her tenure, the "Chicago Course" was offered, a course of study which dealt with the history and problems of the city and the nature of its needs. She consistently stressed the practical approach to studies like mathematics and English grammar. She was responsible for the inauguration of a revolutionary course on "sex hygiene," which parents attended with their children. That idea was short-lived, however, opposed as it was by the board.[36]

During Young's first two and one half years as superintendent her relationships with the school board went smoothly. Vocational education courses prospered, and penny lunches were started, with the preparation becoming part of the household arts curriculum for upper grammar grades.[37] The board reversed an unpopular Cooley decision, returning the Chicago Art Institute to the list of institutions teachers could attend, and an unpopular textbook law was brought to court and decided in favor of the school board with Young's testimony swaying the decision.[38] But with a change in the composition of the board and a new board president early in 1911, the lack of clearly defined responsibilities for the superintendent as distinct from the board began to create problems. The board referred many of the superintendent's recommendations to newly formed special committees before they were considered before the full board.[39] By February of 1912, Young complained that salaries had been approved without her consultation, three of her recommendations for principalships had been turned down, and that she generally felt the board was no longer giving her its support.

That summer rumors circulated that Carter Harrison III, who had been reelected in 1911 as Chicago's mayor, was no longer supporting Young. To clear the air, Harrison wrote a strong letter, stating that "the schools have never prospered more than under your management. I feel the best interest of the schools will be conserved by your retaining your position as long as you are able to perform its duties."[40] But troubles continued with the board, and by late 1912 they took the course of study out of her hands, claiming there were too many "fads and frills" in the elementary curriculum.[41] A disagreement over the constitution of the teachers' pension board and another over which textbooks the system should purchase were battles which, added to diminishing support from the board, caused Young to resign in 1913. She did not leave this time, however, for her resignation resulted in a protest march on the mayor's office and a subsequent rally by several thousand women. Led by reformer Jane Addams, members of the CTF, the principals, the lower-level school administrators and most of Chicago's various women's clubs rallied to convince Mayor Harrison to do what he wanted to do anyway--reinstate his superintendent.[42]

By 1915 the relations between the board and the superintendent had worsened again. Harrison, Mrs. Young's strong supporter, was defeated in the Democratic primary and Republican William Thompson was elected mayor. Thompson publicly stated that he would not involve himself in school affairs. A weak board president in office enabled anti-CTF board member Jacob Loeb to gain control of the board as he assumed the vice-presidency.[43] With Loeb dominating the board and Thompson turning his back on the schools, Mrs. Young knew her efforts on behalf of teachers' salaries would be to no avail. They were told the budget deficit meant they would have to take salary reductions of 7 1/2 percent, though teachers remained convinced that it was only an attempt by Loeb to cut teacher salaries under the guise of economy. In the midst of the controversy Alderman Robert Buck was authorized by the city council to head up an investigation of the schools.[44] At this point, Young who had been meaning to leave once the deficit problem has been settled, finally gave up the struggle and resigned in October of 1915.

Ella Flagg Young has not been treated as one of the great school reformers. She was not male, did not have strong business support, and emerged out of the Chicago public school system rather than marching in with pomp and circumstance from afar. Yet her reform credentials were at least as solid as William McAndrew's and certainly more firmly grounded than Edwin Cooley's. In fact Young was the favorite of the reform bloc on the school board that had dumped Cooley, and, even though her appointment as superintendent came after Dunne's mayoralty had ended she owed it directly to the power that reform had attained in Chicago during his term of office. As superintendent, she expanded school operations, raised per pupil expenditures, fought for higher teacher salaries, attempted to limit the influence of the school board and end patronage practices, and created the school councils that became so popular among teachers. Throughout her superintendency she had cordial relations with labor and unwavering, enthusiastic support from the established middle class reform groups of the city. Finally dumped by an economy-minded, business dominated school board which Thompson, Chicago's most notorious machine mayor, had placed in office, Ella Flagg Young was no less subject to changing political tides than were other reformers. But at the very least Young demonstrated beyond question that reform goals did not coincide with anti-labor policies or pro-business attitudes.

William McAndrew: Expansion Amid Conflict

William McAndrew assumed the office of superintendent in 1924. Appointed by reform mayor William Dever, McAndrew was at first welcomed by teachers, reformers, and the business community alike. As a charter member of the Public Education Association, he had a great deal of standing in progressive education circles around the country. As a former teacher and principal in the Chicago schools, the teachers thought he would be supportive of their interests. As an appointee of reform mayor Dever, the Civic Federation supported him, as did faculty at the University of Chicago School of Education. Because he was known as a successful administrator in the difficult New York public school system, the business community supported him. Many reform groups were impressed by his evident commitment to educational expansion as well as to better management practices, and few could deny that the schools enjoyed a great organizational impetus during his term of office. The lines of battle were quickly drawn however, when McAndrew, rebelling against the enormous amount of work associated with his office, stated in his 1924 Superintendent's Report:

> Other school systems suffer from the tradition that every teacher with a special idea or complaint, every principal, every inventor of a new device, or author or a new book, every friend of an applicant for promotion should properly take the case to the "head man." Since beginning work here I have, in deference to Chicago usage, received all comers. It is a large price to pay for a reputation of approachability. To each visitor it has been explained that a specified officer is employed to handle almost every case. Business has slowly adjusted itself to a more expeditious, satisfactory, and less wasteful conduct. A system directly touching a total of 545,929 pupils and paid members must work clumsily on the old village conception of a one man affair. It must adopt the motto of other big businesses; "organize, deputize, supervise."[45]

The teachers were enraged by what they considered his hierarchical "line and staff regime," denying them direct access to the superintendent. Margaret Haley, the leader of the CTF commented that it was one in which the Cabots speak only to the Lowells and the Lowells speak only to God.[46] The teachers were suspicious and mistrustful of McAndrew's educational innovations as well. In the end, the antagonism of the teachers helped "Big Bill" Thompson build a political base from which to defeat Mayor Dever.

Fiscal Consequence of Reform

While the tales of the McAndrew school wars have been recounted on several occasions, the fiscal story of his superintendency, perhaps the more significant development, has been overlooked. In part this is due to the difficulty of ferreting out fiscal details; in part it is due to the fact that the political battles of the time focused on quite other matters. But whatever the reasons, few have appreciated the fact that McAndrew exploited the public purse on the school system's behalf with such abandon that he left the Chicago schools on the edge of fiscal disaster at the conclusion of his administration. The great irony of the McAndrew reign is in fact the extent to which this reformer seduced leading businessmen into providing him with their fervent support at a time when his own financial policies can be described as nothing short of profligate. McAndrew talked the "efficiency" game, with campaigns for platoon systems, junior high schools, and more business-like administration. But while these slogans won business support and infuriated teachers and labor groups, McAndrew was in fact making resources available to teacher and pupils to an extent unprecedented in the city.

Consider first the sheer expansion of the public schools during the 1920s as depicted in Table VIII-3. In that decade elementary enrollment increased by sixty thousand pupils, and the high schools more than doubled in size from 160,000 to nearly 230,000 students. The percentage of the school age population in the public school jumped from 51 percent to 59.4 percent, the largest increment in any single decade since the very beginning of their establishment. The percentage of the fourteen

Table VIII-3

Average Daily Attendance as a Percentage of School Age Population, Chicago, 1890-1930

Year	Elementary[a]		High School[b]		% ADA Of Total School Age Population	% School Age Population of Total City Population
	% ADA	Age Cohort (n)	% ADA	Age Cohort (n)		
1890	46.6	214,470	3.7	100,472	32.9	28.6
1900	57.4	347,745	6.3	146,860	42.2	29.1
1910	63.8	338,800	9.7	157,470	46.6	22.7
1920	61.7	440,296	21.7	160,201	51.0	22.2
1930	70.9	500,594	34.2	229,543	59.4	21.6

SOURCE: 11th Census of the U.S., Pt. 2, p. 117.
12th Census of the U.S., Vol 2, Pt. 2, p. 126.
13th Census of the U.S., Vol 1, Pt.1, p. 439.
14th Census of the U.S., Vol 2, p. 291.
15th Census of the U.S., Vol 2, p. 743.

NOTES: [a] School age: 5-13 for 1910-1930, and 5-14 for 1890-1900.
[b] School age: 14-17 for 1910-1930, and 15-19 for 1890-1900

to seventeen year old population in school jumped from 21.7 to 34.2 percent. Quite clearly, it was during the McAndrew Administration that secondary education came of age. No wonder he was forced to address problems of managing a large, complex organization and that he proposed devices such as the junior high school and the platoon system to accomodate the large numbers of newcomers attending the schools.

Even with these efficiencies and even in the face of exploding enrollments Table VIII-2 shows that McAndrew reduced the pupil-teacher ratio (from 35.6 to 33.1 between 1920 and 1925) and increased per pupil expenditures in both current and constant dollars. The increment in per pupil expenditures in adjusted dollars was no less than 37.3 percent, an extraordinary increase in light of the equally extraordinary enrollment expansion that was occuring simultaneously.

In pursuing these fiscal policies, McAndrew had certain advantages that neither Cooley nor Young had enjoyed two decades earlier. For one thing, the new Loeb law gave the board of education (and its superintendent) much more authority over the appointment and promotion of teachers, the purchase of textbooks and equipment, the selection of school sites, and the construction of buildings. More importantly the law permitted a school budget based on an estimate of taxes collectible, instead of on taxes already collected from the last fiscal year, which prior to the Loeb law had prevented Cooley, Young or any other superintendent from borrowing funds in anticipation of new tax revenues.

While the school board began raising revenues by means of tax anticipation warrants immediately after the passage of the Loeb law in 1917, McAndrew took advantage of the new arrangement to an unprecedented degree. In 1925 he included in his school budget as revenue available both the monies from the 1924 tax levy, collectible in 1925, and the 1925 levy, collectible in 1926.[47] While this innovative practice allowed the superintendent to report a budgetary surplus, in reality the school system was falling into debt. Before long McAndrew himself reported the consequences of this policy.

> It is no exaggeration to say that the financial system is near the breaking point... On the basis of present revenue the schools cannot complete the year 1927 without exceeding legal

> borrowing power and unless additional revenues are provided at once, the schools cannot go through the year 1927 without omitting some of the regular session, or cutting teachers' salaries, or eliminating present activities, or taking other drastic steps.[48]

By 1926 the board had shifted from using cash in hand to credit by the sale of tax warrants and in doing used up almost eleven years of tax incom in ten years' time.[49]

Organizational Innovations Conflict with Teachers' Sense of Professionalism

While McAndrew was greatly expanding the size and fiscal scale of the Chicago schools, he did not obtain the kind of teacher support that such activities might ordinarily have been expected to receive. Instead, his attempt to introduce a variety of organizational innovations brought him into a prolonged, sustained conflict with teachers and their labor allies that eventually doomed both him and his policies. If any reform superintendent was to discover that he did not belong to an all-powerful elite, it was certainly William McAndrew.

The three of McAndrew's policies that aroused the greatest controversy were his abolition of the teacher councils, the platoon plan or Gary system, and the proposed junior high schools. His refusal to work with the teachers' councils set the stage for much that followed. The platoon plan was never carried out because of teacher opposition to increased work loads and the unflagging opposition of Chicago's trade unions, who associated the plan with United States Steel. The junior high idea was put into operation after a rocky start, opposed as it was by powerful Margaret Haley, when those teachers assigned to the new junior highs became excited about the possibilities of reaching adolescents through the revised curriculum.

Through the years since Young, the teachers' councils had met irregularily, but they were still the means by which the teachers felt they could have a voice in determining the policies they were then asked to execute. Even though the councils were merely advisory, in reality they carried considerable weight since they could claim to represent the entire teaching staff. About the relationship between the superintendent and the councils, Counts says:

> . . . a superintendent of Mr. McAndrew's type, jealous of the prerogatives of his office and trained in a contrary tradition, must have felt himself clothed with the symbols but denied the substance of power. This was repugnant to his nature."[50]

The teachers themselves were partly responsible for McAndrew's dislike of the councils. Only one month and a half after he took office, a general council meeting was called, and the new superintendent faced for the first time delegates from thirty-nine different teachers groups representing eight thousand elementary school teachers. They proceeded to inform him, to pass resolutions, to edify and set down lists of arguments for him, to declare, to recommend, to demand information. No attempt was made on either side to establish a working relationship, to have a "meeting of the minds." Before the conference was adjourned, the superintendent withdrew after wishing the delegates "a pleasant vacation in case he did not see them again." And he did not.[51]

McAndrew's public objections to the teachers' councils were two-fold: 1) he did not think the principals should be excluded from the councils since they were considered part of the teaching staff by the administration, and 2) he did not think the councils should be held on school time. Teachers responded to the first criticism by pointing out that many teachers would not feel free to say what they really thought with principals present. As to the second, it was pointed out that only four teachers' council meetings, two local and two group meetings, were scheduled each semester. The fight continued until September of 1924 with the City Council, groups of citizens and the newspapers becoming involved, usually supporting the right of the teachers to hold their meetings. McAndrew appeared to be weakening under public pressure, but in September he issued a bulletin to the principals:

> . . . no dismissals of pupils from their classes during regular school hours shall be made for the purpose of meetings of councils, either high school or elementary.[52]

By the end of September the issue had been discussed in meetings of the Board and after some debate, the step of concurring "in the recommendation of the superintendent of schools" was taken, and the councils were abolished.

In part because the teacher councils had been eliminated, and in part because the teachers' union had been on the defensive since it had been forced to disaffiliate from the trade union movement, McAndrew encountered great opposition to two major organizational innovations. McAndrew's argument for the first of these, the junior high school, was based on the claim that there were not enough children at the seventh and eighth grade level for the elementary schools to be able to offer them a sufficient variety of courses, and that they would be better off being in a school which could do so. In response to questions raised by the Elementary Teachers' Council which met with him concerning the issue, he assured them that the junior highs were not intended to cause class cleavage, but that the programs would be for those who had to leave school after ninth grade as well as for those who wished to continue on in high school. As for who would be eligible for a teaching appointment to the junior high school, that would be determined in the future.

Junior high schools had already been established in other cities, and Chicago had seriously considered them before McAndrew's arrival, using a report by Charles Judd of the University of Chicago which stressed the advantages of such a system. The Elementary Teachers' Council nonetheless sought to delay their formation by urging that the "fullest publicity be given to all the essential features of the proposed junior high school for Chicago, for public discussion of the same."[53] The superintendent and the board chose to ignore the resolution and on the same day they received the teachers' resolution published a report recommending the adoption of the junior high system without further ado. The teachers were angry and resentful that the decision had been made without more extensive discussions, and that the whole think had been done, as they saw it, so quickly. McAndrew's statements regarding children who must leave school after the ninth grade opened up old wounds left from the fight over the Cooley Bill and antagonized organized labor. The federation of elementary teachers, especially Margaret Haley, also forsaw a threat to its existence in the new system. A large body of junior high teachers with different needs and better salaries would threaten its dominant position. That indeed happened, with the younger teachers who took the examination for the new positions becoming enthusiastic about new approaches to teaching adolescents, and resenting the Federation's blanket opposition to the junior highs.[54]

The second innovation which caused considerable controversy during the McAndrew years was the platoon system, an administrative arrangement which moved children from class to class and onto the playground for supervised recreation when other children were using the available rooms. It had first been used in Gary, Indiana and had been supported by United States Steel, which was a vociferous critic of organized labor. McAndrew thought it would be a good way to give children more hours in school than the present half-day sessions allowed.[55] The Chicago Tribune lauded the idea that the schools would take over "not only the scholastic training of the child but the supervision of his play."[56] The Teachers' Federation fought this battle no holds barred. They sent nine members to a number of cities where the platoon system had been tried and came back with negative reactions to the idea. No teacher group in Chicago supported the plan. They opposed it on the grounds that children, especially shy ones, should not have to establish relationships with so many teachers, that it was best for both children and teachers to get to know each other well. They also claimed that the plan would mean more preparation time, more students and more hours of teaching time for the teachers.

All of these controversies surrounding McAndrew's proposals swelled into a great chorus of opposition. Organized labor referred to junior high schools, the platoon system and IQ testing, still another McAndrew innovation, as "the unholy trinity." They were considered part of a grand scheme devised by business and political leaders to create a pool of well-trained and cheap labor and to strengthen a business caste system. Labor's criticisms of the platoon plan included the belief that its proponents wished to cut school expenditures--more children per teacher and more children per plant. They also suspected it of being a way to rush children through the lower grades "at a faster speed than is considered wise under the present methods."[57] In the summer of 1924, the Weekly New Letter, a publicity paper for the Illinois Federation of Labor, printed a report attacking junior highs:

> The "junior high" schools proposed by the Chicago Board of Education are designed to break the direct connection which now exists between the elementary schools and the high schools and to provide a means whereby the pupils may be given courses which will not qualify them for entry into the regular high schools.
>
> In recent years, high school attendance has increased enormously, until at present nearly all who complete the elementary school...go on into the high school. It is to check these modern tendencies and developments that the separate intermediate or "junior high" school is being introduced.[58]

George Counts, in School and Society in Chicago, reported a rumor which circulated in labor circles regarding the selection of McAndrew for the superintendency, one which was probably an important factor in labor's opposition to the superintendent's reforms. According to this story, toward the close of the previous superintendent's administration, a program for the comprehensive reorganization of the school system was formulated by a group of persons representing business and conservative clubs. This program called for an educational system which would discourage attendance in the upper years of the high school, provide a type of vocational education designed to fill employers' needs for cheap labor, and cut down the rising costs of education. The result was the selection of McAndrew. "Where this story was believed, there is little wonder that the new superintendent entered upon his duties under rather unfavorable auspices."[59]

Apart from his generous fiscal policies, McAndrew made no attempts to woo labor. In his three and a half years as the superintendent of the Chicago public schools, he never accepted an invitiation to speak to a gathering of organized labor, and he never responded to attempts on the part of labor's leaders to establish relationships. Within this framework of distrust and suspicion, one is better able to understand labor's reaction to the junior high school and the platoon system. As Counts points out, the attempt to introduce these reforms is a perfect demonstration of the principle that proposals for educational reconstruction are seldom accepted or rejected on their merits alone. They fall into a social setting where they are clothed with vestments of the past. "The representatives of labor can scarcely speak or write about the junior high school without mentioning the Cooley Bill...when the junior high school came to Chicago it recalled to mind forgotten battles and revived the slumbering antagonisms of the class conflict of a dozen years before.[60]

Labor and teacher opposition to McAndrew was in fact so great that "Big Bill" Thompson made the superintendent a major issue in his campaign against Mayor Dever in 1927. After Dever lost the mayoral election, the victorious Thompson coalition on the school board brought McAndrew to trial for insubordination, using his assistance of school clerks in a recent conflict with the board as the basis for the charge. During the trial McAndrew yawned and read newspapers, finally announcing that he was leaving. At the end of March, 1928, the final charges were summed up: McAndrew was indifferent "to the effects on school children of un-American history books and other British propaganda, treated the teachers despotically, and imposed unsound teaching methods on the schools. But a leader had been found in William Hale Thompson who, with courage and energy, espoused the cause of citizens crying, 'They shall not teach that George Washington was a rebel!'"[61] Overlooked was the fact that McAndrew had laid the basis for a fiscal crisis, one that would restore machine-style politics to the city's schools and jeopardize his own junior high school system (which was eliminated in 1933 as a budget-cutting measure).

McAndrew, himself, who was dismissed by the school board, sued the Board for six thousand dollars in back salary and Thompson for two hundred fifty thousand dollars for libel, but withdrew the suits when a Circuit Court judge ruled that he had been unjustly dismissed, there being no basis for the charges either on grounds of insubordination or lack of patriotism.[62]

While McAndrew received loyal business backing and antagonized teachers and labor, he never lost the backing of the City Club, Mayor Dever, or other parts of the reform coalition. Only with Dever's own defeat was McAndrew removed from office. Unlike Cooley, who also had business backing but encountered strong reform opposition, McAndrew was regarded by reformers as one of their own not only because he had been actively recruited by reformers and teacher organizations initially, but also because he extended the size and scope of the public schools, attempted to introduce organizational reforms that seemed to be opposed by teachers more for self-interested than broadly philosophical reasons, and his zeal for efficiency could never be confused with penny-pinching economizing.

McAndrew's experience amply reveals as well the limits of reform power. Although McAndrew himself may have felt he could impose organizational change from the "top down"[63] he was no more successful at doing so than were either Cooley or Young. As George Counts observed in the course of his contemporary analysis of the McAndrew Administration, "Minor educational pronouncements may emerge from the board of education, but the more important policies are the product of the clash of the organized and articulate minorities that compose modern society."[64]

Conclusion

Progressivism was a product of pluralistic give and take. It was a response to the unsatisfactory and uneven growth of the first approximately fifty years of public schooling. It consisted of attempts to incorporate into the curriculum of the schools, programs which were based on an increased knowledge of the needs of children, both physical and intellectual. It was also an attempt to enhance the public's expectations of a tax-supported public institution as well as an attempt to upgrade the quality of the teaching profession and to enhance its status and material well-being. It was an attempt to expand public education beyond the 3 R's, providing vocational education for the large numbers of students who left school in order to work. And it was an attempt to professionalize the administration of increasingly complex urban school systems. "From its very beginning progressivism was pluralistic . . . and always closely related to broader currents of social and political progressivism."[65]

While it is true that Cooley, Young and McAndrew were all interested in the professionalization of the superintendency, the pluralistic politics of the progressive era precluded dictates "from the top down." Cooley's attempts to satisfy a rather small element of the population, the Commercial Club, by establishing vocational education under the auspices of industry rather than the public schools, led to outraged cries from labor, educators,and reformers. The merit system was defeated by teachers working with a reform board, and even though the Cooley bill was brought before the state legislature three times, political pressure kept it from ever passing. McAndrew's attempts at instituting new programs without carefully consulting teachers and a variety of groups within society, including organized labor, meant political disaster for him in only a few years. The teachers and labor fought the platoon system bitterly because of its association with United States Steel and many of them at first objected to the junior high as well. Ella Flagg Young's opposition came from the school board, which resisted her attempts to centralize pedogogical decision-making in the office of the superintendent. By removing the school curriculum from her hands, claiming there were "too many fads and frills" the board, increasingly dominated by machine-backed members, infuriated her, causing her to resign.

While progressive era reform laws such as the Otis Law strengthened the status of educational administrators and teachers alike, they did not guarantee reform control of the schools. By 1927, Dever and McAndrew were out and Thompson was in. What Chicago alderman Mathias "Paddy" Bauler once observed was certainly true in 1927: "Chicago ain't ready for reform."[66] The provisions of the Otis Law governing borrowing by the board of education were now used by machine mayor "Big Bill" Thompson for his own purposes, contributing, with McAndrew's own expansionist program, to the near collapse of the entire city school system by 1933.

Footnotes

1. Callahan, 1962; Tyack, 1974; Tyack and Hansot, 1982.
2. Tyack, 1974.
3. Cremin, 1961, p. viii.
4. Tyack, 1974, p. 132; Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 189.
5. Wiebe, 1967, p. 117.
6. _Ibid_., pp. 117-118.
7. Tyack and Hansot, 1982, p. 144.
8. Commercial Club of Chicago _Yearbook_, 1911-1912, p. 277.
9. Illinois State Federation of Labor _Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Convention_, p. 52.
10. Sola, 1973, pp. 142-152.
11. Chicago _Tribune_, 17 December 1912, p. 6.
12. Herrick. 1971, p. 119.
13. Dewey, 1913, p. 374.
14. See Chapter III.
15. Cooley, 1914.
16. Illinois State Federation of Labor _Proceedings of the 35th Annual Convention_, p. 127.
17. Tyack, 1974, p. 61.
18. See part II of Collins, 1976. For example, p. 222.
19. Tyack, 1974, p. 62.
20. Rice, March 1893, pp. 200-202. Cited in Donatelli, 1971, p. 48.

21. Chicago Tribune, 3 December 1906, p. 9, col. 1. Cited in Smith, 1979, pp. 136-137.

22. Chicago Chronicle, 10 April 1907; 11 April 1907. Cited in Smith, 1979, p. 137.

23. Herrick, 1971, p. 111.

24. Ibid.

25. Smith, 1979, p. 140.

26. "Cooley Will Step Out," Chicago Record Herald, 10 February 1909, p. 9, col. 6. Cited in Smith, 1979, p. 141.

27. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1916, pp. 125-131. Cited in Donatelli, 1971, p. 402.

28. Young, 1900, p. 55. Cited in Donatelli, 1971, p. 195.

29. Young, 1901, p. 30-31. Cited in Smith, 1979, p. 109.

30. Chicago Board of Education Proceedings, 1898, p. 472.

31. Ibid.

32. Counts, 1928, p. 113.

33. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1913, p. 123. Cited in Donatelli, 1971, p. 398.

34. Ibid., p. 127. Cited in Ibid., p. 377.

35. Ibid., p. 127. Cited in Ibid., p. 359.

36. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1911, p. 126. Cited in Ibid., p. 363. Donatelli, 1971, p. 373.

37. Goggin to Haley, 9 February 1912. Cited in Smith, 1979, p. 185.

38. Chicago Record Herald, 15 December 1910, p. 1, col. 3. Cited in Ibid., p. 184.

39. Goggin to Haley, 9 February 1912. Cited in Ibid., p. 185.

40. Harrison to Young, 1 July 1912. Cited in Ibid., p. 186.

41. Chicago Inter-Ocean, 20 December 1912. Cited in Ibid., p. 187.

42. Swett, 1971, p. 698.

43. Raven to Haley, 29 July 1916. Cited in Smith, 1979, p. 216.

44. See Chapter VII of this manuscript.

45. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1924, p. 12.

46. Herrick, 1971, p. 156.

47. Chicago School Finances, 1915 - 1925, 1927, pp. 77-79.

48. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1925 - 1926, p. 75.

49. Herrick, 1971, pp. 179-180. We discuss this fiscal crisis and its political consequences in Chapter IX.

50. Counts, 1928, p. 116.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

52. Reports of the Elementary Teachers' General Council, p. 274. Cited in Counts, p. 125.

53. Herrick, 1971, p. 146.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

55. Chicago Board of Education Annual Report, 1924.

56. Chicago Tribune, June 1924. Cited in Herrick, 1971, p. 149.

57. Counts, 1928, p. 177.

58. Illinois State Federation of Labor Weekly News Letter, 26 July 1924, pp. 3-4.

59. Counts, 1928, p. 199.

60. *Ibid*, p. 177.

61. Herrick, 1971, pp. 168-170.

62. Wendt and Kogan, 1953, p. 302. Cited in Herrick, 1971, p. 169.

63. See Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Tyack, 1974; Tyack and Hansot, 1982.

64. Counts, 1928, p. 343.

65. Cremin, 1961, p. 22.

66. Rakove, 1975, p. 24.

Chapter IX

MACHINE POLITICS AND FISCAL CRISIS

Economic collapse not only induced a revival of machine-style politics in many of America's depression-ridden cities of the 1930s, but it forced major retrenchments in educational finance as well. While the twenties had been a period of unparalleled growth and expansion, with schools serving more children from a broader age range with more diversified services, the thirties forced a reappraisal of education's appropriate role. Groups that could work together in a decade of optimism found their interests at conflict under more pressed economic circumstances. Any picture of the social forces shaping urban education must account for the bad times as well as the good. Unfortunately, under the worst economic circumstances, school men and women found themselves isolated from all the major centers of power. Business became primarily concerned with economic deficits and what they perceived to be confiscatory tax policies; labor sacrificed broad social goals for the most immediate interests of their staunchest members; and politicians discovered that teachers "controlled" very few votes.

This picture can be painted most starkly in Chicago, for it was in this midwestern metropolis that the depression hit most severely, dependence on a local tax base was greatest, and the expansion of the twenties had left the school system fiscally the most exposed. For these reasons the cutbacks in Chicago were most severe, the political controversies surrounding retrenchments provided the most public discussion, and the divergent interests in education were most easily discerned. It is in Chicago where we can see most clearly that businessmen, far from being in the educational vanguard, were the first to call for fiscal restraint. It is in Chicago where we find the sharpest example of a labor movement caught between its over-arching commitment to public education and its narrow organizational interests. And it is in Chicago that we find a reform movement, isolated from both business and labor, crippled and unable to do more than protest the direction of school policy. Indeed, it is Chicago in the thirties that cleanly delineates the differences between the school-minded reformers and the business elites with whom they are so often identified. It is for this reason that we conclude our last substantive chapter on urban education with reformers, not triumphant and in power, but in defeat and disarray.

Chicago was not the typical depressed city; its condition was far worse. During the decades preceding the 1930s it had grown at a breakneck pace, becoming both an important national and international center of commerce and trade. Large numbers of immigrants coming to the city caused the population to burgeon; from 1900 to 1930 the average increase per decade in the population was 26.1 percent.[1] By 1930, people born in foreign countries comprised 25.3 percent of the population. Combined with second generation immigrants, the total comprised 64.8 percent of Chicago's 3,376,435 people.[2] Many of these immigrants found work in Chicago's thriving manufacturing sector. Here, 33.1 percent of the employed persons in the city were engaged in manufacturing in contrast to Atlanta and San Francisco, where industry was dwarfed by comparison. In 1930, these cities employed only 21.9 percent and 20.4 percent respectively in their manufacturing sectors. (See Table IX-1.)

The depression brought an end to this period of booming industrial growth. In 1930, only 54.8 percent of the total Chicago work force still had jobs.[3] In the decade from 1930 to 1940, the number of employed persons in Chicago industry dropped by more than 200,000 people or by 13.3 percent. San Francisco and Atlanta, with 59.1 percent and 57.8 percent of their work forces employed in 1930, fared somewhat better.[4] Although the economies of all the cities improved with the advent of war, San Francisco and Atlanta, with more diversity in their industries, were able to endure the depression more easily. As had been the case since the founding of the city, Atlanta remained a regional

Table IX-1
Employed Persons by Industrial Sectors: Atlanta, Chicago, San Francisco, 1930

Sector	% of Total Employed		
	Atlanta	Chicago	San Francisco
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Mining	0.[illegible]	0.3	1.4
Construction	6.2	7.0	6.0
Manufacturing	21.9	33.1	20.4
Transportation, Communication and other Public Utilities	11.2	11.6	14.6
Wholesale and Retail Trade	16.4	18.4	18.3
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate	4.7	4.8	6.4
Business & Repair Service	1.4	--	--
Personal Services	25.2	12.0	14.7
Entertainment & Recreation	1.0	1.2	1.4
Professional & Related Services	6.2	5.9	7.4
Public Administration	2.6	2.0	3.7
Industry not available	2.4	3.7	5.6
Total % Employed	100.0	100.0	99.9
Total Employed Persons (n)	130,152	1,558,999	333,562

SOURCE: Fifteenth Census of the U.S., Population, Vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 527, 652, 278

NOTE: Employed persons aged 10 and older.

railroad center in the 1930's. In addition, Atlanta continued to serve as the banking and insurance center of the Southeast, and the city housed the regional headquarters of a large variety of national concerns. Wholesale and retail trade also played an important role in the local economy.[5]

San Francisco in the 1930's grew at a relatively modest pace. Although affected by the depression, it was shielded from any severe economic decline by a variety of federally-financed building programs and by the diversification of its industry. Between 1920 and 1930 the volume of shipping at the port of San Francisco had doubled, reaching a value of over one and one half billion dollars by 1929. The shipping industry did not grow during the decade of the thirties, but remained quite constant, both when measured by number of employees and by value added.

Unlike Chicago, whose industrial sector had experienced phenomenal growth and major qualitative transformations during the 1920s, manufacturing in San Francisco had always been carried out on a small scale. Its geography, competition from Los Angeles and the 1906 earthquake and fire, which occurred at a time when Los Angeles was beginning to flex its muscles, all constituted obstacles to the industrial expansion of San Francisco. Most of its industrial activity occurred in relatively small establishments and involved the processing of raw materials rather than the production of heavy manufacturing goods. Trends show the decline of manufacturing in San Francisco after 1930, accompanied by the steady growth of professional and related services as well as public administration. The city also retained its position as the leading wholesale and banking center of the state through the 1930s.

Gross figures, however, do not convey the true impact of the depression on the lives of people. Using the Chicago experience as an example, those who succeeded in keeping their jobs saw their wages dropping precipitously. While in 1929 the average weekly earnings had attained an all time high of $31.15, four years later wages had dropped 38 percent to a low of $19.38. Many Chicagoans lost their life savings as 177 of the city's 228 banks closed their doors.[6] Thousands were evicted from their homes for failure to pay their rent. During the first years of the depression, relief was woefully inadequate. Local agencies were not capable of dealing with the devastation brought about by the depression. The gravity of conditions in Chicago as compared to the rest of the country is indicated in the fact that by October 1932, Illinois had received one half of all federal loans for relief.[7]

The financial constraints under which the cities found themselves operating affected their school systems as well, but affected Chicago's the most dramatically. All three systems were in a very exposed position as a result of their enormous growth and the increased number of services they offered by 1930, including kindergartens, vocational education programs, junior highs, extended sports and music activities, and junior colleges. School attendance declined in the 1930s, because of the drop off in the birth rate caused by the depression, leaving the city's schools overcommitted with too many teachers and too many capital expenditures. San Francisco was in the best position of the three cities. Compared to 21.6 percent for Chicago and 22.9 percent for Atlanta, it had only 15.2 percent of its population of school age in 1930, so it had comparatively fewer children to educate and fewer expenditures to make.[8]

The varying recoveries which each of the school systems made is largely explained by the development of the financial structures which supported them. Chicago was exceptionally dependent on local sources of taxation, a fact which gave rise to the great controversy over school finances which will be discussed in this chapter. San Francisco fared better because a new amendment to the state constitution passed in 1933 charged the state with providing the mandatory funding for schools which was formerly required of the counties. Three taxes--a new state sales tax, a state use tax, and an income tax--provided the pool of funds needed to finance these increased responsibilities. Inasmuch as the required contribution for each county had been thirty dollars per elementary pupil in average daily attendance and sixty dollars for each high school student, state responsibility greatly increased state support. As a result San Francisco was able to avoid the cutbacks in school expenditures which educational systems in the other cities were forced to make.

Looking at expenditures per pupil, as shown in Table IX-2, San Francisco's expenditures actually rose during the decade of the depression, from $213 in 1930 to $289 by 1940. While Atlanta's PPE fell in current dollars, in constant dollars they showed a slight gain from 1930 to 1935, and at least for white students a definite recovery by 1940.

In Atlanta, the school board received an annual appropriation of 26 percent from the Atlanta city council, and that was increased in 1933 to 30 percent, largely because of the activities of civic groups and labor. Chicago, on the other hand, took much longer to recover from the effects of the depression and the fiscal crisis of the early 1930s. That city, unlike San Francisco, had little help in financing its schools from the state. It received an eight dollar flat grant per pupil from the state, as did every other school district in Illinois.[9] And Chicago, unlike Atlanta, did not receive an annual guaranteed appropriation from the city council. The school system here was primarily dependent on the property tax, and a free and easy way of assessing property according to the whims of elected assessors put the schools in a very precarious situation. Added to this were the problems brought about by the board's deficit financing, a method to which they resorted in order to finance the tremendous growth in the schools from 1915-1930. With the advent of the depression, local property taxes became a matter of great controversy in local politics.

All of the major participants in the great battle over school finances--business, labor, teachers, and politicians--were also contestants in the debate over the local real estate tax, a debate which was becoming increasingly heated by 1927. Business, labor and the teachers alike were unhappy with the existing local tax assessment machinery. The five members of the Board of Assessors had each carved out independent fiefdoms, and each had made assessments in his territory independent of the standards and procedures of the others. Their work was overseen by a three man Board of Review, whose duty it was to equalize assessments and hear appeals. The only people happy with these arrangements were the politicians involved, for the complexities of the

Table IX-2
School Expenditures per Pupil in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Francisco
1930-1940

	San Francisco		Chicago		Atlanta			
					White		Black	
Year Ending	Current $	Constant[a] $	Current $	Constant[a] $	Current $	Constant[a] $	Current $	Constant[a] $
1930	152	213	166	225	116[b]	83[b]	116[b]	83[b]
1935	157	267	197	336	119	70	41	24
1940	173	289	143	239	180	108	67	40

Source: Yearly Statistical Reports of the Atlanta Public Schools.
Annual Statistical Reports of the San Francisco Public Schools.
Monthly Reports of School Statistics, Proceedings, Board of Education.

Notes: Per pupil expenditures computed using current expenditures plus debt servicing. Pupils are those enrolled in high school, elementary, kindergarten, trade vocational, opportunity, continuation, and special schools. Evening and adult schools and city colleges are excluded.

[a] 1947-49 = 100

[b] Breakdown by race not available for 1930.

system allowed many opportunities for responding to particularized claims and special requests, which could be granted in response to political contributions of one kind or another. But while this practice had long been accepted as a constituent part of Chicago politics, tax assessment policy in the late twenties was also criticized for dramatically underassessing property values in general. At a time when economic prosperity was forcing rapid increases in property values, a tax assessment machinery based on tradition and connections was unlikely to respond rapidly to steep increments in the real market value of the property. Teachers complained that schools lacked proper fiscal support, labor claimed that vested interests were holding tax assessments in check, and business leaders became concerned that government policy was not sufficiently rationalized.

Under the leadership of Cook County Board President, Anton Cermak, who saw tax reform as one of the issues that would help him win the next mayoral election, a Joint Commission on Real Valuation was appointed to assist the county assessors in making the 1927 quadrennial assessment of county property values. The Commission, which consisted of "prominent businessmen and citizens," hired a professional director who lacked the usual political connections and who was committed to assessing property "by economic value, not political value."[10] Teachers, other school leaders, and the ranks of organized labor were cheered by the prospect of a systematic review of real estate that would focus on real economic value; undoubtedly, school finances, which had grown increasingly precarious, would soon be restored to a sound basis.

The high hopes of labor and the teachers were dashed, however, because the product of the Commission's work was nothing short of a disaster for Chicago's schools. In the first place, the Commission's very existence delegitimized the existing tax machinery, causing short-term financial havoc for local governments.

Although the Joint Commission was expected to assist in the reform of assessment practices, their efforts were mostly ignored by the County Board of Assessors and the Board of Review. In the assessment of county property, its report was said to be grossly uneven and to bear the marks of deliberate discrimination in the valuation of certain classes of property.[11] A wave of public protest greeted the assessment when it was published, and amid charges and countercharges the reassessment was not completed and released in full until April 1930.[12] During the interim no tax bills were issued by the county treasurer, leaving local governing agencies without any property tax revenues for two years.

With no taxes being collected, the Joint Commission attempted to rescue the schools and other local agencies by appealing to business and civic groups for help. In response to these appeals, a Citizens Committee, led by businessman Silas H. Strawn, raised seventy-four million dollars for the purchase of tax anticipation warrants to help carry over local government agencies. But while this provided some short-term relief, a second blow fell. When the revised assessment finally emerged in 1930, it reduced the tax base for the city from over $3,280,000, to little more than $2,660,000. This devaluation was necessary, it was said, in order to "equalize" valuations between the city and the rest of Cook County, and between Cook County and the rest of the state.[13]

While the 1928 reassessment had the effect of delaying tax collections for two years and reducing the tax base in the city, these effects were compounded by another factor which entered the picture. The 1928 reassessment had been performed in large part during the calendar years 1928 and 1929 when actual property values were at a peak. When the tax bills were issued in 1930, the impact of the 1929 depression was beginning to be felt and property values were on the decline. Many tax payers reasoned that their tax bills were too high, given the general decline in property values. Of the one million assessments for the county area, approximately 450,000 were challenged in court. By 1933, over $200 million were owed in back taxes by the "tax strikers."[14]

By the time the tax reassessment was finally published in 1930, the city's debt was enormous. In spite of the fact that no taxes had been collected for two years, municipal expenditures had increased from $77 million in 1929 to over $109 million in 1930.[15] At the same time, the deficit of expenditures over revenues grew from $7 million to $45 million.[16] Most of the gap between tax revenues and expenditures was made up through the issuance of tax anticipation warrants.

The city's growing financial problems were especially disturbing to business interests. Most of the bonds and tax anticipation warrants whose value was being jeopardized by the excessive proliferation of the debt were owned by Chicago banks. In addition, many businesses contended they could not afford to pay the same tax rate during the depression as during times of normal prosperity, and they demanded that municipal expenditures be reduced.

In 1931, the business community, along with many other groups in the city, deserted the Thompson mayoral camp, turning instead to Anton Cermak, whose mayoral victory signalled the beginning of particularily close ties between business and the Democratic machine.[17] Cermak received endorsements from Robert I. Randolph, president of Montgomery Ward. Other Cermak supporters included Melvin Traylor, president of the First National Bank of Chicago; Silas Strawn, ex-president of the Commercial Club and the Industrial Club; Franklin Loesch, former president of the Union League and the Chicago Bar Association; William G. Dawes, banker; and Julius Rosenwald.[18] Full page newspaper advertisements and radio broadcasts of the "Cermak Progress Parade," a series of pro-Cermak campaign addresses made by business leaders, were sponsored by a Special Business Committee for Cermak.[19] Even traditionally Republican businessmen formed a Cermak for Mayor Republican Club.[20]

Business support for Cermak was coupled with overwhelming support from the city's ethnic communities. In 1930, Cermak had won his third term as President of the Cook County Board as part of a Democratic landslide. In 1931, the Democrats were in a good position to take on Bill Thompson. Al Smith's presidential campaign in 1928 had brought many ethnic groups into the Democratic fold, and victories in the 1928 and 1930 elections had given the party new sources of patronage. After the death of George Brennan in 1928, Cermak emerged as the head of the Cook County Democratic Organization. Cermak was an extremely adept practitioner of coalition politics. Since 1906 he had headed the multi-ethnic United Societies, an organization opposing prohibition. In 1927 he was appointed president of a joint committee of Poles, Czechs and

Slovaks to create a united Slavic-American opposition to the restriction of immigration.[21] By 1928, he successfully welded together the support of newer immigrant groups and was able to challenge the traditional Irish strangle-hold over the Democratic Party leadership.

While Cermak was garnering support from many different areas of the city, Thompson was offending a majority of Chicagoans with his heavy-handed political moves. The "pineapple primary" of 1928, in which gangsters were responsible for the bombing of the homes of Thompson opponents had driven a number of Republican leaders away from Thompson, and some of them into the Democratic camp. When the states attorney raided the offices of Daniel Serritella, Thompson's city sealer one week before the 1931 mayoral election, and then released a statement alleging that fifty-four million dollars were lost due to Serritella's collusion with dishonest merchants, the news hit the depression-plagued city like a bombshell.[22] Cermak also succeeded in taking away one of Thompson's most potent political weapons. With Cermak's long-standing opposition to prohibition, Thompson was unable to repeat his demogoguery magic and garner votes because he was "wetter than the Atlantic." Cermak defeated Thompson by nearly two hundred thousand votes, carrying 45 of 50 wards. With his victory in 1931, and the Democratic guberntorial and presidential victories in 1932, virtually all sources of patronage came under Democratic control. From 1931 onwards, Democrats in Chicago maintained support through the distribution of patronage and the awarding of political prequisites.

As the depression deepened, business became increasingly concerned about fiscal deficits and uncontrolled expenditures. As a result, members of the business community became considerably more active in civic affairs and developed quite direct ties with the machine politicians who occupied City Hall. Organized labor, although extremely distrustful of big business, was eventually brought into the ambit of the machine too, when it became apparent that it was to labor's advantage to be there. The teachers, who had always enjoyed close ties with organized labor as well as with the immigrant communities, found themselves deserted by their allies. Seeking new friends, the teachers became founding members of the Citizens' Schools Committee. Thus the political realignment brought about by the machine politics of the 1930s and exacerbated by the depression, now found the teachers working hand-in-hand with middle-class reformers.

Businessmen and the Political Machine

The business community enjoyed unprecedented access to City Hall during the late 1920s and early 1930s. In spite of the fact that accusations from other segments of the community, including labor and the teachers' leaders, were leveled against businesses for not paying their fair share of the taxes, and in spite of the fact that many businesses were on a "tax strike" during 1930 and 1931, business and financial leaders were still in a position to shape the city's overall fiscal policies. Active involvement of business began with the formation of the Joint Comission on Real Valuation. It increased substantially when that Commission asked civic groups to take some kind of action to deal with the financial plight of the city. As we have seen, the Strawn committee was formed in response, and proceeded to raise $74 million to purchase tax anticipation warrants. But if financial leaders were willing to raise the necessary fiscal resources for the city, they were determined to exact a price. In light of the failure to improve the city's tax base, business turned to cutting governmental expenditures with more vigor. Under the leadership of Fred W. Sargeant, the Committee on Public Expenditures was formed. This influential committee found itself welcome in the offices of both Mayor Cermak and later of Mayor Kelly. Through its close ties with financial interests, it was able to force the school board to cut its budget dramatically. There was another side to the relationship between business and the machine, however. Although the Sargent Committee forced stringent reductions on municipal services, its members did not dictate specifically which programs were to be cut. As we shall see, this respect for the autonomy of political authorities led to an interesting pattern of economy measures within Chicago's school system.

Once in the mayor's office, Cermak cooperated with members of the Strawn Committee, which had raised money for the purchase of tax anticipation warrants, urging the governor of Illinois to convene a special session of the state legislature in order to consider long-term measures for alleviating Chicago's financial problems. Appointed by Governor Emmerson, leaders in business, commerce, and labor participated in a tax conference throughout the summer. The group announced a series of wide-ranging recommendations which included reorganization of the assessment machinery in Cook County plus a graduated income tax, a tobacco tax and an automobile tax.[23] At the same time, however, the conference noted that "governmental expenditures must be reduced."[24] Acting on the recommendations of the Governor's Conference, bills to reorganize Cook County's assessment machinery and to levy a graduated income tax were enacted into law. Although this would have provided a more stable tax base for municipal institutions, the following year the income tax was declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court.

In the aftermath of the Governor's Tax Conference, efforts of various business groups were directed towards reducing school expenditures rather than increasing tax revenues. The Board of Education and Mayor Cermak asked the president of a local department store, D. F. Kelly, to organize a group of businessmen to sell warrants for the schools. Kelly was a former member of the Governor's Tax Conference, and he insisted that if tax warrants were to be sold, the school board's budget would have to be cut. When the boards's budget was too large to suit him, Kelly dissolved his committee in exasperation, saying, the Board of Education had "assumed full responsibility to secure funds to meet its budget and discharge its debt."[25]

Others did not give up so quickly however. On the same day that Kelly dissolved his committee, the Chicago Tribune reported that several members of the Kelly committee were organizing "a committee for the purpose of urging a much larger cut in 1932 than has been undertaken by any of the local governments."[26] This new Committee on Public Expenditures was chaired by Fred W. Sargent, president of the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad. The Sargent Committee maintained close ties with the city's financial interests, and at least one periodical alleged that nearly half of the committee members were directors or other officers of banks.[27] The influence exerted by the committee was

347

enormous. As Sargent later wrote:

> . . . they (the banks) have shown that they positively will not lend money for any municipal function that does not have our active support. This has been a powerful lever in dealing with the really small number of recalcitrants in public office who still cling to faith in Santa Claus.[28]

The Sargent Committee embarked upon a program of negotiating reductions in local governmental expenditures. Because of its influence it was able to negotiate enormous cuts in the school board's budget, eventually reducing the tax levy to $48 million by promising to help the board meet some of its financial obligations. However, its members did not dictate the specific programs to be cut. Instead, Sargent wrote, "we have tried to indicate the size of the economies which must achieved and left it to the responsible authorities to work out their own plans of economy."[29]

The committee's close ties to the city's Democratic politicians persisted when Edward J. Kelly succeeded Cermak in the mayor's office. The Chicago Tribune reported that "one of Kelly's first visitors was Fred W. Sargent . . . with whom he conferred for a half hour on the problem of paying public employees."[30] Kelly made five new appointments to the school board, and although none of these appointments were persons who were major leaders of the business community (two were coal company presidents, one a realtor, another president of a neighborhood bank and the fifth the head of the Machinists Union) all were advocates of further economies in the school budget. The new members assured the banks that further cuts in the school budget would be made. On the very same day that the appointments were made, Kelly announced that downtown bankers had "practically agreed" to purchase nearly $13 million worth of 1932 school tax anticipation warrants.[31] Business influence on the board was further strengthened with the appointment of James McCahey as president and two more fiscal conservatives to the board. James McCahey, a coal dealer whom the press described as the "Mayor's choice," was himself a self-declared "advocate of the strictest economies in the school system."[32]

In July 1933 the board announced its new economy program for the schools. It included the termination of a number of educational services and the attenuation of many others. All the city's junior high schools, the Parental School for delinquents, the Crane Junior College and all but one of the city's continuation schools were permanently closed; house arts and manual training were discontinued in the elementary grades; all swimming pools were closed, and the activities of athletic teams, bands, and orchestras were terminated. Kindergartens were cut by 50 percent; all elementary physical education teachers and 15 percent of the gym teachers were discharged. The teaching load of high school teachers was increased to seven classes a day, and the visiting teacher service was discontinued. In all, some fourteen hundred teachers lost their jobs. Cutbacks were also made in administration with the bureaus of vocational guidance, curriculum and special education abolished, as well as the dramatic reductions in the size of the bureaus of compulsory attendance and child study.[33]

These severe economy measures were necessary because, in addition to over one $140 million in outstanding bond, tax warrant, interest and payroll debts, the school board faced a $10 million deficit in current expenditures.[34] School Board president McCahey explained that the board had been confronted with the choice of "the inevitable closing of the schools, or of courageously applying the knife of economy, in face of certain criticism, wherever necessary in order to save our schools."[35] At the same meeting, the board also attacked the non-essential "fads and frills" which had sprung up in the schools. McCahey declared that "many of the so-called 'extra curricula' [sic] activities, embellishments or 'fads and frills' must be eliminated."[36] "An effort to reduce the taxpayers' bill for public education", he stated, was the school board's motivation for the economy program. Warming to his responsibilities, the school board president even asserted, "these are permanent cuts . . . in my opinion, the schools will really serve their purpose better as a result of this program."[37]

These deep cuts were nonetheless met by an outpouring of rage from teachers, parents, concerned citizens, and educators. Although the Sargent Committee had been in a position to demand the cuts and had participated in setting the size of the budget, no attempt was made by these business leaders to decide where the cuts would be made. This was left to city hall. The result of the decisions which Chicago's machine politicians proceeded to make was the destruction of a traditional political alliance between labor and the teachers. In a number of ways, the machine chose to extend its patronage to organized labor, instead of to the teachers. Janitors, other maintenance workers and civil service employees were kept on the payroll at the expense of the instructional staff. Faced with these board decisions, organized labor chose not to give teachers its wholehearted support but instead took into account the concerns of the school janitors, who were members of the powerful Building Trades and Services Union. In this context of changing political alliances, we shall see why the machine was able to use the fiscal crisis to drive a wedge between the teachers and organized labor, not only depriving the teachers of a powerful ally but forcing them to search for political allies from a different social group altogether. One of the consequences of this change was the formation of the Citizens' Schools Committee founded by teachers and their new allies, the middle-class school reformers.

The Labor-Teacher Split

The teachers were among those feeling the effects of the city and school financial plight the most severely. As early as December of 1929, their paychecks were delayed a week. By June 1, 1932, pay was three months in arrears and by April of 1934, it was delayed by as much as nine months.[38] Because of days shaved off the school calendar and payless school holidays, 23.5 percent was cut from teachers' salaries between 1931 and 1933.[39] Between March 1930 and September 1934, there were only eight paydays on time, and for several of those, the teachers were issued paper "scrip" instead of money.[40]

Part of the problem for the teachers was their lack of political muscle in a city where political muscle was everything. Since 1915 the Chicago Teachers' Federation, headed by capable Margaret Haley, had been the strongest of the teacher organizations. However, Haley and the CTF had been heavily involved in the drive for a new assessment of property in the city in 1927. When that drive produced such disastrous result, Haley and her organization lost face, and as the economics of the city worsened, found themselves increasingly at odds with other teacher organizations.

In 1931 the Teachers' Conference introduced a bill in the state legislature to protect their salaries. The legislation provided that not more than 25 percent of the total tax levied for educational purposes could be used for other than salaries, pensions and the retirement fund. However, the CTF and a friendly organization, the Chicago Division of the Illinois State Teachers Association, opposed the bill. With representatives of teachers lobbying against one another, the bill failed to pass.[41]

During the course of the next few years, the board's actions frequently incited the teachers to more militant action, much of it seemingly spontaneous. There were parades, mass rallies, meetings in Grant Park to protest payment of salaries in scrip, and marches on the mayor's office. In the midst of this turmoil the Volunteer Emergency Committee was formed. Led by John M. Fewkes, a high school physical education teacher, this committee organized numerous demonstrations and protests throughout the spring of 1933. At the opening of the Chicago World's Fair, a huge crowd of teachers unfurled banners calling attention to the contrast between the fair's title, "A Century of Progress" and the plight of the city's schools.

With the 1933 announcement of the board's economy measures, efforts to consolidate increased, but progress was uneven until 1936 when John Fewkes campaigned for the presidency of the Men's Teachers Union on a platform of immediate amalgamation of all teachers' organizations. The response from all groups, with the exception of Margaret Haley's CTF and the High School Teachers Association was very strong, and by October 1937 the Chicago Teachers Union was formally chartered as Local Number One of the AFT with a membership of 6,461, 43 percent the city's elementary teachers and 62 percent of the high school teachers. A year later, its membership would stand at 60 percent of the city's teachers.

Superintendent Johnson and the Board of Education viewed the formation of the CTU with hostility. Johnson declared that the CTU was not a "teachers' organizaton" and banned its activities from school premises.[42] As time passed, the superintendent's resistance to meeting with CTU representatives diminished, but the union was still unable to gain recognition as an agent of collective bargaining for the teachers. However, by 1947 the CTU was able to claim credit for definite progress being made in the area of better teacher salaries.

Considering the conditions under which the teachers were laboring and the large number of activities in which they were engaged to promote their cause, the amount of publicity accorded to them by the labor press, the Federation News was extremely limited. Historically, organized labor's position on public education had been clear and consistent. Although not supportive of all educational reforms, some of which would have been to their advantage, they nevertheless pushed for curricular expansion, increased public financial support for the schools, and better working conditions for teachers. They had firmly aligned themselves with those who opposed the school board's economy moves. Fifteen years earlier, the relationship between teachers and labor had been so strong that when Margaret Haley was told by board member Loeb to disaffiliate the CTF from organized labor, labor chief Fitzpatrick did not see a problem. The two groups had so much in common they could continue to work together without being formally affiliated.

Just a couple of years prior to the great fiscal crisis, the Federation News had printed an editorial stating "As organized labor was the major instrumentality in establishing the free, tax-supported public school, it continues to be the protector of our free public school system from all forms of exploitation."[43] Like the teachers, the CFL felt that the solution to the school systems' financial problems lay not in the economy measures that business men advised, but in increasing the revenues available to the schools. It had supported the drive for reassessment of the 1927 property evaluation, in which the CTF had played such an active role. The Federation News asserted: "Honest reevaluation of the property is the remedy that will provide the schools of Chicago with the needed funds, end the crippling of the school system, allow for a fair compensation for teachers, and terminate the unsanitary and perilous crowding of the schools."[44]

There were a number of changes which had taken place in the fifteen years since 1915, however, which explain labor's increasingly weak support for and eventual desertion of its public school allies. First, in the early thirties the unionized teachers represented only a miniscule portion of the total CFL membership and, at that, were divided into several distinct groups. By 1933 there were approximately fourteen hundred teachers employed by the Board of Education; even if two-thirds of them were card-carrying members of unions with CFL affiliation, they would constitute only a tiny part of the three to five-hundred thousand CFL membership. Further, the teachers were divided into several different organizations all based on different salary schedules and statuses attributed to groups within the teaching force. There was a Substitute Teachers' Union, and Elementary School Teachers' Union, a Junior High Teachers' Association, a High School Teachers' Association, a Principals' Club, and so on; it is easy to see why the teachers did not speak with united voice.

A second reason which helps to explain the limited amount of attention given to the teachers' plight by the CFL is the general unemployment of the period. The onset of the 1929 depression had knocked the bottom out the construction industry in the city and the members of the building trades unions were suffering from the consequent slowdown in new construction starts. Other locals were also having contract difficulties and were involved in strikes, so the teachers' problems constituted only a small fraction of the many facing the CFL.

A third explanation is that during this period the CFL was concentrating its efforts on the problem of domination of the city government by big business. The powerful influence of business in determining spending levels for municipal services, including schools, concerned them. Although labor had initially welcomed Cermak in the mayor's office, they became increasingly suspicious of his relationship with financial interests. Under the headline, "Chicago Government Faces Crash; Bankers Plot Receivership," a harsh judgment was levied against Cermak by the Federation News:

> Mayor Cermak would be powerless to avert the bankers'dictatorship, if one is planned. In the

> first place, Cermak was their man. Melvin A. Traylor, president of the First National Bank, who more than any other man probably stands in the key position in the crisis, is recognized as Cermak sponsor, which can be another way of saying that Traylor is the power behind the mayor's chair. In the second place, not even Cermak with all his admitted administrative acumen, had been able to present a plan for getting Chicago, let alone Cook County, out of the hole.[45]

While all of these factors were responsible for the tension which existed between organized labor and the teachers, it was the political tactics of the machine which dealt the final blow to the relationship. This it did by rewarding labor leaders with political prequisites and by extending its patronage to the more powerful arms of the CFL at the expense of the weak Teachers' Union.

In order to combat the influence of the Sargent Committee on public schools, the CFL began to campaign in 1933 to gain greater representation on the school board. It passed a resolution, asking for five places on the board. However, Mayor Kelly gave them only one of the seven appointments that he made that year. This appointment went to Charles W. Fry, president of the Machinists' Union. Fry turned out to be a different board member than some of his supporters had expected. Soon after his appointment, he was named to the special school board committee constituted to consider economies in the schools. As a member of this committee, Fry participated in drafting the drastic cutbacks announced in July of 1933.[46]

The general body of the CFL vehemently denounced the cutbacks, passing a resolution addressed to the Board of Education declaring:

> . . . The Chicago Federation of Labor does unreservedly condemn the wholesale slashing of public school services of which your honorable body was guilty on Wednesday, July 12, 1933, on the following counts as shown by the facts cited above:
>
> First--It was not in accord with the convictions of the superintendent of the schools

> and his staff;
>
> Second--It was arbitrarily made in an atmosphere of sinister secrecy by men who are for the most part ignorant of the meaning and technique of education;
>
> Third--The claim that it was necessary, we have shown as false;
>
> Fourth--It is not only a discredit to the national administration whose party label you claim, not only contrary to the interests of the children of labor, and, by the same token, to the interests of the children of all patrons of the public school, but it is contrary to the whole interest of social progress.[47]

Several days later, CFL president John Fitzpatrick protested the economy measures in a speech before a mass meeting in the Chicago Stadium sponsored by the various teachers organizations and the Citizens Save Our Schools Committee:

> The Chicago Federation of Labor proposes to publicly name those whom it deems responsible for this crime against our Public Schools.
>
> First, we will name Melvin A. Traylor, banker.
>
> Second, Public Enemy No. 1, Chairman Sargent of the "Citizens' Committee."
>
> Third, Sewell L. Avery of Montgomery Ward and Company.
>
> And last, we intend to hold Mayor Edward J. Kelly responsible until such time as this action is rescinded by the Board of Education.[48]

In spite of its vociferous denouncement of the economy program, there was evidence of ambivalence in labor's response, which first became apparent in the CFL's treatment of Charles Fry. At the CFL meeting following the announcement of the cutbacks, a motion to have the school board member called before the executive committee of the CFL to explain his role in formulating the economy program was withdrawn. Another motion condemning Fry was defeated. The machine was able to use group pride to divert attention from the substantive issues raised by the school cutbacks.

The machine also used its patronage weapon to severely disrupt the traditional alliance between labor and the teachers, giving jobs and high salaries to school maintenance workers, who were members of the influential Building Trades and Services Union. School system maintenance workers had maintained close ties with city politicians since at least the early twenties. In 1920 and 1922 it was reported that school engineer custodians had made separate gifts of ninety thousand dollars and seventy-five thousand dollars to school board members in order to gain salary increases. Although ward committeemen had long seen to it that political favorites were appointed to jobs in the school system, patronage in the custodial ranks of the schools exploded after 1927.[49] Ruling on a suit brought by firemen alleging contract abuses on the part of the janitors by whom firemen were hired, the Appellate Court ruled that school maintenance workers had to be placed under the provisions of the civil service act.[50] The consequences were new contracts with the board, which now had to be negotiated with separate unions for engineering-custodians, firemen, janitors, and women janitors, instead of payment through a lump sum alloted to the engineer-custodians. The numbers of custodial assistants "needed" for maintaining the plants burgeoned, and when necessary, the civil service provisions were circumvented by making appointments on a temporary rather than a permanent basis.[51]

An indication of the consequences of these changes can be seen in Table IX-3. The ratio of the wages of maintenance workers included in the engineer-custodian category to the wages of elementary teachers jumped from 10.5 percent in 1927, the year of the Appellate Court's ruling, to 16.8 percent by the very next year. The same thing happened in the high schools, where monies designated for engineer-custodians salaries changed from 7.6 percent to 9.8 percent of expenditures on high school teachers salaries. The ratios grew steadily throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and by 1947, engineer-custodians salaries as a percentage of the amount spent on elementary and high school teachers salaries was 18.5 percent Clearly, the economy measures taken during the 1930s did

Table IX-3

Expenditures on Engineer-Custodian Wages as a Percentage of Expenditures on Teacher Salaries, Chicago, 1925 - 1947

Year	% by School Level		
	Elementary School	High School	Total
1925	9.7	7.0	9.3
1926	9.9	7.2	9.2
1927	10.5	7.6	9.7
1928	16.8	9.8	14.4
1929	18.8	10.1	16.3
1930	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1931	16.7	8.5	14.2
1932	18.1	8.6	15.2
1933	18.6	8.5	15.4
1934	20.3	9.2	15.9
1935	19.2	9.9	15.5
1936	19.6	10.1	15.8
1937	19.6	10.1	15.7
1938	18.8	9.7	15.0
1939	18.9	N.A.	N.A.
1940	20.4	10.0	15.8
1941	20.5	10.2	15.9
1942	20.9	10.1	16.1
1943	21.4	10.0	16.4
1944	22.1	10.8	17.2
1945	22.8	11.7	18.1
1946	22.9	12.2	18.4
1947	22.2	12.7	18.5

SOURCE: Annual Reports of Receipts and Expenditures in Proceedings, Board of Education, City of Chicago.

not affect custodial workers in the same way as they had affected teachers.

With the question of school economy becoming an ever more salient issue, labor was soon forced to put its cards on the table. Superintendent Bogan addressed a mass rally in July of 1933 at which he proposed a series of measures designed to reduce school expenditures without curtailing school instruction. Prominent among these measures was a plan to reduce the wages of engineer-custodians and janitors. The Federation News was highly critical of this proposal, declaring that the engineer-custodians and janitors had already made great sacrifices.[52] As one of its unions, the CFL defended the Building Service Trades people whether or not their numbers and salaries were inflated by political patronage. The CFL opposed the 1933 economy program, but it would not support an attack on the janitors, a decision which alienated the teachers and the reform-minded Citizens' School Committee, and caused organized labor to become increasingly isolated from the advocates of school reform.

The Citizens' Schools Committee

Anxious to develop a strong base from which to attack the economy measures of the board, representatives of various teacher's organizations met with a number of interested civic groups to found the Citizens Save Our Schools Committee in 1933. Its name was changed two years later to the Citizens' Schools Committee (CSC). Initially some forty community organizations supported CSC, including the Steering Committee of Teacher Welfare Organizations, various local PTA's, the Women's City Club, the Chicago Woman's Club, the conference of Jewish Women's Organization, the Cook County League of Women Voters, the Northern District Federation of Colored Women's Clubs, the Chicago Urban League, the City Club of Chicago and the Chicago Bar Association.[53] Teachers provided much of the impetus for the CSC in its early period. One of the earliest membership reports records that 4,545 out of a total membership of 5,159 were school teachers.[54] The group was, in effect, a "major front organization" for the teachers[55] but with substantial support among the prestigious and traditionally reform-minded civic clubs of the city.

Soon after its founding in 1933 the CSC became the main protagonist of the school board's economy program. Although it agreed with the concept of economy in general, it had many misgivings about the school board's implementation of economies. Arguing that the cuts would undermine the school system and thereby weaken the foundations of democratic society, they fought the closing of Crane Junior College at a time when acute unemployment made more education desirable to otherwise unemployable young adults. Cutbacks in education, the CSC argued, would result in increased juvenile delinquency because the schools were "the most effective agency we have in the battle against crime."[56]

The CSC contented that economy in the school system was possible but that setbacks should be made in the excessively high operation and administrative costs rather than in instuctional costs. Pinpointing the political machine as the reason for inefficiency and wastage in the schools as well as throughout city government, it drew upon data published by the U.S. Office of Education which seemed to show that expenditures for operation and maintenance of school plants in Chicago were unusually high relative to other cities. According to the 1936 report, the average percentage of total school expenditures for the maintenance of school plants was 12.7 percent in seventy-three major cities during 1934-35. In Chicago it was 18.0 percent. Of the ten largest cities in the United States, Chicago had the highest per pupil administrative costs and the lowest per pupil instructional costs.[57] The CSC found itself quite alone in its battle against high maintenance costs, however, since organized labor continued to support the janitors.

The CSC did succeed in making the schools an important issue in local politics throughout the 1930s and 1940s. It actively supported the restoration of school services, the teachers' demands for higher salaries, and efforts to increase state aid to the local schools. Beginning with its attempt to establish ward councils, it also was active in local politics. But, although there were some political successes, most notably in 1947 when the CSC forced the party organization to nominate businessman, Martin Kennelly, instead of one of its own for its mayoral candidate, the fact remains that in spite of the worthwhileness of many of its proposals, the group never became very powerful. One of the explanations for this was its inability to expand its base by incorporating diverse interest groups. Since the CSC necessarily attacked the business community and its part in the economies forced on the schools, it was unable to attract prominent businessmen to its membership, and consequently had limited financial resources.[58] The committee was equally unsuccessful in its attempt to attract members of Chicago's ethnic communities. Appeals for membership were made in many of the city's foreign newspapers.[59] Attempts were made to establish ward councils, small discussion groups in each ward through which citizens would be able to express personal opinions.[60] Even though there were ward councils in forty wards by 1936, the ward council drive had to be abandoned the following year because of public apathy, lack of funds, and political bickering.[61] Cut off from powerful political allies, the CSC eventually evolved into a friendly watchdog organization, ready to attack political influence in the schools.[62]

The CSC's failure to organize the immigrant communities in some ways seems to fit the claims of those who suggest that schools were never intended to meet the needs of the working class or the poor.[63] From this perspective CSC failed to gather trade union and ethnic group support because schools were institutions founded and supported by a coalition of middle-class and upper-class individuals who wished to impose their values on the "dangerous classes." The reformers of the public schools never promoted or much cared about community access to or influence over the schools. The ideal system would be one run by competent, trained professionals in the field of education who would run the system in the manner in which other successful institutions were run. Tyack says, "Underlying the ideology of the 'non-political' urban school board, then, was an actual realignment of power among economic classes."[64]

Yet the activities in Chicago of the Citizens' Schools Committee, when understood in the context of depression politics, points to a quite different understanding of the role of reformers in urban school life. While the CSC was certainly a middle-class group, these reformers acted in direct opposition to rather than in a coalition with the business community, they criticized the educational bureaucracy, they called for decentralization and a return of power to individual wards, and by soliciting the participation of Chicago's immigrant communities, they affirmed a belief in the ability of the general public to determine school policy.

Yet, Chicago's ethnic groups would not join this movement for reform of the schools. Was it because they felt the middle and upper classes were forcing education on them to keep them out of trouble and make them docile, skilled workers for the factories of the rich? Given labor's continuous support for public education over several decades this is hardly a satisfactory explanation. But in the 1930s labor had worked out a co-operative relationship with the machine which provided patronage and political rewards to its leaders, and as a result, labor's support of teacher demands was at best lukewarm. In addition it must be recognized that the Catholic church in Chicago had a vast network of schools itself which many immigrant children attended (see Table IX-4). Concerned with its own fiscal problems, the Church was not an active supporter of the public schools, and indeed backed many cuts in the public education budget, hoping to provide tax relief for its clientele.

Within this context, then, machine politics grew. Appealing to the work and religious cleavages of the diverse immigrant groups, the machine was able to amass large amounts of power for itself. Under the circumstances the appeal of the reformers left the immigrant communities quite unmoved. Neighborhood patronage was understood: broadly-based movements against something so loosely defined and something in which the immigrants had a less direct stake were not.

Conclusion

The economy measures adopted by the Board of Education in 1933 had a profound impact on the Chicago Public School System. The board's resolutions slashed away educational services and programs which had been built up over the course of years. When the schools opened for the fall term in September 1933, mass confusion reigned. With the junior high schools abolished, seventh and eighth graders reported to already

Table IX-4

Catholic School Enrollment as a Percentage of Total School Enrollment in Chicago, 1930-1950

Year	Elementary School[a]		High School[b]		Total	
	% ADA	Age Cohort (n)	% ADA	Age Cohort (n)	% ADA	Age Cohort (n)
1930	27.9	145,116	13.8	15,633	25.4	160,779
1935	26.8	N.A.	11.1	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1940	30.0	124,692	14.2	23,379	25.5	148,071
1945	32.8	N.A.	21.7	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1950	35.3	145,466	26.2	33,322	33.2	178,788

SOURCE: Sanders, pp. 370,377.

NOTES:
a. School age 5 - 14.
b. School age 15 - 17.

overcrowded elementary schools. The former junior high school buildings were converted into high schools but opened the year without equipment, programs or organized staff. By October, the board had changed its position on a few of the July 12th resolutions: swimming pools remained open, print shops were in operation, bands and orchestras were formed as in the past.[65]

The nadir of the financial crunch for the schools was 1933. However, restorations were already in sight during the 1933-34 school year due to some improvements in the financial situation of the board of education. The state had increased its per pupil flat grant to sixteen dollars for pupil, and was paying seven dollars for each high school pupil for the first time; it had legislated a "pegged levy" to guarantee a basic level of tax-levy generated income for the school board. Federal legislation also enabled the board to raise funds by placing a mortgage on some school properties. This improved financial situation allowed the opening in 1934 of three branches of the junior college in the city and the reassignment of a principal to each elementary school.[66] A limited number of other restorations were made during the late 1930s and into the 1940s. The five-class school day was readopted for high school teachers. Days were slowly added to the school term as more money became available, so that by 1940 the original forty-week school year was back. Teachers' salaries, however, still suffered; only in 1943 did the teachers' salary schedule return to its 1922 level.[67]

While the restoration of slashed educational services and programs was accomplished in a piecemeal fashion over a number of years as the financial crisis eased, broader level consequences of the crisis were dramatically altered political alliances. Because of the complexity of government in the Chicago and Cook County areas, numerous opportunities existed for control over jobs, payrolls, budgets and contracts. The potential for patronage and graft in such a system provided fertile ground for the growth of machine politics.

While the organization created by Chicago's Democratic machine operated to satisfy the particularistic demands of interest groups, at the same time it attempted to discourage demands for policies with broad implications. The financial crisis produced an exception to this method of operation. Under the leadership of Anton Cermak, the Democrats were able to form an alliance with business leaders previously associated with the Republican party. The Democrats responded to the business community's request for a policy with broad social implications--the demand for economy within the schools. Not only was the economic and social well-being of the city greatly dependent upon maintaining an environment congenial to business operations, but financial interests in the business community also controlled access to credit that was vital to the maintenance of school and municipal revenues.

In addition to the Democratic party-business alliance, the machine caused the creation of another untraditional alliance. Prior to the rise of the Democratic machine, labor had joined with the city's school teachers to advocate "democracy in the schools" and to oppose manipulation of the school system by business and corrupt politicians. During the 1930s and 1940s the machine successfully divided labor from the teachers. Through bestowing patronage and privileges upon the schools' custodial staff, the machine set the material interests of a powerful unit of organized labor against those of the teachers. In addition, by appointing labor leaders to the school board and to other positions in local government, the machine succeeded in getting labor to identify with the school administration and with the city government. At the same time the school teachers were fighting salary cuts and blatantly political personnel policies, their traditional link to popular working class support became increasingly unresponsive. The teachers subsequently forged closer ties with middle-class civic groups, and the teacher-led opposition to machine intervention came to resemble a middle-class movement for good government.

The 1933 fiscal crisis witnessed the arrival of new political groups fighting for a share in the control of the public schools. Among them was the Chicago Teachers' Union. When the teachers' traditional organization, the Chicago Federation of Teachers, lost face and influence in the tax reassessment battle, the teachers had to face the fiscal crisis disspirited and disorganized. The need for consolidation became more and more clear. Finally in 1937, after months of meetings and planning sessions, a new organization was inaugurated as Local One of the American Federation of Teachers, and by April 1938, membership in the new union had grown to over eight thousand, representing more than two-thirds of the teaching force in the school system.[68]

A second group formed by the circumstances surrounding the financial crisis and having long-range consequences for the schools was the Citizens' Schools Committee. While teachers were the primary founders of the group, they withdrew from its leadership after these initial efforts, and civic leaders took over leadership of the group. Within two weeks of the July 12th meeting which initiated its formation, the group was already marshalling public protest against the board's economy program by conducting a mass meeting of over thirty thousand citizens to voice their protest, and by gathering 350,000 signatures on a petition addressed to the school board. After being chartered by the state in July of 1934, the committee became a permanent reform-minded group which analyzed school board policies, nominated candidates for seats on the school board, and generally fought to protect the school system from political manipulation.

The machine's success in changing the political coalitions of interest groups was due in large part to its independence and autonomy. While it was not a completely free agent, as evidenced by the banks' refusal to purchase any more tax anticipation warrants until school expenditures had been cut significantly, it was free within a given framework. This framework varied with the financial well-being of the municipality. Business, as a powerful interest group, received its reward from the machine which gave it access to high-level municipal decision-making. Labor was in a less advantagous position, but it controlled votes which the machine needed to remain in power. Consequently, its leaders were given some political positions and its powerful members were the recipients of jobs and good wages. Teachers, who were not as powerful as business nor as organized as labor, and who indeed lost prestige in the 1927 reassessment battle, came away with nothing from the machine. Their only friends were the middle-class school reformers who had very little access to decision makers and were unable to mobilize the ethnic communities.

Footnotes

1. Drake, 1940, p. 165.
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population, 1930, p. 638.
3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Occupations, 1930, p. 23.
4. *Ibid*., p. 23.
5. See for example, Allen, 1971, Chapter IV and Woodward, 1974, pp. 116-117.
6. Thurner, 1966, p. 248.
7. *Ibid*., p. 254.
8. San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction, Annual Reports; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population, 1940, p. 659.
9. Herrick, 1971, p. 217.
10. London, 1968, pp. 86-87.
11. Simpson, 1929, p. 87.
12. Simpson, 1930, pp. 120-158.
13. Herrick, 1971, p. 87.
14. Chicago Herald and Examiner, 20 April 1933, p. 11. Contains a report of the County Treasurer which shows a total of $206,014,892 owed.
15. Comptroller, City of Chicago, 1930, p. 14.
16. *Ibid*., p. 14.
17. Gottfried, 1962, p. 248.
18. *Ibid*., p. 20.
19. *Ibid*., p. 211.

20. Ibid., p. 210.

21. Ibid., p. 344.

22. Ibid., p. 206.

23. Herrick, 1971, p. 194.

24. Cited in London, 1968, p. 90.

25. Hazlett, 1968.

26. London, 1968, p. 52.

27. School Review, 1933, p. 161.

28. Sargent, 14 January 1933, p. 78.

29. Ibid., p. 80.

30. London, 1968, pp. 105-106.

31. Ibid., p. 106.

32. Ibid., p. 107.

33. Herrick, 1971, pp. 209-210; Hazlett, 1968, pp. 46-47.

34. Hazlett, 1968, p. 34.

35. Ibid., p. 34.

36. Ibid., p. 50.

37. Chicago Tribune, 14 August 1933, p. 8. Cited in Hazlett, 1968.

38. Levitt, 1936, pp. 9-11. She presents the summary of the medium used for payment, the date of payment, and the number of months in arrears.

39. Ibid., p. 8.

40. Herrick, 1971, p. 190.

41. Levitt, 1936, p. 47.

42. Landwermeyer, 1978, p. 125.

43. Federation News, 22 December 1928, p. 2.

44. Ibid., 19 January 1929, p. 4.

45. Ibid., 30 May 1931, p. 2.

367

46. Hazlett, 1968, p. 48.

47. Chicago Herald and Examiner, 17 July 1933, pp. 1,4.

48. Federation News, 29 July 1933, p. 1.

49. Herrick, 191, p. 165.

50. Ibid., p. 165.

51. Chicago Teachers Union, C.T.U. News Bulletin, 25 February 1939; cited in Hazlett, 1968, p. 136.

52. Federation News, 29 July 1933 p. 5.

53. Levit, 1947, pp. 17-18.

54. Ibid., p. 18.

55. Peterson, 1976, p. 21.

56. Hazlett, 1968, p. 63.

57. Ibid., p. 67; Wrigley, 1980, p. 239.

58. Peterson, 1976, p. 21.

59. Cited in Levit, 1947, p. 27.

60. Chicago Citizens Schools Committee, Chicago Schools, Vol. 10, 1935.

61. Levit, 1947, p. 44.

62. Peterson, 1976, p. 21.

63. Tyack, 1974.

64. Tyack, 1976, p. 233.

65. Herrick, 1971, p. 212.

66. Ibid., pp. 216-218.

67. Ibid., 210-212, 234-238; Peterson, 1976, p. 21.

68. Herrick, 1971, pp. 238-247.

Chapter X

POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE URBAN SCHOOL

Americans have long believed that education and democracy are inextricably linked. Schools train citizens both by giving them the capacity to choose able from foolish leaders, and, perhaps more importantly, by giving citizens the sense that their children have as equal a chance to "get ahead" as do any of their countrymen. But at the same time that schools helped secure the political foundations of the republic, the give and take of politics changed and shaped public education. Educators continuously demanded more for their schools, and, except in depressed times or when either political machines or conservative elites felt they could ignore popular wishes, the educators had political success. Schools in fact became the sacred cow of local politics. Candidates gained little political mileage by running against the schools: while some questioned what they saw as excessive fiscal expenditures, most pledged their commitment to public education's growth and expansion. As time passed, schools in fact became the single most expensive service-delivery system paid for out of local taxes. Schools typically consumed over a third of a local government's revenue.[1]

Popular Support for Public Education

The extraordinarily rapid growth of public education in the United States owes much to the early institutionalization of popular suffrage. Well before the Civil War, and prior to the historical frame of our study, those white males who had become citizens either by birth or by naturalization were voting members of the urban population. In Chicago and San Francisco, the vast in-migration of new groups of foreign born voters and the sheer increase in the size of the electorate meant that nineteenth century politics were in continuous disarray.

Power shifted among competing factions within the two major parties, third party movements occurred with regularity and were at times quite successful, and reformers challenged the patronage-style practices of the machine politicians. Under these circumstances, public leaders could not safely ignore issues and institutions that were of substantial voter concern. To have refused support to the public school would have been to commit political suicide.

School people hardly received everything they wanted, of course. Even in a generally favorable climate any special interest will demand more from the local treasury than the tax revenues can reasonably allow. In all three cities school boards insisted repeatedly that city councils and state legislatures provide more revenue, and the revenue-raising bodies of the city and state regularly gave less than requested. Even when board members and council members came from the same social background, their differing spheres of responsibility placed them in conflict with one another. Boards felt a special obligation to pay teachers at least minimal salaries and to provide at least an acceptable physical plant. City council members and state legislatures, who were called upon to satisfy the needs of other agencies as well as listen to taxpayer complaints, were less likely to be sensitive to educational needs than members of the school board. Conflict over school finance was thus an institutionalized part of local politics.

In these debates, signs of popular discontent with public school expenditures are notable for their absence. Ethnic organizations and trade unions generally supported attempts to extend the schools' fiscal base. Unions, who were also attempting to eliminate child labor practices, were especially supportive of compulsory education and economically viable school systems. The only serious sign of working class opposition came from the Catholic Church, and that must be attributed basically to the Church's own organizational concern for its parochial schools. Indeed, Catholics gave every indication that, in return for state aid to their schools, they would endorse fiscally sound public schools.

Articulate opposition to a growing system of public education also came from others who had more to lose and less to gain--the city's business interests. Businessmen did not always seek to cut the financial base of the public schools, but when depressions occurred or when they sensed that schools had given way to too many "fads and frills," business leaders were willing to apply the budgetary ax. Perhaps it was business uncertainty about the value of public education that gave rise to the assiduous efforts by educators to court business favor. Businessmen were sometimes told that schools would yield a more productive labor force, a more compliant group of employees, and a more conservative and docile citizenry.[2] But while some businessmen, who were being asked to pay for the education of other people's children, may have agreed with these arguments, other business leaders were aware that education can also alert the populace to new possibilities, promise more than the society can deliver, and give a proletarian vanguard the wherewithal to agitate the once submissive. Schools hardly guaranteed social peace, even though some of their enthusiastic supporters might have claimed the same when enlisting what at times was grudging business support.

Campaigns for public schools were continuous, in part because schools were the most expensive of local government services, and in part because schoolmen were appropriately concerned about the expansion of rival institutions. Among the most important organizational competitors that threatened the place of public education were the private day and boarding schools which had proliferated from the East across the Midwest and throughout the South. In return for tuition these schools typically offered a classical, academically-oriented curriculum that prepared students either for the university or for entry into one of the country's burgeoning professions. Nothing could have developed more easily than a public elementary system that served the less fortunate, with a private secondary system that was limited to those who could pay tuition. This pattern was, in fact, becoming deeply entrenched in virtually all of the European countries during the very same decades that saw the rise of the American high school.

One should not romanticize the social and political motives of those educators who created public high schools in Chicago, San Francisco, Altanta and elsewhere. It is unlikely that they were moved primarily by a concern for equalizing opportunities for immigrant children, though this is what they often claimed. In practice, Atlanta's school board provided secondary education for white boys and girls only, and San Francisco's high schools had a basically middle class clientele. Quite probably, nineteenth century boards and superintendents spent scarce monies on secondary schools, less because of egalitarian sentiments than because such institutions lent prestige to the entire public education enterprise. If public school children could demonstrate proficiency in the classics, if public school children could prepare for the university, if public school children could, upon graduation, enter business and the professions, then the public schools could clearly establish themselves as something other than charity institutions expected only to house and subdue the children of the poor.

But even though educators' emphasis on secondary education may have been motivated less by egalitarianism than organizational prudence, the consequences of their actions cannot be understood apart from the political ideology of nineteenth century America. Secondary schools were opened almost coterminously with the creation of the elementary school system in Atlanta, San Francisco and elsewhere, because in a society operating according to democratic ideals one could not successfully argue against an educational ladder that led from kindergarten to the university. One could limit the size of the secondary school offerings on grounds of cost, and one could limit the types of pupils admitted. Catholics and business leaders had these and other complaints. But whatever reservations taxpayers and city councils might have had, educators, drawing upon the democratic creed and the reality of widespread popular participation in nineteenth century municipal politics, captured the high ground when they pronounced the need for advanced opportunities for the more able pupils.

The rhetoric of equal opportunity had its consequences for high school practices as well. Whatever the middle class bias these institutions had, access to them by sons and daughters of the working class could not be foreclosed altogether. Public schools were in theory open to all, and in practice the procedures of selection and admission had to be, on their face, consistent with these principles. To the extent feasible, all students who wished to pursue their studies at the secondary level had to be given a chance. Quite unexpectedly, the conditions were thus set for an extraordinary expansion of the American high school, one that far surpassed anything in Europe and which by the 1930s, would set the stage for the unimagined explosion of college enrollments after World War II.

The coincidence of organizational interests and popular aspirations helped propel this expansion. The schools were eager to extend themselves, especially in a direction that would enhance their prestige, public image, and sense of social worth. A growing secondary school system meant new and more interesting jobs for educators, it provided a more complex, challenging task for school administrators, and it gave school board members the satisfaction of directing an increasingly valuable public institution. But, however badly educators wanted to move in this direction, they could not do so without interested students and fiscal support. Trade union-sponsored child labor laws helped supply the first of these. Denied access to good jobs, young adults had few options other than continued schooling. Besides, many believed that a high school could guarantee better jobs for its graduates. As the numbers attending secondary school increased, this "guarantee" declined in value, but in the crucial years when high schools initially gained a popular clientele, expectations were high.

Fiscal resources for secondary schooling, though strongly supported by trade unions and reform groups, came less easily, especially in periods of economic crisis. But even in the worst of times few, if any, ventured the opinion that secondary education be limited to those who could pay the tuition. Over the decades, Protestant and non-sectarian fee-paying schools dwindled in numbers and significance so that their potential for challenging the public school's dominant role in the provision of secondary education had all but disappeared by World War II.

Public school people achieved this success in part because they had secured for their institution a pre-eminent role in the provision of vocational education. In the late nineteenth century apprenticeship training and informal on-the-job instruction was giving way to privately organized programs of industrial education directly supported by leading businessmen. As the demand for vocational education increased at about the turn of the century, a number of business leaders proposed that a separate, publicly-funded set of institutions be established for the sole purpose of training workers needed for the new industrial empire. Here, on a second occasion, one discerns social forces pressing for a structure of secondary education quite different from the comprehensive high school that became so distinctive a part of American society. But business leaders were no more successful than the day and boarding school providers had been decades earlier. Instead of establishing a vocational system parallel to the regular academic high school, the two were integrated under the aegis of public school administrators.

The vehemence with which public school officials attacked the proposals for a separate vocational system should not be attributed to any excessively altruistic set of concerns, though once again democratic symbols were often invoked in the course of the discussions. Schools had at stake compelling organizational interests of a concrete and material nature. Had vocational education been split from the public school enterprise, private day schools might have revived to assume an important role in providing academic instruction, and the public system might have remained limited to the elementary level.

If the motives of public school leaders are understandable, they do not by themselves account for their ability to defeat strong, well-conceived, business-backed proposals. That can only be explained by the extraordinary popularity schools enjoyed among the public at large, together with the unqualified backing they received from the trade union movement. Public schools quickly established manual training programs as early as the 1880s, when private efforts in this area were only beginning. By the time the vocational education movement appeared in full flower, public schools had become so entrenched a part of local political institutions, they could count on strong working class and trade union support in their claims to a pre-eminent role in this new area of responsbility.

Racial Conflict and the Critique of the Public School

Several decades later--in the 1960s--public schools would not be so well placed, and a rival system of vocational education separate and apart from the public schools would come into being. While these new industrial education programs would be named in ways that de-emphasized their educative purposes, the manpower training programs, neighborhood youth corps, job corps, comprehensive employment and training centers, and community action programs, which were so integral a part of Great Society programming, were close to what Cooley and his business supporters had proposed prior to World War I. These Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) programs, as by the 1980s they became known, were administered in Washington by the Department of Labor, not by the Department of Education. Responsibility at the local level was lodged in the hands of municipal government, not the public schools. The formal authoritative role of the "private industrial councils" had steadily grown so that training programs could be closely related to the needs of local industry. Participation in these programs is limited to those from poverty backgrounds who, it is felt, are especially in need of and appropriate for, training in programs that prepare students for skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Cooley had not proposed a poverty requirement on students entering vocational education, but in other respects the CETA programs of the seventies came close to fullfilling his expectations.

Public schools failed to achieve an exclusive role in vocational education in the sixties when such had been achieved in 1917 in part for religious reasons. The church-state controversy in education precluded federal aid to public schools at the time when manpower development programs were initiated. But in the early 1960s other social forces were also at work, the most important of which was the sense that public schools had not served low income members from racial minorities. Whereas public schools were seen as the solution to almost any social problem in 1917, by 1962 they were defined as part of the problem to be solved. Headstart, Follow Through, Job Corps, CETA, and compensatory education were all designed either to change the schools or to found new insitutions to pursue what schools had not done.

Schools were vulnerable to such an intrusion on their terrain because, as organizations, they had failed to address the needs of racial minorities in the way they had responded to European immigrants. Whereas Chicago's public schools acquiesced to German demands that their native tongue be taught, the Chinese of San Francisco had difficulty walking through the school door, much less finding instruction in their own language. Whereas per pupil expenditures and teacher-pupil ratios in both Chicago and San Francisco were as favorable in predominantly immigrant schools as they were in those serving native-born Americans, the blacks of Atlanta were crowded into delapidated buildings and taught by a less well-compensated staff. Whereas leaders of immigrant groups regularly served on boards of education in Chicago and other northern cities, (see Table X-1) blacks and Asians were frozen from any positions of authority and responsibility in Atlanta, San Francisco and elsewhere. Whereas secondary education provided a channel of social mobility for European immigrants even before 1920, it hardly existed in the South for blacks until after World War II. Whereas Irish and German teachers populated the schools of the North, earning salaries and gaining principalships at a rate approaching that of native-born Americans, it took a federal suit by the black teachers of Atlanta to win in 1944 for the first time the right to equal pay for equal work.

The differences between the way in which southern blacks and west coast Asians were treated, on the one hand, and the way in which European immigrants were treated in big northern cities, on the other, are best explained by the greater political strength Europeans had. Even though all immigrants entered pretty much at the bottom of the social order and had little but economic misery in the beginning, European ethnics soon obtained the vote and eventually became a local political force. Public institutions serving the community usually did not openly treat these immigrants hostilely, because to have done so would have alienated their support in future elections. Under these political pressures, elected officials gradually incorporated European immigrants into the schools, first as recipients of the services and later as providers. Such was not the case with minorities of other races. Without the vote, they had no political base, and could make only weak claims on the public schools.

Once racial minorities did become politically active, the schools as institutions were subject to challenge. When the civil rights drive of the 1960s made the educational concerns of racial minorities a central issue in American politics, political leaders not only tried to reform schools but also searched for educational institutions which were alternatives to the public schools. Manpower training programs were handed over to community organizations, other city agencies, and even to private firms. In addition, critics generalized from the schooling experience of racial minorities to the nature of public education more generally. Schools do not teach, it was said, but only give credentials. They discriminate, they subjugate, and they perpetuate the status quo. Their historical development began to be selectively described. The people who had once been treated as the heroes of American education now became the villians.

No political movement has been treated more harshly in this recasting of educational history than has been the campaign for school reform. At worst reformers are characterized as agents of monopoly capitalism who eagerly structured public schools so as to serve the needs of the corporate-controlled marketplace. At best they are portrayed as innocents whose hopes that schools could soften and ameliorate class conflicts were inevitably dashed by the realities of economic life. From either perspective, it is argued that, just as schools are fundamentally shaped by economic forces, so those who shaped the schools acted in the interests of dominant economic interests.

The Plural Sources of Reform

A political analysis of the historical development of urban shools reveals the simplistic, one-sided nature of such a portrait. As with all political movements, school reform was a complex, pluralistic, multi-faceted undertaking. Its social sources of support, though basically rooted in a growing professional class, were diverse. Its alliances were subtle, numerous, and subject to change. Its program changed with time and circumstance. The composition of the opposition depended on the issue at stake. Its policies were as often rejected as they were approved. When adopted, they were frequently amended. When promulgated, they were not always implemented. Oh, how

Table X-1

Percent Member Years on the Chicago School Board, by Ethnic Group, 1870 - 1928

Ethnic Group	Years					
	1874-1879	1880-1889	1890-1899	1900-1909	1910-1919	1920-1928
Anglo	58.4%	39.5%	52.2%	54.2%	29.9%	29.0%
German	26.6	34.2	24.3	24.2	30.9	34.6
Swedish	.6	5.9	2.7	2.1	11.3	5.6
Irish	11.0	12.5	4.9	11.6	1.27	6.5
Eastern European	1.3	2.6	7.0	5.8	11.8	24.3
Other	1.9	3.9	3.7	2.1	3.4	0.0
Unknown	0.0	1.3	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	99.8% (154)	99.9% (152)	99.9% (185)	100.0% (190)	100.0% (204)	100.0% (107)

SOURCES: Elsdon C. Smith, New Dictionary of American Names, New York: Harper & Row, 1973. Augustus Wilfrid Dellquist, These Names of Ours, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1938. E. G. Withcombe, The Oxford Dictionary of English Christian Names, 3rd Ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Chicago Board of Education Reports for 1870 - 1928.

well reformers would have fared had they been as unified, as potent, and as far-seeing in their vision, as some now would have us see them!

As diverse as reform was, its contributions to educational politics and policy permit two broad generalizations about the nature of its contributions. First, whatever their talk of efficiency, school reformers were educational expansionists. When they came to power, the schools generally spent more, expanded their terrain, and paid teachers higher salaries. When one calculates per pupil expenditures in constant dollars, one finds that the San Francisco schools do best in nineteenth century politics when reformers are in power. Chicago schools flourished momentarily when Chicago's first reform mayor, George Dunne, appointed a strong reform majority to that city's board of education in 1906. This experience repeated itself when Mayor Dever appointed a reform board who recruited an aggressive reform-minded superintendent in 1924. Whatever else Superintendent William McAndrew did, he pushed school finances to new highs; indeed, when he resigned his office he left the schools on the verge of bankruptcy.

The penny-pinchers in school politics were not reformers but machine-connected politicians or traditional, conservative elites. Atlanta's schools labored under a school board governed by conservative elites from the ante-bellum era until reformers paved the way for a more expansionary policy in 1897. San Francisco's per pupil expenditures reached their nadir in 1885 when Boss Buckley's machine was at the zenith of its power. When business and machine interests were solidly in control of Chicago schools in the early 1900s, school expenditures fell. And Chicago's harsh treatment of public schools during the 1930s depression came at the hands of a strong, disciplined political organization working in close co-operation with the city's leading businessmen.

Machine reluctance to support urban schools generously is understandable for several reasons. First, machine politicians traditionally took a minimalist view of the role of government. Having little in the way of a substantive, programmatic agenda, they characteristically saw their role as providing the basic housekeeping services the city needed, and as distributing jobs needed to perform this work to clients and followers. Given their size and the labor-intensive nature of their operations, schools provided one of the largest sources of patronage. Also, school land acquisition, school construction, and school purchasing requirements provided succor for ambitious politicians. It was in these areas, not the size and scope of school operations, that machine politicians took a special interest.

Secondly, the concept of "honest graft," to use George Washington Plunkett's famous phrase, provided the basis for a modus vivendi between machine politicians and local business leaders. Honest graft meant giving to friends and followers only those jobs and contracts that the city needed in any case. One took only the "opportunities" that arose in the course of government's usual business. Dishonest graft was the sort that required public expenditure above and beyond the minimum needed. One way, in fact, that business leaders could be assured that graft was being contained within "honest" bounds was by keeping taxes low and government operations to the routine. Within this framework machine politicians had less room for imaginative innovations and programs of reconstruction.

Thirdly, machine politicians saw schools as institutions for community integration rather than agents of social change. To the neighborhood politician, what was important about schools was the place it provided for making life-long friends, the spirit its athletic activities gave to the local community, and the focus it gave to local social life. Few understood schools as centers for educational achievement, much less as mechanisms for society's reform. The schools constant quest for more money, more personnel and more varied responsibilities was regarded by the machine politicians as being driven more by organizational aggrandizement than by any substantive need. If those in city hall acquiesced, they did so more as a response to public demand than any strongly held conviction of their own. Finally, it should also be remembered that in many large cities machine politicians were predominantly Catholic, while reformers usually were Protestants. Although Catholics came to accept public education, few zealously promoted the system's expansion, if for no other reason than its competitive relationship with private schools. Indeed, one of the factors that invited special attention by municipal reformers to school policy was the belief by Protestants that machine politicians starved public schools because their own children did not attend them.

Reformers not only held expansionary views of the role of public education; they also wanted to upgrade its standards, enhance the quality of instruction given, and organize its administrative structure to be more efficient. Some of the most pronounced themes of the reform movement revolved around matters of efficiency, merit, integrity, and devotion to public service. Thus, one of the central goals of reformers in education was the improvement of the school system's administrative structure. This meant, above all, the establishment of a strong, professionally-oriented superintendent who was able both to shape board policy in ways consistent with professional ideals and to implement that policy when adopted. In general, reformers wanted smaller boards of education, fewer board committees, greater school system autonomy from the city council (and municipal government in general), no other staff appointees other than the superintendent reporting directly to the board, and recruitment, promotion and salary advancement on the basis of merit. These principles of organization, which Max Weber called a rational-legal mode of organizing activity, and which at the time were apparently being applied quite systematically in the private sector, were expected to give unity of direction to what had become a large, complex, sprawling institution.

These reform proposals were so widely adopted in urban education, as elsewhere in society, that one can hardly doubt that they responded to underlying organizational imperatives, much as Weber said. For one thing, schools were assuming many new tasks--feeding pupils, providing medical services, creating secondary schools, initiating vocational education, and instituting extra-curricular activities. Many of these new activities required a functional form of organization (with line administrators in a central office); a strong superintendent capable of managing the enterprise as a whole could hardly be avoided. Gone forever were the days in which each school, directed by its own principal, could operate in virtual isolation of other system components. The need for strengthened central direction was in fact so apparent to school officials that scarcely any strong superintendent during this era could avoid being given the reform label. And if reform is only interpreted to mean strong central administration, then, surely, even Edwin G. Cooley can be declared a school reformer.

Reformers believed in professionalism for teachers as well as administrators, and here the reform impulse had to struggle with its own internal inconsistencies. The nub of the problem with which reformers wrestled was the problem of fitting members of a profession--teachers--into a hierarchical administrative structure--the big city school system. If teachers were professionals, they had to be given the autonomy to carry out their tasks in accordance with their own judgment and their own sense of mission. At the same time, if educational administration was to be rationalized, then administrators had to evaluate subordinates and regard them according to the perceived quality of their performances.

Choosing between these alternative conceptions of a reformed school system was complicated by the fact that many reformers were women, were sympathetic to the feminist movement of the period, and were more or less aware that teachers were overwhelmingly female, while administrative posts were often reserved for men. If the public language of the day did not allow these questions to be discussed with the brutal frankness that sometimes characterizes modern commentary on matter of gender, they could hardly have been overlooked altogether by women working in a sex-differentiated institution. In consequence, reformers could not be relied upon to give their undying loyalty to any male superintendent who wished to assert his educational authority.

In this context one understands especially well how and why Ella Flagg Young came to epitomize an idyllic synthesis of educational reform goals. Appointed by a reform-board, itself primarily chosen by Chicago's first reform-minded mayor, Young gave coherence to the several sides of reform in a way that would not be realized again in this city until after World War II. She presided over a school system that paid teachers better salaries and reduced class size for students. She campaigned for greater superintendent authority over the schools, asking for a well-defined, limited scope for school board involvement. She insisted that the appointment power be lodged in her own hands and resented board interference in personnel matters. Finally, she sought to involve teachers in the policy-making process by forming school councils to deliberate on policy questions (but to leave final decisions to administrative discretion). In part because she was a woman she was well-received by the teaching staff. Only when machine politicians regained control of the board was she forced to resign her position.

For Young, as for most reformers, the attempt to combine professionalization with administrative direction would always remain problematic. For business leaders, with their allies in the party machine, a relentless corporate model of hierarchical control substituted for any such problematic, as can be seen in the case of the 1915 Loeb law controversy. The main issues this time were teacher unionization and merit pay for teachers, though the questions of superintendent authority and board autonomy from city hall also entered the equation. Threats to remove teachers from office because of union affiliation were especially disturbing to reform leaders and the groups associated with them, and in this case reformers formed a solid alliance with teachers. The alliance was solidified, to be sure, by a suspicion that the political machine intended to use the new law to pack the schools with patronage workers. Even so, reformers found it possible to work with teachers on behalf of a tenure policy that give this new profession greater independence and autonomy.

Reformers were more ambivalent a few years later when they themselves had the responsibility of giving direction to school policy. Superintendent McAndrew came to Chicago with strong City Club and other reform support. McAndrew promoted numerous organization reforms including the platoon system and the junior high school, and he greatly extended the size and cost of school programs. He nonetheless had little time for the argument that teachers as professionals, needed autonomy, independence, and opportunities for participating in the making of decisions affecting school administration. When the teachers aggressively attacked McAndrew, support from reformers for "one of their own" cooled, but never disappeared altogether. Dever backed his superintendent of schools, even though this contributed to his defeat in

1927.

The twin themes of urban educational reform--expansion and professionalization--were rooted in the beliefs, values, and interests of middle class professionals, who believed in science, education, expertise and commitment to public service. The ideology was self-interested because it justified the social place of most of those committed to reform principles. Yet this self-interest was disciplined by a concomitant concern for the public interest and, in any case, was readily distinguishable from the class interests of corporate elites. Reform ideals were not simply a mask for established interests; on the contrary, these middle class professionals found that their political agenda just as often induced them to co-operate with trade union leaders and working class groups.

Reform After World War II

Once reform is appropriately defined, its locus of greatest strength is more readily identified. In this study we have shown that the diverse sources of reform came into evidence in the late nineteenth century and began to flourish in the early twentieth. The reform tide flowed and ebbed continuously and its high water mark during these decades varied from one city to another. Further, reform was not just a concomitant of the Progressive era. Its days did not end with the 1930s depression and Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. Indeed, the reform legacy, as experienced by schools today, was not fully institutionalized in many American cities until after World War II. It might even be said that events described in preceding chapters were only precursors of reform, the harbingers of a political movement that would achieve its greatest success after World War II. Urban reform, especially in education, was at its zenith in the period beginning with the close of World War II and continuing into the 1960s, when the civil rights movement gave "reform" new meaning.

As has been shown elsewhere,[3] post-war reform succeeded in almost every domain where early reform had been only partial. In the first place, the end of the second war saw the beginning of the most sustained period of educational expansion the public schools had ever enjoyed. The baby boom brought millions of new faces into the classroom; their arrival stimulated a program of great capital expansion. New parents, with higher expectations for their children, expressed horror at the conditions they observed in many American cities; they threw out the politicos whom they held responsible for schools that had not been modernized for two decades. Per pupil expenditures dramatically increased, pupil-teacher ratios fell just as rapidly, teachers were treated with a new dignity, and the percentage of the Gross National Product spent on the public schools more than doubled.

Secondly, the post-war era became, more than ever, the age of the strong superintendent. Professional administrators trained in leading departments of education were given respect by school boards, teacher organizations, and community groups. They built schools, commandeered resources both from state legislatures and by means of aggressive tax and bond referenda compaigns, built a complex administrative infrastructure, and spoke convincingly for a united educational front. These professional superintendents decisively pushed patronage politics outside the school door. Administrative and principal appointments were at the superintendent's discretion; boards were reduced to a rubber stamp in personnel and many other matters. School business offices were given over to professionals, who placed competitive bids whenever possible. Even in machine cities, politicians discovered that it was best to leave the schools alone when distributing their patronage. The shibboleth which says that schools and politics shall not mix finally became a well-entrenched slogan.

The teacher was given new respect as a professional. Formal wage differentials between males and females were eliminated; the same was done for blacks and whites. Teachers' salaries were raised at regular intervals, and they began to share in the post-war prosperity. At the same time, teacher organizations became more independent of administrative influence and more attentive to specifically teacher needs. With the merit system well established and teacher tenure provisions widely adopted, teachers had a new capacity to challenge even strong professional administrators. Rivalry between the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers encouraged a more militant approach on the part of both. Eventually, the pressures for formal collective bargaining procedures, and even for teacher strikes, became so widespread that school boards were forced to give way. The school teacher, once scorned and rejected, now had direct access to the policy-making agenda.

The post-war reform in American education, though powerful and long lasting, began to lose its steam in the seventies. In the wake of the civil rights movement, schools were put on the defensive, and disparate political pressures were felt by school administrators who were challenged by the necessities of school desegregation, school decentralization and collective bargaining. It is perhaps not an accident that at the very time the principles of reform were being challenged in the academy by social scientists and educational historians that professional administrators (who personified reform values) were caught in intense political cross-fire. Once expected to provide educational leadership, they were now supposed only to find acceptable compromises. Once thought to be the architects of school policy, they were now to be the executors of the school board, or the mayor, or some municipal finance authority. Once recruited for their credentials as educators, their political savvy and connections now seemed more important. With only a few exceptions, the day of the strong superintendent had passed.

Is it a coincidence that the period of educational expansion was also replaced in the late seventies by one of caution and retreat? During this period student enrollments declined, teacher salaries dropped, expenditures as a percentage of the Gross National Product fell, pupil-teacher ratios stabilized, percentages of students attending non-public schools creeped upward, and per pupil expenditures in public schools fell. None of these trends are dramatic or irreversible. A dark day has not come over American education. But the élan, energy, confidence, and self-esteem that accompanies the times of educational reform and expansion will need to be revived if American schools are to continue to enjoy the multi-class popular appeal that has historically been theirs.

References

Allen, I. 1928. *Atlanta from the Ashes*. Atlanta: Ruralist Press.

Allen, I. Jr. with Hemphill, P. 1971. *Mayor: Notes on the Sixties*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Allswang, J. M. 1971 *A House for All Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Chicago, 1890-1936*. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky.

American School 2, no. 7. July 1916.

Atlanta Board of Education. *Annual Reports*.

Atlanta Board of Education. *Board Minutes*.

Atlanta City Council. *Council Minutes*.

Atlanta *Constitution*, 1868-1897.

Atlanta *Daily Sun*

Atlanta Girl's High School Scrapbook. Atlanta: Public School System Archives.

Atlanta *Independent*, 1904-1905.

Atlanta *Journal*.

Atlanta *Journal of Labor*.

Bacote, C. 1955 (a). "The Negro in Atlanta Politics" *In Phylon* 16.

Bacote, C. 1955 (b). "William Finch, Negro Councilman and Political Activities in Atlanta during Early Reconstruction." In *Journal of Negro History* 40.

Banfield, E.C. and Wilson, J.Q. 1963. *City Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bean, W. 1967. *Boss Ruef's San Francisco: The Story of the Union Labor Party, Big Business, and the Grant Prosecution*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Beasley, D. L. 1919. *The Negro Trail Blazers of California*. Los Angeles: n.p.

Becker, G. S. May-June 1972. "Comment." In *Journal of Political Economy* 80: 252-255.

Benson, A. 1966. "Race Relations in Atlanta as Seen in a Critical Analysis of the City Council Proceedings and other Related Works, 1865-1877." Masters thesis, Atlanta University.

Bolden, W. 1978. "The Political Structure of Charter Reform Movements in Atlanta During the Progressive Era." Doctoral dissertation, Emory University.

Bowles S. and Nelson V. February 1974. "The Inheritance of IQ and the Intergovernmental Reproduction of Economic Inequality." In *Review of Economics and Statistics* 56: 39-51.

Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. 1976. *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life*. New York: Basic Books.

Bridges, A. B. 1980. "A City in the Republic, New York and the Origins of Machine Politics." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Bright, J. 1930. *Hizzoner Big Bill Thompson*. New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith.

Bullough, W. A. 1979. *The Blind Boss and His City: Christopher Augustine Buckley and Nineteenth Century San Francisco*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Burnham, D. 1970. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Democracy*. New York: Norton.

Callahan, R.E. 1962. *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carlton, F. T. 1908. *Economic Influences Upon Educational Progress in the United States, 1820-1850*. Madison: University of Wisconsin; Reprinted., 1965. New York: Teachers College Press.

Chamberlin's 159. July 1916.

Chambers, W.N. and Burnham, W.D. 1967. *The American Party System*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chang, F. Y. 1936. "A Study of the Movement to Segregate Chinese Pupils in the San Francisco Public Schools up to 1885." Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University.

Charles E. Merriam Papers. University of Chicago: Charles E. Merriam Library.

Chicago Board of Education. *Annual Reports*.

Chicago Board of Education. *Proceedings*.

Chicago Board of Education. 1872-1916. *School Censuses*.

Chicago *Chronicle*. 10 April 1907; 11 April 1907.

Chicago Citizens Schools Committee. July 1934 - June 1963. *Chicago Schools*. Chicago: Citizens Schools Committee.

Chicago City Council. *Council Proceedings*. 19 January 1917.

Chicago *Daily News*.

Chicago *Herald and Examiner*.

Chicago *Inter-Ocean*.

Chicago *Record Herald*.

Chicago School Finances 1915-1925. 1927. Chicago: Chicago Bureau of Efficiency.

Chicago Teachers Federation. (CTF). *Federation News*, files of the Federation and the Margaret Haley Papers. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society.

Chicago Teachers Union (CTU). *News Bulletin*. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society.

Chicago *Tribune*.

Chinn, T. 1969. *A History of the Chinese in California: A Syllabus*. San Francisco: Chinese Historical Society of America.

Christian Science Monitor. 17 January 1917.

City Directories and Maps of the City of Chicago. 1896-98. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society.

City Directories. 1869-1880. Atlanta.

Clark, H. 1897. *The Public Schools of Chicago: A Sociological Survey*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cloud, R. W. 1952. *Education in California: Leaders, Organizations, and the Accomplishments of the First 100 Years*. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press.

Collins, C.W. 1976. "Schoolmen, Schoolma'ams and School Boards: The Struggle for Power in Urban School Systems in the Progressive Era." Doctoral dissertation, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University.

Commercial Club of Chicago. 1911-1912. Yearbook. Chicago: Commercial Club of Chicago.

Committee on Schools, Fire, Police and Civil Service of the City Council of Chicago. 9 December 1917. "Recommendations for the Reorganization of the Public School System of the City of Chicago." Chicago: Chicago Historical Society.

Commonwealth Club of California. December 1917. "Schools of San Francisco." In Transactions 13.

Comptroller, City of Chicago. 1930 . Seventy-Fourth Annual Report. Chicago: Department of Finance.

Cooley, E. G. 1914. "Professor Dewey's Criticism of the Chicago Commercial Club and its Vocational Education Bill," in Vocational Education 3.

Cooper, W. 1934. Official History of Fulton County. Atlanta, Ga.: Walter W. Brown Publishing Co.

Cooper, W. 1896. Official Catalogue of the Cotton States and International Exposition and South, Illustrated. Atlanta Ga.: The Illustrator Press.

Counts, G. S. 1928. School and Society in Chicago. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

Craig, J. E. and N. Spear. March 1979. "Marginality, Integration, and Educational Expansion: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Europe." Paper presented at the Conference of Europeanists, Washington, D.C.

Craig, J. E. and N. Spear. November 1978. "The Diffusion of Schooling in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Toward a Model." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Social Science History Association, Columbus, Ohio.

Cremin, L. A. 1961. The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957. New York: Vintage Books.

Cronin, J.M. 1973. The Control of Urban Schools. New York: The Free Press.

Cubberley, E. P. 1920. The History of Education. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Currey, J. S. 1912. Chicago: Its History and Its Builders, Vol. I. Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company.

David S. M. and Peterson, P. E., eds. 1976. *Urban Politics and Public Policy: the City in Crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger.

Davis, J. W. 1978. General Social Surveys, 1972-1978: Cumulative Codebook". Mimeographed. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.

Deaton, T.M. 1969. "Atlanta in the Progressive Era." Doctoral dissertation. University of Georgia.

Dellquest, A. 1938. *These Names of Ours*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.

deLone, R. 1979. *Small Futures: Children, Inequality and the Limits of Liberal Reform*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich.

Dewey, H. E. 1937. "The Development of Public School Administration in Chicago." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Dewey, J. 1913. "An Undemocratic Proposal," in *Vocational Education* 2.

Dodge, C.C. 1941. *Reminiscences of a School Master*. Chicago: Ralph Fletcher Seymour.

Dolson, L. S., Jr. 1964. "The Administration of the San Francisco Public Schools, 1847-1947." Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

Donatelli, R.V. 1971. "The Contributions of Ella Flagg Young to the Educational Enterprise." Doctoral dissertation, Department of Education, University of Chicago.

Dorsett, L.W. 1968. *The Pendergast Machine*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Drake, C. S. 1940. *Churches and Voluntary Associations in the Chicago Negro Community*. Chicago: W.P.A. District 3.

Drake, C. S. and Cayton H. B. 1945. *Black Metropolis*. New York: Harcourt & Brace.

Ecke, Melvin W. 1972. *From Ivy Street to Kennedy Center: Centennial History of the Atlanta Public School System*. Atlanta: Board of Education.

Education Week. Washington, D.C.: Editorial Projects in Education, Inc.

Elazar, D. J. *Cities of the Prairie: The Metropolitan Frontier and American Politics*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Epps, E. G. 1955. "The Participation of the Negro in the Municipal Politics of the City of Atlanta, 1867-1908." Masters thesis, Atlanta University.

Erie, S. P. 1975. "The Development of Class and Ethnic Politics in San Francisco, 1870-1910: A Critique of the Pluralist Interpretation." Doctoral dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles.

Evans, M. G. 1929. "A History of Organized Labor in Georgia." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Garrett, F. 1954. Atlanta and Environs. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press.

Georgia State Legislature. Legislative Report.

Goggin to Haley. Letter, 9 February 1912. Chicago Teachers Federation Files, Box 41, Folder 3. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society.

Gompers, S. 21-23 May 1914. Testimony before the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, New York City.

Gordon, A. 1937. The Georgia Negro. Ann Arbor: Edwards Press.

Gosnell, H. 1935. Negro Politicians. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gottfried, A. 1962. Boss Cermak of Chicago. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Grady, H.W. 1890. The New South, New York: R. Bonner's Sons.

Grantham, D. W. 1958. Hoke Smith and the Politics of the New South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Greenstone, J. D.and Peterson, P. E. 1973. Race and Authority in Urban Politics. New York: Russell Sage.

Greer, C. 1976. The Great School Legend. New York: Penguin Books.

Harrison to Young. Letter, 1 July 1912. Carter H. Harrison Papers. Chicago: Newberry Library.

Hawley, M. M. 1971. "Schools for Social Order: Public Education as an Aspect of San Francisco's Urbanization and Industrialization Process." Masters thesis, San Francisco State College.

Hawley, W.D. 1973. Nonpartisan Elections and the Case for Party Politics. New York: John Wiley.

Hayes, E.C. 1972. Power Structure and Urban Policy: Who Rules Oakland? New York: McGraw Hill.

Hays, S. P. 1974. "The Changing Political Structure of the City in Industrial America." In Journal of Urban History 1.

Hays, S.P. 1964. "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era." In Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55, pp. 157-169.

Hazlett, J. S. 1968. "Crisis in School Government." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Heidenheimer, A. J. 1972. "The Politics of Public Education, Health, and Welfare in the U.S. and Western Europe: How Growth and Reform Potentials have Differed." American Political Science Association Meetings, Washington, D.C.

Herrick, M.J. 1971. The Chicago Schools: A Social and Political History. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc.

Heyns, B. January 1978. "Schooling in Capitalist America, a Review Essay." In American Journal of Sociology 83: 999-1006.

Hofstadter, R. 1955. The Age of Reform. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hogan, David. 1978 (a). "Capitalism and Schooling: The Political Economy of Public Education in Chicago, 1880 - 1930." Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana.

Hogan, D. Fall 1978. "Education and the Making of the Chicago Working Class, 1880-1930." In History of Education Quarterly 18: 227-270.

Holli, M.G. 1969. Reform in Detroit. New York: Oxford University Press.

Homel, M. W. 1972. "Negroes in the Chicago Public Schools, 1910-1941." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Huntington, S. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Illinois Guardian. April 1915.

Illinois House Journal. 21 February 1917, 16 May 1917.

Illinois State Federation of Labor. 1914. Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Convention.

Illinois State Federation of Labor. 1916. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Convention.

Illinois State Federation of Labor. 1917. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Convention.

Illinois State Federation of Labor. Weekly News Letter.

Issel, W. Summer 1977. "Class and Ethnic Conflict in San Francisco Political History: The Reform Charter of 1898." In Labor History 18: 341-359.

James, L. H. 1937. "The Politics of Organized Labor in Relation to Negro Workers in Atlanta, 1869-1937." Masters thesis, Atlanta University.

Jencks, C. et al. 1972. Inequality. New York: Basic Books.

Jencks, C. et al. 1979. Who Gets Ahead? New York: Basic Books.

Jenkins, H. 1974. Forty Years on the Force. Atlanta: Emory University Institute for Research on Social Change.

Johnston, S. 1880. Historical Sketches of the Public School System of Chicago: The 25th Annual Report of the Board of Education. Chicago: Clark & Edwards.

Katz, M. B. May 1979. "An Apology for American Educational History." In Harvard Educational Review 49: 236-266.

Katz, M. B. 1971. Class, Bureaucracy and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America. New York: Praeger.

Katz, M. B. 1968. The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts. Boston: Beacon Press.

Katznelson, I. 1976. Black Men, White Cities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kelly, A. H. 1938. "History of Illinois Manufacturers Association." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Kennan, G. 1 June 1907."The Japanese in the San Francisco Schools." In Outlook.

Key, V.O. 1949. Southern Politics. New York: Random House.

Knights of Labor. Chicago.

Kolko, G. 1963. The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Labor Enquirer. Chicago.

Lakeside Directory of Chicago. 1890-1918. Chicago: R.R. Donnelley and Sons.

Landwermeyer, F. M. 1978. "Teacher Unionism Chicago Style." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Lazerson, M. 1971. Origins of the Urban School: Public Education in Massachusetts 1870-1915. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Levit, M. 1947. "The Chicago Citizens Schools Committee." Masters thesis, University of Chicago.

Levitt, E. 1936. "The Activities of Local Teacher Organizations in Chicago since 1929." Masters Thesis, University of Chicago,

Lineberry, R. and Fowler, E.P. 1967. "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities." In American Political Science Review 61: 701-716.

London, S. D. 1968. "Business and the Chicago Public School System, 1890-1966." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Lortie, F. N., Jr. 1973. "San Francisco's Black Community, 1870-1890: Dilemmas in the Struggle for Equality." Masters thesis, San Francisco State.

Martin, G. H. 1893. Evaluation of the Massachusetts Public School System. Boston: n.p.

Martin, T.H. 1902. Atlanta and Its Builders. Atlanta: Century Memorial Publishing Company.

McDonald, T. J. 1979. "Urban Development, Political Power and Municipal Expenditures in San Francisco, 1860-1910: A Quantitative Investigation of Historical Theory." Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University.

McKitrick, E. L. December 1957. "The Study of Corruption." In Political Science Quarterly 72: 502-514.

Merchants Association Review. Chicago.

Merchants Association Review. San Francisco.

Merriam, C. E. 1929. A More Intimate View of Urban Politics. New York: MacMillan Co.

Merton, R. K. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: The Free Press.

Merton, R. K. 1969. "The Latent Functions of the Machine." In Urban Government: A Reader in Administration and Politics. Edited by Banfield, E. C. New York: The Free Press.

Meyer, J. W., Tyack, D., Nagel J. and Gordon, A. 1979. "Public Education as Nation-Building in America: Enrollments and Bureaucratization in the American States, 1870-1930." American Journal of Sociology 85: 591-613.

Miner, J. B. 1957. Intelligence in the United States. New York: Springer Publishing Co.

Mowry, G. E. 1951. The California Progressives. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

National Education Association (NEA). 1916. Proceedings.

Nee, V. G. and deBary, B. 1972. Longtime Californ': A Documentary Study of an American Chinatown. New York: Pantheon Books.

New Republic. 15 July 1916.

New York Tribune.

Newman, J. W. 1978. "A History of the Atlanta Public School Teachers Association, Local 89 of the American Federation of Teachers, 1919-1956." Doctoral dissertation, Georgia State University.

Peterson, P. E. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Peterson, P. E. 1976. School Politics, Chicago Style. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Peterson, P. E. 1983. Federal Policy and American Education. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.

Peterson, P. E. and Rabe, B. G. 1981 (a). "Career Training or Education for Life: Dilemmas in the Development of Chicago Vocational Education." Paper prepared for the Vocational Education Study Group in the Educational Policy and Organization section of the National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C.

Peterson, P. E. and Rabe, B. G. 1981 (b). "Urban Vocational Education: Managing the Transition from School to Work." Paper prepared for the Vocational Education Study Group, National Institute of Education, Washington, D.C.

Pierce, B. L. 1957. A History of Chicago, 3 vols. Vol. 3: The Rise of a Modern City. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

President's Papers. Chicago: University of Chicago, Regenstein Library, Special Collections.

Rabinowitz, H. 1978. Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865-1890. New York: Oxford University Press.

Racine, P.N. 1969. "Atlanta Schools: A History of the Public School System, 1869-1955." Doctoral dissertation. Emory University.

Rakove, M. 1975. Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Rantoul, R. Jr. 1854. *Memoirs*. Boston: n.p.

Raven to Haley. Letters, 29 July 1916. Chicago Teachers Federation Files. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society.

Ravitch D. 1978. *The Revisionists Revised: A Critique of the Radical Attack on the Schools*. New York: Basic Books.

Reid, R. L. 1968. "The Professionalization of Public School Teachers, 1895-1920." Doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University.

Reller, T. L. 1935. *The Development of the City Superintendency of Schools*. Philadelphia: The Author.

Reports of the Elementary Teachers' General Council. 1921-1925. Chicago: Board of Education.

Review 60: 306-326.

Rice, J.M. March 1893. "The Public Schools of Chicago and St. Paul." In *The Forum*: XV: 200-215.

Rights of Labor. (Formerly *Knights of Labor*). Chicago.

Riordan, W. L. 1963. *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc.

Robert Buck Papers. Chicago: Chicago Historical Society.

Salisbury, R.H. 1970. "Schools and Politics in the Big City." In *The Politics of Education at the Local, State, and Federal levels*, ed. M.W. Kirst, pp. 17-32. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation.

Sanders, J. W. 1970. "The Education of Chicago Catholics." Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Education, University of Chicago.

San Francisco *Alta*.

San Francisco *Argonaut*.

San Francisco *Bulletin*.

San Francisco *Call*.

San Francisco *Examiner*.

San Francisco *Monitor*.

San Francisco *Municipal Reports*.

San Francisco *Post*.

San Francisco *Star*.

San Francisco Board of Education. *Report of the Committee on Manual Training*, 14 March 1894.

San Francisco Superintendent of Public Instruction. *Annual Reports*.

Sargent, F. W. 14 January 1933. "Taxpayer Takes Charge." In the *Saturday Evening Post*.

Saxton, A. 1971. *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

School Review 61, no. 3, 1933.

Shefter, M. 1977. "New York City's Financial Crisis: The Politics of Inflation and Retrenchment." In *Public Interest* 48: 98-127.

Shop and Senate. San Francisco.

Shradar, V. 1974. "Ethnic Politics, Religion, and the Public Schools of San Francisco, 1849-1933." Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University.

Simpson, H. D. 1929. *The Tax Situation in Illinois*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Simpson, H. D. 1930. *Tax Racket and Tax Reform in Chicago*. Measha, Wisconsin: Collegiate Press.

Simpson, S. A. 1831. *A Manual of Workingmen*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: n.p.

Smith, E. 1973. *New Dictionary of Family Names*. New York: Harper & Row.

Smith, J. K. 1979. *Ella Flagg Young: Portrait of a Leader*. Ames, Iowa: Educational Studies Press.

Sola, P.A. 1973. "Plutocrats, Pedagogues and Plebes: Business Influences on Vocational Education and Extracurricular Activities in the Chicago High Schools." Doctoral dissertation, Departments of Education and History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Southern Historical Association. 1895. *Memoirs of Georgia*. Atlanta: Southern Historical Association.

Spear, A.H. 1967. *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Stickland, C. 1980. "The Rise of Public Schooling in the Gilded Age and the Attitude of Parents: The Case of Atlanta, 1872-1897." Mimeographed. Atlanta, Ga.: Emory University.

Swett, J. 1872. *History of the Public School System in California.* Berkeley: University of California, Bancroft Library Archives.

Thompson, R. H. 1931. "Events Leading to the Order to Segregate Japanese Pupils in San Francisco Public Schools." Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University.

Thornberry, J. J. 1977. "The Development of Black Atlanta, 1865-1885." Doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland.

Thorndyke, R. L. and Gallup, G. H. 1944. "Verbal Intelligence of the American Adult." In *Journal of General Psychology* 30: 75-85.

Thurner, A. W. 1966. "The Impact of Ethnic Groups on the Democratic Party in Chicago, 1920-1928." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Townsend, A. 1927. "The Germans of Chicago." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Troen, S. K. 1975. *The Public and the Schools: Shaping the St. Louis System, 1838-1920*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Truth. San Francisco.

Turner, M. 1979. "Educational Issues in the Black Community of Atlanta, 1865-1900." Mimeographed. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Turner-Jones, M. 1982. "A Political Analysis of Black Educational History: Atlanta, 1865-1943." Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago.

Tyack, D. 1976. "Needed: the Reform of a Reform." In *Urban Politics and Public Policy: the City in Crisis*, eds. David, S. M. and Peterson, P. E. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Tyack, D. 1974. *The One Best System. A History of American Urban Education*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Tyack, D. and Hansot, E. 1982. *Managers of Virtue: Public School Leadership in America. 1820-1980*. New York: Basic Books.

U. S., Bureau of the Census, *Occupations*. 1930. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U. S., Bureau of the Census, *Population*. 1870, 1880, 1890, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U. S. Congress, Senate. 1906. Japanese in the City of San Francisco, California: from the President of the United States, transmitting the final report of Secretary Metcalf. S. Doc. 147, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess.

Urban, W. 1978. "Hoke Smith and the Politics of Vocational Education." Paper presented to the Annual Meetings of the History of Education Society, Chicago.

Urban, W. 1977. "Progressive Education in the Urban South." In The Age of Urban Reform, ed. by Ebner, M. H. and Tobin, E. M. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press.

Vare, W. S. 1933. My Forty Years in Politics. Philadelphia: Roland Swain.

Voice of Labor. Chicago.

Watts, E. J. 1974. "Black Political Progress in Atlanta, 1868-1895." In Journal of Negro History 59: 282-85.

Watts, E. J. 1969. "Characteristics of Candidates in City Politics: Atlanta, 1865-1903." Doctoral dissertation, Emory University,.

Watts, E.J. 1978. The Social Bases of City Politics. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Wendt, L. and Kogan H. 1953. Big Bill of Chicago. New York: The Bobbs Merrill Co.

White, Walter. 1948. A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White. New York: Random House.

Wiebe, R. 1967. The Search for Order. New York: Hill and Wang.

Wiebe, R.H. 1962. Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wolfinger, R.E. and Field, J.O. 1966. "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government." In American Political Science Review 60: 306-326.

Wolfinger, R. E. 1974. The Politics of Progress. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Wollenberg, Charles. 1976. All Deliberate Speed: Segregation and Exclusion in California Schools, 1855-1975. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Woodward, C.V. 1971. Origins of the New South, 1897-1913. Baton Rouge, La: Louisiana State University Press.

Woodward, C. V. 1974. The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wotton, G. H., Jr. 1977. "New City of the South, Atlanta 1843-1873." Doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland.

Wrigley, J. 1980. "The Politics of Education in Chicago: Social Conflicts and the Public Schools, 1915-1975." Manuscript.

Writers' Program of the Works Project Administration. 1942. Atlanta: A City of the Modern South. New York: Smith and Durrell.

Yorke, P. C. 1933. Educational Lectures. San Francisco, California: Textbook Publishing Company.

Young, E. F. 1900. Isolation in the Schools. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ziegler, H.N., Jennings, M.K. and Peak, W. 1974. Governing American Schools. North Scitate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press.